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Personality can be understood from at least 
two perspectives. One focuses on stable, 
between-person differences, or traits. The other 
perspective focuses on within-person differ-
ences and dynamics, i.e., fluctuations in person-
ality in response to situations and across time. 
This Research Topic reflects recent develop-
ments in personality research to integrate both 
trait and dynamic perspectives. An integrated 
view on personality recognizes both stability in 
between-person differences and within-person 
change. Contributors are drawn from research 
teams across Europe, North America and 
Australasia, and from basic and applied fields, 
including organizational, educational, and clin-
ical. The studies reported provide new evidence 
in support of an integrative approach, highlight 
currently active areas of research and propose 
new directions of research. Current streams of 
research include the study of contingent units of 
personality and within-person processes under-
lying traits, the comparisons of findings based 
on within- vs. between-person data, the conceptualisation and operationalization of perceived 
and objective change in situation variables, the malleability of personality and the potential for 
personality interventions. Integrative approaches using within-person designs provide new, 
bottom-up insights into general principles of personality that explain differences between peo-
ple while reflecting the complexities of within-person personality dynamics at the level of the 
individual.
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Editorial on the Research Topic
Dynamic Personality Science. Integrating between-Person Stability and within-Person Change
“Personality is the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that
determine his characteristic behavior and thought” (Allport, 1961, p. 28).
Trait theorists and social-cognitive theorists have begun to integrate their respective descriptions
and explanations of personality. The new framing of personality accommodates both between-
person stability and within-person variability in personality. Whilst individuals differ from each
other in predictable ways—differences that can sufficiently be described by broad trait constructs
such as neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness, openness, extraversion, and core self-
evaluations—they also vary systematically in the ways they respond to situations they encounter
and change as a person over time. An integrated framework of personality raises many interesting
questions. This Research Topic aims to move forward frontiers, both conceptually and empirically,
for several of those questions. We provide new evidence in support of an integrated approach to
personality, highlight currently active areas of research, and propose new directions of research into
why individuals think, feel, and behave the way they do.
Research on the integrated approach to personality is now being conducted by research teams
in Europe, the USA, and Australasia, much of which is captured by the papers in this Research
Topic. Currently, there are several well-developed theoretical frameworks of integrated personality
(e.g., Mischel and Shoda, 1995; Cervone, 2004; Fleeson and Jayawickreme, 2015) but empirical
research is still in relatively nascent stages. There is a long way to go before the accumulated
body of findings provide the level of robust support evident in trait research, particularly for
the Big 5. Hopefully, the papers in this Research Topic, along with other similar offerings (e.g.,
special issues in European Journal of Personality, 2015; Journal of Research in Personality, 2015,
Journal of Research in Personality, in press; Personality and Individual Differences, under review;
Journal of Organizational Behavior, under review), will enable researchers to take stock and focus
their research on the more important unanswered questions and speed up the accumulation of
knowledge across different research agendas.
Initial steps toward the integration of traits and the systematic motivational dynamics of
behavior tended to focus on the explanatory mechanisms for the impacts of traits on behavior
using multi-trial experiments and field studies to capture the translation of traits into motivational
states and responses. This research has a relative long tradition (e.g., Wood and Bandura, 1989)
and is captured by two of the papers in this Research Topic (Cuadrado et al.; Hofmans et al.).
More recently, the numbers of trials or measurement moments for within-person states have been
extended through the use of digital technologies, which has enabled individual level modeling of
4
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the within-person dynamics. Several papers in this issue provide
applications of individual level modeling in different areas
of application, including the relational self (Andersen et al.),
aesthetic appreciation (Fayn et al.), psychopathology (Wright
et al.), situation change networks (Rauthmann and Sherman) and
implicit theories (Cripps et al.).
As reflected in the opening quote, the papers in this
Research Topic build on a tradition of studying personality
from a within-person perspective that dates back at least to
Allport (1937), who described a person-centered approach that
focused on the organization of personality attributes within the
individual and the development of the personality system over
time (Allport, 1961). Allport’s work was preceded by that of
German psychologist Stern (1911), whose framework included
psychography, which he described as the study of attributes within
an individual (Asendorpf, 2015). Block (1971; Block and Block,
1980) drew a distinction between person-centered approaches
that focus on the organization of traits or prototypes and variable-
centered approaches that focus on the covariation of traits in
the population. He identified personality prototypes derived
from his theory of ego resiliency and ego control that described
different configurations of Big 5 traits. The three personality
prototypes identified by Block (1971), resilient, undercontrolled,
and overcontrolled (also known as ARC types1), have been widely
researched and are generally considered as having the strongest
theoretical foundation and empirical rigor of existing typologies
for the classification of individuals as personality types (Chapman
and Goldberg, 2011).
The focus in this Research Topic is data collected across
occasions at the within-person or intra-individual level
(idiographic) to come to conclusions about groups of people
or the population (nomothetic). The ARC types discussed by
Asendorpf (2015) and others (e.g., Chapman and Goldberg,
2011) are not based on repeated observations of individuals.
They base their conclusions on the same data as between-person
trait analysis (in Stern’s framework “correlation research”) but
the data is analyzed differently using Q-sort or inverted factor
analysis (in Stern’s framework “comparative research”).
The new approaches to measurement of personality states
have also led to the introduction of new statistical methods. The
earlier approaches to the integration of stable between-person
traits and dynamic within-person states relied on group-level
methods such as repeated measures ANOVAs and SEM (e.g.,
Wood and Bandura, 1989; Cuadrado et al.), which are limited in
their applicability to inferences about individuals. More recently,
integrative approaches have employed growth curve modeling
and Bayesian techniques (e.g., Cripps et al.; Hofmans et al.) to
model repeated personality responses at the individual level.
These developments within personality psychology have run
in parallel with newmethodologies for studying the development
of types, such as the ARC types (resilient, undercontrolled, and
overcontrolled), in developmental psychology (Asendorpf, 2015),
and personality assessment procedures in clinical psychology
1ARC refers to Asendorpf-Robins-Caspi, who were the lead authors of three
articles that reported the initial extensions of Block’s types (Caspi and Silva, 1995;
Robins et al., 1996; Asendorpf et al., 2001).
(Shedler and Westen, 2007). Asendorpf (2015) provides a critical
review and recommendations for the methods and measures
used in studies of ARC types that include assessments of
the elevation, shape, and scatter of intra-individual personal
profiles or configurations of traits. These include the Q-
factor analyses pioneered by Block (1971), cluster analysis
and more advanced methods such as latent cluster analysis
(LCA). In clinical psychology, the Shefler-Westen Assessment
Procedure (SWAP) provides clinicians with a diagnostic tool
that integrates the scientific rigor of empirical approaches with
the complexity and relevance required in clinical assessments.
The SWAP includes a dictionary of 200 statements that provide
detailed descriptions of diagnostic behaviors, including motives,
functions, and contextual details, which enables clinicians to
develop a profile of the patient using the Q-sort method. The
SWAP has been shown to have good reliability, validity, and
clinical utility (Shedler andWesten, 2007; Blagov et al., 2012) and
is a measurement method that could be used in other applied
areas, such as organizational psychology. However, as noted
above, these data collection methods and analyses do not capture
the intra-individual dynamics provided by data collected across
occasions.
The areas of research identified by the papers in this Research
Topic and requiring further attention include: The requirements
for integration of between- and within-person factors; the
conceptualization and operationalization of within-person
units of personality; the study of within-person processes as
antecedents and/or consequences of between-person individual
differences; the comparison of within- vs. between-person
personality structures and processes; the conceptualization,
categorization, and measurement of situations; personality
interventions based on the integrated approach; and data
collection methods.
APPROACHES TO BETWEEN- AND
WITHIN-PERSON INTEGRATION
A central objective of this Research Topic is to integrate
and, where possible, to synthesize different conceptual and
methodological approaches to the study of personality and their
empirical outcomes. Work on the integrative perspective has
been developing on several fronts, including: (1) A general
acknowledgement that there is both stability and variability in
personality and that it is worth studying both short- (state)
and long-term (trait) personality change (e.g., Liu and Huang);
(2) Comparison and the linking of findings from within- and
between-person analyses (e.g., Wright et al.; Fayn et al.); (3) The
conceptualisation of units of personality that are based onwithin-
person data and represent individual differences in within-person
structures and processes (e.g., Minbashian et al., 2010, in press);
(4) Going beyond the descriptions of groups and individuals
solely in nomothetic and idiographic terms, respectively (e.g.,
Lakey; Wright et al.; Cripps et al.).
Within-person refers to the analysis of structure and processes
based on the repeated measurement of the same individual(s)
over time and situations. The resulting data can be used to
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org September 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1486 | 5
Beckmann and Wood Editorial: Dynamic Personality Science
describe processes and structures that apply to a group of
individuals (nomothetic, e.g., Minbashian et al., 2010) as well
as single individuals (idiographic, e.g., Cripps et al.). Lakey
demonstrates the integrated approach by using a variance
partitioning approach to distinguish between Person effects (P),
Situation effects (S), and P × S effects (i.e., individual profiles of
responses across situations). Both S and P × S effects represent
within-person variance (see also Wright et al. for nomothetic
and idiographic within-person structures). Similarly, the process
of transference outlined by Andersen et al. is thought to be
common to all individuals (nomothetic within), whilst the
underlying interpersonal knowledge structures are unique to
single individuals (idiographic within). Cripps et al. demonstrate
how individual growth curves (idiographic within) belong to
groups based on implicit theories of ability (nomothetic).
More research on the nomothetic within-person effects that
explain behavior is one path for gaining insights into general
principles of personality that apply to individuals. This proposal
is far from being new (e.g., see already Lamiell, 1981, 2013,
2014). However, there is now an increasing awareness of the
necessity to study individuals repeatedly over time in order
to adequately describe, explain, and predict the psychological
processes underlying behavior (e.g., Roe, 2008, 2014; Grice, 2015;
Grice et al., in press). This, together with the availability of
new technology (e.g., apps and mobile devices) and statistical
advances that enable researchers to collect and model extensive
repeated measurement data more efficiently and effectively will
allow researchers to make greater progress.
WITHIN-PERSON UNITS OF PERSONALITY
Investigation of the systematic components of within-person
processes has included studies of stable between-person
differences in within-person effects. Cripps et al. for example,
identify different functional forms of the repeated responses for
individuals with entity and incremental implicit theories (Dweck,
1999) and model their differential responses to performance
setbacks. Contingent units of personality are another example.
These studies are promising in that they provide evidence in
support of the conceptualisation and operationalization of
personality in terms of contingent, “if this ... then that ..., units”
or behavioral signatures of the CAPS model (see Mischel and
Shoda, 1995). Contingent units of personality are trait-like
in that they are relatively stable between-person constructs,
however, and in contrast to other traits such as the Big Five, they
represent within-person structures and processes. Specifically,
contingent units of personality describe (a) within-person
variation in personality states as a function of within-person
variation in situation perceptions, and (b) between-person
differences in the strength and direction of within-person
situation-state relationships. For instance, task-contingent
conscientiousness refers to individual differences in the level
with which one responds to increases in task demands with
increases in state conscientiousness (Minbashian et al., 2010).
In contrast to the conscientiousness trait, the focus is on a
person’s responsiveness to situational demands rather than
their overall level of conscientiousness. Others have identified
similar situation-response contingencies for other traits (e.g.,
Fleeson, 2007; Berenson et al., 2011; Huang and Ryan, 2011;
Judge et al., 2014; Sherman et al., 2015). However, they still
await wider replication. Little is known about their positioning
within a nomological network and their predictive validity. To
our knowledge only one study has shown that a contingent
personality unit is correlated with a performance outcome
variable (Minbashian et al., 2010).
Hofmans et al. provide novel findings into the functional
forms of the contingent relationships modeled in the “if this ...
then that” units, which highlight the need for further research.
Previous research has modeled the relationships in contingent
units of personality as linear in form. Hofman and colleagues
show that the relationship between work pressures and core self-
evaluation (CSE) states is curvilinear. Hofman and colleagues’
argument for an inverted U shaped functional form was based
on an established body of evidence, that of how the impact
of work pressure on performance follows an inverted U form
(Yerkes and Dodson, 1908; Gardner and Cummings, 1988).
Future research utilizing contingent units of personality will need
to consider theoretical arguments and empirical evidence for
different functional forms based on existing research evidence for
the impacts of situational variables.
WITHIN-PERSON PROCESSES
Within-person mechanisms underlying between-person
differences, i.e., traits, have been studied extensively; and models
of the within-person relationship between personality variables
and relevant outcome variables, such as performance, have been
devised for several traits. Many studies prioritize between-person
differences by starting with well-established trait variables (e.g.,
Big Five) to then investigate underlying within-person processes
that might explain why a specific trait is predictive of certain
behavior. For example, Fayn et al. show that the personality
domain Openness/Intellect reflects individual differences in
aesthetic appreciation due to underlying appraisal-emotion
contingencies that unfold at the level of the individual.
Studies have also uncovered the within-person mechanisms
that link stable individual differences with behavior for traits
outside the Big Five, including, in this Research Topic,
dispositional prosocialness (Cuadrado et al.) and core self-
evaluations (CSE, Hofmans et al.). Cuadrado et al. show how
dipositional prosocialness and other dispositions are manifest
as prosocial motivational states that predict levels of prosocial
behavior. Consistent with theories of prosocial behavior and
the conceptualizations of traits as individual differences in the
sensitivity to situations (Marshall and Brown, 2006), Hofmans
et al. and Cuadrado et al. provide some support for the
moderation of relationships between traits and related reactions
and responses. Hofmans and colleagues demonstrate that the
sensitivity of individual CSE states to work pressure is moderated
by levels of trait CSE. For those with low trait CSE “the depleting
effect of work pressure via state CSE happens at low levels of work
pressure, while for people high in trait CSE the depleting effect is
located at high levels of work pressure” (Hofmans et al.).
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Other authors prioritize within-person processes and start
with process-level variables as antecedents of between-person
individual differences. The work by Andersen et al. on the
relational self provides a good example of such an approach
in their application of the CAPS model of Mischel and
Shoda (1995) to the interpersonal domain. The authors outline
how idiosyncratic within-person knowledge structures and
processes might explain the emergence of stable, between-person
differences as described by specific traits such as rejection
sensitivity, and potentially—though this is an open empirical
question—more global interpersonal traits such as agreeableness
and extraversion. Whilst it seems sensible to use the Big
Five as an organizing framework from where to start (top-
down), this might also be limiting. Starting with process-level
investigations (bottom-up) might lead to the emergence of
traits that are not covered by the Big Five. Thus, we suggest
the top-down approach be complemented by a bottom-up
approach.
COMPARISONS OF WITHIN-PERSON AND
BETWEEN-PERSON PERSONALITY
STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES
Between-person findings are often used as proxies for within-
person phenomena even though it has been repeatedly
demonstrated that this is inappropriate (see Lamiell, 1981,
2014; Nezlek, 2001; Borsboom et al., 2003; Molenaar, 2004;
Schmitz, 2006; Grice, 2015). Within-person structures and
processes may not be the same as those identified for related
traits (e.g., Borkenau and Ostendorf, 1998; Grice et al., 2006;
Beckmann et al., 2010). Wright et al. investigate the structure
of psychopathology in individuals with personality disorder.
Whilst at the between-person level they found a two-dimensional
structure comprising the widely accepted broad dimensions
of mental disorder (internalizing, externalizing), findings
at the within-person level suggested a more differentiated
four-dimensional structure of psychopathology (negative
affect, detachment, hostility, impulsivity). Building on recent
developments in structural equationmodeling (e.g., unified SEM)
they also demonstrate how modeling of the dynamic patterns of
daily responding for individuals provides information about the
person’s psychological functioning of relevance to clinicians (see
also Rauthmann and Sherman, for individual-specific situation
change networks).
Another frontier is the type of statistical methods used
to model within-person processes. Two of the papers in
this issue use Bayesian techniques to model within-person
processes (Cripps et al.; Hofmans et al.). Bayesian techniques
are not widely used or understood in psychology and are
not yet available in easy to use packages but offer additional
flexibility in the modeling of complex and dynamic response
patterns at the level of the individual. For example, they
can provide an estimate of the probability with which each
individual in a sample conforms to the proposed hypothesis
or model. Also, because they do not assume asymptotic
normality of the sample estimates, inferences about patterns
of individual responding can be made based on relatively
few observations. As Bayesian and other statistical techniques
become more widely available, there is no excuse for not
collecting intensive repeated measurement data and modeling
within-person processes longitudinally and at the level at which
they occur—the individual.
SITUATIONS
Situations are central to an integrated view on personality
because of the impacts they have on within-person variations in
cognitive, affective and behavioral responses. This has become a
very active area of research (e.g., Wood et al., 2011; Rauthmann
et al., 2015). The recently introduced taxonomies provide
personality researchers with tools to conceptualize, categorize,
and measure situations, and a language to communicate about
situations, both with regard to objective features (PERLS,
Noftle and Gust, 2015) and subjective perceptions of situations
(DIAMONDS, Rauthmann et al., 2014; Rauthmann and
Sherman, 2016; CAPTION, Parrigon et al., 2017). An alternative
approach to the study of situations is to focus on specific domains
(e.g., tasks or interpersonal domains), and study them at a more
fine-grained (e.g., facet) level. In the task domain, for example,
this may include perceived task support, task difficulty, task
urgency, task importance, and task controllability (Minbashian
et al., 2010; see Judge and Zapata, 2015, for work-related
context variables, and Wood (2005, Table 1) for categories of
organizational events and work arrangements that stimulate and
facilitate self-regulatory processes).
Regardless of the degree of specificity, study of the dynamic
components of personality requires an understanding of how
and why situations and perceptions of situations change and
how these changes relate to short- and long-term changes in
personality. Rauthmann and Sherman outline a comprehensive
research programme to study situation change, including person-
situation transactions, and provide preliminary data illustrating
their approach at both the between- and within-person level of
analysis.
Clearly, the choice of situational variables will need to be based
on the theoretical arguments that link situations to responses
of interest. For example, perceived collaboration in a team
setting could be expected to reduce the risks associated with
extraverted responses such as gregariousness and contributions
to conversations. Therefore, on average, this would produce a
positive relationship between perceived collaboration and state
extraversion. However, assessments of risk may differ between
individuals and lead to different scores for the collaboration-
extraversion relationship. Established group level predictors
for response states of interest—such as perceived justice as a
predictor of compliance with requests—will provide a useful
source of ideas for the situational variables to study.
We now consider two areas of research that we think
deserve more attention. These are the malleability of personality
(including the question of how to bring about personality
change), and the measurement of dynamic components of
personality.
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PERSONALITY MALLEABILITY AND
PERSONALITY INTERVENTIONS
Topics might include the trainability of personality, personality
change in response to life events (e.g., work, schooling),
and personality interventions for clinical and non-clinical
samples (e.g., in educational, organizational settings). Whilst
there is now considerable evidence of short-term within-
person variability in personality states (e.g., Fleeson, 2001;
Fleeson and Gallagher, 2009; Judge et al., 2014; Fleeson and
Jayawickreme, 2015; Fleeson and Law, 2015), a growing literature
provides evidence about long-term within-person change in
personality traits in response to changes in life circumstances
(e.g., Lüdtke et al., 2011; Bleidorn et al., 2016; Niehoff et al.,
2017; for short-term trait change see Shields et al., 2016).
For example, Liu and Huang studied personality change in
the context of cross-cultural adjustment. They show that
both the initial level of contextualized extraversion as well
as the rate of observed change in extraversion in response
to new cultural experiences predicted adjustment outcomes.
Evidently, personality change was an important precursor
of transition success. Individual differences in personality
malleability, i.e., flexibility in personality responding, might
indicate an underlying ability that enables some individuals to
better adapt and adjust to various changes in life circumstances
than others. To date, there are few studies of how insights about
malleability can be used for training and other interventions
targeting personality change. Hudson and Fraley (2015), for
example, show that people can actively change their personality
traits, if they are motivated to do so, and such change can be
facilitated by carefully designed interventions. Hermsen et al.
(2016) give an example of how providing feedback through
digital technology can be used to disrupt and change habits,
which may also be employed in reshaping the contingent units
of personality that predict targeted behaviors.
MEASUREMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Mill et al. provide a timely reminder of potential biases in the
measurement of emotions, one of the core responses in units
of personality. They show how ratings of emotions that require
retrospective recall ranging from 1 day to 2 weeks are more
negative for older people and for those who are more tired at
the time of the data collection, when compared to those who are
younger and less tired. They also found that recollections of fear,
sadness, anger, and happiness emotions were related to selected
Big Five personality traits. The Mill et al. findings highlight the
need for measurement of both trait and state emotions to take
account of a range of potential biases in responses. Experience
samplingmeasures of emotions that ask for a daily recall may also
differ in systematic ways from those that collect more immediate
responses multiple times each day.
More generally, work is needed to establish the psychometric
quality of experience sampling personality state measures.
Researchers interested in the measurement of personality traits
will find a number of validated instruments. These are much
harder to find for the measurement of personality states using
experience sampling designs in the field (see Finnigan and Vazire,
2017, for a recent validation study). An additional complication
is that the number of items that can reasonably be presented to
participants on a daily basis has to be relatively small, providing
less room for exploration and testing of new questions. It also
means that often only a subset of items is taken from established
measures.
Second, and following from the first point, research should
test the validity of more efficient measurement procedures for
the collection of data used to assess dynamic components of
personality. The experience sampling method that is commonly
used to collect within-person data is a labor intensive procedure
that might extend over several weeks. Participants sometimes
find the daily requests for responses intrusive and they might
not respond if they are engaged in an activity. Thus, it is worth
testing alternative approaches and their validity. For example,
the semantic sequential priming task might be a more efficient
method to assess contingent units of personality (Moeller et al.,
2010; Berenson et al., 2011).
These are exciting times for personality researchers. The
integration of trait and social-cognitive theories promises to
bring about a more differentiated understanding of personality,
it also highlights where “blind spots” have been and data is
still scarce or missing. There is also the added advantage of
considering personality as a phenomenon that is, at least in
principle, malleable. As more data become available on how to
facilitate personality change, psychologists will be better able to
support individuals to become the person they aspire to be. It is
here where personality research might be most relevant and have
lasting impact outside the ivory towers of academia.
In conclusion, the papers in the current issue highlight
both progress toward and areas requiring further research for
an integrated approach to personality. Hopefully, researchers
across the different sub-disciplines of psychology, including
health, educational, and organizational psychology will find
ideas in the theories and approaches outlined in the papers
in this Research Topic and beyond to inform their own
research.
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This article reviews a variance partitioning approach to within-person variation based on
Generalizability Theory and the Social Relations Model. The approach conceptualizes
an important part of within-person variation as Person × Situation (P×S) interactions:
differences among persons in their profiles of responses across the same situations. The
approach provided the first quantitative method for capturing within-person variation
and demonstrated very large P×S effects for a wide range of constructs. These
include anxiety, five-factor personality traits, perceived social support, leadership, and
task performance. Although P×S effects are commonly very large, conceptual, and
analytic obstacles have thwarted consistent progress. For example, how does one
develop a psychological, versus purely statistical, understanding of P×S effects? How
does one forecast future behavior when the criterion is a P×S effect? How can
understanding P×S effects contribute to psychological theory? This review describes
potential solutions to these and other problems developed in the course of conducting
research on the P×S aspect of social support. Additional problems that need resolution
are identified.
Keywords: Person × Situation, P×S, SRM, RRT, G theory, within-person variation
We often describe people’s personality characteristics. For example, I might describe David as
more conscientious than Sarah. What do I mean by that? In one sense, the word conscientious
organizes a group of characteristics such as diligence and frugality. So, by saying that David is
more conscientious than Sarah I mean that he is more diligent and frugal. In another sense, I mean
that David is more conscientious than Sarah across situations and time. Pick a group of randomly
selected situations, and on average, David will be the more conscientious. This is how most people
think about personality most of the time. Yet, there is another way to think about personality.
One can think of David and Sarah’s unique profile of conscientiousness across situations (within-
person variation). For example, David might be more conscientious than Sarah when monitoring
household savings, but Sarah might be more conscientious in managing property owned by the
family. This article is about such within-person variation.
This article describes a variance partitioning approach to within-person variation based
on Generalizabilty (G) Theory (Cronbach et al., 1972) and the Social Relations Model
(SRM; Kenny et al., 2006; Kenny, unpublished computer program). G Theory and the
SRM are closely related and can be treated as variations of the same approach for the
purposes of this article. The approach defines within-person variation as differences among
persons in their profiles of reactions to the same situations, beyond (1) the person’s trait-
like tendency to respond in the same way on average, to all situations, and (2) the
situation’s tendency to evoke the same response, on average, across people. The approach
has revealed very large P×S effects for a wide range of constructs, including anxiety
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(Endler and Hunt, 1966, 1969), five-factor traits (Van Heck et al.,
1994; Hendriks, 1996), leadership (Livi et al., 2008; Kenny and
Livi, 2009), social support (Lakey and Orehek, 2011) and task
performance (Woods et al., in press).
Yet, the approach has not reached its full potential because of
conceptual and analytic challenges, as investigators seem to have
trouble moving beyond estimating the strength of P×S effects.
One commonly sees a few studies showing strong P×S effects
and no further progress. This stunted progress leaves many
important questions unposed and unanswered. For example,
what is the psychological meaning of P×S effects and how is this
different from the effects of personality traits and situations? How
does one conduct research to reveal this psychological meaning?
Can P×S effects forecast important outcomes (e.g., leadership
or job performance)? What research designs are appropriate for
such forecasting? How can understanding P×S effects inform
psychological theory? This article describes proposed solutions to
many of these questions by drawing from recent P×S research
on social support and identifies additional problems to be
solved. This article will focus on conceptual issues rather than
on statistical procedures. There are many excellent sources for
estimating P×S effects and many are cited in this article.
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
Key Definitions
The variance partitioning approach defines P×S effects
quantitatively, typically in repeated-measures experimental
designs. Consider the design in which persons are exposed to the
same situations and their anxiety in each is assessed (Table 1).
There are three effects in this design: person, situation and
Person × Situation interactions. Defining P×S effects requires
that one first define person and situation effects.
Person effects indicate how much people differ from the grand
mean in their levels of anxiety, averaged across situations. For
example, Person 1 has higher anxiety than average, whereas
Persons 2 and 3 have lower than average anxiety (Table 1). This
effect reflects trait-like personality, as well as cross-situational
consistency (Mischel, 1968) and is the traditional focus of
personality psychology.
Situation effects indicate the extent to which situations differ
from the grand mean in the extent to which they evoke anxiety,
on average, across persons. For example, Situation 1 evokes lower
anxiety in people than average, whereas Situations 2 and 3 evoke
TABLE 1 | An example of a simple structure of a design to reveal
Person × Situation effects.
S1 S2 S3 Mean
P1 6 5 9 6.7
P2 5 7 5 5.7
P3 2 6 8 5.3
Mean 4.3 6.0 7.3 5.9
Each of three persons is indicated by P1 – P3 and each of three situations is
indicated by S1 – S3.
FIGURE 1 | P×S profiles from Table 1. Each of three persons is indicated
by P1 – P3 and each of three situations is indicated by S1 – S3.
higher anxiety than average (Table 1). Situation effects are the
typical focus of social psychology, but when estimated in repeated
measures designs, also reflect within-person variation. Situation
effects reflect normative variation in how persons’ anxiety, on
average, ebbs and flow from one situation to the next. The effect
is normative in that it captures people’s typical responses.
P×S effects reflect how people differ in their profiles of anxiety
across situations. For example, in Table 1 and Figure 1, Person
1 has a different profile of anxiety across the three situations
than does Person 2. Person 1 is highly anxious at funerals
(S3), but not when giving speeches (S1) or when on first dates
(S2). Persons 2 and 3 display a different pattern. P×S effects
are defined quantitatively, and thus with clarity and precision:
P×S = Xij − Pi − Sj + M in which xij is person i’s score
in response to situation j. The person’s mean score across all
situations (person effects) is Pi, Sj is the situation’s mean score
across all persons (situation effects) and M is the grand mean.
That is, Person 1 responds with more anxiety to funerals (xij)
than how she typically responds to situations on average (Pi), and
with more anxiety than people typically experience at funerals
(Sj). Phrased differently, funerals evoke unusually high anxiety
in Person 1. Thus, like situation effects, P×S effects reflect
within-person variation. However, P×S effects reflect within-
person variation that is idiosyncratic to specific persons whereas
situation effects reflect normative variation. Like person effects,
P×S effects also capture individual differences. However, P×S
effects reflect differences among persons in their profiles of
responses to situations whereas person effects reflect differences
among persons, on average, across situations.
The Development of the Variance
Partitioning Approach
The variance partitioning approach emerged first from Cronbach
et al.’s (1972) G theory of test reliability. G theory describes
how to conceptualize and estimate various substantive effects
and sources of measurement error. Substantive effects are
what investigators want to measure and error is everything
else. The designs for estimating P×S effects are essentially
similar to, and were derived from, designs used to estimate
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test reliability. Consider again Table 1. If one substitutes
test items for situations, we have the classic design for
estimating measurement error and the internal consistency
of a test. Thus, person effects reflect the extent to which
people differ in anxiety, on average across items. This is
typically what investigators want to measure. Person × Item
interactions are essentially Person × Situation interactions: the
extent to which people have different profiles of responses
across items. Within the context of measurement theory, P×I
interactions indicate the extent to which differences among
people depend upon the item (i.e., measurement error). Internal
consistency reliability is based on the relative strength of
person effects and Person × Item interactions, as well as
the number of items in a test. The key insight was that the
same procedures for estimating Person × Item effects (i.e.,
measurement error) could be used to estimate P×S effects.
Endler and Hunt (1966, 1969) were the first to apply this
insight when Cronbach, Endler, and Hunt were at the psychology
department at the University of Illinois (Urbana/Champaign)
in the early 1960s. These analyses were sufficiently advanced in
their day that they had to be calculated with the university’s
supercomputer.
The second major approach to studying P×S effects is the
SRM (Warner et al., 1979; Kenny and La Voie, 1984; Malloy
and Kenny, 1986; See Back and Kenny, 2010, for an accessible
introduction). The SRM defines P×S effects in the same way
as G theory, but applies to the special case in which other
people are the situations and persons rate each other in a round-
robin design. That is, instead of studying persons’ reactions
to funerals, speeches and first dates, one studies reactions to
Jenny, Richard, and Stephen. Treating people as situations is
an important conceptual advance and the SRM also reveals
effects not encountered in G theory. Social psychology typically
examines classes of situations at a high level of abstraction that
averages out the specifics. The hope is that what is learned about
situations transcends the particulars, including the specific people
who populate the situations (Kenny, 2006). Yet, funerals are very
different depending upon whom the funeral is for and who is
present. A funeral for the parent of a co-worker is one thing; a
funeral for your parent is something else entirely. A funeral for
your parent when you like your family is different from a funeral
when you dislike your family. In other words, the SRM assumes
that important determinants of the effects of situations are the
specific people who populate the situation.
EVIDENCE FOR STRONG P×S EFFECTS
There are very strong P×S effects for many constructs, including
family negativity (Rasbash et al., 2011), attachment (Cook,
2000), person perception (Park et al., 1997; Branje et al., 2003),
aggression (Coie et al., 1999), psychotherapy (Marcus and Kashy,
1995; Lakey et al., 2008), romantic attraction (Eastwick and
Hunt, 2014), and many more. The next section provides a more
detailed review of P×S effects on anxiety, five-factor personality
traits, perceived social support, leadership, and performance. The
strength and replicability of P×S effects are impressive.
Anxiety
Endler and Hunt (1966, 1969) applied the variance partitioning
approach to P×S interactions in their seminal studies of anxiety.
Endler and Hunt developed a questionnaire that assessed anxiety
in specific situations. For example, “You are just starting off on
a long automobile trip,” “You are getting up to give a speech
before a large group,” and “You receive a summons from the
police.” The data were analyzed as a Person × Situation design,
as described previously (Table 1). Across 22 separate samples,
P×S effects accounted for 17% of the variance in anxiety. Person
effects accounted for 8% and situations accounted for 7%. That is,
there were large effects whereby people had different profiles of
anxiety across situations. For example, Richard might have more
anxiety in response to receiving a summons than in making a
speech; whereas Stephen might have more anxiety in making a
speech than in receiving a summons. There were also substantial
person effects whereby some people reported more anxiety, on
average, across situations than did others. For example, Richard
might be more anxious on average than are others. In addition,
there were substantial situation effects whereby some situations
(e.g., receive a summons) evokedmore anxiety in people than did
other situations, on average (e.g., beginning a car trip).
Ingraham and Wright (1987) also found very large P×S
effects in anxiety using the SRM. They used a round-robin
design in which each person in the sample rated every other
person (i.e., situations) on how much anxiety the other evoked.
Study 1 was composed of graduate students participating in a
group therapy training experience and Study 2 was composed of
group therapy outpatients. There were large P×S effects in both
studies, accounting for 37% of the variance. For example, Richard
experienced less anxiety with Stephen than (1) Richard typically
experienced across people, and (2) Stephen typically evoked in
people. That is, anxiety largely reflected the unique relationship
between two people. For comparison, person effects accounted
for 15% of the variance and situation effects (other people)
accounted for only 3%. Very strong P×S effects on anxiety were
recently replicated in round-robin studies of Marines and college
roommates (Lakey et al., in press).
Thus, there are very large P×S effects in anxiety that are at least
as large as trait anxiety. These findings replicate well, are found
for nominal situations (e.g., funerals) as well when situations are
other people.
Five-Factor Traits
The five-factor model of personality has been widely influential as
a standard framework for organizing personality characteristics,
and the five traits are typically viewed as broadly generalizable
across situations (Goldberg, 1990). Yet, people also have large
idiosyncratic patterns in their levels of traits across situations.
Van Heck et al. (1994) assessed neuroticism, extroversion,
conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness in a wide range of
situations through self-report. Among Dutch and Italian college
students, P×S, person, and situation effects were approximately
equally strong, with each accounting for about 12% of the
variance. Hendriks (1996) replicated these findings among
Dutch college students and included peer reports as well.
There were large P×S effects accounting for about 20% of
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the variance for each of the five traits. Hendriks (1996) also
found person (≈20%) and situation effects (≈12%). Thus,
although people differ in their typical levels of the five factor
traits (person effects), people also have idiosyncratic profiles
in their responses to situations. For example, Person 1 might
have high levels of agreeableness during a quarrel and low
levels when playing a game. Person 2 might show the opposite
pattern. In summary, five factors traits show strong P×S
effects.
Perceived Support
Perceived support is the subjective judgment that friends
and family would help during times of need and is a well-
replicated marker of emotional well-being (Cohen and Wills,
1985; Barrera, 1986). Studying P×S effects for perceived support
is essentially similar to studying anxiety or personality except
that (1) the situations are people who provide support and
(2) persons rate the supportiveness of providers rather than
their own anxiety or personality. In a meta-analysis, P×S effects
accounted for 62% of the variance in supportiveness (Lakey,
2010). Thus, the extent to which a person sees a provider
as supportive is mostly idiosyncratic to the person. Phrased
differently, the supportiveness of a provider reflects the unique
relationship between the person and the provider. In addition
to P×S effects, perceived support also reflects persons’ trait-
like tendencies to see other people as supportive (27%) and a
relatively small portion (7%) reflects agreement among persons
that some providers are more supportive than others (situation
effects). These findings have been observed when Ph.D. students
rated faculty members (Lakey et al., 1996), elite youth athletes
rated coaches (Rees et al., 2012), and medical residents rated
clinical mentors (Giblin and Lakey, 2010). They have also
been found when sorority sisters (Lakey et al., 1996), marines,
college roommates (Lakey et al., in press), and nuclear family
members rated each other (Branje et al., 2002; Lanz et al.,
2004).
Leadership
Leadership is a key concept in organizational behavior and
theories vary widely in how leadership is conceptualized and
studied. Yet, much research, theory and practice seems to reflect
an implicit assumption that leadership is a trait-like characteristic
of leaders (situations) that generalize across a range of followers
(persons; Avolio et al., 2009). Variance partitioning studies of
leadership provide a more nuanced approach. Most variance
partitioning studies have used round-robin designs in which
four- to five-person groups rate each other on leadership after
completing a group task (Livi et al., 2008; Kenny and Livi, 2009).
Tasks have included leaderless group discussions, thinking of
essential items if stranded and thinking of ways to promote
tourism. A recent meta-analysis found that 20% of leadership
reflected P×S effects, 40% reflected leaders (situations) and 10%
reflected followers (persons; Livi et al., 2008; Kenny and Livi,
2009). That is, the extent to which a given leader elicits a sense of
leadership in followers partly reflected followers’ personal tastes.
One sees this in presidential elections. Although one candidate
is ultimately preferred by a majority of voters, there is also
substantial disagreement among voters about which candidate is
the best leader.
Performance
An important question in applied psychology is how to improve
people’s performance on tasks, such as typing, standardized
tests, memory, vigilance, work performance, reading, and many
others (Kanfer and Ackerman, 1989; Kluger and DeNisi, 1996).
Research often focuses on how to train people (Kanfer and
Ackerman, 1989; Kluger and DeNisi, 1996) and structure tasks
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996) for optimal performance.
Variance partitioning offers the unique focus on the extent to
which performance is affected by the unique relationships among
members of the work group. Consider three crewmembers
operating a battle tank. The variance partitioning approach
identifies three aspects of performance. Each crewmember has
trait-like skill at the task (person effect) and each might elevate
the performance of his other crew members (situation effects,
as in leadership). In addition, the unique relationship between
any two crewmembers might also elevate performance (P×S
effects). If so, then in addition to selecting and training effective
tank leaders (situations) and crewmembers (persons), tank teams
might be selected so that the particular combination of soldiers
(P×S effects) enhances performance beyond person and situation
effects.
Recent research provides an example of identifying P×S
effects on team performance (Woods et al., in press; Study
3). Groups of four strangers played a warfare video game
that accommodated doubles play. Each person played the
game with each of three teammates (situations) in a round-
robin design and performance was assessed objectively as well
as through self-reports. There were strong P×S effects in
which a player’s performance depended upon the teammate
with whom he was paired, accounting for 74% (self-rated)
and 35% (objective) of the variance. For example, Ken
might display unusually good performance when paired
with Matt, than when paired with Bill, beyond Ken’s trait-
like skill and Matt’s ability to elevate performance in his
teammates. There were also strong person effects in that
some players had higher skill than did others, accounting
for 23% (self-rated) and 63% (objective) of the variance in
performance. There were no effects whereby some teammates
elevated the performance of all other teammates (situations, cf.
leadership).
Other investigators have documented P×S effects for memory
performance following training (Gross et al., 2009, 2015). Persons
heard presentations from different trainers (stimuli) and were
tested on retention. There were significant P×S effects on
memory following training, in that a person’s memory for
training depended, in part, on which trainer presented the
material. For example, Person 1 might have unusually good
memory for Trainer 1’s presentation than for Trainer 2 or 3.
Person 2 might show a different pattern.
Thus, there is emerging evidence for strong P×S effects on task
performance. It would be straightforward to apply the variance
partitioning approach to a wide range of human performance
problems.
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To conclude this section, very strong P×S effects have
been observed for a wide range of constructs, including
anxiety, five-factor personality, perceived support, leadership and
task performance. Given the replicability, strength and broad
generality of P×S effects, the variance partitioning approach
should be widely used in many research areas. This does not seem
to have happened. Why not?
DEVELOPING A PSYCHOLOGICAL
UNDERSTANDING OF P×S EFFECTS
Although strong P×S effects are ubiquitous, it has been hard to
make sustained progress in understanding them. Time and again,
large P×S effects are observed for a construct and no further
progress is made. After estimating the size of P×S effects, it has
not been clear how to move forward.
How can investigators develop a psychological (versus purely
statistical) understanding P×S effects? This is a special case of the
general problem of how to develop a psychological understanding
of anything. Cronbach and Meehl’s (1955) seminal work on
construct validity provides the key answer. The solution is
merely to apply the general strategy of construct validation to
the special case of P×S effects. This involves simply developing
the nomological network for the P×S aspect of a construct,
including (1) establishing the other constructs to which the
P×S aspect is related (2) identifying mechanisms for the P×S
aspect and (3) forecasting future outcomes from the P×S
aspect.
According to Cronbach and Meehl (1955), construct
validity is built by developing an understanding of a new
construct’s empirical properties (i.e., its nomologial network).
In personality research, this primarily involves understanding
the new construct’s correlations with other constructs. Over
time, well-replicated links between the new construct and other
constructs are established. Some of the links fit well with the
rudimentary theory; others do not. The rudimentary theory is
revised in light of these findings and new studies are devised
to test the revised theory. Thus, one begins an iterative series
of empirical studies and theory revision. In this way, one
develops the validity of a new construct by pulling up by one’s
bootstraps.
Here is an example of how this process has worked for
perceived social support. Perceived support measures were
developed to assess the extent to which friends and family
helped with stressors (Barrera, 1986). The word “perceived”
was used only to acknowledge that the measures relied upon
self-report. Yet, perceived support was hypothesized to reflect
the actual help that friends and family provided to promote
coping and thereby protect persons from the harmful effects
of stress. As expected, people with high perceived support had
better emotional well-being than did people with low support
(Cohen and Wills, 1985; Barrera, 1986). Yet, it was not long
before other findings cast doubt on the original theory. For
example, perceived support was not very closely related to
support actually received from family and friends (Barrera,
1986), and support received was not consistently linked to
better emotional well-being (Barrera, 1986; Finch et al., 1999;
Bolger et al., 2000). Instead, perceived support was much
more closely linked to perceptions of providers as similar to
recipients in attitudes and values (Lakey et al., 2002). In addition,
most of perceived support’s links to emotional well-being did
not involve stress buffering, but occurred regardless of the
presence of stress (Lakey and Orehek, 2011). Such findings were
inconsistent with the original theory, led to additional empirical
studies and the development new theories (e.g., Uchino, 2009;
Lakey and Orehek, 2011). Some research findings will not
fit the new theories, and this iterative process will continue.
Thus, one develops a psychological understanding of perceived
support.
How does one apply construct validity to P×S effects? This
question seems to have been the sticking point in making
progress, and the solution is both technical and conceptual.
Building construct validity requires linking constructs to other
constructs, but P×S effects are represented as profiles of
scores across situations (Figure 1). How does one establish a
nomological network for profiles of scores? Cronbach et al.
(1972) provided the answer with multivariate generalizability
analyses (see Strube, 2000, for an accessible introduction).
The key insight is that since P×S aspects are represented
as profiles, all other constructs must also be represented
as profiles. In addition, the profiles must be commensurate.
That is, if the P×S aspect of a construct is represented as
a profile across five situations, the P×S aspect of another
construct must also be represented across the same five
situations.
Thus, it is not meaningful to correlate the P×S aspect with
the trait aspect of a construct because they are represented
incommensurately. As depicted in Table 1, each person has a
profile of anxiety in the three situations. Each person also has
an anxiety score averaged across the three situations (the person
aspect). Estimating a correlation between trait anxiety and each
person’s profile requires mapping the three P×S profile scores
onto the single person score. Of course, this cannot be done
meaningfully, in part because each P×S score has already had
the person aspect of anxiety removed. Moreover, there is more
information in a three-score profile than can be contained in
a single person score. Using a questionnaire measure of trait
anxiety does not solve the problem, because we are still left with
the issue of mapping three bits of information onto a single bit.
Thus, one cannot explain the P×S aspect of anxiety in terms of
the five factor traits, unless the traits are also expressed as profiles.
It is straightforward to represent the five factors as profiles (Van
Heck et al., 1994; Hendriks, 1996), but doing so changes their
meaning. At minimum, the P×S aspects of the five factors are
no longer traits.
Historically, a major obstacle in applying Cronbach
et al.’s (1972) insight was the lack of computer programs
for conducting the analyses. Kenny (unpublished computer
program) developed a program for round-robin analyses and
Brennan (2001) developed a program for more typical G designs.
In addition, such analyses can be done with structural equations
and multilevel modeling (Biesanz, 2010; Ackerman et al.,
2015).
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FIGURE 2 | P×S profiles of supportiveness (PSS) covary with P×S
profiles of positive affect (PA). Each of three persons is indicated by
P1 – P3 and each of three situations is indicated by S1 – S3.
Developing Nomological Networks for
P×S Effects: The Case of Perceived
Support
Perceived support research provides an example of developing
the nomological network for the P×S aspects of constructs.
A core finding in perceived support research (Cohen and Wills,
1985; Barrera, 1986) is that perceived support is linked to
emotional well-being. Thus, it is important to determine that
this link occurs for the P×S aspects of support and well-being
specifically.
Investigators have studied persons in the laboratory as they
had conversations with the same support providers (situations),
on multiple occasions (Neely et al., 2006; Veenstra et al., 2011).
After each conversation, persons rated their positive and negative
affect during the conversation, as well as the supportiveness of
the provider. Independent observers also rated the conversations
in Neely et al. (2006). Both studies found that the P×S aspect
of perceived support was linked to the P×S aspects of high
positive, and low negative affect. That is, when a provider evoked
unusually high positive or low negative affect in a person, the
person saw the provider as unusually supportive. That is, each
person’s profile of affect across providers covaried with her profile
of supportiveness across the same providers (Figure 2).
Most social support research is field research and the variance
partitioning approach can easily be applied to field contexts. For
example, in one study, participants rated their perceived support
and affect typically evoked by important support providers
(Lakey et al., in press). In round robin designs, marines and
college roommates rated each other. As found in laboratory
studies, the P×S aspect of supportiveness was linked to the P×S
aspect of affect. That is, when a provider evoked unusually high
perceived support in a person, the provider also evoked unusually
favorable affect.
These examples show that establishing the nomological
network, and hence the construct validity of the P×S aspect of
a construct is essentially the same as for any other construct.
The key difference is that correlations must be estimated for the
P×S aspects of constructs specifically, and thus studies must be
designed to isolate P×S aspects.
If one wants to understand the P×S aspect of a construct,
one cannot use conventional research methods. Consider a
conventional study in which persons rate the supportiveness
of their social networks and their own emotional well-being.
A typical finding is that perceived support is linked to emotional
well-being. Unfortunately, the design cannot reveal the extent
to which the link between perceived support and emotional
well-being reflects, (1) the trait-like tendencies of persons to
see everyone as supportive and to experience well-being (person
effects), (2) persons’ good fortune to be surrounded by providers
who evoke a sense of support and well-being in nearly everyone
(situation effects), or (3) the unique relationships between
persons and providers in which the provider who elicits unusually
high support in a person also elicits unusually good emotional
well-being (P×S effects). The psychological meaning of these
correlations differs dramatically depending upon which aspect
of support the correlations reflect. The correlation between
perceived support and emotional well-being, estimated with
conventional methods, could reflect any one of the three effects,
or some unknown combination of the three.
Identifying Mechanisms for P×S Effects
Part of developing a nomologial network is identifying the
mechanisms by which constructs are linked, but in the P×S
research just described, no mechanisms were identified. We
learned that when a person saw a provider as unusually
supportive, the provider also evoked unusually favorable affect,
but the studies did not indicate how this occurred. For
example, how did Person 1 arrive at a judgment of Provider 1’s
supportiveness that was different from how Person 1 typically
sees other providers, and different from how Provider 1 is
typically seen?
Lutz and Lakey (2001) hypothesized that the P×S aspect
of perceived support emerges, in part, because persons weigh
information about providers (situations) differently when
judging support. Persons use information about providers’
personality (e.g., agreeableness and emotional stability) to
judge providers’ supportiveness (Lakey et al., 2002). Lutz and
Lakey (2001) tested the hypothesis that persons weigh these
traits differently. In two studies, persons were presented with
descriptions of over 100 providers who differed in their five-
factor personality profiles. For example, one provider was
described as “self-conscious, not self-assured, somewhat reliable,
very literary, not tender-hearted.” The investigators could derive
regression equations that described how each person used
information about providers’ personality to judge providers’
supportiveness. As predicted, there were significant differences in
how persons’ weighed personality traits to judge supportiveness.
To see how these differences can explain P×S effects, consider
the case depicted in Figure 3 in which Persons 1 and 2 rate
Providers 1 and 2. Providers 1 and 2 have different five-
factor profiles. For example, Provider 1 has high agreeableness
and conscientiousness and Provider 2 has high neuroticism
and openness. Person 1 and Person 2 weigh provider traits
differently in rating supportiveness. Person 1 weighs provider
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FIGURE 3 | P×S effects emerge when persons weigh providers’ traits differently in forming support judgments. N = neuroticism; E = extroversion;
O = openness; A = agreeableness; C = conscientiousness.
agreeableness and conscientiousness heavily and Person 2 weighs
neuroticism and openness heavily. Each person’s judgment of
each provider is determined by (1) multiplying each provider’s
personality trait score by (2) the weight typically used by each
person to judge support from the trait. For example, Provider
1’s agreeableness score of 3 is weighed by 0.5 by Person 1, but
weighed by 0 by Person 2, contributing to disagreement about
Provider 1’s supportiveness. Thus, when persons weigh provider
traits differently in judging support, persons disagree about the
supportiveness of the providers, resulting in P×S profiles. This
mechanism is essentially similar to Mischel and Shoda’s (1995)
hypotheses that links among mediating units translate encoded
information about situations to each person’s unique profiles of
responses to situations.
Forecasting Important Outcomes for the
P×S Aspects of Constructs
An important part of the validity of a construct is that
it can forecast future outcomes. For example, the construct
validity of conscientiousness is supported by the fact that job
applicants’ conscientiousness scores forecast their subsequent job
performance (Oh et al., 2011). Forecasting the P×S aspects of
constructs is a simple extension of establishing a nomological
network among P×S aspects: P×S profiles from Time 1 are used
to forecast P×S profiles at Time 2.What follows are two examples
of forecasting the P×S aspects of constructs.
There are large P×S effects for students’ (persons) evaluations
of instructors’ (situations) teaching (Gross et al., 2009, 2015).
That is, Student A might find Instructor A to be more effective
than Instructor B, but Student Bmight have the opposite opinion.
Given the large size of P×S effects, it might be useful to forecast
which students will find which instructor especially effective,
so that specific instructors could be recommended to specific
students to optimize instruction.
Gross et al. (2015) tested this concept by developing brief
videos of instructors’ teaching. The teaching trailers (cf. movie
trailers) were shown to a group of students in three large college
classes at the beginning of the semester. Students rated the
effectiveness of each instructor’s teaching in response to the
trailer. Later in the semester, students heard hour-long lectures
from each of the instructors and rated the effectiveness of each.
Forecasting the P×S aspect of teaching effectiveness involved
mapping each student’s profile of responses to the trailers at Time
1 to his profile of responses to lectures at Time 2. In fact, Gross
et al. (2015) could accurately forecast the instructors that specific
students found unusually effective.
A second example of forecasting future outcomes for P×S
profiles comes from social support research. Given the strong
P×S effects on perceived support, one approach to intervention is
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to assign specific support providers to specific persons, such that
unusually supportive relationships emerge. Such an approach
requires the technology to forecast which person will see which
provider as uniquely supportive. Veenstra et al. (2011) forecasted
the P×S aspect of supportiveness from brief conversations
between persons and providers (situations). That is, a person’s
reaction to a stranger from a brief conversation forecasted the
extent to which the person ultimately saw the former stranger
as unusually supportive weeks and months later. Veenstra et al.’s
(2011) analytic approach was the same as in Gross et al. (2015).
From the first conversation (Time 1), each person had a profile
of scores across the providers. Each person also had a profile of
scores across the providers at Time 2. Forecasting P×S effects
from Time 1 to Time 2 involved calculating the correlation
between the Time 1 profiles and the Time 2 profiles.
The variance partitioning approach to P×S forecasting just
described is essentially similar to that described by Shoda et al.
(1994), except that the variance partitioning approach is simpler.
Shoda et al. (1994) observed four types of children’s behavior
(e.g., prosocial, whining) across five types of situations (e.g., peer
approaches, adult warns), over two time periods. For each child,
Shoda et al. (1994) constructed profiles of responses for each
behavior across the five situations. In calculating the profiles,
each child’s person score and each situation’s score was removed.
Thus, the profiles were identical to P×S profiles. Shoda et al.
(1994) found that P×S profiles at Time 2 could be forecasted
from P×S profiles at Time 1. However, this approach requires (1)
calculating profiles for each person, (2) calculating correlations
between profiles at Time 1 and Time 2 for each person and
then (3) taking the average of the correlations across persons. In
contrast, the variance partitioning approach achieves these steps
in a single, ANOVA-like analysis.
To summarize, this section described how to establish the
construct validity of the P×S aspects of constructs. In principle,
TABLE 2 | P×S effects in a high-density design captured well (A) and
poorly (B) by a simpler design.
Situation class
Interpersonal Achievement
Person class Persons Situations
S1 S2 S3 S4
(A)
Dependent P1 4 4 2 2
Dependent P2 4 4 2 2
Self-critical P3 2 2 4 4
Self-critical P4 2 2 4 4
(B)
Dependent P1 2 2 4 4
Dependent P2 4 4 2 2
Self-critical P3 2 4 4 2
Self-critical P4 4 2 2 4
Each of four persons is indicated by P1 – P4 and each of three situations is indicated
by S1 – S4.
it is no different from establishing the validity of any construct.
In tandem with theory development, one establishes a network
of associations to other constructs. This process differs for
P×S aspects only in that constructs are represented as profiles
rather than as single scores. Yet, isolating the P×S aspects
likely requires some re-conceptualization of the construct. For
example, neuroticism is typically viewed as a trait that it
is stable across situations and time. Yet, P×S neuroticism
is not a trait, in that it is not stable across situations. By
extension, mechanisms that are geared to explain the trait-like
aspect of neuroticism (e.g., chronically accessible constructs or
catecholamine dysfunction) might not translate well to P×S
profiles. Thus, theories of the P×S aspect of neuroticism would
need to focus on mechanisms that can take into account how
different situations evoke different levels of neuroticism in
different people.
P×S EFFECTS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO
THEORY
The variance partitioning approach to P×S effects can make an
important contribution to theory development. The approach
can increase conceptual clarity by requiring the theory to be
explicit about whether the core constructs are P×S, person
or situation effects. If the theory can be made explicit, the
variance partitioning approach provides guidance about research
designs to test the theory with greater precision and recommends
approaches to intervention. Examples from social support
research will be used to illustrate these points.
Until recently, social support theory has been vague about
whether perceived social support reflects P×S, person or situation
effects. Most social support theory implies that perceived support
reflects situation (provider) effects such that persons agree that
some providers aremore supportive than others and consensually
supportive providers have beneficial effects on persons’ emotional
well-being (Thoits, 1986). Yet, there is a minority view that
perceived support is a property of persons (Sarason et al.,
1986; Lakey and Cassady, 1990; Uchino, 2009). That is, some
persons are predisposed to see providers as supportive and to
have good emotional well-being. Recent theory conceptualizes
perceived support as a P×S interaction (Lakey andOrehek, 2011).
Conventional research designs have been unable to discriminate
among these interpretations. Greater conceptual clarity on the
nature of perceived support is helpful.
One would design studies differently depending upon whether
one conceptualized perceived support as an aspect of the person,
the provider (situation), or a P×S interaction. As described
previously, to capture the P×S aspect of perceived support, one
must isolate each person’s profile of supportiveness (and other
constructs) across a number of providers, while removing person
and situation effects. This typically requires a repeated-measure
experimental design in which at least subsets of persons rate the
same providers. To capture the person aspect, one should average
perceived support (and other constructs) across many providers,
situations, and time. To capture provider effects, one should have
many providers rated by many persons; providers (instead of
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persons) should be treated as subjects. Ironically, although most
social support research at least implicitly conceptualizes support
as an aspect of providers, almost no research has used designs that
capture provider effects specifically.
The variance partitioning approach also provides useful
guidance about how to help people change. One would approach
intervention very differently depending upon whether one
wanted to target the P×S, person or situation aspect. Social
support interventions provide an example. Most interventions
have been designed to work through provider effects. Thus, a
set of providers are selected by project staff and made available
to persons. This assumes that selected providers will be seen as
supportive by nearly all persons and the providers will evoke
better emotional well-being in nearly everyone (Heller et al.,
1991). However, if one wanted to influence the person aspect
of perceived support, interventions should attempt to change
persons. For example, training persons in social skills and
in resisting cognitive biases might alleviate tendencies to see
everyone as unsupportive (Brand et al., 1995). Interventions to
modify the P×S aspect of supportiveness would pair persons with
providers such that unusually supportive relationships emerged
(Lakey and Orehek, 2011).
To summarize this section, variance partitioning approaches
can contribute to theory development by providing (1) greater
conceptual precision in descriptions of core constructs, (2) guides
to study design to test theories with greater precision, and (3)
guides to intervention. Perceived support served as an example
in this section, but the basic principles could be extended to a
wide range of constructs. For example, to what extent is adult
romantic attachment a feature of the person (he is insecure with
everyone), a feature of the situation (she elicits insecurity in
everyone) or an aspect of P×S effects (he is uniquely insecure
with her)? To help him develop more secure attachment, should
he seek psychotherapy to change his predispositions or get a
different romantic partner? If he gets a different romantic partner,
should he look for a partner who elicits security in everyone or
a partner who elicits high security in him uniquely? As another
example, is leadership a property of the leader (stimulus), the
unique relationships (P×S) among specific leaders and followers,
or the dispositions of followers (persons) to see everyone as
good leaders? Training people to become better leaders assumes
implicitly that leadership is a property of leaders and that people
can learn leadership qualities that are broadly generalizable
across followers and contexts. Alternatively, one might select
leaders who are well-matched with the followers in a particular
organization, or a leader might elect to lead an organization
composed of dispositional followers.
CHALLENGES FACING VARIANCE
PARTITIONING APPROACHES
There remain important challenges to understanding the P×S
aspect of within-person variation. These include reducing the
information density of P×S profiles, forecasting P×S profiles in
response to novel stimuli and studying contexts in which persons
do not encounter the same situations.
Reducing the Information Density of P×S
Profiles
In variance components research, P×S profiles are represented
so that each person is a level of a person factor and each situation
is a level of a situation factor (Table 1), as described previously.
This is an information-dense representation, as it requires large
amounts of information about situations and persons. Even in a
small study with 10 persons and 10 situations, 100 cells would be
needed to represent each person’s P×S profile. The information
density of such designs can easily exceed software capacity and
investigators’ working memories. A simpler representation would
be to classify persons and situations into categories. For example,
in the 10 × 10 design just described persons and situations could
each be classified into one of two categories, reducing the 100-cell
design to four cells (2 × 2). A simpler representation would be
preferable, as long as it could explain variance nearly as well as the
more information-dense design. Yet, as described momentarily,
there is no guarantee that P×S effects revealed in an information-
dense design will be captured in a simpler design.
Most individual differences research uses only simple
representations in the search for P×S effects. For example,
research on depression and negative life events classified persons
as high in dependency or self-criticism and classified life events
as relevant to either interpersonal or achievement concerns
(Hammen et al., 1985; Coyne and Whiffen, 1995). Dependent
people were predicted to respond to interpersonal events (e.g.,
marital conflict) and self-critical people were predicted to
respond to achievement events (e.g., failing a training program).
Although initially promising, the work has not yielded very
replicable findings (Coyne and Whiffen, 1995). One possibility
is that there are, in fact, P×S effects in how people respond to
events, but the research represented P×S profiles too simply to
capture the effect.
Table 2 uses simulated data to illustrate how P×S effects in a
high-density design might not be captured in a simpler design.
Panels A and B include exactly the same data points and differ
only in how they are arranged. Both panels include a high-
density design as well as a simpler design. When analyzed as a
high-density design, both panels yield very strong P×S effects
with no person or situation effects. How well does the simpler
design capture the P×S effect revealed in the high-density design?
In Panel A, the simpler design accounts for all of the P×S
effect. All dependent persons respond with increased depression
to interpersonal events, but not to achievement events. All
self-critical persons respond to achievement events, but not to
interpersonal events. However, in panel B, the high-density P×S
effect is not captured by the simpler design at all. Of course, if
the simpler design captures the P×S effect well (Panel A), there
would be no need to use the information-dense design. Yet, if
the simpler design does not capture the P×S effect (Panel B),
one would have to rely upon the high-density design. If one had
only the simple design, one might incorrectly conclude that there
were no P×S effects. Unfortunately, the simple design is what
psychologists studying Person × Situation interactions typically
have. If one happens to choose the right classification scheme, one
will find a P×S effect. However, it might be better to start with the
high-density design to see if a P×S effect is present. Then, one can
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figure out how to represent the effect with a simpler classification
scheme.
The variance partitioning approach is well-suited to analyze
how well a simpler design can capture P×S effects revealed
by a high-density design. Note that in Table 2, persons are
nested within the dependent or self-critical class and situations
are nested within the interpersonal or achievement class. If the
simple design can capture a P×S effect present in the high-density
design, we should see that the variance accounted for the P×S
effect in the high-density design shifts to the Dependent/Self-
critical × Interpersonal/Achievement interaction when the
nesting factors are added.
It might be the case that many P×S profiles revealed in
high-density designs cannot be adequately captured by simpler
designs. If so, one will have to learn how to study P×S
profiles in information-dense designs. Fortunately, the variance
partitioning approach provides a way of conducting research
with high-density designs. As described earlier in a different
context, one can characterize the kinds of situations that elicit
unusually strong reactions (P×S effects) in specific persons.
For example, providers (situations) who evoke unusually high
positive affect in persons are seen by persons as unusually similar
to themselves, agreeable, supportive, eliciting good ordinary
conversation as well as sharing activities (Lakey et al., 2004,
in press). If an investigator does not want to rely on persons’
subjective judgments to characterize situations, one could study
more objective indicators. For example, the provider who evoked
unusually high objective task performance in a person also
evoked unusually few automatic negative thoughts and high
self-rated performance (Woods et al., in press; Study 3).
Forecasting P×S Profiles for Novel
Situations
How can we forecast a person’s profile of responses to
situations he has never faced? The approach to forecasting
P×S profiles described by Veenstra et al. (2011) and Gross
et al. (2015) do not apply to this question because their
approach requires that persons have had brief exposures to the
situations. Here, the prediction problem is when there is no prior
exposure.
One approach would be to determine for each person
how she weighs information about situations and then apply
those weights to generate predictions about reactions to new
situations. Thus, a regression model would be developed for
each person. To forecast how a person would respond to
novel situations, one would obtain descriptions of each novel
situation on the same dimensions used to develop each person’s
regression model. For example, Lutz and Lakey (2001) developed
individual regression models to describe how people used the
five factor traits to judge provider supportiveness. To forecast
judgments of novel providers, one would need descriptions of
the providers’ five-factor traits. Applying the persons’ weights
to the providers’ features would generate predictions of how
each person would react to each provider. This approach is
commonly used in commercial recommender systems such as
Pandora. In the Pandora system, raters evaluate songs on a
number of dimensions. Users (persons) indicate the songs they
like. From user ratings, weights are presumably derived about
how persons use the dimensions to judge songs. These weights
are presumably used to predict reactions to new songs. Pandora
is a proprietary system, and thus the details of the approach,
as well as how well the approach predicts outcomes, are not
explicit.
Although this approach should work in principle, there will
be challenges in making such predictions with high precision.
For example, how well will raters’ descriptions of new situations
generalize to each person’s perceptions of the situations? We
might know that a person weighs agreeableness heavily in judging
providers. We might also know that observers have rated a
novel provider as agreeable. In this case, we would forecast
that the person would see the provider as supportive. However,
the accuracy of the prediction will be limited by how well the
observers’ ratings generalize to the person’s perception of the
provider as agreeable, especially after the person has gotten to
know the provider. If the person ultimately sees the provider
as disagreeable, the original prediction based on observers’
descriptions of the provider will be inaccurate. There is good
reason to believe that generalizing observers’ ratings to persons
will introduce important imprecision, as inter-rater agreement
about the personality traits of providers typically account for only
about 30% of the variance (Kenny et al., 1994). Nonetheless, the
variance partitioning approach provides the analytic tools for
addressing these questions.
Sometimes Situations are Nested within
Persons
Throughout this article, the assumption has been that persons are
exposed to the same situations. Yet often, important situations
are encountered by only a few people. That is, situations are
nested within persons. For example, one has a small number
of parents, and except for one’s siblings, these parents are not
shared with other people. One solution is to study only persons
who encounter the same situations. Yet such designs exclude
many people and situations. Another solution is the one-with-
many design (Kenny et al., 2006). In one such design, situations
(the many) are nested within persons (the one). For example,
Lakey and Scoboria (2005) studied persons’ reactions to their
mothers, fathers and closest friends and no one in the sample
shared the same parents and closest friends. In such a design, it
is not possible to separate P×S effects from situation effects. This
is because P×S effects cannot be defined without first defining
situation effects and situation effects require that at least sub-
sets of participants encounter the same situations. Thus, P×S
effects are confounded with situation effects. In another example,
Marcus et al. (2011) studied therapy patients (themany) who each
rated his therapist (the one). This design can isolate therapist
(situation) effects, but person and P×S effects are confounded
because no patients rated the same therapists, and no patients
rated multiple therapists.
Designs that confound P×S effects with other effects can
be a serious problem if one wants to understand P×S effects.
However, the problem might not be so serious under some
circumstances. For example, situation effects are very small
compared to P×S effects for perceived support (Lakey, 2010) as
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well as for negative affect (Ingraham and Wright, 1987; Lakey
et al., in press). Thus, for these constructs, the confounded
(situation + P×S) effect in one-with-many designs primarily
reflects P×S effects. Yet there is no guarantee that this will occur
for other constructs. A given construct might primarily reflect
situation effects (e.g., leadership), in which case one-with-many
designs would be useless for understanding P×S effects. Thus,
one must estimate the relative strength of situation and P×S
effects in fully crossed designs before confidently interpreting the
results of one-with-many designs. Still, for some constructs, the
one-with-many design can be a useful tool for understanding
P×S effects, especially since one-with-many designs are typically
much easier to execute than round-robin studies.
Is It Always Necessary to Develop
Separate Nomological Networks for P×S
Effects?
As described previously, one develops the construct validity
of the P×S component of a construct by developing its
nomologial network. One problem is that studies that isolate
P×S components are typically more difficult to execute than are
more conventional designs. Couldn’t one use more conventional
research designs to estimate the P×S nomological network? One
could do this, and it might work under some circumstances.
However, one runs the risk of mistakenly assuming that a
correlation between constructs occurs for the P×S component
when it does not. There are several examples in which aspects
of the nomological networks for constructs differed depending
upon the variance component that was studied. Examples include
adult romantic attachment (Barry et al., 2007), enacted support
(Lakey et al., 2010), capitalization support (Shorey and Lakey,
2011) perceived support (Lakey et al., in press) and the link
between positive and low negative affect (Lakey and Scoboria,
2005; Barry et al., 2007; Shorey and Lakey, 2011). Thus, one
cannot know that a correlation between constructs occurs for
a given component until one conducts studies that isolate the
component.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
If the reader is interested in Person × Situation interactions
and is willing to take the variance partitioning approach, there
is a very good chance that he will be rewarded with very large
P×S effects for nearly any psychological construct he chooses
to study. Moreover, with some modification, he can apply the
same construct validation procedures used for personality more
generally to develop a psychological understanding of the P×S
aspects of constructs. The variance partitioning approach can add
increased precision to theory by defining with greater clarity key
aspects of constructs. Understanding whether the key constructs
are features of the person, the situation, or P×S interactions will
help him design studies to test theory with greater precision, and
will provide a useful guide for training and intervention.
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Contextual Variability in Personality
From Significant–Other Knowledge
and Relational Selves
Susan M. Andersen*, Rugile Tuskeviciute, Elizabeth Przybylinski, Janet N. Ahn† and
Joy H. Xu†
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, USA
We argue that the self is intrinsically embedded in an interpersonal context such
that it varies in IF–THEN terms, as the relational self. We have demonstrated
that representations of the significant other and the relationship with that other
are automatically activated by situational cues and that this activation affects both
experienced and expressed aspects of the self and personality. Here, we expand
on developments of the IF–THEN cognitive-affective framework of personality system
(Mischel and Shoda, 1995), by extending it to the domain of interpersonal relationships
at the dyadic level (Andersen and Chen, 2002). Going beyond Mischel’s early research
(Mischel, 1968), our framework combines social cognition and learning theory with
a learning-based psychodynamic approach, which provides the basis for extensive
research on the social-cognitive process of transference and the relational self as it
arises in everyday social interactions (Andersen and Cole, 1990), evidence from which
contributes to a modern conceptualization of personality that emphasizes the centrality
of the situation.
Keywords: significant others, relational self, close relationships, transference, cross-situational inconsistency
INTRODUCTION
The notion that people’s responses and behavior will tend to vary by the situation they are in, as a
function of internal states, mental representations, and interpretations that are brought to the fore
by cues in the situation (Mischel, 1968, 1973, 1977; Wright and Mischel, 1987; Shoda et al., 1994),
was iconoclastic when proposed, but is now supported by considerable evidence.While it may seem
that people tend to possess global traits that do not vary appreciably by situation, this concept does
not do justice to the complex nature of personality. In situ research has demonstrated substantial
variability inbehavior across situations (Mischel, 1968),while stability canbeobserved in thepattern
of behavior individuals engage in across different situations over time (Mischel and Peake, 1982;
Mischel and Shoda, 1995). What arises is a kind of personality signature or behavior profile across
situations. Indeed, variability across situations that is stable over time is now rather widely accepted
(e.g., Kenrick and Funder, 1988; Fleeson, 2001; Funder, 2008; Fleeson and Noftle, 2009).
In this article, we present a conceptual framework and a line of research in the interpersonal
domain that characterizes individual behavior as the result of context-specific cues and makes use
of long-term memory storage in a dynamic way—that is, emphasizing both what the individual
brings to the table from personal experience and the situational cues that trigger such experience.
We present the social-cognitive model of transference and the relational self, and the research
that supports it (e.g., Chen and Andersen, 1999; Andersen and Chen, 2002), as an IF–THEN
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person-situation interaction model and an interpersonal version
of what is known as the cognitive-affective personality system or
cognitive-affective processing system (CAPS) approach. Beyond
this, we go further here than elsewhere in specifying the
relation of our framework to the CAPS model, and further,
address explicitly the voluminous literature on trait dispositions
(particularly interpersonal traits) and their potential interface
with this framework.
The CAPS framework relies on cognitive-affective units
(CAUs), which represent individual experience and contribute to
an individual’s interpretations and behavior in particular contexts
(Mischel and Shoda, 1995; see also Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999).
Past experience alters the meaning and significance accorded to
present situations, and importantly, the strength and likelihood
of relevant behaviors being enacted in those situations. Of central
importance in predicting human behavior, and if desired, in
changing it, is accounting for the stimuli in situations that
prompt particular behavioral patterns (Metcalfe and Mischel,
1999). The cognitive-affective systems model of personality is
thus an IF–THEN theory in which the situation—or set of
triggering cues—interacts with whatever disposition or set of
associations the individual has with these cues, which in turn,
places the individual in a distinct psychological situation. Indeed,
the situational IF cue(s) evokes a contextual THEN, or the
relevant experience and behavior.
In our research, we have examined howmental representations
of significant others—that is, any important person, such as a
close friend, current or past romantic partner, sibling, or parent
whom the individual knows well and has had a considerable
impact on the individual—arise as a function of contextual cues,
and influence moment-to-moment interpersonal responses on
the basis of their implicit activation. Because significant-other
representations are often evoked and used, they tend to be
chronically accessible (Andersen et al., 1995) and are even more
likely to be evoked if triggering cues are present in the situation
(Andersen et al., 1995; Chen et al., 1999; see Higgins, 1989, 1990).
Hence, in the process known as transference, certain cues in a new
person, such as his or her behavior or conveyed beliefs, attributes,
or even facial features, can activate a relevant significant-
other representation. The representation is then applied to
understanding the new person. Of course, significant others
are, by definition, people in whom the individual is invested
emotionally and motivationally (Higgins, 1987, 1997; Hinkley
and Andersen, 1996; Andersen et al., 1998). Hence, they allow for
special relevance to be accorded to a new person, when triggered
in transference, leading the new person to be seen, interpreted,
and remembered in terms of significant-other knowledge, while
also evoking a variety of relationship-specific and self-with-other
experiences that are emotional and motivational in nature.
Accordingly, cues of any subtle resemblance to a significant
other in a new person will evoke the significant-other
representation, the relational self, and the transference process
in IF–THEN terms. In many instances, this process can be
interpersonally useful, easing social interactions, and prompting
the individual to give new persons the benefit of the doubt, as
positive feelings toward the significant other are felt anew toward
(“transferred” to) these new persons (e.g., Andersen and Chen,
2002). In fact, under some circumstances, it can even diminish
intergroup bias (Saribay and Andersen, 2007) and promote a
sense of shared reality (Przybylinski and Andersen, 2012, 2015).
However, it can have detrimental consequences as well (e.g.,
Berenson and Andersen, 2006; Reznik and Andersen, 2007; Berk
and Andersen, 2008; Miranda et al., 2013) if the relationship with
the activated significant other happens to be troubled in some
way, even if this person is otherwise loved.
Given that the concept of transference derives from
psychoanalytic thought (Freud, 1958, 1963) as modernized
in neo-Freudian and interpersonal terms (Sullivan, 1953), it is
perhaps less surprising that we conceptualize and examine it
in social-cognitive terms (Andersen and Glassman, 1996; Chen
and Andersen, 1999; Andersen and Chen, 2002). Drawing on a
set of century-old assumptions about personality, psychological
disturbance, and treatment, this work is clearly relevant to
bridging the gap between contemporary social cognition,
interpersonal approaches to the self, and psychodynamics.
Moreover, it construes person-situation interactions as an
interpersonal version of a cognitive-affective system approach.
A central contribution of this research is that it begins to
populate the CAPS model with needed content and content
specificity. Indeed, the CAPS model focuses primarily on process
and to a degree, structure, while providing relatively little
guidance as to the content of CAUs within the model. The
current framework and research does this with a focus on the
interpersonal domain, and outlines situations and processesmore
specifically. In particular, we emphasize how individual behavior
varies across interpersonal situations, in a manner determined
partly by the process of transference. In the process, elements of
the interpersonal situation (i.e., of the person one is interacting
with) resemble and, in turn, implicitly and automatically bring to
mind a prior significant other, which influences the individual’s
inferences about and evaluation of the new person. Indirectly,
this activation also brings to mind the relationship with this
significant other, as well as the individual’s view of the self
in this relationship at the moment, his or her motivation,
goals, and regulatory strategies, not to mention emotions and
behaviors. Accordingly, in the CAPS model, the CAUs, such
as expectancies, goals, affect, and self-regulatory plans, form a
“system” of units that interact with each other in mediating
behavior. In our approach, these units consist of the various
aspects of an individual’s significant-other relationships, and
such units are organized in terms of individual representations
of specific significant others and one’s relationship with each,
which are all stored in memory. Each one can be triggered from
memory when the significant other is implicitly activated by
subtly relevant cues in the environment (a person, a situation),
leading to shifts in observed responses.
Further, our approach treats “dispositions” as reflected and
embodied by the content of the longstanding significant-
other representations and relationships in memory, which
enable both stability in the individual’s responses and the
variability that arises in them across relevant interpersonal
situations. Research on trait approaches to individual differences
defines personality in terms of global dispositions that are
shared and nomothetic (people differ in the degree to which
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they hold a trait, rather than in its qualitative definition),
and some trait dispositions are explicitly interpersonal (e.g.,
need for affiliation, extraversion, agreeableness, dominance).
Our approach, by contrast, defines personality and individual
differences particularly ideographically, based on prior learning
and prior relationship experience. Although we do not argue
that all variability across situations in individual responding (or
stability over time) is reducible to interpersonal experience alone,
nor that significant-other representations and relationships are
the sole basis for the content of self and personality, we do simply
argue that such knowledge in memory captures meaningful,
longstanding, personally relevant knowledge, that anchors the
individual in his or her own prior learning and experience, while
still enabling variability in individual behavior to emerge as a
function of variability in interpersonal contexts.
THE RELATIONAL SELF
Imagine that a new employee is hired at your workplace. He loves
reading mystery novels, much as your adored older brother does,
has a similar liking for Italian food, and even similar quirks (e.g.,
the same bombastic laugh). You immediately like him without
knowing why and find yourself holding his opinion in especially
high esteem. You even doubt yourself when you disagree with
him, which you do not do with other coworkers. In this case, your
self-doubt cannot be explained solely by a general personality
trait (e.g., insecurity), or by the situation itself (being at work).
Our model of transference, however, provides a framework for
understanding why, when, and how this specific kind of response
happens.
In transference, the representation of a significant other
(e.g., one’s brother) will be activated when a new person (e.g.,
the coworker) resembles that significant other in some subtle
way (e.g., has a similar laugh). This resemblance can come
in the form of the new person’s personal characteristics, such
as interests, behavioral tendencies, values, interpersonal style,
specific expressions, or physical appearance. Once the significant-
other representation is activated, it tends to be applied to the new
person, influencing one’s perception of the new person and one’s
responses to him or her (Andersen and Cole, 1990; Andersen
and Baum, 1994). Thus, significant-other cues encountered in a
situation combined with knowledge stored in memory (which
is chronically accessible) about the significant other, affect both
interpretations of the new person as well as one’s responses to
him or her. For instance, knowledge one has of the significant
other is then assumed to be true of the new person who resembles
this significant other, in addition to what one actually sees and
learns about the new person. The individual then thinks that he or
she “learned” this transferred information about the new person,
when, in fact, the individual did not.
This effect on memory can be evoked based not only on cues
to a new person’s characteristics, but, as implied, also on his or
her facial resemblance to a significant other (Kraus and Chen,
2010), and has been shown to persist for weeks (Glassman and
Andersen, 1999b). Moreover, cues of either sort can provoke a
relatively automatic positive evaluation of a new person when
he or she implicitly resembles a significant other who is also
regarded positively—that is, liked or loved (e.g., Andersen and
Cole, 1990; Andersen and Baum, 1994; Andersen et al., 1995;
Chen et al., 1999; Günaydin et al., 2012). Finally, this transference
process not only occurs implicitly (Andersen et al., 2005), but can
also be triggered by cues presented entirely outside of awareness
(Glassman and Andersen, 1999a). The latter is of importance
both because the notion of the unconscious is so predominant
in psychodynamic theory and in the transference concept, and
because it suggests that the process of transference may not be
readily detected or intentionally controlled.
Significant-other representations are linked in memory to
representations of the self by the relationship with each
significant other (Andersen and Chen, 2002). Thus, individuals
have a specific relational self associated with each significant
other represented in memory (Andersen et al., 1997; Chen and
Andersen, 1999; Andersen and Chen, 2002: see also Baldwin,
1992; Chen et al., 2006), reflecting the version of the self
generally experienced in that relationship. Accordingly, these
versions of the self are also indirectly activated when a significant-
other representation is activated as a function of situational
triggering cues. Because any significant-other cue can activate
the significant-other representation, these cues will also indirectly
activate the self-with-significant-other representation and the
significant-other relationship. Once these representations are
activated, one “becomes” who one typically is with that significant
other. Furthermore, motivations and goals relevant to the
significant-other relationship are also activated in response to the
new person—for instance, one might be particularly motivated
to not be candid with him or her. In transference, information
about the significant other’s past acceptance or rejection stored
in memory should also be activated when the significant-other
representation is activated and thus should also be anticipated
from the new person. In this way, the significant other need not be
physically present to greatly influence the self and interpersonal
interactions.
Said differently, significant others have been shown to be
represented in memory in a manner that is rich in features
and highly distinctive (Andersen and Cole, 1990; Andersen
et al., 1998), both in terms of personality characteristics and
physical features, as well as in interpersonal styles, habits, and
interpersonal tendencies. Moreover, included in such significant-
other knowledge are complex IF–THEN units that reflect the
particular psychological (internal) states these others experience
and how they behave based on them (as situational contexts,





Although most trait theorists, historically, have acknowledged
the relevance of situations to trait expression (e.g., Allport, 1937;
Murray, 1938; Cattell, 1965), and the interaction between the
person and the situation, this has not tended to be emphasized or
commonly examined in empirical research. That is, the consensus
was (and largely is) that trait dispositions are stable over time, as
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are their correlates, and as such, are worthy of study in their own
right, independent of context. This makes sense, and of course,
Mischel’s early work also prompted systematic research pitting
the person against the situation (and vice versa) in numerous
trait-situation studies at the debate’s inception (e.g., Endler, 1975;
Sarason et al., 1975; Endler and Magnusson, 1976; Magnusson
and Endler, 1977), and onward, with results sometimes favoring
the person and sometimes the situation, depending on the design
of the research (Bem, 1972; see also Wachtel, 1973). Since then,
the inclusion of potentiating environmental factors, whether life
events like stressors or encounters with relevant situations, or
experimental manipulations, for example, contextual “primes”
that bring to mind trait-relevant content (e.g., Moskowitz, 1988;
Schmit et al., 1995) has become less atypical, as researchers have
examined both transient and more stable factors in observed
personality responding (e.g., Chaplin et al., 1988; Murtha et al.,
1996; Pervin, 2000). The stability of traits over time is of course
well-argued and demonstrated (e.g., Block, 1971; Costa and
McCrae, 1988; McCrae and Costa, 1990; Roberts and DelVecchio,
2000), and in conjunction with the person by situation debate,
which addresses variability by context (even if just referring to
contextual “primes”), the research on cross-situational variability
is important and revealing about personality processes and
content.
Considered differently, a question that arises is: What
constitutes personality (and individual differences in personality)
in the first place? It is presumably not restricted to trait
dispositions. For example, more specific dispositional tendencies
are presumably pertinent as well, such as the chronic individual
difference of believing one is falling short of the ideal standards
that a significant other holds for one, in longstanding goals with
a significant other (e.g., for affection) that may have chronically
gone unsatisfied, and more broadly, individual differences in
chronic depression, or rejection sensitivity, or attachment style.
We see these as deeply relevant to an interpersonal view of
personality although such individual differences are not as broad
as global trait dispositions per se, and the former have been
examined in research on the relational self and transference
(noted below). Trait dispositions, on the other hand, have not.
Beyond simply examining individual differences inpersonality,
a central focus in conceptualizing personality as involving the
relational self and stored knowledge about significant others is on
illuminating what makes a person unique (Allport, 1937; Kelly,
1955; see also Higgins, 1990). Certainly, this is the thrust of
George Kelly’s approach to personality. We also aim to examine,
not so much what is general and global in dispositions, but
rather, what is idiographic about the individual in the domain of
relationships. Indeed, the content of significant-other knowledge
is idiographic—that is, the features that define significant-other
knowledge are varied, including assumed qualities, habits, and
the like, and these features are specific to each individual and to
the particular relationship—and also, by definition, stable over
time. The relationship with the significant other is also unique
to the person and is comprised of content that is specific to
the way the individual interacts with that other, which is in
turn indirectly evoked with new persons when the significant-
other representation is implicitly cued. On the other hand, the
process itself that is triggered when contextual cues activate such
prior knowledge—the overall process by which significant-other
representations are activated and used with a new person—is
common and nomothetic across people (Andersen and Chen,
2002). Our approach to the relational self (and transference),
which is an idiographic-nomothetic approach that captures the
unique in stored knowledge and the general in process, ultimately
integrates both what is stable in the self and personality, and what
is variable across triggering cues, providing a more nuanced and
complete view.
Still, global traits and dispositions could, indeed, be readily
examined in relation to this process. Based on existing research,
we assume that the process of transference is likely to be triggered
and to transpire quite readily regardless of individual differences
in trait dispositions. However, the content of any individual’s
relational responses (those that depend on the relationship and
the self in the relationship) may well vary considerably from
another individual’s, based on such dispositional differences,
potentially predicting differentiated affective, and motivational
responses. These are empirical questions that remain open.
On this note, one might ask the question of how this
relational self (and transference) research links or specifically
interacts with existing structural models of personality
emphasizing interpersonal traits, such as affiliation, extraversion,
agreeableness, or dominance. While the current research does
not speak to the exact ways in which such dispositions may
emerge in transference and the relational self, such interpersonal
traits have been found to be of importance in interpersonal
situations (see McClelland, 1985). For instance, the need for
affiliation as well as for intimacy has been shown to underlie
behavioral variability in interpersonal contexts (McAdams and
Constantian, 1983; McAdams, 1999), for both men and women,
and is assessed mostly using the thematic apperception test
(TAT). As such, correlational work shows that those high in
need for intimacy are more motivated to connect, share, and
communicate with others, and are inclined to focus more on
communal goals (McAdams and Powers, 1981; McAdams and
Constantian, 1983), in addition to making more eye contact, and
smiling and laughing more (McAdams et al., 1984). Likewise,
extraversion, which is part of the Big Five (and also assessed
by self-report), has been associated with one’s ability to create
positive social environments (Eaton and Funder, 2003). Indeed,
extraverts tend to be more popular (Paunonen, 2003) and tend
to have more satisfying romantic relationships (e.g., Watson
et al., 2000). Relatedly, agreeableness (i.e., another Big Five trait
assessed by self-report) is associated with better interpersonal
adjustment among peers in adolescence (Graziano et al., 1997),
more helping behavior (e.g., Graziano et al., 2007), and likeability
(Nikitin and Freund, 2015). It has been linked as well to
more distress in response to interpersonal conflict (Suls et al.,
1998), and to preferences for tactics of de-escalation, such as
negotiation rather than power assertion (Graziano et al., 1996).
By contrast, trait dominance has been associated mainly with
others’ perceptions of the individual as competent (as reported
by fellow group members and outside observers; Anderson and
Kilduff, 2009), and relatedly, dominance-conveying behaviors
(assessed by independent observers) have been shown to be more
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commonly expressed with same-sex friends than with same- or
opposite-sex strangers (Moskowitz, 1988).
With any such global trait disposition, such as these, one might
predict that some of the processes revealed in the research on
transference and the relational self may be more pronounced
among people high in the particular interpersonal trait. Our guess
is that this may not necessarily be the case, and rather, it is
likely that each of these particular traits may further predict the
content of the particular relational self and relationship patterns
that arise, based on significant-other activation and use (e.g., in
transference). This question may warrant future examination.
Cognitive Models
One way of thinking about the notion of transference is from the
perspective of George Kelly’s personal construct theory (Kelly,
1955). In this model of personality, people formulate personal
constructs to represent the social environment, especially
other people and themselves, by categorizing them into trait
adjective terms. These personal constructs then guide individual
interpretations, decisions, and actions. According to Kelly,
significant others are fundamental to the constructs a person
forms and stores in memory (each labeled by a trait adjective)
because these constructs help the individual understand how
various significant others are similar to and different from each
other as well as from (and to) the self. These constructs are
idiographic in nature—that is, unique to the individual. Mischel
(1973) argued that such constructs are central to cognition,
and are formed through basic social-learning mechanisms. By
the latter extension, expectancies, learning strategies, and self-
regulation are evoked by stimuli in specific situations based on
what is stored in memory.
Of course, research on trait dispositions can be (and has been)
conducted in cognitive terms, whether to identify the cognitive
level of specificity and evaluative components of trait concepts
(John et al., 1991) or to directly examine, for example, trait anxiety
or neuroticism, and processes associated with each, in terms of
how they are contextually cued and with what consequences (e.g.,
Eysenck, 2000), or to examine how trait categories influence social
perception (e.g., Kenrick and Stringfield, 1980;Woike andBender,
2009; see also Kihlstrom, 2013). Similarly, numerous researchers
in clinical psychology have focused on individual differences in
clinical syndromes such as phobia or major depression, and as
such, they have long examined cognitive schemas of feared objects
or of the self to illuminate the link between provoking stimulus
cues or interpersonal situations and relevant existing knowledge
(e.g., Hammen et al., 1985; Mathews and MacLeod, 1987). Still,
idiographic measurement in the trait domain has remained rather
atypical (although see, e.g., Lamiell, 1981; McAdams, 1996; and
see also Larson and Csikszentmihalyi, 1983; Fournier et al., 2002;
Conner et al., 2009).
Our model of the relational self and transference (Andersen
and Chen, 2002) draws from both personal construct theory
(Kelly, 1955) and Mischel’s later notion of the cognitive-affective
processing system (CAPS,Mischel and Shoda, 1995), to show that
individuals bearing minimal resemblance to significant others
implicitly activate significant-other representations and this leads
to various perceptual, affective, and behavioral consequences. In
doing so, this model integrates the perspectives of psychoanalysis,
behaviorism, and cognitive-behavioral approaches (Andersen
and Saribay, 2006). Of course, at its core, it is a cognitive
model, but conceptually it is also influenced by basic learning
processes (learning theory, behaviorism) and by interpersonal
psychodynamic approaches (Sullivan, 1953) that link the self to
significant others and emphasize the central role of motivation
and emotion. It nonetheless remains most compatible with other
cognitive approaches (see, e.g., Kihlstrom, 2013).
Personality Prototypes as Mental
Representations
In contrast to a fully idiographic approach, it is worth noting that
personality prototype models (Cantor and Mischel, 1977, 1979)
are based onknowledge about (conceptualizations of) personality,
stored in memory, and grounded largely in general, nomothetic
knowledge (beliefs) about people, such as trait assumptions or
notions of personality types. Personality prototypes canbe defined
by a trait (i.e., adjective) label, designating a main feature of an
individual’s personality (and its synonyms) or by a noun label (see
alsoHiggins andKing, 1981), the latter of which ismore elaborate,
richer, and more distinctive in features, as in a “caricature” or
stereotype of the whole of an individual’s personality (Andersen
and Klatzky, 1987). As such it is used particularly efficiently in
making judgments (Andersen et al., 1990). Our work expands
and moves beyond such notions of personality types, overall, to
what may be the richest and most distinctive of such mental
representations in memory (e.g., Andersen and Cole, 1990,
Studies 1 and 2)—those that designate significant others in the
individual’s life (i.e., each of one’s various significant others). This
should and does make these representations compelling tools for
encoding. The richer and more distinctive the representations,
the more accessible and likely they are to be used, a notion (about
significant-other representations) that is well supported by the
data, as we show (e.g., Andersen and Cole, 1990, Study 3).
Indeed, a further innovation of early work on personality
prototypes was to use cognitive measures (e.g., a recognition
memory paradigm) to measure, experimentally, when and how
personality prototypes are applied to a new person to “go
beyond the information given” about this new person (Bruner,
1957; Cantor and Mischel, 1977). In this research, these traits
were conceptualized as cognitive concepts, held in memory
(see also Kenrick and Stringfield, 1980; Kihlstrom, 2013), that
implicitly influence the kind of personality assumptions that the
individual tends to make about others. Research on transference
(e.g., Andersen and Cole, 1990) adapted that experimental
paradigm (Cantor and Mischel, 1977) and, in so doing, offered
the first evidence that transference occurs as a social-cognitive
process in everyday perception. Further, the transference effect
has been replicated repeatedly, including a variety of control
conditions designed to rule out alternative explanations, and
measuring a variety of consequences beyond the signature
biased inference/memory and evaluation effects, all of which
arise based on a new person’s resemblance to a significant
other (and the relationship and relational self evoked). Such
consequences include relevant shifts in the motivation and goals
that are pursued, behaviors that are enacted, and the sense of
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self experienced, along with relevant shifts in emotions (e.g.,
Andersen et al., 1995, 1996; Baum and Andersen, 1999; Glassman
and Andersen, 1999a; Berk and Andersen, 2000, 2008; Berenson
and Andersen, 2006; Reznik and Andersen, 2007; Miranda et al.,
2013; Przybylinski and Andersen, 2015). Of course, a significant-
other representation is an n-of-one representation, and hence,





Historically, the concept of transference has been focal in
psychoanalysis (Freud, 1958), and has referred to the assumption
that patients re-experience unconscious psychosexual impulses
(libidinous drive) and conflicts from childhood with their analyst
(Freud, 1958, 1963; see also Andersen and Glassman, 1996).
Libidinous drive fuels structures of mind (id, ego, and superego),
he proposed, and although he did note that “imagoes” may be
formed of one’s parents, these have no causal role in the theory.
Indeed, in the drive-structure model (Greenberg and Mitchell,
1983), the structures of mind and the unconscious psychosexual
drive that fuels it are universal; people vary mainly in intensity
of their libidinal drive. Transference, in his view, is thus fueled
by libidinal impulses and processes. Freud acknowledged too
that transference can transpire outside of the patient-therapist
relationship, but this was far from his emphasis (Freud, 1958; see
Luborsky and Crits-Christoph, 1990). Our emphasis is on social-
cognitive processes in which “transference” occurs in everyday
perception and interpersonal interaction, arising as an ordinary,
non-defensive process, based on significant-other knowledge
stored in memory that is triggered situationally by interpersonal
cues. Hence, ours is a distinctively non-Freudian characterization,
although we retain the term and the overall assumption that
something about one’s past experience emerges in the present.
The Psychodynamic
More specifically, our approach draws directly from that
of the neo-Freudian, Harry Stack Sullivan, an interpersonal
psychodynamic theorist who contradicted most of Freud’s
assumptions (he dropped the entire drive-structure model,
the notion of infantile psychosexual drive, and unconscious
libidinal wish), focusing instead on actual interpersonal learning.
Sullivan proposed the notion of parataxic distortion, a version
of transference in which “personifications” of significant others
and of the self (linked through “dynamisms” or relational
dynamics) both emerge with new people (Sullivan, 1953).
Personifications and dynamisms are somewhat analogous to
mental representations of significant others and the relationship,
respectively, and are developed through actual learning and
interpersonal interactions with significant others (rather
than drive). Given that Sullivan rejected assumptions about
psychosexual drive made by Freud, he proposed instead basic
needs for satisfaction and safety (security). Expressing one’s
own perceptions, feelings, and beliefs in words with others,
and also developing one’s own talents and capabilities, in each
case while managing to remain connected (“integrated”) with
significant others, together fulfill the former need. Security is
compromised if a balance across these components of satisfaction
cannot be reached. As such, the content of personifications and
dynamisms includes these motivations and how they were (or
were not) met with the significant other, and these are reflected
in parataxic distortion with others (i.e., transference) as well.
Sullivan’s assumptions about motivation are quite consistent
with ours, although we have proposed other human needs
as well—that is, for connection, autonomy, competency and
control, comprehension/meaning, and security (Andersen
et al., 1997; Andersen and Chen, 2002). Like Freud, Sullivan
emphasized transference in the therapeutic context. On the other
hand, he also discussed its occurrence in everyday life and did so
more than Freud did. We, of course, emphasize significant-other
representations and their association in memory with the self, as
well as the processes by which they are brought to mind in new
interpersonal encounters, affecting perception and behavior. Our
approach is thus vastly closer to Sullivan’s than to Freud’s, even
though we adopt Freud’s term–transference–simply because it is
less cumbersome and, generally, more recognizable.
It is also worth noting that aspects of Sullivan’s interpersonal
model are similar to object relations theory, as described
by Melanie Klein and others, with the exception that the
former emphasizes interpersonal learning and behavior as well
as actual interpersonal experiences, while the latter focuses
more on fantasy and libidinal drive (Klein, 1946, 1952;
Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983; Grotstein, 1985). Still, like
Sullivan, object relations theorists assume a notion similar to
mental representations of significant others—individuals develop
internalized relations with objects (significant persons) in the
environment, and engage in projective identification in which
these internalizations can be projected onto others. They also
largely focused on transference in the therapeutic context, while
not rejecting that it may arise in everyday life.
Attachment Theory
Attachment theory is yet another framework inwhich interactions
with significant others are thought to contribute to the
development of internal working models of the self and others
that are then used in subsequent relationships, influencing
beliefs, memories, emotions, expectations, and behaviors about
others as well as the self (Bowlby, 1973). These working models
are developed from early interactions with attachment figures,
reflecting expectations about the availability and responsiveness
of the caregiver in times of stress, and whether or not the
self is competent and worthy of love (Bowlby, 1969). A core
assumption is that these working models serve as the basis
for later relationships. Much research has focused on infant-
caregiver interactions in the Strange Situation paradigm as well as
toddler/child-caregiver interactions (e.g., Thompson, 1998, 1999),
and of course, on adult attachment in romantic relationships that
involve categories of secure or insecure attachment, assessed by
self-report (e.g., Hazan and Shaver, 1987; Bartholomew, 1990;
Griffin and Bartholomew, 1994; Pietromonaco and Barrett, 2000;
Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007).While the latter function as a broad
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individual differences (e.g., avoidant attachment), people alsohave
relationship-specific working models (e.g., Baldwin et al., 1996;
Overall et al., 2003; Klohnen et al., 2005). Working models in the
attachment framework are similar to mental representations (of
self, other, and the relationship) in that they guide responding in
new situations, when relevant. Hence, although our model does
not originate from attachment theory, or share its precise focus,
it is clearly compatible as a framework.
In Sum
Since its inception, the concept of transference has been examined
largely theoretically, rather than empirically, and thus rarely
subjected to the scrutiny of science (with some exceptions, e.g.,
Horowitz, 1989, 1991; Luborsky and Crits-Christoph, 1990). How
transference has been defined has also differed depending on the
theorists involved (e.g., Greenson, 1965; Ehrenreich, 1989), with
the common components tending to reflect “the experiencing
of feelings, drives, attitudes, fantasies, and defenses toward a
person in the present which are inappropriate to the person
and are a repetition, a displacement of reaction originating in
regard to significant persons of early childhood” (Greenson, 1965,
p. 156). Although the conception of transference and the data
we have are compatible with this definition in broad strokes,
our framework and data focus on a wide variety of significant
others (not only from early childhood) and highlight the precise
cognitive processes that evidence suggests underlie transference.
Specifically, our framework and data emphasize what is likely to
trigger transference and how—that is, under what circumstances
and with what consequences—leading to precise predictions that
are subjected to experimental test. Such evidence emphasizes the
specific nature of each particular significant other in one’s life
and the relationship one has with him or her, as well as the self
as experienced with that significant other, while also examining
the basic cognitive processes that underlie the transference effect.
We examine the cues in an interpersonal situation that trigger
transference, the specific processes that prompt it, and its precise
consequences that arise via what knowledge is stored in memory.
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING TRANSFERENCE
AND RELATIONAL SELF
A Word on Methods
Research on transference typically uses a two-session paradigm.
In the first session, participants name and describe at least one
significant other by listing an equal number of positive and
negative sentences (two to six words each)—about the significant
other’s interests, likes, attitudes, beliefs, tendencies, or specific
behaviors or styles (e.g., likes to think about politics, plays the
flute, is even-tempered)—and then rank-ordering the sentences
based on their descriptiveness of this significant other. Weeks
later, participants return for a supposedly unrelated experiment,
and are for example, randomly assigned to a condition in
which they learn about a new person who is described using
some of the features the participant listed in the first session
about their significant other intermixed with filler items that
are indicated as being irrelevant to the significant other, or a
new person who does not resemble a significant other at all
(e.g., Andersen and Baum, 1994; Andersen et al., 1996; Berk
and Andersen, 2000; Berenson and Andersen, 2006). Hence, in
one condition the new person bears a subtle resemblance to
the significant other. In a yoked control condition, significant-
other descriptions are instead drawn from those that another
participant listed about his or her significant other. This
one-to-one yoking of a participant in the control condition
with one in the transference condition ensures that those in
the resemblance and control conditions are presented with
exactly the same descriptions. This allows us to control for
content of the features used and thus rule out the possibility
that descriptions of any significant other can trigger the
transference process. After being presented with descriptions
about the new person, participants complete various dependent
measures.
It is worth noting as well that we have also made use of
a fully within-subjects design in which the participant learns
about various new persons, one of whom resembles their own
significant other, while the other new persons do not, allowing
for the examination of shifts in the same participant’s responses
as a function of triggering cues (e.g., Andersen and Cole, 1990;
Andersen et al., 1995; Glassman and Andersen, 1999b). In
addition, we often cross such within-participant manipulations
with between-subject factors in a mixed model design (e.g., Chen
et al., 1999; Przybylinski and Andersen, 2013, 2015).
Signature Cognitive and Evaluative Effects
Inference and Memory
Early work on transference has assessed activation of a
significant-other representation and its use via a recognition-
memory paradigm assessing what one remembers about a
new person and the tendency to “fill in the blanks” about
him or her using the significant-other information stored in
memory (adapted from Cantor and Mischel, 1977). Research has
demonstrated that after learning about a new person who exhibits
some subtle similarity to a significant other, individuals will tend
to assume that the new person possesses other features of their
significant other. That is, they report higher confidence in having
learned specific features about the new person that they in fact
did not—features relevant to significant-other knowledge (e.g.,
Andersen and Cole, 1990; Andersen and Baum, 1994; Andersen
et al., 1995; Baum and Andersen, 1999; Berenson and Andersen,
2006; Saribay and Andersen, 2007; Przybylinski and Andersen,
2013, 2015). The individual remembers the new person in a
manner colored by the stored significant-other knowledge, based
on subtle resemblance to the significant other (versus to a yoked
participant’s significant other). For instance, if an individual finds
out that a new person likes to knit and it so happens that the
individual’s own sister likes to knit and is also very self-confident,
the individual is more likely to incorrectly remember having
learned that the new person is actually very self-confident.
In this research, resemblance to a significant other is usually
constructed as a small number of significant-other based features
embedded among distractor cues (irrelevant features), which
makes the triggering/cueing process relatively implicit in all
of our experiments. Accordingly, the effect has been found
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even when significant-other features are presented subliminally
(Glassman and Andersen, 1999a), and thus outside of conscious
awareness. The transference effect occurs effortlessly, and cannot
be controlled easily—that is, it is automatic (see Andersen
et al., 2007)—and also persists over time (Glassman and
Andersen, 1999b). Moreover, the effect arises even when the
significant-other representation is activated based on subtle
facial resemblance to a new person. That is, individuals made
inferences about the new person consistent with knowledge of
their significant other after being presented with a photograph,
allegedly of the new person, which they had previously rated (in
a prior session) as resembling their significant other (Kraus and
Chen, 2010).
To rule out alternative explanations of such effects, potential
experimental confounds have been carefully examined. For
instance, these effects could possibly be accounted for by the
fact that participants themselves generated their own significant-
other features used to describe the new person in a previous
session (Greenwald and Banaji, 1989), but did not generate such
features for the yoked-control condition. Since memory tends
to be better for self-generated materials, a control condition
is used to include descriptions that the participant also self-
generated, but instead to describe a social category the person
tends to use (Andersen and Cole, 1990), or a non-significant other
in the person’s life (e.g., Andersen et al., 1995; Glassman and
Andersen, 1999b), or in some cases, no one person at all (the
no representation condition, e.g., Przybylinski and Andersen,
2013, 2015). Such control conditions address self-generation
effects. The inference and memory effect, in sum, is stronger
for representations of a significant other than for other self-
generated information and for social categories the individual
tends to use. Hence, the effect cannot be reduced to simple social
categorization effects (e.g., stereotyping) or to self-generation.
Much research shows that transference is quite pervasive
and occurs even averaging across individual differences in
relationships. Indeed, the transference effect, as indexed by this
signature cognitive measure, occurs regardless of whether the
individual views the significant other positively or negatively
(e.g., Andersen and Baum, 1994; Andersen et al., 1996; Hinkley
and Andersen, 1996). It also emerges independent of the self-
discrepancy the individual may have from a parent’s standpoint
(when the parent is the significant other), for example, if the
individual has fallen short of the parent’s standards (Reznik and
Andersen, 2007), and regardless of psychological and physical
abuse by a parent (as the significant other) while growing up
(Berenson and Andersen, 2006), chronically dissatisfied affection
goals with the significant other (Berk and Andersen, 2008),
and of depressive symptomatology (Andersen and Miranda,
2006; Miranda et al., 2013). Unsurprisingly, other affective and
motivational consequences also arise in this process (noted
below), usually as a function of the relationship that is indirectly
activated when the significant-other representation is cued.
Finally, as further evidence that the transference process does
in fact emerge quite automatically, evidence shows that the
transference process is moderated by variables that are known to
moderate other automatic processes. Research in other labs has
shown that transference is more likely to occur if the individual is
experiencing a circadian rhythm mismatch (it is the wrong time
of day for him/her, Kruglanski and Pierro, 2008), or is high in
need for closure (Pierro and Kruglanski, 2008), or is not inclined
to engage in careful assessment (Pierro et al., 2009).
Evaluation
Individuals evaluate people and objects quickly and relatively
automatically (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996). Such snap judgments
can be influenced by significant-other representations. That is,
when a significant-other representation is activated and applied
to a new person in transference, the way one evaluates the
significant other is also implicitly evoked and applied to the
new person, and the person is evaluated as the significant other
is—that is, positively or negatively. This significant-other based
evaluation is grounded in the notion of schema-triggered affect
(Fiske and Pavelchak, 1986), as it arises based on the triggering
of a significant-other representation, and this effect is considered
another signature effect of transference. Indeed, a new person
will be evaluated more positively in self-reported Likert ratings
if he or she minimally resembles an individual’s own positive
significant other versus a yoked participant’s positive significant
other (Baum and Andersen, 1999) or versus an individual’s own
negative significant other (Andersen and Baum, 1994; Andersen
et al., 1996; Berk and Andersen, 2000). As noted, this effect
also occurs across a wide variety of relationships, for example,
when the significant other is a parent and the individual believes
he or she falls short of the parent’s standards (Reznik and
Andersen, 2007; see Higgins, 1987), or if the individual was
abused by the parent (shown in facial expressions, Berenson and
Andersen,2006).
Indeed, snap judgments can also be triggered by minimal
facial resemblance in a new person, as shown by research from
two other labs—for instance, when the new person is depicted
using a photograph that was previously rated by the participant
as similar (versus not) to a loved significant other (Kraus and
Chen, 2010), he/she is rated more positively. Along these lines,
when the new person is depicted using a photograph that was
created by morphing the face of a loved significant-other with
another person’s face (Günaydin et al., 2012), the individuals
tended to indicate (by saying “yes” versus “no”) that the new
person possessed certain positive traits, such as trustworthiness
or intelligence. Moreover, automatic positive evaluation of a new
person, based on his or her significant-other resemblance, is
enhanced when one’s own mortality is made salient (Cox et al.,
2008, Study 5). That is, research in yet another lab has shown
that a parent-resembling new person is evaluatedmore positively,
especially if one has just thought about one’s own death (versus
about extreme pain; Cox et al., 2008), suggesting that transference
involving a loved significant other is more likely in the face of
death threat and may thus serve terror management functions
and serve existential needs (see Przybylinski and Andersen, 2015).
Indeed, when the significant other is regarded positively, an
immediate positive emotional response should be elicited, and
there is evidence on the individual’s own facial expression of affect
to support this. When the new person is similar to a positive
rather than a negative significant other, more positive facial affect
is expressed (as unobtrusively recorded), and this occurs quite
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quickly—that is, as one reads the relevant features presented about
the new person (Andersen et al., 1996). The quick emergence of
this emotional response suggests automatic evaluation of the new
person (Bargh et al., 1996), arising in the transference process,
based on evaluation of the significant other. As noted, this effect
is even evident when the significant other is an abusive parent
from one’s childhood (Berenson and Andersen, 2006). People
often denote that they love their parents independent of having
negative or dangerous experiences with them, and these positive
feelings are elicited relatively immediately in transference in the
form of positive facial affect (Berenson and Andersen, 2006).
Relationship Effects
Expectancies
Intermixed with the information one has about significant others,
is information regarding how each significant other relates to
and behaves toward the individual, and this knowledge should
be applied to new people resembling these significant others
in transference. Indeed, research shows that the acceptance
or rejection one expects from a significant other is activated
and applied to the new person in transference. When a new
person resembling a positive versus negative significant other is
encountered, the new person is expected to be more accepting
and less rejecting, an effect that does not hold in the control
condition (Andersen et al., 1996; Berk and Andersen, 2000).
Thus, the individual anticipates being liked or disliked by the
person based on expectations he or she has of the significant
other, and this occurs across individual differences, such as
one’s self-discrepancy from the parent’s perspective (Reznik
and Andersen, 2007), whether or not the significant other has
typically shown the level of affection one has desired (Berk and
Andersen, 2008), whether or not one has been rejected by a loved
significant other (Miranda et al., 2013), and whether or not a
parent was abusive in the past (Berenson and Andersen, 2006).
Beyond the transference context, relationships (as stored in
memory) are known to be linked with overall expectations
of rejection or acceptance (e.g., Baldwin and Sinclair, 1996).
Knowledge of how accepting or rejecting a significant other is,
is stored in memory, and such expectancies are readily activated,
whether in relationships or based on priming of the relationship
(e.g., Baldwin et al., 1990; Miranda et al., 2013); this is especially
so if the individual tends to be rejection-sensitive (Downey and
Feldman, 1996).
Interpersonal Behavior
Another important component of significant-other relationships
is behavior. The typical behaviors engaged in with the significant
other should also be activated in transference and enacted with
the new person, evoking behavioral confirmation—or a self-
fulfilling prophecy. The new person should then enact behaviors
the individual expects of him or her. Indeed, individuals
having a phone conversation with a naïve stranger who was
made to resemble a positive (or negative) significant other—
or not—evoked expected behaviors from the new person
(Berk and Andersen, 2000). The new person’s part of the
conversation, as assessed by the ratings of independent judges
who were blind to condition, connoted the expected positive
or negative affect, based on how positively or negatively
the significant other was regarded, and this effect was not
evident when the new person did not resemble a significant
other. Some research suggests that this effect occurs without
specific intention and thus individuals do not consciously
attempt to elicit the expected behavior (e.g., Chen and Bargh,
1997). We assume this is what happens in transference. In
a familiar example, an individual may unknowingly respond
to a new person as though he is a past romantic partner
without realizing that he or she is doing this, and in turn
the new person may start to behave as the romantic partner
would.
Furthermore, individuals in transference will also, under some
circumstances, engage in behaviors designed to solicit liking and
positive responding from the new person despite a troubled
relationship with the significant other. That is, when a new person
resembled a well-regarded significant other who commonly failed
to satisfy one’s goals for affection, individuals not only became
more hostile as a result, but this hostility was linked to persisting
longer on a behavioral task said to increase positive response
from others (Berk and Andersen, 2008). Thus, behaviors done to
achieve a particular goal one has with the significant other are
evoked and enacted in transference.
Motivation and Goals
The motives and goals held with significant others are stored
with significant-other knowledge in memory, and evidence
shows that they are, indeed, brought to mind and applied
when significant-other knowledge is evoked. In transference,
goals to be close to positive significant others are frequently
activated and pursued with a new person in the context of
transference. That is, individuals are motivated to approach
and to be disclosing toward a new person who bears minimal
resemblance to a positive significant other and to avoid closeness
when the new person is similar to a negative significant other
(Andersen et al., 1996; Berk and Andersen, 2000). As further
evidence of this, behavioral approach motivation has also been
shown to emerge in a positive transference. That is, individuals
moved their chairs closer to where they were told the new
person would sit for an upcoming interaction if this new person
resembled the positive significant other versus not (Kraus et al.,
2010).
However, this behavior is also relationship-specific. For
example, when a loved significant other has not met one’s goals
for love and affection—the goal is unsatisfied—this knowledge
emerges in transference (Berk and Andersen, 2008). When such
a significant other is evoked by resemblance to him or her in
a new person, the usual positive affect evoked by transference
is disrupted and the individual shows a decreased motivation
to be close and disclosing to the new person, even showing
increased hostility. Interestingly, when the significant other in
this study was a relative (suggesting that the relationship is not
likely to be ended), the hostility expressed by the individual was
positively related to increased enactment of explicit behaviors
that would help attain acceptance and liking from the new
person (Berk and Andersen, 2008). The goal that had not been
fulfilled with the significant other was pursued in transference,
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even as the individual became more hostile and even if these
mixed messages—expressing hostility yet also seeking affection—
may prove particularly confusing and frustrating to the new
person.
Beyond this, transference not only prompts goal activation
and goal pursuit—when mental representations of significant
others are activated—but also specifies both the how and why
of goal pursuit based on the activated relationship. That is,
activation of significant-other knowledge shapes both the overall
goal to be sought, as the why of goal pursuit (its higher-order
goal), and the subgoal to be selected, as the how of goal pursuit, or
the means of pursuing that goal (Ahn and Andersen, 2016). Such
evidence attests to the richness of the transference concept in its
implications for motivation and goals.
Even achievement goals can be brought to the fore in
transference. When a significant other holds such a goal for the
individual and knowledge of that significant other is implicitly
activated in transference, the individual will actively pursue the
achievement goal in behavioral terms at that moment (Xu and
Andersen, 2014). Moreover, such goals from a prior significant-
other relationship can be triggered and enacted even with a
current romantic partner (versus only with new persons). Thus
in transference, achievement goals from a prior relationship may
be suddenly pursued with a current romantic partner, even if this
goal is potentially disruptive to the current relationship (Xu and
Andersen, 2014).
Finally, research outside the domain of transference has
shown other goals can also be evoked when a significant-other
representation is activated. For instance, priming a significant-
other representation increases the pursuit of goals that one has
with the significant other—such as competition, achievement,
and helping goals (Fitzsimons and Bargh, 2003; Shah, 2003a,b)
as well as attachment-style congruent goals when a significant
other with whom one is securely or insecurely attached is primed
(Gillath et al., 2006).
Moreover, research from other labs has again shown that
while significant others do affect the kinds of goals that are
activated and pursued, goals that are activated at the moment
also can, in turn, have implications for social perception
and social categorization. When a goal has been primed,
individuals spontaneously bring to mind the individuals in
their life that are instrumental to the goal—useful for pursuit
of the goal—or not. For instance, after a goal is primed,
individuals make more memory errors between individuals
within categories of “instrumental” and “non-instrumental,”
respectively, suggesting that social categorization also depends
on the kinds of goals that are active (Fitzsimons and Shah,
2009). On the other hand, activating a significant other
does not always foster active behavioral goal pursuit of
the most relevant goals in that relationship and may even
undermine motivation, since people often tend to “outsource”
goal pursuit plans to significant others who are supportive of
those goals (Fitzsimons and Finkel, 2011). Moreover, being
subliminally exposed to the name of a significant other who
is controlling can elicit reactance and oppositional behavior
(Chartrand et al., 2007), depending on the nature of the
relationship.
Some Effects of the Self in Relation to the Other
Likewise, individuals tend to form a version of the self in
the context of a particular relationship, as the self is typically
experienced with each specific significant other, and this
relational self should be evoked in transference. Indeed, in
transference, an individual’s sense of self should parallel the
version of the self that is experienced with the relevant significant
other. For example, one may be especially gentle and supportive
toward one’s wife, and yet one may be assertive and seek power
amongst co-workers. These various ways of perceiving the self
and behaving–for example, being both gentle and assertive–can
each constitute the self; however, in line with Mischel’s IF–
THEN theory (Mischel and Shoda, 1995), they differ based on
the interpersonal context in which they are activated. When the
significant other representation is activated, the corresponding
self is activated and enacted, as well (Andersen and Chen,
2002).
Indeed, there is evidence to support this. Adjusting for one’s
self-definition at pretest, the “relational self ” with the specific
significant other is experienced with the new person, independent
of whether the significant other is regarded positively or
negatively (Hinkley and Andersen, 1996). The knowledge one
has of the self with the significant other, as well as its valence,
enters the working self-concept when the significant-other
representation is evoked. This effect can also be provoked by
facial resemblance to a significant other in a new person. When
presented with a photo of a new person whom individuals had
previously rated as resembling a significant other in an earlier
session, individuals described themselves more as the person they
are when with the significant other (Kraus and Chen, 2010).
Activation of the relational self has also been shown
to indirectly activate automatic self-verification processes in
transference. Research from another lab showed that upon
learning about a significant-other resembling person (versus
not), individuals end up rating themselves in a manner that
better reflects their desired self (how they would like to be
viewed) on self-attributes most important to the relational self
(Kraus and Chen, 2009). In the absence of significant-other
resemblance, by contrast, individuals are more likely to self-
enhance using a wide variety of attributes. In fact, when a
significant-other representation is activated, individuals will also
describe themselves (e.g., how athletic or artistic they are) to a
new person resembling the significant other in such a way as
to receive self-verification for important aspects of the activated
relational self (Kraus and Chen, 2014).
Along the same lines, one’s sense of self-worth is also
dependent in part on the relational self that is active at the
moment. Contingencies of self-worth that are experienced with
a significant other (e.g., Crocker and Wolfe, 2001; Horberg
and Chen, 2010) are activated when that significant-other
representation is implicitly activated in transference. Research
from another lab showed that when a significant other with
whom individuals wanted to be close to was implicitly activated,
individuals were more likely to stake their self-esteem on
performance in those domains in which the significant other
wanted them to do well (Horberg and Chen, 2010). That is,
individuals’ sense of self-worth and the degree to which they had
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thoughts about failure were affected by perceived success or lack
thereof on performance in that particular domain.
Relational selves can also help affirm one’s overall sense of
self when aspects of relational selves are deemed important. For
example, research on self-affirmation and relational selves from
another lab suggests that individuals who see relational self-
aspects as particularly important to their identity, can readily
maintain a positive sense of self in the face of threat (e.g., negative
feedback on an aptitude test) by focusing on these particular
aspects of the self (Chen and Boucher, 2008), and in so doing,
protect their self-esteem. That is, individuals threatened by bogus
negative feedback showed a heightened tendency to characterize
themselves in relational terms in a self-description task (Study 1)
and to evaluate positively the letters in their own names (versus
other letters, Study 2), suggesting positive implicit self-esteem
(Chen and Boucher, 2008).
Cultural differences also sway how the self is contextually
experienced and perceived in relation to different significant
others. For instance, research has shown that Asian Americans
show more cross-situational inconsistency across different
relationships than do European Americans, and yet they
do maintain consistency in self-descriptions—within each
relationship—over time (an across-time consistency often found
in dispositional research, writ large, English and Chen, 2007).
Further, among European Americans, but not Asian Americans,
inconsistency in individuals’ self-perceived traits across different
relationships has been shown to be associated with reduced
feelings of authenticity and relationship quality. Both groups,
however, experience lower levels of authenticity and relationship
satisfaction based on perceived inconsistency in the same
relationship over time (English and Chen, 2011). In short, this
research suggests that Asian Americans may be even more
likely to experience the self on an if-then basis, even though
we know European Americans also show such cross-situational
consistency, as noted.
In addition, evidence stemming from other labs does show
that the attachment system is triggered in transference (e.g.,
Cox et al., 2008, Study 5) and that attachment style and
working models clearly emerge in transference (e.g., Brumbaugh
and Fraley, 2006, 2007). In the classic transference paradigm,
manipulated resemblance to a prior romantic partner led
individuals to apply their attachment style with a past romantic
partner (the prior significant other) to a potential dating partner,
as reflected in self-reported anxiety and avoidance (Brumbaugh
and Fraley, 2006). Likewise, such manipulated resemblance led
the overall attachment style to arise in relation to potential new
friends (again in anxiety and depression, Brumbaugh and Fraley,
2007). Beyond this, other research indicates that manipulated
mortality salience (thoughts of death) makes transference more
pronounced in relation to a new person (based on manipulated
resemblance to a parent), in terms of self-reported liking and
also behaviors such as arranging for less physical distance (more
physical closeness) with the new person (Cox et al., 2008,
Study 5), increasing the relevance of the parent as a secure base,
and hence, the new person as a safe haven.
Hence, the relational self that is active at any particular time is
clearly dependent on important situational cues—that is, whether
or not a new person bears a resemblance to the significant other.
IF significant-other resembling cues are present in the situation,
THEN the significant-other representation will be evoked, and
the self-with-that-significant-other will become the functioning
self-concept at that time.
Self-Regulation
In addition to shifts in the working self-concept as a function
of the implicit activation of a significant-other representation,
contextual self-regulation is also evoked in transference. One
example of this is when negative self-with-significant-other
features enter the operative self-concept in transference, and
thus pose a threat to the self, a self-defensive response should
be elicited—as is common in response to other threats (see
Greenberg and Pyszczynski, 1985; Steele, 1988). Indeed, when
a significant other who is associated with a disliked version of
the self is evoked (Hinkley and Andersen, 1996; Reznik and
Andersen, 2007), the negative self-with-other features that have
been evoked should lead to the positive features that are not a
part of the relational self to enter into the working self-concept,
shielding one’s image of the self from threat, and this is in fact the
case (Hinkley and Andersen, 1996; Reznik and Andersen, 2007).
Similarly, the individual may, under some conditions, come
to protect the significant other in transference. This kind of
regulation may occur because it is favorable for people to believe
that their significant others are generally loving and good, despite
their faults. Thus, significant-other faults are often transformed
into charming quirks and even virtues (e.g., Murray and
Holmes, 1993). In transference, this process may occur relatively
automatically if it tends to occur consistently in the relationship
over time. Indeed, as previously noted, immediate facial affect
expressed in transference connotes the general feelings related
to the significant other. Furthermore, when negative features of
a positive significant other are encountered, participants express
even more positive immediate facial expressions than when they
encounter positive features, an effect not evident in the control
condition (Andersen et al., 1996). Thus, it appears that facial
affect transforms the valence of the feature from negative to
positive, so as to parallel the general positive affect related to the
significant other. This implies that self-regulation of this kind is
evoked because encountering a negative feature of a liked or loved
significant other in a new person may threaten the positive regard
one has for the significant other.
Such self-regulation could in principle extend to a significant
other’s negative emotions or behaviors when they are expressed
by a new person, as well. In particular, for example, if a significant
other has psychologically and physically maltreated an individual
in the past, a cue that may suggest rising tension from this
significant other should be especially negative; however, it should
still elicit self-regulation from the individual. Hence, cues like
anger from the significant other are likely to signal impending
abuse and may prompt self-regulation in the individual to shield
him or her from its consequences. Research has tested whether or
not new people in transference can trigger similar self-regulation
processes. For example, research tested how individuals abused
as children by a parent (or not) respond in transference when the
new person displays the pattern typical prior to abuse, such as
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becoming more irritable when awaiting the interaction (Berenson
and Andersen, 2006).
Although abused individuals displayed immediate positive
facial affect in transference, they expressed negative evaluations of
the new person compared to a control condition—they expected
rejection from him or her, were indifferent to whether or not
the new person liked them, and experienced significantly more
negative mood. When they were told that the new person was
becoming irritable and angry, however, those in transference
relative to the yoked control condition exhibited more positive
facial affect regardless of abuse history, presumably to maintain
general positive regard for the significant other. Previously
abused participants showed comparable levels of positive facial
affect as non-abused participants after encountering this cue.
Such a regulatory response aimed at protecting the other may not
be wise if the new person who is similar to the abusive significant
other is also abusive; that is, abuse could be perpetuated in a new
relationship. Interestingly, abused participants exhibited much
less negative affect when the new person resembled their parent
and was also acting angry and irritable compared to participants
in all other conditions, a kind of apathy that is referred to as
“emotional numbing” in the abuse literature.
In addition, individuals who possess certain emotional
vulnerabilities may be particularly likely to experience negative
affect when a loved, but rejecting significant other is activated in
transference. For example, dysphoric and non-dysphoric college
students who expected to meet a new person resembling a loved,
but sometimes rejecting, significant other were asked to describe
themselves by completing sentences to assess their working
self-concept (as in Hinkley and Andersen, 1996). Dysphoric
individuals described themselves in terms that were rated by
judges as more rejecting (Miranda et al., 2013). They also
experienced an increase in negative affect. However, when the
new person resembled a yoked significant other, or even a disliked
significant other, this effect did not occur. In fact, dysphoric
individuals showed a decrease in depressive mood when a
disliked significant other was brought to mind compared to a
yoked participant’s significant other. Non-dysphoric individuals
did not experience such shifts in mood following the activation
of any of the significant-other representations.
Another way of thinking about self-regulation and
transference is to consider how an individual may experience
having a self-discrepancy (Higgins, 1987) from the perspective
of a parent, when falling short of the standards held by that
parent, and the emotional vulnerability this entails. Indeed,
implicit activation of a parental representation in transference
should indirectly activate one’s sense of self, as well as the
parent’s standards for the self, which may not be the same
(Reznik and Andersen, 2007). Hence, activating a parental
representation may evoke a self-discrepancy (e.g., Higgins, 1987)
in transference, if such a discrepancy exists in the relationship
with the parent. A discrepancy between one’s actual self and
one’s ideal self (who one could ideally be) or one’s ought self
(who one should be) prompts feelings of dejection (as the
actual-ideal discrepancy is activated) or feelings of agitation (as
the actual-ought discrepancy is activated). These precise feelings
thus arise in transference, when relevant to the relationship.
However, when significant-other cues are encountered in the
new person that directly bring to mind the standard a parent
holds for oneself (i.e., when the new person emphasizes hopes
for or obligations for new friends), the regulatory functions of
the standards activated (i.e., according to self-regulatory focus
theory; Higgins, 1997) should be prompted based on transference.
That is, ideal standards (or hopes) are relevant to a promotion
focus—a focus on seeking out potential gains, while ought
standards (or obligations) are relevant to a prevention focus—
a focus on threat to avoid losses. Feelings of agitation should
be exacerbated when in a state of prevention focus, whereas a
promotion focus should decrease feelings of dejection, and this is
what evidence has shown. Individuals in transference with an
actual-ideal discrepancy from their parent’s standpoint who were
presented with a cue bringing to mind the parent’s ideals showed
evidence of promotion focus that reduced feelings of dejection
while a similar cue presented to individuals with an actual-ought
discrepancy did not facilitate a reduction of agitation-related
feelings in transference (Reznik and Andersen, 2007).
Other problematic inconsistencies that exist in a significant-
other relationship are also activated in transference. For instance,
a discrepancy in goals one has with a significant other, such
as an unsatisfied goal for love and affection, as noted, is
activatedwhen the significant other is (Berk andAndersen, 2008).
This leads individuals to experience feelings of hostility toward
the new person, while still attempting to satisfy the activated
goal. That is, when the representation of the significant other
with whom they have such a goal discrepancy is activated in
transference, individuals persist on a task designed to elicit liking
from the new person. Similarly, dysphoric individuals who have
sometimes been rejected by loved significant others, and thus
have experienced a discrepancy in their relationship regarding
love and affection, report increased depressed mood when such
a significant other is activated (Miranda et al., 2013). They also
describe themselves in a manner conveying rejection in this
context.
Indeed, a different way of viewing the matter of self-regulation
with respect to transference and the relational self is to ask
whether or not this relatively automatic process can ever be
intentionally short-circuited. When the transference process
perpetuates suffering by triggering interpersonal problems,
individuals may have good reason to want to prevent it. On the
other hand, its automaticity—that is, the notion that it arises
without effort, intention, or awareness (see Andersen et al.,
2005, 2007)—should make it difficult or impossible to control
(Przybylinski and Andersen, 2013). Evidence suggests that this
is so. However, it can be controlled when people make use of an
intentional strategy that can itself be automatized, which can in
fact be effective in eliminating unwanted inferential and memory
biases (Przybylinski and Andersen, 2013).
In Sum
Taken together, this research convincingly demonstrates how
the self, as experienced from moment-to-moment, can vary as
a function of situational triggering cues that activate and bring
to mind stored knowledge of significant others. When such
knowledge is activated, it indirectly activates the specific relational
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self, as well as the relationship with a particular significant other.
This results in shifts in judgments, memory, evaluations, goals
and motivations, as well as emotional state, and perceptions of
the self, based on this activated stored knowledge. In turn, how
one responds to a new person at the moment will also depend
on the nature of the significant other that is activated in the
moment. The effects tend to be of moderate effect size and are well
replicated (e.g., Miranda et al., 2013; Przybylinski and Andersen,
2013, 2015). In this sense, the evidence demonstrates the cross-
situational variability of the person in the domain of interpersonal
relationships as a function of triggers in the current situation.
While we do not assume that everything about personality
is interpersonal, the fact that significant-other representations
have been shown to be activated quite automatically, based on
incidental contextual cues, implies that even when the individual
is consciously focused on other things or enacting a common
routine exchange with another person, the process is still likely
to unfold, at least in subtle ways. Of course, if the individual
is anticipating further interaction with the person or for other
reasons is more engaged, self-relevant expectations, emotions,
and motivations should be more likely. In this respect, there are
likely to be boundary conditions on the more emotionally laden
phenomena we have observed. In addition, as previously noted,
there may be circumstances under which the transference process
is particularly likely to occur such as when one is experiencing
a circadian rhythm mismatch (Kruglanski and Pierro, 2008), is
high in need for closure (Pierro and Kruglanski, 2008), or low
in assessment orientation (Pierro et al., 2009), or when one’s
mortality has been threatened in some manner (Cox et al., 2008).
Finally, although we do not focus exclusively on within-person
designs that directly examine variability in responses within
the individual across contexts—nor focus on stability in the
transference effect over time (longitudinally)—we have shown
that the transference effect, as provoked (or not) by initial
situational (person) cues and that this persists at least over a
2- to 3-week period concerning that new person (Glassman and
Andersen,1999b).Moreover, evenwhenweuseabetween-subjects
design, this still does involve long-standing (and relatively stable)
stored significant-other knowledge. The experimental designs
are also carefully controlled, by manipulating whether or not the
individual’sownsignificantother is cued (i.e., exposure todiffering
interpersonal situations), in order to assess how responses then
vary.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The complex, situation-dependent ways of responding we have
empirically shown to occur in transference provide support for
a relational IF–THEN conceptualization of personality, and call
for future research that could clarify the conditions of behavior
and personality, based on situational cues. First, significant others
are often not thought of as merely “positive” or “negative,” but
rather possess varying degrees of ambivalence that have specific
significance for one’s experience when these significant-other
representations are activated. Such ambivalence, as it may be
triggered situationally by transference, is in need of further testing
beyond the activation of standards that the significant other holds
and past abuse by that significant other.
Considerably more research on these topics is necessary,
particularly that which focuses on emotion and emotion
regulation in transference. For instance, it is now well-known
that, although significant others may be loved, they may still
be associated with painful emotions and this suffering can
be perpetuated in transference. Conceptually, it is of central
importance to ascertain whether or not or precisely how people
may prevent the processes of transference (beyond just memory
and inferences, as in Przybylinski and Andersen, 2013) from
transpiring when triggering cues are present in a situation.
The ability for one to regulate a relatively automatic way of
responding evoked implicitly and without intention so as to not
be affected by it is worth further consideration.
In addition, examining the conditions in which positive
interpersonal results may come about in transference, as opposed
to just negative ones, would be important to understanding
the way positive interpersonal responses are related to
representations of significant others. For instance, in some
circumstances individuals should not only make certain mistakes
in interpreting the new person, but also may pay special attention
to him or her and be especially motivated to understand
him or her, such as through empathy. These consequences of
transference have not been adequately explored.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, our model, known as the relational self, integrates
the self and personality. We draw in part on Mischel’s (1968)
notion of cross-situational variability in behavior, and also
show consistency within individuals based in the cognitive-
affective processing system and their personality signature
(Mischel and Shoda, 1995; Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999). Our
model shows an intrinsic link between the situation and
an individual’s responses in the situation—including emotion,
expectancy, and the experience of the self—that is grounded in
relationships with significant others. We argue that significant-
other representations can be individually activated at any time as
a function of situational cues, leading to the indirect activation of
the self when with the significant other, as well as the relationship
with the significant other. These activated representations affect
interpersonal behavior and other responses in predictable ways.
We argue that the precise responses in transference are specific
to the person and to the relationshipwith the significant other that
is evoked, even though they are stable over time—that is, when
similar cues are present in the environment, similar responses
should be evoked. In this way, the self and personality are, at
any given moment, dependent on cues in the situation as well as
on the chronic accessibility of significant-other representations.
Thus, significant-other knowledge stored in memory that may
be activated is stable over time, as is the version of the self one
is with that other. Thus, transference occurs on an IF–THEN
basis—IF one encounters someone who is similar to a significant
other, THEN one becomes the version of the self when with that
significant other. Indeed, this process transpires in individualistic
cultures like the U.S.—where the research was conducted—as
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well as across genders, and among individuals not specifically
preselected as allocating special attention to relationships.
Overall, the contributions of Mischel and his colleagues—
both conceptual and empirical—facilitate an important shift in
the field of personality. Researchers are increasingly embracing
the notion that behavioral variability is fundamental to
personality, and are embracing ways to test the complexity of
that variability, versus regarding it as merely error variance.
This can enrich our understanding of individuals greatly.
As a relational IF–THEN framework, our model reflects this
perspective in personality theory, and can be considered
one of various IF–THEN models of personality to emerge
in the last decade or so, such as those reconceptualizing
CAUs (Mischel and Shoda, 1995) as “schemas” or organized
knowledge structures similarly brought to the fore in
relevant situations, thus allowing for situation-specific
interpretive tendencies (Cervone, 2004; Cervone and Batooszek,
2013).
Our work shows the important role significant others play
in understanding personality, especially affect, expectations,
behavior, and how the self is experienced from one situation to
the next. It also integrates ideas from psychodynamic theory, as
well as those from social cognition and learning theory. Drawing
on Mischel’s insights, the model combines diverse areas of
psychology to map the complexity of personality, by integrating
an individual’s interpersonal history with the present situation,
and highlighting why an individual’s variability by context reflects
essential aspects of the person.
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Psychiatric diagnostic covariation suggests that the underlying structure of
psychopathology is not one of circumscribed disorders. Quantitative modeling of
individual differences in diagnostic patterns has uncovered several broad domains
of mental disorder liability, of which the Internalizing and Externalizing spectra have
garnered the greatest support. These dimensions have generally been estimated from
lifetime or past-year comorbidity patters, which are distal from the covariation of
symptoms and maladaptive behavior that ebb and flow in daily life. In this study,
structural models are applied to daily diary data (Median = 94 days) of maladaptive
behaviors collected from a sample (N = 101) of individuals diagnosed with personality
disorders (PDs). Using multilevel and unified structural equation modeling, between-
person, within-person, and person-specific structures were estimated from 16 behaviors
that are encompassed by the Internalizing and Externalizing spectra. At the between-
person level (i.e., individual differences in average endorsement across days) we found
support for a two-factor Internalizing–Externalizing model, which exhibits significant
associations with corresponding diagnostic spectra. At the within-person level (i.e.,
dynamic covariation among daily behavior pooled across individuals) we found support
for a more differentiated, four-factor, Negative Affect-Detachment-Hostility-Disinhibition
structure. Finally, we demonstrate that the person-specific structures of associations
between these four domains are highly idiosyncratic.
Keywords: internalizing, externalizing, personality structure, personality dynamics, psychopathology, multilevel
SEM, idiographic modeling, unified SEM
INTRODUCTION
Occasioned by patterns of extensive diagnostic co-occurrence, there has been substantial interest
in mapping the fundamental nature of psychopathology using quantitative modeling techniques
(e.g., Krueger, 1999; Krueger and Markon, 2006; Cramer et al., 2010; Borsboom et al., 2011; Kotov
et al., 2011; Wigman et al., 2015). Prime examples of these efforts include the empirically identified
Internalizing (e.g., unipolar mood disorders, anxiety disorders) and Externalizing (e.g., substance
use, antisocial behavior) spectra (e.g., Achenbach, 1966; Krueger, 1999; Wright et al., 2013). As has
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been the case in the basic personality trait literature, research
on the structure of mental disorders has prioritized the between-
person level of analysis (i.e., individual differences). However,
there has been increasing interest in studying contextualized
dynamic processes associated with psychopathology (e.g., Myin-
Germeys et al., 2009; Wichers, 2014). These approaches use a
variety of within-person data collection and analytic techniques
that seek to illuminate the granular and nuanced dynamics
of mental disorders. On the surface these two perspectives to
understanding psychopathology may seem at odds: one seeking
to cast clinical phenomena in terms of generalities, the other
pursuing a high degree of specificity. Here we explore bridging
these two approaches by examining the structures that emerge
from daily diary reports of maladaptive behaviors at the between-
person, within-person, and person-specific levels of analysis. In
so doing we draw links to efforts in basic personality science that
seek to integrate structural and dynamic models by treating traits
as ensembles of contextualized processes (e.g., Wright, 2014;
DeYoung, 2015; Fleeson and Jayawickreme, 2015; Revelle and
Condon, 2015).
The Structure of Individual Differences in
Psychopathology
Psychiatric comorbidity is extensive in the general population
(Kessler et al., 1994, 2005), and in clinical samples poly-
diagnosis is the rule rather than the exception (Zimmerman
and Mattia, 1999). This complicates clinical communication,
treatment selection, and frustrates efforts to uncover the
pathophysiology, etiology, and maintenance mechanisms of
mental illness (Hyman, 2010). As a result, prominent clinical
scientists, including the current and past heads of the U.S.
National Institute of Mental Health, have called for a complete
overhaul of the framework for classifying mental disorders
(Hyman, 2010; Insel et al., 2010). Rather than enumerating
increasingly detailed categories of disorder, it has been suggested
that dimensions of functioning that cut across traditional
diagnoses better approximate the structure of psychopathology
(e.g., Brown et al., 1998; Widiger and Trull, 2007; Cuthbert and
Insel, 2013; Harkness et al., 2014). One promising approach
for addressing these issues involves statistically modeling
patterns of covariation in diagnosed disorders and symptoms
to clarify the natural between-person structure (BP-Structure)
of mental disorders (Krueger and Markon, 2006; Wright and
Zimmermann, 2015). This approach has been profitably applied
to both child (Achenbach, 1966; Lahey et al., 2008) and adult
(Krueger, 1999; Krueger and Markon, 2006; Kotov et al.,
2011) disorders. In adult psychopathology, as noted above, a
well-replicated BP-Structure has emerged based on individual
differences in the clustering of disorders and their symptoms into
Internalizing and Externalizing spectra (Wolf et al., 1988; Kotov
et al., 2010a; Markon, 2010; Wright et al., 2013). This structure
has demonstrated strong empirical and statistical evidence for
its validity, including invariance across cultures (e.g., Slade and
Watson, 2006), gender (Eaton et al., 2012), age groups (Eaton
et al., 2011), and time-points within samples (Krueger et al., 1998;
Vollebergh et al., 2001).
However, these domains are necessarily broad and
decontextualized. In other words, they describe psychopathology
in terms of individual differences, not in terms of the within-
person or person-specific dynamic processes that often define
mental disorders. Indeed, BP-Structural analyses of mental
disorder covariation have largely relied on lifetime diagnoses
(Krueger, 1999; Kotov et al., 2010a, 2011; Røysamb et al.,
2011; Forbush and Watson, 2013; Wright et al., 2013) or some
admixture of lifetime and current diagnoses (e.g., Markon,
2010; Blanco et al., 2013; Wright and Simms, 2015). What can
be concluded from these studies is that the identified spectra
of psychopathology (e.g., Internalizing, Externalizing) reflect
latent dimensions of liability for the recognized mental disorders
(Krueger and Markon, 2006; Caspi et al., 2014). That is to say,
they reflect population-level risk for developing more specific
instantiations of psychopathology during the lifespan. These
spectra provide invaluable information about patterns of disorder
covariation (i.e., co-morbidity), heritability (Kendler et al., 2011),
and even the lack of specificity in responses to treatment (Barlow
et al., 2010). Yet by themselves these dimensions lack the ability
to provide information about proximal etiologies of clinically
significant impairment, processes contributing to symptom
exacerbation, or possible maintenance mechanisms.
Psychopathology as Maladaptive
Dynamic Processes
Major theories of psychopathology posit processes of disorder
development, exacerbation, and maintenance that play out
over diverse time scales and frequently involve an interaction
between individuals and the context in which they live their
lives (e.g., Beck et al., 1979; Teasdale, 1988; Nolen-Hoeksema,
1991; Linehan, 1993; Benjamin, 2005). Indeed, many of the
symptoms that define psychiatric disorders are cue- or context-
dependent. For instance, social phobia is characterized by
intense anxiety and behavioral avoidance when confronted
with social or evaluative situations. The hallmark interpersonal
impairments of borderline PD are responses to perceptions
of significant others’ behavior. The binge-purge cycles of the
patient diagnosed with bulimia nervosa reflect a maladaptive
and extreme regulatory cycle (e.g., binges and purges both
occur in response to heightened negative affect in a specific
sequence). Even the blunted hedonic response in depression
can be understood as a lack of the normative shift in affect in
response to pleasurable events. This has led many researchers
to begin studying the dynamic processes of psychopathology
as they unfold in the naturalistic settings of daily life (e.g.,
Shiffman et al., 2002; Wegner et al., 2002; Silk et al., 2003;
Ebner-Priemer et al., 2007; Trull et al., 2008; Sadikaj et al.,
2013; Pe et al., 2015; see also Myin-Germeys et al., 2009 for a
review).
This approach has provided much needed systematic
empirical confirmation of the clinical description of psychiatric
phenomena (e.g., affective instability in borderline PD; Russell
et al., 2007; Trull et al., 2008) and has offered new insights into
maladaptive behavioral sequences (e.g., individuals diagnosed
with borderline PD are more likely to respond to perceived
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quarrelsomeness with negative affect, but no more likely to
respond to negative affect with quarrelsomeness than controls;
Sadikaj et al., 2013). Interestingly, as debates about psychiatric
nosology have been pushing the field away from disorder-specific
symptoms and toward dimensions that cut across traditional
diagnoses, the study of dynamic processes in psychopathology
has instead been emphasizing highly specific micro-processes
(e.g., Wichers, 2014; Fried, 2015). It is notable that the majority,
but not all, of the research studying dynamic processes in
naturalistic settings have used a diagnostic group based design
(e.g., comparing patients vs. community controls). Although
there are plenty of good reasons for selecting circumscribed
diagnostic groups for study (e.g., ensuring sufficient levels of
pathology; maximizing statistical power in very expensive and
difficult to collect data), this approach is at odds with efforts
to collapse across categories to study dimensions of shared
impairments (Krueger and Markon, 2006; Insel et al., 2010).
Thus, there is a tension between different areas of clinical
science, which presumably share the same goal of clarifying the
nature of psychopathology. The tension created is one between
emphases on BP-Structure and within-person processes, which is
certainly not a novel challenge (cf. Titchener, 1898). Taking as a
given that both empirical thrusts have important information to
contribute, the question becomes how best to integrate advances
in the between-person structure of individual differences with
the within-person study of dynamic processes (Wright, 2011;




A model for resolving the tension between investigations that
focus on BP-Structure and within-person dynamic processes
can be found in contemporary personality theory. Akin to
the quantitative modeling of covariation in mental disorders,
personality researchers invested heavily in the modeling of
dispositional attributes that ultimately resulted in the Big-
Five/Five-Factor Model of personality (for reviews see Digman,
1990, 1996; Goldberg, 1993; Wright, in press). Paralleling these
investigations, researchers interested in personality processes
have sought to study the within-person temporal dynamics of
specific thoughts, feelings, and behavior, which are the behavioral
building blocks of personality traits (e.g., Carver and Scheier,
1982; Larsen, 1987; Mischel and Shoda, 1995; Eid and Diener,
1999; Fleeson, 2001; Moskowitz and Zuroff, 2004; Cervone,
2005). Until recently and with few exceptions (e.g., Borkenau
and Ostendorf, 1998), studies of the BP-Structure and dynamic
processes of personality have largely proceeded separately (Read
et al., 2010). There is now increasing interest in meaningful
synthesis of models of individual differences in structure and
the putative underlying dynamic processes that give rise to
this structure (e.g., Fleeson, 2007; Fleeson and Gallagher, 2009;
Fournier et al., 2009; DeYoung, 2015; Fleeson and Jayawickreme,
2015; Revelle and Condon, 2015). At the risk of oversimplifying,
these integrative approaches take the domains outlined by BP-
Structural models of individual differences (e.g., the Big-5), and
use them as the orienting dimensions to organize hypotheses
and investigations into the patterning of within-person dynamic
processes (e.g., McCabe and Fleeson, 2012; Wright et al.,
2015).
This integrative approach may be viable in psychopathology
research given that the structures of personality and
psychopathology are meaningfully overlapping (Wright
and Simms, 2015). Long hypothesized, going back to antiquity
and the writings of Hippocrates and Galen, evidence for the
link between personality/temperament and mental disorders
has is now quite robust. For one, several meta-analyses show
that personality trait ratings and mental disorder diagnoses
are strongly associated (e.g., Saulsman and Page, 2004; Ruiz
et al., 2008; Samuel and Widiger, 2008; Kotov et al., 2010b).
The meta-analytic results show that disorders falling within
the Internalizing spectrum demonstrate strong associations
with Neuroticism and Detachment (i.e., Introversion),
whereas disorders falling within the Externalizing spectrum
are most strongly associated with Disinhibition (i.e., low
Conscientiousness and Impulsivity) and Antagonism (i.e., low
Agreeableness).
Moreover, the hierarchical organization of personality
traits and mental disorders bear unmistakable resemblance.
A consistent finding is that at the level of two higher-
order domains, dimensions of maladaptive personality bear
close resemblance to the Internalizing and Externalizing
spectra (Markon et al., 2005; Kushner et al., 2011; Wright
et al., 2012; Wright and Simms, 2014). In these models,
the Internalizing domain subsumes lower-order domains of
Negative Affectivity and Detachment, and the Externalizing
domain subsumes Disinhibition and Antagonism. Further, there
is now accumulating evidence from models that incorporate
broader sampling of psychopathology for additional spectra
labeled Antagonism and Detachment/Anhedonic or Pathological
Introversion (Markon, 2010; Kotov et al., 2011; Røysamb et al.,
2011; Wright and Simms, 2015). Although direct evidence from
hierarchical structural models of DSM diagnoses is lacking, the
conceptual convergence with hierarchical models of personality
suggests that a disorder based Antagonism domain can be joined
with traditional indicators of disinhibitory pathology to form a
broader Externalizing factor (e.g., Krueger et al., 2007), whereas
Pathological Introversion would join affective disorders to define
a higher order domain of Internalizing. Thus it is expected
that with further targeted research the hierarchy of mental
psychopathology and personality will largely converge.
Taken together, this suggests that much like contemporary
personality science, investigations into within-person temporal
processes of mental disorders could benefit from using the same
empirically derived domains (e.g., Internalizing, Externalizing)
that organize between-person differences in psychopathology
in traditional cross-sectional research. As such, demonstrating
similarities in structure at both levels would be the minimum
requirement to ensure success of this approach. However, it is
unknown whether the within-person structure (WP-Structure)
that emerges from the temporal patterning of specific behaviors
over time mirrors the BP-Structure of individual differences
in the expression of those same maladaptive behaviors either
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at the higher-order level of Internalizing and Externalizing or
possibly with lower-order differentiation of sub-factors within
each domain.
Methodological Integration of Structure
and Dynamic Processes
Joining models of between-person individual differences with
the study of within-person dynamic processes immediately raises
the issue of how to appropriately model and test whether
such a marriage will succeed. Specifically, it involves modeling
data that has a multilevel structure, with many time-points or
occasions of measurement nested within individuals. There are
two sources of variance in this type of data: variability associated
with between-person differences in mean item endorsement,
and variability associated with within-person, time-point specific
deflections around those means. As Molenaar (2004) has shown,
the structure of within-person covariation of behaviors is
mathematically distinguishable from the covariation patterns
of between-person differences in the mean levels of these
behaviors (see also Nesselroade and Molenaar, 1999; Borsboom
et al., 2003; von Eye and Bergman, 2003; Grice, 2004). That
is to say, there is no guarantee that the same structure
holds at both levels. Furthermore, the same WP-Structure
may not apply to all individuals (Molenaar, 2004; Molenaar
and Campbell, 2009). Indeed, for many applications, it is the
person-specific (i.e., idiographic) structure (PS-Structure) that
is of greatest interest. For instance, when it comes to tailoring
and applying a behavioral intervention, substantial individual
heterogeneity compels the development of a “model of the
individual.”
A note on terminology is warranted. Here we draw a
distinction between three tiers of structural analysis that
are available when modeling intensive longitudinal data. BP-
Structure refers to traditional conceptions of cross-sectional
individual differences, and is derived from the covariation of
behaviors averaged across time-points. Thus, it is time-invariant,
or static in nature.We additionally consider two levels of dynamic
structure. For the first dynamic approach, we use the term “WP-
Structure” for the structure of temporal covariation in behaviors,
pooled in whole or in part across individuals as is common
in multilevel analysis. In other words, it is the within-person,
dynamic patterning of behaviors, controlling for average levels,
but shared, at least in part, across all individuals in the sample. For
the second approach we use the term “PS-Structure” for person-
specific models of temporal covariation that are based solely on a
single subject’s multivariate time-series.
Several approaches have been developed for the appropriate
structural analysis of intensive longitudinal data in groups of
individuals. Multilevel structural equation modeling (MSEM;
Muthén, 1991, 1994) generally offers a top–down approach,
decomposing the total variance of the observed variables into the
latent between- and within-person portions, and then fitting a
model to each. It can be considered a top–down method because
in MSEM a WP-Structure is specified that is then fitted to all
individuals simultaneously (see also Shumway and Stoffer (2006)
section 6.11 for a time-series perspective on this approach).
Other methods adopt a bottom–up approach, starting with
the structure of individuals and finding communalities in the
individual data structures [e.g., the Integrated Trait-State Model
(Hamaker et al., 2007) or Multilevel Simultaneous Component
Analysis (Timmerman, 2006)], or iteratively fitting group- and
individual-specific SEMs [e.g., Group Iterative Multiple Model
Estimation (Gates andMolenaar, 2012)]. These approaches arrive
at partially shared structure or parameters.
Methods for deriving PS-Structures involve the idiographic
analysis of a single individual’s multivariate time-series.
Certain methods are mathematically and conceptually parallel
to the analysis of multivariate structure across individuals
[e.g., P-technique Factor Analysis (Baldwin, 1946; Cattell,
1966)] or augment the analysis with temporal information
by including a block-Toeplitz matrix [Dynamic Factor
Analysis (Molenaar, 1985)] or using a multiple indicator
vector autoregression moving average model (Hamaker et al.,
2005). Recent developments include unified SEM (uSEM), which
combines vector autoregression with SEM (Kim et al., 2007).
Although similar, these methods differ in their emphasis on
latent variables and inclusion of temporal lags [i.e., modeling
associations from one time point (t-1) to the next (t)].
All of these methods share the ability to appropriately handle
multilevel data structures, and each offers distinct advantages
and disadvantages that need to be weighed with the specific
modeling demands of the research question. To highlight a key
distinction, the models of dynamic structure (i.e., WP-Structure
or PS-Structure) differ in their level of complexity and flexibility
in allowing for differences in structure across individuals. The
least complex is the shared WP-Structure derived from MSEM
with the most being the PS-Structure derived from idiographic
analyses. Arguably, PS-Structure offers the most precise match to
any given individual’s actual patterning of behavior. At the same
time, when investigating large samples of individuals there may
be value in using a more constrained approach like MSEM to
appropriately reduce highly dimensional data into coherent but
manageable factors. Practically speaking, investigators need to
balance traditional assessment considerations (e.g., reliability of
estimates, measurement error, bandwidth fidelity tradeoffs, etc.)
with modeling complex nuanced dynamic processes.
The Current Study
The overarching goal of the current study was to provide a bridge
between research paradigms that adopt divergent approaches
to clarifying the fundamental nature of psychopathology. More
precisely, we sought to provide a much needed conceptual link
between work that has established transdiagnostic domains or
crosscutting dimensions of psychopathology in cross-sectional
data, and more recent efforts to understand the complex dynamic
processes that characterize mental disorders as they play out
in daily life. Toward this aim, we posed the following specific
questions. First, does the BP-Structure of individual differences
in daily endorsement of maladaptive behaviors conform to the
latent structure of psychiatric diagnoses (i.e., Internalizing and
Externalizing)? Second, can the same structure be applied to
the WP-Structure of dynamic daily fluctuations in maladaptive
behaviors? Third, is there PS-Structure heterogeneity in the daily
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and cross-day (i.e., lagged) links among the dimensions identified
by WP-Structural analyses?
To answer the first two questions we estimated multilevel
confirmatory factor analyses (i.e., MSEM) in a sample of
individuals diagnosed with PDs who completed daily diaries
of maladaptive behaviors over 100 consecutive days. We tested
two a priori models for both the BP- and WP-Structures.
We based our tested models on research on the overlap in
BP-Structures of personality and psychopathology discussed
above. Thus, we tested two-factor Internalizing and Externalizing
models, as well as a nested four-factor model that partitioned
Internalizing into its lower order domains of Negative Affectivity
and Detachment, and partitioned Externalizing into lower order
domains of Disinhibition and Hostility (representative of the
broader Antagonism domain). Finally, we then addressed the
third question by using uSEM to examine the person-specific
interplay among components of this dynamic structure for a
subset of participants, mapping networks in which Internalizing




The sample used in this study was collected as part of a project
designed to investigate general daily processes of behavior in
individuals with PD. As such, recruitment targeted individuals
diagnosed with any PD. Participants were recruited from a
clinical sample (N = 628) enrolled in an ongoing study to
improve efficient measurement of PD (Simms et al., 2011, under
review). Participants were recruited into the broader clinical
sample by distributing flyers at mental health clinics across
Western New York, and were eligible for participation in the
parent study if they reported psychiatric treatment within the past
2 years. Participants received structured clinical interviews by
trained assessors for clinical syndromes and PDs using the sixth
edition of the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Inventory
(MINI; Sheehan and Lecrubier, 2010) and a version of the
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR PDs (SCID-II;
First et al., 1997), respectively. Only specific PD diagnoses were
evaluated; PD-NOS was not evaluated or diagnosed. Disorder-
level Kappas from independent ratings of a subset of participants
(n = 120) were strong (Mdn K = 0.96; range = 0.66–1.00).
Those who met the threshold for any PD diagnosis on the
clinical interview were contacted for possible participation in the
current daily diary study. The sole additional requirement for
participation was daily Internet access via computer or mobile
device.
One hundred and sixteen participants attended the baseline
assessment for the daily diary study. Due to the focus on
variability in behavior in this study, only participants providing
at least 30 days worth of data were included to ensure reliable
estimates of variability. Only 15 individuals were excluded
for providing less than 30 diaries, resulting in an effective
sample size of 101. Of these participants, 66 (65.3%) were
female, and the majority reported being either White (82.2%) or
African American (14.9%). On average, time between diagnostic
interview and the initial assessment in this study was 1.4 years
(Range = 1.2–1.7 years; SD = 0.16 years). The rates of PD
diagnoses were as follows: 35.6% paranoid, 13.9% schizoid, 16.8%
schizotypal, 7.9% antisocial, 36.6% borderline, 2.0% histrionic,
19.8% narcissistic, 53.5% avoidant, 5.9% dependent, 50.5%
obsessive-compulsive. The average number of PD diagnoses
per participant was 2.4. Additionally, 62.4% were diagnosed
with mood disorders, 69.3% with anxiety disorders, 8.9%
with psychotic disorders, and 23% with substance/alcohol use
disorders. Demographics for the retained sample are presented
in Table 1. Relative to the pool of 628 participants the current
sample was drawn from, no differences were found on Age, Sex,
or Employment Status. We found differences on Race (ϕ = 0.19),
Marital Status (ϕ = 0.13), Educational Attainment (ϕ = 0.16),
and Income (ϕ = 0.17), all of which were of small effect.
Participants in the retained sample were less likely to be Black,
and were more likely to be in higher Income or Educational
Attainment categories. The retained sample was more likely to
be married and less likely to be divorced or separated. Seventy-
two percent of participants reported current mental health care
treatment, 14% within the last year, and the remainder longer
than 1 year prior to the daily diary protocol.
Procedure
A complete description of the study was provided, and written
informed consent was obtained prior to participation in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The University at
Buffalo institutional review board approved all study procedures.
Participants attended an initial in-person training and assessment
session during which study procedures were explained, and a
battery of self-report measures was completed via computer.
Starting the evening of the in-person assessment, participants
were asked to complete daily diaries assessing daily interpersonal
behavior, affect, symptoms, stress, and functioning via secure
website every evening for 100 consecutive days. Surveys were
to be completed at roughly the same time each day, between
8 pm and 12 am. However, participants were allowed to deviate
from this schedule if necessary (e.g., working nightshift) so
long as (a) they completed diaries at the end of their day, and
(b) the diaries were completed at roughly the same time each
day. Participants received daily email reminders and also were
provided several paper diaries they could use in the event of
technological difficulties. Compliance rates were very high, with
a total of 9,041 diaries completed by participants in this study
after data cleaning (Mdn = 94 days, M = 89.5 days, range = 33–
101 days, 90% > 60 days), a small fraction of which were
done by paper (∼2% of completed diaries).1 Compensation was
1We examined basic demographics of gender and age, severity of personality
disorder based on clinical interview, and average reported daily diary domains that
we examined in the study. We found modest correlations of rate of participation
with age (r = 0.20, p = 0.04) but not gender (r = 0.17, p = 0.10), no association
with any of the personality disorders (all p’s > 0.10), and modest associations with
average daily hostility (r = −0.24, p= 0.02) and disinhibition (r = −0.23, p= 0.02)
but not the remaining two daily domains (p’s > 0.07). Thus, individuals who were
younger and reported higher levels of daily Externalizing behavior participated
less. However, we believe this had little influence on the results given that (a) these
associations are in the context of very high rates of participation (Mdn = 94 days;
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Native American 3 3.0
Hispanic 5 5.0
Education
No high school diploma 6 6.0
High school diploma 16 15.8
Some college 34 33.7




















Never Married 48 47.5
N = 101.
provided for daily participation at the rate of $100 for ≥80%
participation, and prorated at $1/day for <80%. Participation
also was incentivized though recurring raffles ($10 drawing every
5 days for those providing at least four diaries) and drawings for
additional money and tablet computers at the end of the study,
with the odds of winning proportionally tied to participation.
Measures
Daily behaviors were measured using 16 items created for the
purpose of this project. The specific questions used in this
study are listed in the boxes denoting observed variables in
Figure 1. These 16 items were selected for their relevance to
the current study from a larger set of behaviors designed to
provide broad coverage of the daily manifestations of personality
pathology. Items were intended to reflect concrete behavioral
manifestations of broad domains of personality pathology as they
M = 89.5 days) and (b) multilevel SEM weights participants contribution to the
covariance matrices based on the number of observations.
might occur in daily life. Items were written so that they were
not so extreme as to have problematically low endorsement on
a daily basis, and participants were given an 8-point response
scale for each item anchored with Not at All (0) and Very
Much So (7). Prior work in this sample has examined the
basic descriptive features of these and the additional excluded
items, including rates of endorsement, levels of (in)stability, and
associations with the DSM-5 personality trait domains (Wright
and Simms, under review). Of the 16 items used in this study,
four were hypothesized primarily to reflect Negative Affectivity
(multilevel coefficient alphas using Geldhof et al., 2014 approach
were αBetween = 0.88, αWithin = 0.76), three primarily to reflect
Detachment (αBetween = 0.84, αWithin = 0.64), four primarily
to reflect Hostility (αBetween = 0.93, αWithin = 0.87), and the
remaining five to primarily reflect Disinhibition (αBetween = 0.92,
αWithin = 0.82).
Additionally, symptom counts from diagnostic interviews
for major depressive disorder, dysthymia, generalized anxiety
disorder, social phobia, post-traumatic stress disorder, alcohol
use disorder, substance use disorder, child conduct, antisocial,
avoidant, dependent, borderline, narcissistic, histrionic, and
paranoid PDs were used to develop a interview based structural
model described below. Reliabilities (K’s) are reported above.
Data Analysis
As described in the introduction, our analyses incorporate both
MSEM and uSEM, and we describe each in turn.
Testing BP- and WP-Structure of Maladaptive Daily
Behaviors
The first two questions we sought to answer concerned
whether the structure derived from individual differences in
psychiatric diagnoses could be adequately fit to the daily
diary data at the between- and within-person levels. We
additionally sought to use the WP-Structure to reduce the
dimensionality and complexity of the data for subsequent
idiographic analysis. Therefore we selected MSEM as an
analytic framework. MSEM extends traditional multilevel
regression (i.e., hierarchical linear modeling; random coefficient
regression) to multilevel covariance and mean structural
modeling (Muthén, 1991, 1994). It does so by partitioning
the total variance in the observed variables into the latent
between-person variance (commonly referred between-cluster or
between-group variance), and the observed within-person (also
within-cluster or within-group) variance (Muthén, 1991). The
partitioned variance can then be used to calculate both between-
and within-person covariance matrices. Although the within-
person covariance matrix is straightforwardly calculated and
understood, calculation of the between-person covariance matrix
is more complex (e.g., it is weighted for differences in cluster
size) and is conceptually akin to the covariance among random
intercepts (seeMuthén, 1994 andHeck, 1999 for technical details,
and Reise et al., 2005 and Preacher et al., 2010 for accessible
summaries).
With the variance thus partitioned, MSEM offers the
opportunity to separately estimate and compare between- and
within-person structures by fitting standard latent variable
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FIGURE 1 | Diagram of multilevel confirmatory factor analysis model with standardized factor loadings and latent covariances. Item specific residual
variances and factor variances not depicted.
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models, like confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Amultilevel CFA
was employed here and allows for potentially different factor
structures to emerge at each level of the data. In the current
context, the between-person structure reflects the pattern of
covariation in average item endorsements over the course of the
study, or, conceptually, the trait structure of these behaviors. In
contrast, the within-person structure reflects the tendency for
individual behaviors to covary at the daily level, or, conceptually,
the dynamic structure of these behaviors. Here we estimate a
series of between- and within-person factor models to determine
the optimal structure of daily maladaptive behaviors sampled in
this study.
For our first aim, we primarily were interested in testing
whether a two-factor (Internalizing, Externalizing) model would
acceptably fit the data, and if so, whether a four-factor model
(Negative Affect, Detachment, Hostility, Disinhibition) improved
upon this fit at the BP and WP levels. In addition to the
2- and 4-factor models of interest, we estimated one-factor
models as a point of comparison. To test this, we estimated a
series of MSEM models in Mplus version 7.31 (Muthén and
Muthén, 1998–2012). Due to significant skew and kurtosis in
the Externalizing behavior items, we treated all items as ordinal,
and estimated multilevel CFAs using a robust (mean adjusted)
weighted least squares approach (WLSM) on the polychoric
correlation matrix. Model fit testing in MSEM can be challenging
because the χ2 test and alternative fit indices are derived from
the comparison of the observed and implied covariance for
both the between- and within-person matrices simultaneously.
Therefore it is difficult to disentangle sources of ill model fit
across levels. To address this complication, we adopted Ryu
and West’s (2009) approach, which eliminates any source of ill
fit from a given level by fitting a saturated model (i.e., zero
df ), while models of interest are tested in the other level. For
example, first a saturated model was fit on the within-person
level, and hypothesized models were fit to the between level, and
then this process was reversed, fitting a fully saturated model
at the between level, and estimating models of interest at the
within-person level. Saturated models fit the data perfectly, and
therefore they do not contribute to lack of fit, so any source
of ill fit comes from the models at other levels. Ryu and West
(2009) provide additional details about appropriate calculation
of alternative fit indices for independence models at each level.
Although evaluation of global model fit in MSEM remains an
understudied topic, we considered the χ2 test, as well as several
alternative fit indices, using their single-level SEM recommended
cutoffs (Hu and Bentler, 1999). These include the root mean
square error of approximation (RMSEA) with values <0.05 for
good model fit, comparative fit index (CFI) with values near
or >0.95 indicative of good model fit, and the SRMR, with
values <0.08 indicative of good model fit. Because we used the
WLSMestimator, nested models were compared using the strictly
positive Satorra–Bentler scaled χ2 difference test (Satorra and
Bentler, 2010).
In order to test the validity of our retained model, in a
final MSEM we estimated interview-based Internalizing and
Externalizing spectra using data from the structured clinical
interview that were administered on initial assessment, and
used these as predictors of the between-person factors from the
daily behaviors. We used Kotov et al. (2011) structure, which
includes PD diagnoses in the model, as a template to select
relevant variables for our interview based model. We combined
the diagnoses from Kotov et al.’s (2011) Externalizing and
Antagonism domains in order to arrive at a broader Externalizing
domain that would better match out daily behaviors. Thus, our
interview-based Internalizing model was indicated by symptom
counts for major depression, dysthymia, social phobia, post-
traumatic stress, generalized anxiety, avoidant, dependent, and
borderline PDs. The interview-based Externalizing factor was
indicated by symptom counts for alcohol use, drug use, childhood
conduct, adult antisocial, narcissistic, histrionic, paranoid, and
borderline PDs (Please see Appendix A in Supplementary
Material for example MSEM syntax).
Exploring Person-Specific Structures of Maladaptive
Daily Behavior
Our second aim was to demonstrate how the optimal WP-
Structure derived from the MSEM could be leveraged to inform
person-oriented personality processes, providing a picture of
the data at a third conceptual level of analysis. To accomplish
this, we implemented individual-level unified structural equation
modeling (uSEM; Kim et al., 2007; Gates et al., 2010). This
approach combines SEM and vector autoregression of a single
participant’s daily diary data in order to map the interplay among
personality factors, that is, how variability in each factor is
influenced by the contemporaneous (occurring on the same day,
t) and lagged (occurring on previous days, t-1) variability in other
factors. The model with a mean fixed zero is defined as:
η(t) = Aη(t) + 1η(t − 1) + 2η(t − 2) + . . .
+ jη(t − j) + ζ(t),
where η(t) is the p-variate time series to be explained at day
t = 1, 2,. . ., T, with p the number of MSEM-derived within-
person factors and T the number of daily diary entries, A
the (p,p)-dimensional matrix of contemporaneous regression
coefficients explaining how each factor is influenced by other
factors on the same day, q is the (p,p)-dimensional matrices
of regression coefficients at lag q = 1, 2,. . ., j explaining
how each factor is influenced by itself or other factors from
previous days, and ζ is the p-variate error process, lacking
sequential dependencies and having a zero mean and a diagonal
contemporaneous covariance matrix. Simulation studies have
found that incorporating contemporaneous and lagged effects
simultaneously greatly improves reliability of results when
compared to models that solely include one type of effect (Gates
et al., 2010) and has been successfully applied to neuroimaging
and observational data (Hillary et al., 2011; Beltz et al., 2013), with
the present study being the first application to daily dairy data.
We fit uSEMs to the daily diary data of four exemplar
participants in a data-driven fashion (cf. Gates et al., 2010)
that accounted for the presence of multiple solutions (a
characteristic of SEMs; MacCallum et al., 1993), and that satisfied
the assumption of independent errors. We used LISREL for
the analyses (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1992). Model fitting was
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TABLE 2 | Multilevel confirmatory factor analysis model fit and model fit comparisons.
Model fit Model comparisons
Model df χ2 χ2 p RMSEA CFI SRMRW SRMRB Models χ2 df χ2SB χ2SB
p
Between
(1) SW/1B 104 52.07 1.00 0.000 1.00 – 0.090 – – – –
(2) SW/2B 103 21.16 1.00 0.000 1.00 – 0.060 1 vs. 2 1 30.58 <0.001
(3) SW/4B 98 16.63 1.00 0.000 1.00 – 0.055 2 vs. 3 5 4.78 0.443
Within
(4) 1W/SB 104 2860.36 <0.001 0.054 0.95 0.111 – – – – –
(5) 2W/SB 103 1284.23 <0.001 0.036 0.98 0.062 – 4 vs. 5 1 1581.46 <0.001
(6) 4W/SB 98 478.76 <0.001 0.021 0.99 0.057 – 5 vs. 6 5 794.87 <0.001
Selected model at each level bolded. Models were estimated treating all observed variables as categorical using mean adjusted weighted least squares (WLSM in MPlus)
as the estimator. In the Model column the numerals reflect number of factors estimated, and W, within; B, between; S, Saturated. RMSEA, root mean square error of
approximation; CFI, Comparative fit index; SRMR, standardized root mean square residual; χ2SB, Satorra-Bentler chi-square difference test.
conducted in several steps. First, the items contributing to each
MSEM within-person factor were averaged to create a factor
composite score, as is commonly done in individual differences
research. Second, a null uSEM model (i.e., no contemporaneous
or lagged effects estimated) of the first order was fit to the data
using the block Toeplitz method (cf. Molenaar, 1985). Third,
Lagrange Multiplier tests (i.e., modification indices; Sörbom,
1989) were used to free and estimate the parameter in the A
or 1 matrix that would most improve model fit; this process
iterated until no parameter would significantly (at p ≤ 0.05)
improve model fit it if were freed. Multiple solutions could
occur during this iterative process if modification indices showed
that two parameters would equally improve model fit (i.e., their
Lagrange Multiplier tests were equivalent). In these cases, each
parameter was freed and estimated in a separate solution, and
the iterative estimation process continued independently for each
(with the possibility of further separations), generating a set of
possible solutions (cf. Beltz and Molenaar, in revision). Fourth,
non-significant parameters were trimmed from the models. Fifth,
model fit was evaluated for the solutions using alternative fit
indices, with two of the following four required to indicate
excellent fit (Brown, 2006): RMSEA ≤0.05, SRMR ≤ 0.05,
CFI ≥ 0.95, NNFI ≥ 0.95. Sixth, if multiple solutions occurred
during the model fitting process, then the optimal solution
was selected by choosing the model with the lowest AIC, a
selection criterion employed in previous work (Akaike, 1974;
MacCallum et al., 1993; Beltz andMolenaar, in revision). Seventh,
the solution was examined for independent residuals using a
posteriori model validation (Box and Jenkins, 1970). Specifically,
one-step-ahead prediction errors were generated from the model
and tested for white noise (cf. Beltz and Molenaar, 2015). If
white noise was found, then a first order uSEM was appropriate
for the data, and the solution was accepted. If white noise
was not found, then a first order solution was insufficient
for capturing all sequential dependencies in the data, and
steps two through seven were repeated for a second order
uSEM (i.e., a model with A, 1, and 2 matrices; Please
see Appendix B in Supplementary Material for example uSEM
synt).
RESULTS
Global model fit and model fit comparisons for the MSEM
analyses can be found in Table 2. Starting with the between-
person level, all estimated models were considered a good fit to
the data using the chi-square tests, which were uniformly non-
significant. This was expected due to the low-powered test with a
between-person sample size of 101. The RMSEAs and CFIs also
were excellent, although the SRMRwas only acceptable in models
with 2 and 4 factors. The likelihood ratio test indicated that model
fit improved going from 1 to 2 factors, but a four-factor model
did not significantly improve the fit. As such, we selected a two-
factor structure as the optimal BPmodel in these data. For theWP
level, the chi-square tests were uniformly significant. This was
expected due to the high-powered test with 9,041 within-person
observations. The RMSEA and CFI suggested all models were
good fitting, although each improved appreciably going from 1
to 4 factors. The SRMR was only acceptable in models with 2 and
4 factors. Finally, the chi-square difference test strongly favored
a four-factor solution. Thus, our final retained model differed in
structure across levels of analysis, with two factors at the between-
person level, and 4 factors at the within-person level of analysis.2
The model with standardized parameter estimates can be found
in Figure 1.
To test the validity of this model, we estimated Internalizing
and Externalizing factors from the original clinical interviews and
regressed the daily diary based Internalizing and Externalizing
factors on each of these. This resulted in an excellently fitting
model [χ2(525) = 568.54, p = 0.09; RMSEA = 0.003; CFI = 1.00;
NNFI= 1.00; SRMRWithin = 0.05, SRMRBetween = 0.09]. Relevant
model parameter estimates can be found in Figure 2. We found
2To be comprehensive, we estimated three-factor models at each level, which
had a negligible impact on fit at the between-person level, but resulted in
significantly poorer fit relative to the four-factor model at the within-person level.
We additionally note that changing the estimator to robust maximum likelihood
(MLR) resulted in identical conclusions, as did mean and variance adjusted
weighted least squares (WLSMV) estimation. In fact, all parameter estimates were
identical using the WLSMV estimator, and model fit was substantially improved,
but direct comparison of fit cannot be accommodated in a MSEM framework in
MPlus. Thus, our results and conclusions are robust to estimation approach.
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FIGURE 2 | Diagram of multilevel structural equation model (standardized estimates) with interview based Internalizing and Externalizing factors
predicting daily diary based Internalizing and Externalizing Spectra. Item specific residual variances and factor variances not depicted. Asterisks depict
significant regression paths between latent factors (∗∗∗p < 0.001), but significance is not provided for other parameters.
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that the interview-based Internalizing factor was a significant
predictor of daily Internalizing (β = 0.60; 95% confidence
interval = 0.38 to 0.81; p < 0.001), but not of daily Externalizing
(β = 0.15; 95% confidence interval = −0.09 to 0.38; p < 0.22). In
contrast, we found that the interview-based Externalizing factor
was a significant predictor of daily Externalizing (β = .41; 95%
confidence interval = 0.18 to 0.63; p < 0.001), but not of daily
Internalizing (β = −0.08; 95% confidence interval = −0.32 to
0.16; p < 0.55). Thus, our between-person factors estimated from
daily diaries evidence significant associations with corresponding
traditional interview based factors, and these associations were
specific.
Next, we examined person-oriented personality processes by
mapping with uSEM the interplay among the four within-person
factors for four exemplar participants; four, three, five, and
four items as indicated from the MSEM analysis were averaged
to create the Negative Affect, Detachment, Disinhibition, and
Hostility composite scores, respectively; see Figure 1. Time
series plots and descriptive statistics for each participant’s scores
are shown in Figure 3. Notice how some characteristics of
participants’ daily responses shown in the time series plots were
independent of the descriptive statistics (i.e., means and standard
deviations shown in the bar graphs). For example, participants
A, B, and C had similar Disinhibition means and standard
deviations despite markedly different patterns of responses across
days, such as participant B having large peaks and valleys that
appear to co-occur with Negative Affect, a pattern not seen in
the others. Also, participant D had means close to zero for all
composite scores even though Detachment scores were close to
5 on a couple of days. Finally, participant C had long periods
of constant Detachment scores, but this information is lost in
the descriptives. These are precisely the characteristics – those
typically lost in cross-sectional research or when time series data
are analyzed in aggregate – that uSEM captures and reflects in
individual-level dynamic personality network maps, revealing the
person-oriented processes underlying personality.
Model fit can be found in Table 3, and the final uSEM
maps for each participant are shown in Figure 4. The final
map for exemplar participant A (Figure 4A) fit the data well;
multiple solutions were not present, and first order relations were
sufficient for capturing all sequential dependencies in the data.
The final map for exemplar participant B (Figure 4B) fit the data
well; four solutions were generated, with the retained solution
selected based on lowest AIC and first order relations were
sufficient. The final map for exemplar participant C (Figure 4C)
fit the data well; seven solutions were generated, AIC was again
used to select the final solution, and first order relations were
sufficient. The final map for exemplar participant D (Figure 4D)
fit the data well; three solutions were generated, and second order
relations were required to capture all sequential dependencies in
the data.
The maps can be understood as visual depictions of a series
of regression equations (consistent with the beta-weights that
accompany the relations), with one equation for each personality
factor. A simple example concerns the Detachment of participant
B: on any given day, it was positively predicted by Negative Affect
occurring on the same day, meaning that increases (decreases)
in Negative Affect statistically predicted increases (decreases)
in Detachment. This is consistent with the synchronous rise
and fall of Negative Affect and Detachment scores visible in
the time series plot. A more complex example concerns the
Negative Affect of participant A: on any given day, it was
explained by Negative Affect (i.e., itself) levels from the previous
day, and inversely by Detachment levels from the previous day.
Participant A’sNegative Affect was also explained byHostility and
Detachment levels on the same day, and it predicted Detachment
levels on the same day as well as Hostility levels on the next day.
The set of relations between Negative Affect and Detachment
(with reciprocal same day relations, and an inverse prediction of
Negative Affect by Detachment) and the pair of relations between
Negative Affect and Hostility (with Negative Affect predicting
Hostility on the next day, but Hostility predicting Negative Affect
on the same day) suggest the presence of feed-forward and
feedback mechanisms.
The maps reveal several interesting findings. Visual inspection
shows different personality dynamics for each of the participants.
For example, the map for participant B was the sparsest (i.e.,
had the fewest relations with 6), and the maps for the other
three participants were equally dense (i.e., had 10 relations). This
is an especially interesting finding for participant D, who had
composite scores close to zero and second order map relations,
suggesting the presence of complex personality processes despite
low mean levels of endorsed symptomatology. Graph theoretical
metrics, such as total degree (i.e., the number of incoming and
outgoing relations for a factor), reveal that Negative Affect was
the most important factor for participants A and B, Detachment
and Hostility were most important for participant C, and
Disinhibition was most important for participant D. This is
intuitive in some cases (e.g., Negative Affect also had the highest
mean for participant A), but not in others (e.g., Detachment had
long periods of constant scores and Hostility had the lowest mean
for participant C).
DISCUSSION
The overarching aim of our study was to provide a conceptual
and analytic integration of individual differences research on the
structure of psychopathology liability and the complex dynamic
processes that comprise mental disorders. First, using data from a
sample of individuals diagnosed with PDs who completed several
months of (Mdn observation N = 94) daily diary studies, we
tested the BP- andWP-Structures of 16 behaviors chosen to index
the broader Internalizing and Externalizing spectra with MSEM
(see Figure 1). Results indicated that for the BP-Structure, a two-
factor model (Internalizing and Externalizing) was sufficient for
explaining individual differences in the endorsement of the 16
behaviors, whereas for the WP-Structure a more differentiated
four-factor model was supported (Negative Affect, Detachment,
Disinhibition, and Hostility). We then demonstrated that the BP-
Structure of this model showed specific associations with similar
factors derived from traditional psychiatric interviews. Second,
using the results of the MSEM, which served to greatly reduce the
multivariate modeling space from the individual items to these
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FIGURE 3 | Time series plots and descriptive statistics for composite scores of the four within-person factors used in person-oriented uSEM
analyses for each of four exemplar participants (A–D). Time series plots show the composite scores for each daily diary. Bar graphs show the means and
standard deviations of the scores across all diaries. Within-person factors in shades of blue define the between-person factor of internalizing, and within-person
factors in shades of yellow define the between-person factor of externalizing.
TABLE 3 | Unified SEM (uSEM) model fit results for four exemplar participants.
Model fit AIC for multiple solutions




A 12 13.57 0.33 0.025 0.043 0.99 0.98 60.65 N/A
B 16 13.68 0.62 0.000 0.044 1.00 1.00 52.68 53.10
C 12 11.58 0.48 0.000 0.044 1.00 1.00 59.41 60.36
D 28 18.00 0.93 0.000 0.037 1.00 1.00 116.90 129.40
Models were estimated in LISREL at the lowest temporal order to produce white noise residuals, and multiple solutions were identified during data-driven model fitting.
RMSEA, root mean square error of approximation; SRMR, standardized root mean square residual; CFI, Comparative fit index; NNFI, non-normed fit index; AIC, Akaike
information criterion.
four factors, we fit a set of idiographic uSEM models to a subset
of the participants (n = 4) in order to showcase the heterogeneity
in dynamic associations among the four daily constructs (i.e.,
PS-Structures). Thus, our approach represents a hybrid of using
MSEM for data reduction and theoretical model testing, followed
by the data driven exploration of fine-grained person-specific
dynamic processes. We consider each analytic approach and set
of results in turn.
Integrating Structure and Process: Daily
Internalizing and Externalizing Behaviors
This study was motivated, in large part, by a tension that
has developed in the science of psychopathology; namely, how
can models that seek to establish crosscutting dimensions of
functioning be reconciled with data collection and analytic
approaches that seek to study nuanced contextualized processes?
As noted in the introduction, this is a basic tension that has
long existed in the personality literature (e.g., Read et al.,
2010), which only lately has been given serious theoretical
attention (e.g., Fleeson and Jayawickreme, 2015). Adopting
some of the conceptual strategies from basic personality
science, we tested whether the structure of daily fluctuations in
maladaptive behavior conformed to a similar structure derived
from individual differences in lifetime psychiatric diagnosis;
specifically, the Internalizing and Externalizing spectra. We
found that a variant of the hypothesized structure provided a
good fit to the data. At the between-person level the items
mapped onto a clear two-Factor Internalizing-Externalizing
structure. However, the correlation among these two factors
was high (r = 0.77), indicating that those individuals who
report higher average levels of daily Internalizing behavior also
report higher average levels of daily Externalizing behavior.
Prior research has, in fact, found correlations among lifetime
variants of these two factors ranging from modest to strong
(range of rs = 0.17–0.56) (e.g., Krueger, 1999; Markon, 2010;
Røysamb et al., 2011; Forbush and Watson, 2013; Kotov et al.,
2011; Wright et al., 2013). Although our final model would
suggest these two domains are significantly discriminable, their
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FIGURE 4 | Network maps from uSEM analyses, showing the interplay among the four within-person personality factors for each of four exemplar
participants (A–D). Solid lines are contemporaneous relations, dashed lines are relations of the first order, dotted lines are relations of the second order, black lines
are positive relations, red lines are negative relations, and beta-weights show the magnitude of the relations (all significant at p ≤ 0.05). All maps fit the data well; see
fit statistics in text.
covariation argues for the importance of considering general
severity in daily psychopathology (cf. Kessler et al., 2005;
Caspi et al., 2014). Due to the novelty of these analyses,
direct comparisons with additional samples are not possible.
As such it remains unclear why the covariation between
these two factors here is higher than in traditional individual
differences work. It may be due to truly higher overlap
among daily behaviors, the manner in which MSEM partials
between-person variance, the estimator (i.e., robust WLS),
the severe nature of the sample, or other factors. Future
research will be needed to clarify the degree of overlap among
individual differences in these domains derived at the daily
level.
More central to our aim, we found that the WP-Structure of
daily maladaptive behaviors was more differentiated than the BP-
Structure. The identical two-factor Internalizing-Externalizing
structure as the between-person model provided good fit to
the data by most indices, even as the four-factor structure
provided significantly improved fit. The fanning out of content
at the four-factor model is consistent with structural models of
psychopathology (Markon, 2010; Røysamb et al., 2011; Wright
and Simms, 2015) and maladaptive personality traits (Markon
et al., 2005; Kushner et al., 2011; Wright et al., 2012; Wright
and Simms, 2014) and can be understood as more circumscribed
variants of the “pathological Big-4” (Livesley et al., 1998; Widiger
and Simonsen, 2005; Calabrese et al., 2012). As such, the resultant
2- and 4-factor structures reflect the hierarchical organization of
personality and psychopathology.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of understanding
these dimensions as hierarchically organized. In the contem-
porary era of studying contextualized processes, as researchers
seek to study putatively highly specific dynamic phenomena,
there will be a pressing need to organize the results of
individual studies, highlighting near-neighbor processes
for investigation and mapping out “dynamic nomological
nets” (cf. Cronbach and Meehl, 1955). As specific dynamic
processes are proposed and tested, it will behoove researchers
to test for convergent and discriminant validity in near
neighbor constructs. For instance, hypotheses that specify
processes associated with negative affect should demonstrate
discriminability between specific affects and/or detachment
related processes. This is a basic approach adopted in individual
differences research, and will serve to further clarify specificity
and generality in dynamic processes in psychopathological
research.
Estimating and Interpreting Individual
uSEM Models and Treatment
Implications
Armed with the reduced dimensionality of the four-factor WP-
Structure, we then sought to demonstrate that it provides a
strong platform for studying dynamic PS-Structures as they
play out across days. We approached this by estimating
uSEM models at the individual level for four exemplar
participants; we mapped the lagged and contemporaneous
interplay among Negative Affect, Detachment, Disinhibition,
and Hostility for each person. The heterogeneity among these
participants is evident in their time series plots (Figure 3)
and in their network maps (Figure 4). The time series
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showed that each individual tracked different Negative Affect,
Detachment, Disinhibition, and Hostility trajectories. For
example, participants A and D had Detachment ratings that were
mostly low and punctuated by relatively few extreme spikes,
whereas participants B and C had Detachment ratings that
were constantly changing. The maps showed a highly distinct
network of associations among the domains of pathology for
each individual. For example, the relations between Negative
Affect and Detachment differed among the participants, with
Negative Affect positively predicting Detachment for participants
B and C, reciprocal positive contemporaneous relations between
Detachment and Negative Affect on the same day and
Detachment inversely predicting Negative Affect on the next
day (perhaps evidencing feed forward and feedback loops) for
participant A, and no association between the behaviors for
participant D.
In the context of a research study, each of these network
maps catalyzes the imagination, leading to questions about how
these processes play out in participants’ daily lives. However, in
different contexts, specifically clinical settings, one could envision
collecting similar data, and using these models to develop
hypotheses about a patient’s particular sequence of maladaptive
behavior and points of intervention. Take, for example, the uSEM
model for participant A. The model suggests that Negative Affect
is the lynchpin in this individual’s pathology. Negative Affect,
although central to the person’s structure, is more often than
not an outcome. Thus, an initial point of intervention may be
to address predictors of this individual’s Negative Affect, such
as Detachment and Hostility. Hostility, for example, appears
to drive same day Negative Affect and Disinhibition, which
leads to decreases in next day Detachment, perhaps suggesting
pursuing rapprochement with embattled others. This may signal
a relative interpersonal strength or healthy functioning that
might be leveraged in a treatment. Many additional distinct
hypotheses flow from examining the remaining paths across the
four maps.
Clinically, the goal would be to disrupt these processes
in order to effect change. Yet it would not require distal
armchair speculation, as the clinician and patient would have
proximal experience with which to augment these quantitative
findings. A practitioner could use similar diagrams to those
presented here as a tool to engage the patient in a collaborative
discussion of how he or she understood his or her own processes,
and together develop a target and plan for intervention. This
approach of developing hypotheses based on coefficients derived
from intensively sampled data and integrating the patient’s
own phenomenology is likely viable, as similar methods have
been furthered and tested based on traditional dispositional
measures (e.g., Finn, 2007). Thus, these results have the potential
for direct clinical applicability, at least as a novel tool that
can be taken from bench to bedside. In fact, several of the
modeling challenges (e.g., multiple well fitting solutions; see
Beltz and Molenaar, in revision) may be seen as a boon because
they can be presented as alternative hypotheses for the patient
to choose from, thereby engaging him or her in his or her
treatment. The major rate-limiting step is the development
and dissemination of powerful but user-friendly data collection
tools, analysis software, and research on the use in clinical
practice.
Selecting an Appropriate Modeling
Framework and Alternative Approaches
Refocusing our lens on the methods, we note that there are always
a number of decision points to navigate when doing any statistical
modeling. With highly multivariate, intensive, longitudinal data
across many individuals, the number of possibilities for different
analytic approaches is, to say the least, quite large. There were
several major considerations that we grappled with, of which we
mention two here: (1) adopting a confirmatory vs. exploratory
framework, and (2) deciding whether to estimate structures with
parameters that varied or were shared across individuals.
First, both confirmatory and exploratory models can be
estimated in a MSEM framework. Our primary goal here was
to test the degree to which an established model could be fit
to a distinct data type. However, different modeling scenarios
may compel an exploratory framework. Much needed is basic
psychometric and scale development work for item banks to be
used in intensive longitudinal data. The same degree of care that
has been put into cross-sectional measures has generally not been
incorporated in the measures used in dynamic processes (for an
exception see Tomko et al., 2014).
Second, one of the exciting possibilities afforded by intensive
longitudinal data of the type we modeled here, is that
it allows for the estimation of not only the structure of
individual differences, but individual differences in structure
(i.e., idiographic structures). A challenge for covariance-based
idiographic modeling approaches such as uSEM is that they
require a minimum of variance in each observed variable in
order to be included in the estimation (cf. Nesselroade et al.,
2007). In prior studies, which have used many fewer participants,
large portions of items have had to be discarded due to
lack of endorsement (Nesselroade et al., 2007). This becomes
particularly problematic given the use of maladaptive items,
which tend to have lower endorsement, even among clinical
samples. Even considering the 16 items used here, for many of the
individuals specific items would have to be discarded. Therefore,
by usingMSEM (which estimates theWP-Structure pooled across
individuals) or by creating behavioral composites for idiographic
analyses, all participants and items can be included in the
model.
A related consideration is the optimal degree of complexity
for the estimated networks of dynamic processes. For some
applications, very specific behaviors may be desired (e.g., in
the study of suicidal attempts), but as granularity increases,
so too does the potential network complexity. To make
this concrete, consider assessing 20 specific negative affect
items at each assessment, and analyzing a network of
associations among the individual items. This would result
in up to 380 possible contemporaneous associations, not
considering lagged associations. This would strain direct
interpretability, and place limits on the amount of other
domains (e.g., social behavior, cognition, motivation) that
could be modeled congruently. Naturally, graph theory indices
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(e.g., node centrality) can be used to winnow down such a
highly parameterized model. Alternatively, selecting fewer
but broader domains offers desirable qualities like enhanced
reliability of assessment, greater bandwidth of measurement, and
easier interpretability. The point is that researchers need to be
mindful of the optimal level of granularity for their questions of
interest.
Limitations and Future Directions
Several limitations with the current study bear mention.
For one, our model derives from the specific set of daily
behaviors we chose to measure, and it does not include items
related to daily substance use. This is a potential limitation
seeing as substance abuse forms a major component of
the traditional dispositionally estimated Externalizing domain.
Nevertheless, substance abuse is thought to reflect specific
instantiations of broader constructs such as Disinhibition or
impulsivity, which were well covered in our daily diary data.
This is evident in the significant regression path between
our interview and daily diary based Externalizing factors.
Additionally, the results must be interpreted in the context
of this specific sample, which was not a random section
of the population, but rather selected to possess elevated
psychopathology. Specifically, the current sample was selected
for a diagnosis of any PD. Although this ensured breadth
of psychiatric diagnoses due to well-established comorbidity
patterns, and participants additionally met the criteria for several
other clinical syndromes (e.g., anxiety disorders, mood disorders,
substance use disorders), future work would benefit from a
broader range of severity.
Furthermore, we only estimated and presented uSEM models
for four participants. As noted above, this was primarily to
demonstrate that, despite strong covariation among factors in
the WP-Structural model, individuals exhibit rich and interesting
heterogeneity in the dynamic processes constituting that model;
the factors within the WP-Structure have contemporaneous and
lagged associations with each other that are directional and
unique to each participant. Future work should examine the
full sample, ideally with a method that can establish shared and
unique pathways across individuals (e.g., GIMME; Gates and
Molenaar, 2012).
A related issue is that these models were estimated as context
independent, and future work is needed that incorporates
external variables (e.g., daily stress; cf. Gates et al., 2011).
In the current sample we additionally measured a variety
of daily stressors, perceived stress in response, several
indicators of daily functioning (e.g., sleep, job attendance),
and a number of basic behaviors (e.g., affect, social behavior)
in the daily diary. In subsequent investigations we plan
to examine daily stressors as a contextual input to the
system predicting daily fluctuation in psychopathology
domains. Similarly, we hope to examine the effect of
fluctuations in daily psychopathology on daily functioning.
Finally, we hope to test whether a variety of baseline
dispositional assessments serve amplify or dampen these
within-person linkages in context (stress), psychopathology, and
functioning.
An Agenda for Integrating Empirical
Structure and Dynamic Processes in
Psychopathology
As this study is the first to attempt to bridge the contemporary
empirical thrusts of structural and dynamic investigations into
psychopathology, we have merely scratched the surface of what
is possible. Here we outline several necessary steps toward
more fully realizing the potential of an integrative science of
psychopathology.
First, as mentioned briefly above, we must stress the need
for measurement development and normative data collection.
The items used here were developed ad hoc for this current
project as no inventory for intensive repeated measurement
of psychopathology (e.g., momentary, daily, etc.) was available.
That these items performed extremely well as intended is
very encouraging, but that should not preclude more extensive
measurement development and refinement. Structural models
of individual differences, which have arguably established
broad domains of relevant phenotypic functioning (Harkness
et al., 2014), provide a firm base from which to launch
these measure development excursions. Moreover, there are
many other variables that could imbue this work with more
psychological texture and nuance. For instance, incorporating
motivations and goals in addition to behavior and affect
would likely prove fruitful. Going hand in hand with this
effort should be the collection of normative data. If intensive
repeated measurement is to be used clinically, then established
norms, in both the population and treatment samples will
be necessary. This will involve more than just importing
and applying traditional psychometrics (e.g., means), but
the thoughtful application of existing and development of
novel “dynamic psychometrics.” At the most basic level this
might include relevant measures of variability and instability
of behavior over time (e.g., Jahng et al., 2008; Houben
et al., 2015), but should conceivably be expanded to include
normative associations between daily behaviors, behaviors and
environmental antecedents (e.g., What is the average strength
of association between daily stress and hostility? Or, between
social anhedonia and withdrawal?). Integration of graph theory
metrics into the normative data description may also prove
fruitful, especially as variable sets increase in number and
complexity.
Second, we have focused here on the individual as a
closed system, considering neither environmental inputs nor
impact on external variables (e.g., other people). However, it
is well understood that humans are not closed systems, and
indeed as reviewed briefly above contemporary theories of
psychopathology are largely based on models of the individual
acting in context. Thus, further research in this vein should
incorporate traditional inputs and outputs to the system in the
form of putative environmental antecedents, stressors, protective
factors, and functional concomitants of maladaptive functioning.
At the same time we underscore that although traditional
perspectives might draw distinctions between environmental
and individual located variables (e.g., Cohen et al., 1995) in
practice these distinctions are difficult to make, and the current
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diagnostic nomenclature blends contextual, behavioral, and
functional variables. In this regard, the focus on and use of more
fine-grained data sampling and analytic approaches may help
disentangle the problematically heterogeneous disorder based
models of psychopathology.
From this follows our third suggestion, that further work
in this area should move forward unencumbered by traditional
diagnostic categories. Current models of psychopathology reflect
top–down organizational schemes, and are largely studied as
such. In the current study we have similarly adopted a top-down
perspective in part, in that we used results from quantitative
structural models of psychopathology as the starting point for
establishing structural models of daily behavior. We believe this
provides useful if not necessary scaffolding for the subsequent
person-specific analyses. Yet whether one starts with a refined
(as we suggest) or an unconstrained set of variables, starting
from the bottom–up and seeking out individual differences in
dynamic patterns of behavior is an avenue ripe for exploration;
especially if combined with techniques that can establish
relatively homogenous groupings of individuals based on shared
parameters. Building on this, there is a need for more research
that takes intensive repeated measurement as a starting point,
and seeks to establish functional outcomes that are strongly if
not uniquely predicted by resulting parameters (e.g., Stepp et al.,
2011; Forbes et al., 2012).
Finally, we believe that this line of research is ideally suited
to refining the way in which clinicians assess, diagnose, and
monitor treatment effects. For one, the approach is rooted in a
dimensional architecture that recognizes that psychopathology
varies along gradients of severity, and does not adhere
to convenient but arbitrary boundaries. But key is that it
incorporates that psychopathology is a process, and therefore
should be assessed as such. Thus beyond goals of reducing
overall symptom levels, many of the processes hypothesized to
drive change in psychotherapy involve not only the decrease
in the level of one variable, but also the dynamic change in
the association among multiple variables. Indeed, as we have
been arguing, psychological symptoms rarely occur in isolation,
and instead are coupled with specific contingencies, linked
with problematic behaviors, and connected with maladaptive
processes. As a result, clinicians often seek not just to decrease a
problematic behavior, but also to change the connection between
two or more behaviors in order to disrupt the maladaptive
processes that maintain psychopathology. Examples include
increasing emotional differentiation (i.e., unlink distinct negative
emotions), diminishing the link between negative emotions
and maladaptive self-regulation (e.g., cutting, substance use,
withdrawal), increase positive coping behaviors when distressed,
increase tolerance of anxiety in feared situations, and attenuating
the link between triggering stimuli and phobic responses.
Quantitatively, each of these would be represented by a dynamic
relationship among variables—or, stated otherwise, an association
that changes over time. Accordingly, the targeted variables
should be assessed in a manner that allows for establishing
the strength of these links, and then repeatedly assessed in a
way that allows for the continued probing of the strength of
that link via appropriate quantitative methods (Wright et al.,
2014).
The avenues for future work in this area are wide open, and
we have outlined but a few potential directions for a program
of research that seeks to integrate structural and dynamic
processes. Importantly, much of the fundamental work has yet
to be done, starting with measurement, establishing structural
similarities, refining the psychometrics, and then moving from
a well-established beachhead into more complex and nuanced
investigations.
CONCLUSION
In sum, we believe the findings presented here are an initial
step down one possible path toward merging two contemporary
paradigms in psychopathology research, the psychometric
approach to establishing crosscutting domains, and the
investigation of contextualized dynamic processes. It is our
hope that the clearly interpretable factor solutions estimated
at the between- and within-person levels demonstrate that
domains derived from the study of individual differences in
psychopathology can be fruitfully applied and used to organize
investigation into person-specific dynamic processes. This
approach is already being implemented in basic and applied
personality science to establish contingencies and mechanisms
driving behavior (e.g., Beckmann et al., 2010; McCabe and
Fleeson, 2012), and similar approaches should be viable in
psychopathology research.
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A Bayesian technique with analyses of within-person processes at the level of the
individual is presented. The approach is used to examine whether the patterns of
within-person responses on a 12-trial simulation task are consistent with the predictions
of ITA theory (Dweck, 1999). ITA theory states that the performance of an individual with
an entity theory of ability is more likely to spiral down following a failure experience than the
performance of an individual with an incremental theory of ability. This is because entity
theorists interpret failure experiences as evidence of a lack of ability which they believe
is largely innate and therefore relatively fixed; whilst incremental theorists believe in the
malleability of abilities and interpret failure experiences as evidence of more controllable
factors such as poor strategy or lack of effort. The results of our analyses support
ITA theory at both the within- and between-person levels of analyses and demonstrate
the benefits of Bayesian techniques for the analysis of within-person processes. These
include more formal specification of the theory and the ability to draw inferences about
each individual, which allows for more nuanced interpretations of individuals within a
personality category, such as differences in the individual probabilities of spiraling. While
Bayesian techniques have many potential advantages for the analyses of processes at
the level of the individual, ease of use is not one of them for psychologists trained in
traditional frequentist statistical techniques.
Keywords: bayesian statistics, implicit theories, mindsets, within-person, personality processes, performance
spiraling, simulations
1. INTRODUCTION
Psychological reports based on the study of between-person effects often characterize the results as
relating to individual level within-person processes. For example, Blackwell et al. (2007) describe
how, relative to those with an entity or fixed view, individuals with an incremental or developmental
view of intelligence “display mastery-oriented strategies (effort escalation or strategy change)
vs. helplessness strategies (effort withdrawal or strategy perseveration) in the face of setbacks”
(Blackwell et al., 2007, p. 247). The implication for most readers is that an individual with an
incremental view of intelligence will respond to an incident of failure or setback with a mastery
oriented strategy, and that an individual with an entity view of intelligence will respond to an
incident of failure or setback with a helplessness strategy. The argument that the views, mindsets or
beliefs held by individuals shape their reactions to situations, such as failure and setbacks, has been
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tested for a range of latent variables, including, for example, the
ideal vs. ought self (Higgins et al., 1994), learning vs. performance
goal orientations (Elliott and Dweck, 1988), external vs. internal
locus of control (Paulhus, 1983) and cultural group processes (Na
et al., 2010). In each of these cases, the argument is made that
the prior view of each individual influences his or her pattern
of responses, but the effects are tested at the group level using
aggregate statistics such as means, variances and correlations.
Thus, statistical inferences regarding between-person differences
are used to imply the existence of dynamic within-person
processes.
While it is possible that the average pattern of responses
observed at the group level will also be observed at the individual
level, this cannot be assumed without testing at the individual
level (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1985; Borsboom et al., 2003; Grice,
2015). As noted byGrice (2015, p. 1)many relationships observed
at the group level do not replicate at the level of the individual,
such as the structure of the Big 5 (Grice et al., 2006; Beckmann
et al., 2010) and the Power Law of Learning (Heathcote et al.,
2000). While this fact is widely recognized and frequently
discussed (e.g., Nezlek, 2001; Schmitz, 2006), a barrier to testing
models of psychological processes at the individual level has been
an over reliance on the aggregate frequentist statistics of means,
variances and correlations that require sample sizes greater than
one (Danziger, 1990; Grice, 2015). As a result, the study of
individual level processes using, for example, case studies or
individual time series to capture the dynamics of within-person
processes, such as those described by Blackwell et al. (2007) for
entity theorists and incremental theorists, has received relatively
little attention until recently.
In more recent times, the collection of individual level time
series data with repeated observations of the psychological states
and behaviors at multiple time points has been facilitated through
the development and application of simulations (Wood et al.,
2009; Beckmann et al., 2012) and experience sampling methods
(e.g., Minbashian et al., 2010; Fisher and To, 2012). The analyses
of these individual time series has been associated with an
increased use of growth curve modeling techniques, including
latent curve modeling (LCM; e.g., Goodman et al., 2011) and
growth mixture models (GMM; e.g., Grimm et al., 2010), which
combine LCM and finite mixture models to estimate individual
trajectories. These methods provide a significant advance in the
modeling of dynamic psychological processes in that, in addition
to means, variances and correlations they provide estimates of
the different trajectories and other features of the pattern of
responses over time. However, these are frequentist methods and
inference relies on the assumption of asymptotic normality of the
sample estimates1. While this assumption is generally correct for
group level estimates, it is unlikely to be true at the individual
level without a large number of observations per individual. As a
result, inferences at the individual level from frequentist growth
curve modeling techniques are limited to point estimates and
do not allow for inferences regarding dynamic within-person
processes.
1The finite sample properties of the estimates in LCM and GMM have not been
established.
In the current study, we present a Bayesian approach to the
modeling of individual level processes using a multiple trial task.
Bayesian approaches provide greater flexibility in the modeling
of the pattern of within-person processes at the individual level
because they are not limited by the assumption of asymptotic
normality of the distribution of sample estimates. Given a model
to predict the likely observed pattern of individual level outcomes
and prior assumptions regarding the parameters that describe the
model, Bayesian analyses enable inferences to be made regarding
each individual in a sample.
Bayesian analysis offers some advantages for psychologists
interested in moving beyond group level tests of between-person
differences to study if and how their theories of individual
level processes impact on the observed pattern of within-person
responses. First is the fact that a Bayesian approach allows for
the modeling of individual processes and interpretation of the
pattern of observations for each individual in a sample to see if
they fit the pattern predicted by the theory. Second, the flexibility
of a Bayesian approach requires a priori specification of the
processes that generate observations according to the specific
theory used to generate the hypotheses, including the predicted
pattern of specific values for those observations. The researcher
must be able to describe the dynamic model of the processes
in mathematical terms, thus requiring greater precision than
the prediction of a significant correlation, covariance or mean
difference. Third, in the absence of significance tests, Bayesian
methods require more detailed examination and explanation of
the pattern of results. For example, analyses at the individual
level may reveal that most but not all incremental theorists adopt
a mastery strategy following failure and that most but not all
entity theorists adopt a helplessness strategy. With individual
level Bayesian analyses, we are able to determine how many
and which individuals in each category respond in a manner
that is consistent with the theoretical model and the probability
that each individual responds in a manner consistent with their
categorization.
In the following we will demonstrate how the Bayesian
approach can be used to model within-person processes at the
level of the individual. We use data from 28 professionals who
worked on a complex, dynamic decision-making task and for
whom we also collected data about their implicit beliefs about
ability.
2. AN EXAMPLE STUDY: IMPLICIT
THEORIES OF ABILITY
Two views on intelligence were first described by Carol Dweck
as implicit theories of ability (ITA) and later as mindsets
(Dweck, 1999), which Dweck labeled as entity and incremental
theories. Individuals with an entity theory of ability believe
that intelligence is inherent or natural and therefore fixed and
not readily subject to change. To the degree that experience
and developmental activities make a difference, entity theorists
believe it to be the result of pre-existing natural abilities.
Individuals with an incremental theory of ability believe that
abilities like intelligence are malleable because they are primarily
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the product of experience, effort and developmental activities.
For an incremental theorist, natural abilities are potential to be
developed and realized through developmental strategies and
effort.
As noted by Blackwell et al. (2007) these two different views
of intelligence have been shown to significantly influence how
people react to failure and setbacks when learning new tasks
(Wood and Bandura, 1989; Dweck, 1999; Tabernero and Wood,
2010). In her formulation of the ITAmodel, Dweck (1999) argued
that entity theorists who experience failure or setbacks during
learning interpret the feedback as evidence of a lack of ability
and begin to doubt their capacity to learn the task. If the task is
complex enough and requires full use of cognitive resources, this
self-doubt interferes with subsequent performance and will lead
to a downward spiral. Also, when performing at an acceptable
level, entity theorists will stick with the strategy they know and
not experiment with new strategies that might expose them to
the risk of failure. Thus, in the early stages of learning, entity
theorists will often lock into a strategy that proves suboptimal as
the task unfolds. In contrast, according to Dweck (1999) those
classified as incremental theorists are more likely to interpret
failure feedback as evidence of a poor strategy or lack of effort. As
a result of these attributions to controllable factors, incremental
theorists experience less self-doubt and focus on opportunities
for improvement by changing their strategy or working harder
on subsequent trials, which is more likely to lead to recovery over
time.
Thus, the ITA model leads to the prediction that, at an
individual level, when performance drops, entity theorists are
more likely to spiral further down while incremental theorists
are more likely to recover. As a corollary, entity theorists are
predicted to learn a taskmore slowly and have lower performance
than incremental theorists, as has been shown at the group level
(Wood and Bandura, 1989; Tabernero and Wood, 2010). As
noted above, these aggregated group level results do not directly
test the arguments for the differential patterns of individuals’
responses to failure by entity and incremental theorists, nor
do they demonstrate that the observed group level effects are
the product of the predicted dynamics at the individual level.
The only conclusion that can be made with confidence in
comparisons of the group level learning curves of entity and
incremental theorists is that entity theorists, on average, learn at
a slower rate than incremental theorists. As well as allowing us
to examine group or between-person differences in the average
rate of performance increase (Question 1), a fuller and more
direct analysis of the ITA model at the individual level using
Bayesianmethods also allows us to examine within-person effects
(Questions 2 and 3). Our analyses address the following research
questions:
1. Do individuals classified as entity theorists increase
performance at a slower rate on average than individuals
classified as incremental theorists?
2. Following failure what is the likelihood that an individual
exhibits spiraling, that is further decreases in performance?
3. Is the probability of spiraling higher for individuals classified
as entity theorists than for those classified as incremental
theorists?
In addressing these questions we demonstrate features of the
Bayesian approach for the analyses of individual level processes
and the advantages and disadvantages of that approach. One
important advantage of the Bayesian approach for the testing
of psychological theories, noted above, is the requirement of
specifying how the explanatory mechanisms described in the
model will influence the patterns of responses for individuals,
plus any assumptions built into the model. Consider research
Question 2: To answer this question we need to precisely
define spiraling behavior in formal mathematical terms and
then develop a statistical model to test for its existence.
We define spiraling behavior to be a sustained decrease in
performance so that individual performance trajectories must
be monotonically increasing before the commencement of any
spiral and monotonically decreasing afterwards. If individuals’
trajectories are assumed to be linear2 this means that the slopes
of these trajectories are positive before and negative after the
commencement of a spiral. We will show how we incorporate
this structure into our model via the prior distribution of the
regression coefficients.
The assumption of a prior distribution is sometimes pointed
to as a subjective Achilles’ heel of Bayesian methods but, in
addition to the explicit statement and formal mathematical
modeling of the explanatory mechanism and assumptions made,
the necessity of specifying a prior distribution allows one
to examine the sensitivity of any conclusions to these prior
assumptions. For example, in addressing Question 3, we ask:
How much prior information needs to be imposed in order to
conclude that entity theorists are more likely to exhibit spiraling
behavior than incremental theorists? We can make inferences
about observed differences between entity and incremental
theorists using prior beliefs that a difference will occur with a
probability ranging from 0 to 100%. Researchers using frequentist
statistics are less likely to test the sensitivity of inferences
to the assumptions of their models, because the assumptions
of asymptotic normality are implicit in the methods so that
psychological researchers are often unaware of their existence3.
Another important feature of Bayesian statistics for analyzing
individual level processes is that any event or quantity of interest
can be treated as a random variable. In many theories of latent
psychological variables that influence individual level processes
of learning and performance, the situational event of interest
is the experience of failure or a setback. Failures and setbacks
are the result of many exogenous forces and can occur at
different times for different individuals. This can be modeled as
a random variable using Bayesian methods. By way of contrast,
psychological experiments based on frequentist methods of
inference typically seek to constrain the experience of failure to
a single fixed event, a manipulation, and then use the aggregate
or average group level response to infer individual responses. In
Bayesian analyses, the non restrictive assumption of randomness
may be applied to a parameter that describes a distribution,
such as the mean slope of individual performance trajectories
(Question 1), the probability that an individual will start to spiral
2This is not a necessary assumption, but we use it as a simple example.
3Even when tests for finite samples exist, it is very unusual for psychological
researchers to report them.
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on a given trial, or it may even be one of a set of statistical
models.
These flexible features of the Bayesian approach provide two
benefits for the analyses of the individual level processes in
response to failure. First is that the trial on which a failure
occurs does not have to be fixed but can vary randomly across
trials for individuals. Thus, analyses to address Questions 2 and
3 do not have to assume that the initial experience of failure
is a fixed event that occurs at the same time, or on the same
trial, for all individuals in a particular group. But, when the
experience of failure does occur, be it on trial 3 or trial 10, the
responses of entity theorists and incremental theorists will be
different. The average performance differences of entity theorists
and incremental theorists, even if measured across multiple trials
(e.g., Wood and Bandura, 1989), does not directly test the model
proposed by Dweck (1999) and others (e.g., Blackwell et al.,
2007) which describe the processes at the individual level when
responding to failure events.
Relatedly, Bayesian inference based on the marginal posterior
distribution accounts for the joint uncertainty surrounding all
unknown parameters. This means that a statement such as
“the probability that entity theorists are more likely to exhibit
spiraling behavior than incremental theorists is equal to 0.95,”
accounts for the uncertainty not just in the location of the
commencement of the spiral, but also for the uncertainty in the
size of individual and group level regression coefficients and error
variances. We can therefore be more confident that the effect
is real than if we were to plug-in our best guess of the other
unknown parameters and compute a p-value.
Psychologists interested in analyzing within-person processes
at the individual level will also benefit from the fact that Bayesian
analyses attach probabilities to each individual’s compliance and
non compliance with a hypothesis, rather than just reject or
accept the hypothesis at the group level. For example, research
Question 2 will be answered by computing the probability
of the two competing models, spiraling or no spiraling, for
each individual, based on data available for all individuals. The
resulting posterior probability for an individual provides an
estimate of the probability that he or she will spiral on future
tasks, should we wish to predict the later performance of an
individual. For example, we would predict that individual A, for
whom the probability of spiraling is equal to 0.99, is much more
likely to spiral following failure on a future task than individual B
for whom the probability of spiraling is found to equal 0.51.
By way of contrast, the frequentist approach to hypothesis
testing would classify both individuals as spirallers and predict
that both would spiral following failure on a future task and
not differentiate between the probability of each happening.
Because the observed pattern of performance for an individual
will show that they either spiral or do not spiral, the probabilities
of the different models included in the model averaging process
must add to 1.0. For example imagine two people, individual A
and individual B. For individual A the predictions for spiraling
and not spiraling following failure would be weighted by 0.99
and 0.01, respectively. For individual B, the predictions for
spiraling and not spiraling following failure would be weighted
by 0.51 and 0.49, respectively. Clearly, there would be much
greater uncertainty about the prediction for individual B than for
individual A. Frequentist predictions based on model selection
ignore the uncertainty associated with the model, and ignoring
model uncertainty often leads to p-values that overstate the
evidence for an effect (Hoeting et al., 1999).
As the number of possible hypotheses or models increases
so do the advantages of model averaging over model selection
(Raftery and Zheng, 2003). In this paper we average over a
very large number of models; for each individual there are 11
possible models, the first specifying no spiral, and within the
spiral hypothesis there are 10 sub models, one for each possible
location of the trial on which spiraling begins, not allowing
spiraling on the last two trials. Therefore, for all 28 individuals
the number of possible models is 1128, which is very large indeed.
Likelihood based model selection using frequentist procedures,
such as AIC or BIC, are not feasible when the number of
models under consideration is very large. With such a large
number of models we use Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods to stochastically search across the entire model space
and predictions are based on a subset of models, rather than a
single model, with these predictions weighted by their posterior
probability (i.e., the probability of model allocation given the
data). Model averaging allows the researcher to ask questions
such as “what is the probability that individual j started to exhibit
spiraling on trial i?”
3. METHODS
3.1. Participants
The participants were 28 managers from various organizations
who were attending a 3-day executive training program at
different times over a year. The 28 participants were all males and
had an average age of 34.15 years (SD= 3.23 years).
3.2. Experimental Task
The experimental task required the participants to manage a
computer simulation of a small furniture production and repair
workshop containing 5 workers through 12 simulated weeks of
business activity (i.e., trials). In this task participants managed
the performance of five employees by assigning them to each of
five tasks required to complete a weekly order. The five tasks
and the 5 employees remained the same throughout the 12
trials. The challenge for the participants was to learn the optimal
match of employees to tasks. The employee performance norm
was set at 100 at the start of the task, allowing participants to
make judgments about their employees’ level of performance
(including increase, decrease or otherwise). Trial by trial feedback
included the task performance of each of the five employees and
the overall team performance. The metric for both employees
and team performance was hours used as a percentage of
budgeted hours for the assigned weekly order, scored so that
better performance resulted in higher feedback scores. By using
this feedback to test decision options systematically, managers
could discover the impact of alternative choices and thereby learn
how to increase the organization’s performance. Therefore, for
each manager there were twelve trials that recorded workgroup
performance indicative of managerial ability, which we used as
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the dependent variable. Further details of the task are described
in Wood and Bailey (1985).
The performance of workers in the simulation had two
components; a deterministic component reflecting the
consequence of the participant manager’s decisions and a
random component. The random component was included so
that participants could not perfectly predict outcomes, which
is a realistic representation of the business world in which
managers operate. Note that we chose a dynamic computer
simulation that was a novel experience for the participants,
for which they had limited expertise and for which they were
required to develop new strategies or adapt existing strategies
(Wood and Locke, 1990). New or adapted strategies require
greater cognitive effort, have a greater risk of further failure, and
require greater persistence in their development and execution
than well-known, routine strategies. It is these efforts that are
potentially undermined by negative self-evaluations.
3.3. Measures
Prior to working on the furniture workshop simulation,
participants completed an 8-itemmeasure of their ITA. The eight
ITA items were taken from the measures developed and validated
by Dweck and her co-workers (Dweck, 1999) and included four
entity type items, such as “People have a certain fixed amount
of ability and they cannot do much to change it,” and four
incremental type items, such as “People can always substantially
change their basic skills.” All items had a 6-point Likert-type
scale ranging from 1 = strongly agree to 6 = strongly disagree.
The incremental items were reverse scored and the eight items
were added to create a single scale (alpha = 0.87, Mean = 3.41,
SD= 0.69), with a higher score indicating a stronger incremental
theory and a lower score indicating a stronger entity theory of
ability.
A median split was deemed to be an appropriate method
of ITA classification as it is the method of categorization for
the ITA scale used in Dweck (1999). As a result, the raw
data underlying the classifications of participants based on the
median split are no longer available; only the coded data has
been retained. We acknowledge that using a median split is an
increasingly outdated procedure. Nevertheless, we argue that our
data are still informative since an individual above the median
is more likely to be classified as an incremental theorist than
one below the median. Furthermore, the median split provides
simpler inferences, although with some loss of granularity, than
a continuous variable (e.g., consider the research questions in the
Introduction).
Based on a median split of the ITA scores, 14 individuals
were classified as entity theorists and 14 classified as incremental
theorists. Figure 1 shows the performance of the 28 individuals
across 12 trials. Those that are classified as entity theorists are
shown in red (Mean = 108.42, SD = 12.68) and those classified
as incremental theorists are shown in blue (Mean = 112.1,
SD= 15.04).
4. BAYESIAN HIERARCHICAL MODEL
We start this section with a hierarchical Bayesian representation
of what are commonly called latent curve models (Gelman and
FIGURE 1 | Observations on performances over 12 trials for 14
individuals classified as entity theorists (red) and 14 individuals
classified as incremental theorists (blue).
Pardoe, 2006; Gelman and Hill, 2007) and then demonstrate how
the use of prior distributions, together with data augmentation,
can be used to extend and tailor these models to answer the
questions of interest to psychological researchers.
Consider a series of performance measures on J individuals
across T trials. Let Y = (y1., . . . , yJ.), where yj. = (yj1, . . . , yjT)
′
and yjt is the performance of the j
th individual on trial t
and denote f (t) to be some function of time. Our purpose in
this paper is to demonstrate a number of features of Bayesian
methods and therefore we restrict our discussion in the paper
to linear functions of time with normally distributed errors.
However, in Appendix A in Supplementary Material, we relax
these restrictions and consider a nonlinear monotonic function
of time and another error distribution.
One possible Bayesian hierarchical model is
ytj = αj + βjt + εtj, εtj ∼ N(0, σ
2)
αj ∼ N(µα, τ
2




∼ IG(a, b) (1.1)
where αj and βj are the regression coefficients for individual j and
the notation IG(a, b) indicates an inverse gamma distribution
with shape and scale parameters a and b, respectively.
Model Equation (1.1) is a hierarchical one; there are trials
within individuals. The model allows individuals to have
different regression co-efficients and hence different expected
performance trajectories, but the regression co-efficients are
restricted to a distribution that depends upon parameters
common to all individuals. This distribution is assumed to
be normal and the parameters in common are the means,
µ = (µα, µβ) and variances τ
2
= (τα, τβ), of the regression
coefficients. These assumptions are not necessary, but are
commonly used in Bayesian methods for computational ease,
and in frequentist methods because the asymptotic sampling
properties of the estimators are known.
The error term in the first line of Equation (1.1) is the
within-person variation and τ2 represents the between individual
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variation. As τ2 → (0, 0) then all individuals have exactly the
same expected performance trajectory, while as τ2 → (∞,∞)
individual expected trajectories have nothing in common with
each other and may as well be estimated independently. Clearly
the advantage of such a model is that individual trajectories can
be estimated based on only a few data points, by “borrowing"
information contained in data from other individuals. Note that
with only a few data points individual trajectories can only be
estimated; inference surrounding individual trajectories requires
the specification of a data generating process such as Equation
(1.1), or a large number of data points for each individual.
The model specification is completed by specifying a prior on
the hyperparametersµ and τ. In constructing these priors we use
a technique known as Empirical Bayes (Robbins, 1955; Efron,
2005) where the type of prior distribution is specified by the
user and then frequentist techniques are used to determine the
parameters that describe these prior distributions. For example
both µα and µβ are assumed to be independent and normally
distributed, centered around the average of the maximum
likelihood estimates of the individual regression coefficients, with
standard deviations equal to half the range of these quantities. See
Appendix C in Supplementary Material for a full discussion.
4.1. Extending and Tailoring the Model
One of the beauties of Bayesian statistics is that, having
specified the basic probabilistic data generating process, data
augmentation and MCMC techniques can be used to compute
the desired characteristic of any posterior distribution. In this
section we show how to extend the model in the previous section
to answer the research questions described in the introduction.
4.2. Using Priors to Formulate Hypotheses
and Impose Constraints
Research Question 1 is relatively straightforward to answer, so
we discuss our solution to this before tackling Questions 2 and
3. In Equation (1.1) we represented a latent curve model as a
hierarchical Bayes model in which the unobserved individual
regression coefficients, the α’s and the β’s, are generated from a
prior distribution. We now modify this prior to answer specific
research questions. There is no reason to suppose, a priori,
that an individual’s ITA classification affects their performance
before they have received any performance feedback; as argued
above, it is the response to failure feedback and setbacks that
differentiates entity and incremental theorists (Dweck, 1999).
Therefore, we assume that the prior distribution for the intercept
is the same for all individuals, αj ∼ N(µα, τ
2
α). However, in order
to answer research Question 1 we parameterize our prior for the
slope, βj, to depend upon an individual’s ITA classification. Let
µβ = (µE, µI)
′ and let zj = (1, 0) if individual j is classified
as an entity theorists and zj = (0, 1) otherwise. Accordingly
βj ∼ N(zjµβ, τ
2
β
), so if an individual is classified as an entity
theorist then β1 ∼ N(µE, τ
2
β
), and if an individual is classified




in the mean slopes between the two classifications is given by
µE − µI and Question 1 is answered by exploring the posterior
distribution p(µE−µI |Y); if entity theorists increase performance
at a slower rate than incremental theorists then we would expect
this distribution to have most of its support less than zero. Note
that there is not much practical advantage in using a Bayesian
method to answer research Question 1. A frequentist approach,
such as restricted maximum likelihood (REML) estimation,
would also suffice and we present a comparison of a frequentist
and Bayesian analysis in the Results section.
Answering research Question 2 is more complex. As discussed
in the introduction, the mean function must be monotonically
increasing before and decreasing after the commencement of a
spiral.We use the prior distributions of the regression coefficients
to enforce these constraints. Suppose the regression function
prior to the spiral is given by α1j + β1jt, where the subscript
1 denotes the function before the spiral. If this function is
monotonically increasing then the slope, β1j, must be positive.
Similarly suppose the regression function after the spiral is
given by α2j + β2jt, then the slope, β2j, must be negative. In
addition these two regression functions must intersect at the
commencement of the spiral, which we call the cut point and
denote by cj. To ensure this we need the intercept of the
second regression function, α2j, to equal α1j + cj(β1j − β2j).
So we have three constraints (i) β1j > 0, (ii) β2j < 0 and
(iii) α2j = αj + cj(β1j − β2j), all of which can be imposed
in a logically consistent manner by the prior. We impose the
first and second constraints by assuming that β1j and β2j have
normal distributions constrained to be positive and negative,
respectively. The third constraint is also formulated as a prior
distribution, which is that the intercept α2j is equal to α1j+cj(β1j−
β2j) with probability one. Such a distribution function is referred
as a Dirac delta function. Note that it is not necessary to think of
the prior for α2j as a Dirac delta function, we do so here to show
that Bayesian inference is a coherent framework for imposing all
model assumptions.
4.2.1. Using Data Augmentation to Model Spiraling
In our response to Question 2 we not only want to identify
individuals who spiral following failure but we also want to
determine the likelihood of spiraling for each individual. That
is, we want to be able to say, for example, that “the probability
that participant 10 will exhibit spiraling behavior is 0.64.” Then,
in order to address Question 3 we want to determine if the
probability of spiraling behavior for each of the 28 participants
is related to their categorization as an entity theorist or an
incremental theorist. That is, in addition to modeling behavior
at the individual level, researchers also want to understand
how group level factors, such as ITA personality classification,
affect these individual probabilities of spiraling. In this section
we show how data augmentation can answer these questions
by facilitating the MCMC scheme that performs the required
multidimensional integration needed to estimate the marginal
posterior distributions of interest.
To detect spiraling behavior we augment the data with a




1 if a spiral occurs at any time for individual j,
0 otherwise.
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If an individual j exhibits spiraling behavior (i.e., Sj = 1) we
augment the data again with another variable to indicate the
point at which the spiral commences, the cut-point, cj, so that
cj = t|Sj = 1 if individual j begins to spiral at time t. The cut-
point is a discrete random variable, taking values 1, . . . ,T − 2
and we assume a priori that the spiral is equally likely to occur
on any trial, therefore Pr(cj = t|Sj = 1) =
1
T−2 . Note, under
this formulation we do not allow a spiral to begin for the last two
trials. The reason for this is to reduce boundary effects and to
estimate the regression co-efficient with some precision.
Conditional on Sj and cj our model for the performance score
of individual j on trial t is,
if Sj = 1 and t < cj
ytj ∼ N(α1j + β1jt, σ
2),
if Sj = 1 and t ≥ cj
ytj ∼ N(α1j + cj(β1j − β2j)+ β2jt, σ
2)
with
α1j ∼ N(µα, τ
2








and if Sj = 0 then
ytj ∼ N(α1j + β1jt, σ
2)
α1j ∼ N(µα, τ
2




β2j ∼ δ(x− a) (1.3)
where a = 0.
The notations NC+ and NC− indicate a normal distribution
constrained to be positive and negative, respectively. The
notation δ(x) means that δ(x) = 1 if x = 0, otherwise δ(x) = 0.
So that, in Equation (1.3), β2j = 0 with probability one.
Note that conditional on an individual spiraling and
the location of the cut-point, the estimate of the expected
performance trajectory is piecewise linear; α1 + β1jt before the
cut point and α1j + cj(β1j − β2j) + β2j afterwards. However,
unconditional on these quantities the estimate of the mean
performance trajectory is not necessarily piecewise linear. Indeed
it will only be piecewise linear if the posterior probabilities of a
spiral and corresponding cut-point both equal 1. Figure 2 gives
an example of the performance behavior of two individuals.
Figures 2A,C show the estimated posterior mean, Ê(ytj), and
posterior probability, P̂r(cj|Y), respectively for individual 20.
Figures 2B,D are the corresponding plots for individual 28. The
fit in Figure 2B is close to piece-wise linear, reflecting the fact that
the posterior distribution of cj is tightly centered around t = 1.
The nonlinear fit in Figure 2A is the result of averaging across
several piecewise linear functions, where the averaging is with
respect to the posterior distribution of the cut-point.
We denote the probability that an individual spirals by
Pr(Sj = 1) = π, so that Sj ∼ Be(π) and research Question 2 is
answered by computing Pr(Sj = 1|Y) for each individual. To
answer research Question 3, we allow π to depend upon the ITA





where δ = (δE, δI), so that the probability that an entity theorist
spirals is πE =
exp(δE)
1+exp(δE)
and the probability that an incremental




We now discuss the prior for δ. If we have no prior belief
regarding the probabilities πE and πI , other than they must
lie between 0 and 1, then the prior on δ should reflect this.
For example in the Appendix in Supplementary Material we
use the prior δ ∼ N(0, cδI2), where I2 is the 2 × 2 identity
matrix, and show that the choice of cδ = 4 corresponds
approximately to a joint uniform prior. Having established a prior
for δ, we answer research Question 3 by exploring the posterior
distribution p(πE − πI |Y). One way of ascertaining the strength
of the relationship between the ITA personality type and the
propensity to spiral is to see how strong our prior belief must be
in order to conclude that there is no relationship. In the results
section we show the impact of the value of cδ has on the posterior
density p(πE − πI |Y).
Appendix D in Supplementary Material shows how data
augmentation is used to facilitate the MCMC scheme that
performs the multidimensional integration needed to estimate
the marginal posterior distributions, p(µE−µI |Y), p(πE−πI |Y).
5. RESULTS
In this section we present the results for two models; one where
the possibility of spiraling is ignored and the other where it is
explicitly modeled. Results are categorized as (i) results regarding
parameters common to groups of individuals; (ii) results
regarding specific individuals; and (iii) results regarding the effect
of priors on inference. Model diagnostics, such as residual plots,
and simulation results which establish the frequentist properties
of the method, are contained in Appendix B in Supplementary
Material.
We present here results for a linear function of time and
normal distributed errors. To minimise the risk that any findings
are a result of model misspecification consequent upon the choice
of a particular function of time, we also obtained results for a
logistic growth function, and errors that have a tν distribution.
The results of these analyses are available in Appendix A in
Supplementary Material and show that the conclusions drawn
from the data are unaffected by assumptions regarding these
error distributions and functions of time.
5.1. Results for Parameters Common to
Groups of Individuals
First, we examine the results when spiraling is ignored, as
described in Equation (1.1). Equation (1.1) could also be
estimated under the frequentist paradigm and we did so using
REML, calculated in the R package lme4 (Bates et al., 2015).
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Shows the data and fitted line for individual 20, who was classified as an entity theorist. The observed data are indicated by “*” and the posterior
mean of the regression line is given by the blue line. (C) shows the posterior probability of the commencement of the spiral cj . (B,D) are corresponding plots for
individual 28, who was also classified as an entity theorist.
Table 1 reports the results when estimating the parameters
common to groups of individuals using both frequentist and
Bayesian techniques. The results are very similar4.
A Bayesian analysis of Equation (1.1) also allows us to easily
estimate p(µE−µI |Y), the posterior distribution of the difference
between the average rate of learning for entity and incremental
theorists. Figure 3A is a histogram estimate of this posterior
distribution and shows support for research Question 1; on
average entity theorists learn more slowly than incremental
theorists, with probability 0.98. In other words, given the data and
prior, the probability that incremental theorists learn at a faster
rate is 0.98. Figure 3A reports this by showing∼0.98 of the mass
of p(µE − µI |Y) lies below zero.
As noted in the Introduction, when modeling spiraling
behavior explicitly in our data, as in Equations (1.2) and (1.3),
a frequentist analysis is not feasible. We therefore turn our
attention to Bayesian analyses only for the rest of the article.
4 We note that, for the frequentist analysis, the sample size may be inadequate
for Gaussian approximations to the sampling distributions of estimators and
that sampling distributions of estimators of individual level trajectories are not
available.
TABLE 1 | Overall performance baseline (µα) and performance trajectory


























Standard errors and posterior standard deviations are in brackets.
Figure 3B shows the histogram estimate of p(µE − µI |Y) when
the existence of spiraling is explicitly modeled. A comparison
of the histograms in Figure 3 shows that the difference in the
learning rate between the two ITA classifications disappears after
controling for the possible existence of spiraling behavior.
Figure 4 contains a histogram estimate of the posterior
distribution, p(πE − πI |Y), and shows that the probability of
spiraling is much higher for entity theorists than for incremental
theorists, with p(πE > πI |Y) ≈ 0.96.
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Reports a histogram estimate of the posterior distribution of µE − µI, for the model given by Equation (1.1) and f (t) = t and εjt ∼ N(0, σ
2 ). (B) is a
similar plot for the model given by Equations (1.2) and (1.3).
FIGURE 4 | Histogram estimate of the difference in the probability of
spiraling between entity and incremental theorists, πE − πI, for the
model given by Equations (1.2) and (1.3) with f(t) = t and ε ∼ N(0, σ2).
5.2. Individual Level Results
Figure 5 shows the individual posterior mean performance
trajectories for entity theorists (red) and incremental theorists
(blue), for the model that allows the possibility of spiraling.
Figure 5A shows the fit for all individuals. Figure 5B shows the
figure for those individuals for whom the probability of spiraling
was <0.5, and Figure 5C the figure for individuals for whom the
probability of spiraling was >0.5. The three panels of Figure 5
show that while entity theorists are more likely to spiral, not
all do. Five out of fourteen did not. Only one out of fourteen
incremental theorists exhibited spiraling behavior. Figure 5C
also shows that when it is very probable that an individual
spirals, the change in that individual’s performance trajectory is
substantial.
Table 2 shows the posterior probability of spiraling for all
28 individuals. The ∗ and ∗ indicate individuals classified as
either an entity theorist or an incremental theorist, respectively,
for whom the probability of spiraling is >0.5. An estimate of
the median value of the point at which the spiral begins, ĉj, is
given in the last column. This table shows that the probability
of spiraling and the point at which this spiral begins varies
between individuals of the same personality classification and
demonstrates the need to model behavior at the individual
level.
6. EFFECT OF PRIORS ON RESULTS
Figure 6 shows the impact that the choice of the prior variance
of δ, cδ, has on the posterior probability Pr(πE > πI |y)).
Figure 6 shows that the conclusion that entity theorists are more
likely to spiral than incremental theorists is largely unchanged
in the range 1 < cδ < 20. Indeed the strength of this result
can be seen by examining how much prior information needs
to be imposed before the result is no longer apparent. From
Figure 6 it can be seen that cδ ≤ 0.01 before the P(πE >
πI |Y) ≤ 0.5. In other words we must be 95% certain a priori
that the probabilities, πI and πE, lie in the interval [0.45, 0.55],
before we would conclude that, on the balance of probabilities,
individuals classified as entity theorists are not more likely to
spiral than those classified as incremental theorists. For a full
discussion of the choice of cδ see Appendix C in Supplementary
Material.
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FIGURE 5 | (A) Posterior mean of all individual performance curves for entity (red) and incremental (blue) theorists for the model given by Equations (1.2) and (1.3),
f (t) = t and εjt ∼ N(0, σ
2 ). (B,C) are similar plots for individuals for whom the probability of spiraling is <0.5 (B) and >0.5 (C).
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a Bayesian analysis for the testing
of within-person processes at the level of the individual, as well
as providing the group level analyses that are usually reported
in psychological research using frequentist statistical methods.
The contributions and related implications of the reported study
can be broken into three categories, which are discussed in
turn. First, we discuss the advantages of the Bayesian method
for psychologists who wish to study within-person processes
at the level of the individual. Second, we discuss the results
for the Bayesian analyses of the dynamic model of individual
level performance outlined in the ITA model described by
Dweck (1999) and the implications for testing other theories
of motivation and personality at the individual level. Third, we
discuss the functionality of the demands of Bayesian methods for
psychologists.
The Bayesian approach provides several advantages over the
more commonly used frequentist techniques for psychologists
who wish to understand how within-person processes are
manifest in the behavior of individuals. First, it allows inference
at the individual level even when there are relatively few
observations per individual, which is typically the case in
longitudinal studies in personality and social psychology. In the
current study, there were 12 observations per individual and we
were able to test a complex dynamic model as specified by the
theory. By way of contrast, if we were to rely on asymptotic
arguments that underpin frequentist use of aggregate statistics
for inference we would have required many more observations
per person and a complex model of the type tested would
require a sample of manymultiples of that number. Psychological
research is expensive and Bayesian methods are more efficient,
as well as being more effective in enabling inferences about
individuals. This is not an argument for small samples; the
cost of obtaining individual level inference is that one must
specify a model that generates the data and prior distributions
for parameters. Like frequentist methods, Bayesian methods
provide more reliable inference with larger samples. Unlike
frequentist methods, Bayesian inference is based on the posterior
distribution that is calculated using the observed sample. Of
course, in Bayesian statistics a small sample size may mean
the prior distribution has a large influence on the posterior
distribution. Note, however, that one can test the effects of prior
specification on the results, as was done in this study.
Second, the specification of the prior required by Bayesian
methods is a formal mechanism for spelling out the assumptions
and prior knowledge of the theory to be tested. This is a discipline
that is not required by frequentist approaches but one that
will require psychologists to think more critically about the
assumptions and current state of knowledge for the theories they
employ. Psychologists may not think through the assumptions
that underpin the frequentist approaches that they use because
there is no formal mechanism or requirement for them to do so.
Over time, repeated use of Bayesian methods will begin to lead to
common knowledge of priors for different theories and research
questions. The current state of knowledge about a relationship
can be accumulated on a study-by-study basis. Bayesian methods
can also include sensitivity analyses to test for the effects of
different priors on the predicted outcomes, as was shown in the
results of the current study. Such sensitivity analyses can be used
when there is a question about the appropriate prior or when
the circumstances suggest that an established prior may not be
appropriate due to, for example, challenges to an assumption.
The requirement to spell out assumptions and arguments when
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TABLE 2 | Estimate of posterior means for individuals’ probability of
spiraling, P̂r (Sj = 1|Y ), and posterior medians of the commencement of
the spiral, ĉj , for all individuals classified as entity theorists (red) and as
incremental theorists (blue) with f(t) = t and εjt ∼ N(0, σ
2).
Posterior probability of spiraling
Incremental theorists Entity theorists
Individual # ˆPr(Sj = 1|Y ) ĉj Individual # ˆPr(Sj = 1|Y ) ĉj
1 0.11 0 3 0.24 0
2 0.91* 4 5 0.10 0
4 0.09 0 10 0.10 0
6 0.04 0 13 0.05 0
7 0.12 0 14 0.61* 3
8 0.18 0 16 0.33 0
9 0.04 0 18 0.97* 4
11 0.09 0 19 0.99* 9
12 0.22 0 20 0.95* 4
15 0.38 0 21 1.00* 4
17 0.14 0 22 1.00* 3
23 0.02 0 24 0.34 0
25 0.08 0 26 1.00* 3
27 0.12 0 28 0.94* 1
Average 0.18 0.62
Note that for individual 19, the high probability of spiraling is a result of a low performance
score on trial 12. Figure 9 in Appendix A (Supplementary Materials) demonstrates how
modeling the possibility of large deviations via a t3 distribution mitigates the impact of
outliers.
using Bayesian methods will enable more critical assessments of
the cumulative knowledge in psychological research. It will also
enable more critical evaluation of populist recommendations,
often espoused by consulting firms, that are based on a single
study of unknown validity or relevance to the big picture.
Third, Bayesianmethods enable researchers to jointly estimate
the uncertainty surrounding all parameters. For example, in
the current study this enabled us to treat the trial on which
an individual experienced their first incident of failure that
either did or did not lead to spiraling as a random variable.
For psychologists seeking to predict the outcomes of individual
processes, the ability to model exogenous factors, such as a
performance setback, an action by another person, or some
other unexpected event, as random factors, greatly enhances the
validity of attempts to model the effects of those events.
This study provided the first test of the individual level
performance dynamics of ITA theory. The work of Dweck and
colleagues (Dweck, 1999) plus other psychologists who have
used ITA theory to develop their hypotheses has been based
on an argument that entity theorists respond differently to
failure than incremental theorists. In particular, entity theorists
are more prone to negative self-evaluations following failure
than incremental theorists and these negative self-evaluations
are predicted to undermine subsequent performance and lead
to spiraling. The data from this study are consistent with the
ITA arguments, and further studies are underway to establish
the reproducibility of these findings. The results of the current
FIGURE 6 | The posterior probability that an individual classified as an
entity theorist is more likely to spiral than an individual classified as an
incremental theorist, as a function of the variance of the prior on δ.
study showed that those identified as entity theorists on a prior
independent assessment were more likely on average to exhibit
spiraling following an initial failure than those identified as
incremental theorists.
We estimated the between-person effect based on the
observed within-person response patterns using a bottom up,
i.e., individual to group approach, rather than using group-level
aggregate statistics to infer the existence of specific response
patterns at the level of the individual (top down) as typically
done. We also followed recent recommendations to investigate
psychological phenomena as a function of time (see Roe, 2008).
This enabled us to show not all individuals exhibited the
outcomes predicted based on their categorization as either an
entity theorist or an incremental theorist, and the onset of the
spiraling behavior varied for individuals. These details, which are
important for understanding the dynamics and potential limits
of the theory are lost in the aggregate statistics of group level
analyses. In order to capture these details, we need to model
behavior at the individual level, and allow the timing of the
commencement of spiraling to vary with individuals.
Approximately two-thirds of the participants classified as
entity theorists exhibited spiraling behavior, while the remaining
third did not. This is not an uncommon outcome for predictions
based on personal characteristics, which are probabilistic and
not deterministic. All assessments of the outcomes related to
personality characteristics such as ITA have variability and
counter indicative results that need to be explained. A further
benefit of the Bayesian analyses is that it enables us to identify
which of the specific participants categorized as entity theorists
did not spiral. Additional knowledge of those individuals and
their performance histories can then be explored to see if their
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deviation from the prediction of the theory are due to problems
in the arguments of the theory, boundary conditions of the theory
or the fact that they, for whatever reason, did not experience
failure during the 12 trails of the simulations. For example, some
entity theorists may not have encountered the task conditions
that produce failure or they may have discovered effective
strategies in the early stages of their task experience. Without
the experience of failure, an entity theorist does not experience
the self-doubt that can undermine their subsequent performance
and may behave like an incremental theorist. Without much
larger samples, current frequentist methods cannot identify
the performance responses of individuals to specific events.
As a result, researchers who use those methods often ignore
the variability in predicted outcomes or attribute it to error.
Explanations, when offered, are at the group level and refer to
characteristics of the sample, the task or the context.
The fact that Bayesian techniques provide individual estimates
of the probability of spiraling also has practical implications. For
example, if a teacher or counselor was to provide advice to a
student identified as an entity theorist, that advice would almost
certainly be different for a student with a 0.95 probability of
spiraling following failure in an exam than one whose probability
of spiraling is found to equal to 0.51. As noted earlier, the
hypothesis selection approach of frequentist statistics would
label both as spirallers. The capability of social and personality
psychologists to provide more nuanced, individual level analyses
of individuals who vary from the mean in their assigned
personality category will benefit the clinicians and practitioners
who use those categories in their assessments of individuals
and resulting interventions. The replication and generalization
of the results in further studies will, hopefully, lead to the
development of robust priors, this means a priori reflections
regarding expected effects of tasks, performance profiles and
personality constructs. Also, our results might bring spiraling
as a general class of response patterns into a more process-
orientated focus of attention for different psychological theories
that specify differential reactions to success and failure. Another
benefit of a Bayesian approach is that it allows updating of
estimated probabilities as new evidence comes to hand (rather
than abandon old findings and subscribing to new ones, which
often is perceived by practitioners as disorientating).
Finally, we turn to the functionality of Bayesian methods for
psychologists interested in the study of within-person processes
at the individual level. Given the advantages outlined, we
might ask why aren’t more social and personality psychologists
Bayesian? For established scholars whose careers have been
built on the understanding and use of frequentist methods,
operationalized through standardized statistical packages such
as SPSS, AMOS, and Minitab, the use of Bayesian methods will
present some challenges. Converting the formal mathematical
model of the theory into a statistical model requires the use
of a range of sampling scheme techniques, such as MCMC,
Importance Sampling (IS), and Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC),
to efficiently explore the entire model space. The application of
these schemes is a non-trivial task and one that often requires
mathematical and programming expertise (Browne and Draper,
2006). The flexibility of Bayesian methods to tailor models to
answer specific problems, which is one of its strengths, makes the
development of off-the-shelf standardized methods problematic.
For some researchers who have not had any training in Bayesian
statistics these hurdles may seem insurmountable, but not for
others. Over many decades, psychology scholars have introduced
increasingly sophisticated statistical methods, ranging from
factor analyses to growth curve modeling. Depending upon
the timing of one’s career, scholars have learnt new methods
either during their PhD studies or on the job. Over time the
introduction of Bayesian statistics training in social sciences will,
hopefully, produce a growing body of psychologists who are
adept in the flexible application of Bayesian methods and there
is evidence that this is a current trend (Andrews and Baguley,
2013).
Of course, not all psychologists interested in the study of
dynamic individual level processes need to become experts in
Bayesian techniques. Our experience in this research is that
collaboration between psychologists and Bayesian statisticians
can benefit both disciplines (O’Hagan et al., 2006). Scholars who
develop Bayesian methods benefit because often the application
of current methods to real problems leads to the development
of new methods. Psychologists benefit by being able to construct
formal models of their theory and to employ flexible statistical
models that provide more direct individual level tests of their
theory than less flexible frequentist models. In the current
collaboration, the interaction with the Bayesian scholars required
clear specification of the arguments and assumptions of the
within-person processes in ITA theory and how they would be
manifest in an observed pattern of performance over multiple
trials, which were then incorporated into the formal model. The
specification of the formal model led to greater clarity in the
specification of the arguments for the ITA theory and the use
of highly flexible Bayesian methods enabled the testing of the
specified processes at the level of individuals.
Bayesian techniques have the advantage of being more
adaptable for specific scientific questions than frequentist
techniques. Programs such as R and Winbugs do provide
pre-programmed software for some of the standard Bayesian
methods used in the analyses of mixture models. However,
programmed off-the-shelf software is not yet available for the
Bayesian techniques used in the analyses of the complex mixture
models required to address specific questions such as those
addressed in this manuscript. However, the manuscript provides
an explicit description of the MCMC scheme and Matlab code
and data can be provided by the authors upon request. The
spiraling model may well be one of a general class of models for
different psychological theories that specify differential reactions
to success and failure, as many social cognitive theories do. For
similar, but not identical, applications we argue the collaboration
between statisticians and psychologists is necessary to surmount
these challenges.
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Change of Situation Variables
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When, how, and why situations flow into one another is important for understanding
dynamic personality processes, but the topic of situation change has traditionally been a
thorny issue in personality/social psychology. We explore conceptual andmethodological
issues in research on situation change: (1) What is situation change, which variables
could we measure, and how can situation change be methodologically captured and
analyzed (at between- and within-person levels)? (2) Which person-situation transaction
mechanisms (situation management strategies) could entail stability and change of
situations in daily life? (3) How do single or repeated instances of situation change impact
short-, middle-, and long-term outcomes (e.g., intra- and interpersonal adjustment)?
Besides laying out a research program for situation change, we present preliminary data
from participants who wore mini-video cameras recording their situations so that they
could be rated later in the lab. We demonstrate rater consensus on when situations
change, mean-level changes of situation characteristics across situations, similarity of
situation characteristics across adjacent situations, and inter-individual differences in
intra-individual situation change in change networks.
Keywords: situations, situation change, person-situation transactions, situation management strategies,
Situational Eight DIAMONDS, individual differences
SITUATION CHANGE
When, how, and why does one situation end and another other begin? Studying situation change
has been a thorny issue in psychology for several reasons. Research on situations in general has
faced recurring problems, such as the conceptualization, taxonomization, and measurement of
situational information (Hogan, 2009). The lack of a clear and consensual understanding of what
situations are and how they can be described and measured obviously makes the study of situation
change practically impossible. Thus, the topic of situation change—as the stability vs. variability
of situations or how situations flow into each other—has received relatively little attention so
far although its importance has been already understood (e.g., Argyle et al., 1981; Magnusson,
1981c). Recently, however, situation research has begun to receive renewed interest and increasing
attention (Reis, 2008), resulting in several advances that may be useful when studying situation
change (e.g., Rauthmann et al., 2015a,b). As such, this article seeks to lay the foundation for such
research by addressing three major questions (along with specific sub-questions; see Figure 1):
(1) Conceptualization and Measurement:
What is situation change? How can it be captured and studied?
(2) Correlates and Antecedents:
Which variables explain (= coincide with or predict) situation change?
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FIGURE 1 | A research program for situation change.
(3) Trajectories and Outcomes:
How does situation change unfold? Which variables does
situation change predict?
THE IMPORTANCE OF (STUDYING)
SITUATION CHANGE
Before we address the three major issues outlined above, we
summarize reasons why it is important to study situation change
in the first place. First, most of psychology (save developmental
psychology) is focused rather on static structures. As such,
much of situation research is devoted to understanding “the
situation” or certain (experimentally manipulated) stimuli. In
such research, situational variables are static in the sense that
they do not or cannot change. However, real life is lived in
a flowing stream of situations that are ever changing. If it is
our goal to understand the everyday lives of people, we must
develop theories and methods to study dynamic aspects of
situations. Elaborations on situation change should serve to fill
this lacuna. Second, while it is important to acknowledge that
situations change at all, it will be good to know how (i.e., in
which ways) they change. The types of situation change may tell
us something about the people in those changed or changing
situations. If it is our goal to predict behavior (not just central
tendencies such as the mean, but also other parameters of entire
density distributions of personality expressions; see Fleeson and
Gallagher, 2009), we should also take into account in which ways
the situations change. For example, some situations may change
suddenly and abruptly, while others may drag along and change
gradually. In such cases, different behavioral processes will
undoubtedly be involved. Third, understanding why situations
change will elucidate person-situation transactions, or more
specifically, “person-to-situation” transactions. Personality and
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situation characteristics are correlated (Ickes et al., 1997;
Rauthmann et al., 2015c), and these correlations may emerge
because of what people “do” to their situations (and also what
these situations, cumulatively over time, do to them). How people
navigate and “manage” their daily situations should, to a great
deal, determine further information processing, behavior, and
other outcomes (e.g., health). For example, in the corresponsive
principle of personality development (Roberts and Wood, 2006),
it is posited that people seek out situations that “fit” their
personalities, while those sought after situations, in turn, deepen
and consolidate the personalities that have led to seeking
them out. Such person-situation transactions in personality




The measurement of situation change hinges upon how it is
defined. Generally, three broad questions need to be answered:
(1) Resolution: At what level of abstraction are “situational
variables” located?
(2) Variable Type:Which types of “situational variables” are used?
(3) Analytic Level: Are analyses conducted nomothetically
(between-person level) or idiographically (within-person
level)?
Resolution
Rauthmann et al. (2015b) clarified that there are different
phenomena that have been referred to as “the situation” in
extant theory and research: situation, episode, environment,
and context. These terms are hierarchically nested within each
other. Several situations (e.g., being greeted by friends, getting
something to drink, listening to loud music, a vivid conversation,
etc.) can be linked together so that they form an ongoing
episode (e.g., a party episode with many different situations in it).
Situations and episodes are embedded into the environment of a
person (i.e., one’s habitual socio-ecological surroundings) which
itself is, in turn, couched into a larger context (e.g., history, epoch,
zeitgeist, socio-culture). This work is concernedwith situations as
momentary and fleeting phenomena that dynamically flow into
each other. It is the flow, or the segmentation of this flow, that is
so daunting to situation change research. In examining stability
and change of situations, we inevitably will also touch upon
episodes which are at a lower resolution because they are more
abstract (and could potentially subsume several situations that
have changed yet are still sufficiently similar to group together).
Though the change of one’s environment (and context) is also
an interesting topic, this presupposes that we have knowledge
on situation change because environments are, to a great part,
a function of recurring, typical, or “crystallized” situations and
episodes of a person (Rauthmann et al., 2015b).
Variable Type
Objective vs. Subjective Demarcations
Demarcations of situations can be generally viewed from a
more objective or more subjective perspective (Fiske, 1977;
Raush, 1977; Craik, 1981; Magnusson, 1981a,b,c). The objective
perspective stresses either (a) physically existent or “objectively”
quantifiable information in the environment (stimuli) or (b)
consensually agreed upon “quasi-objective” facts, while the
subjective perspective, in contrast, experiences or perceptions
of people (that need not be shared with others, but can be
idiosyncratic; see Rauthmann, 2012 and Rauthmann et al.,
2015a,b for details).
This basic distinction is important to the question of situation
change. For example, the episode “going home from the
gym” includes (at least) three spatially distinct environments:
gym, way home, at home. This could imply three physically
demarcated situations, yet the psychological situation of the
walking individual may not have changed within these three
environmental settings (Stebbins, 1969) as he/she might have
been thinking all the walking time about what to cook later (and
would thus classify the entire situation episode as “planning
what to do”). So: Has the “situation” changed or not? In objective
terms it has (because of the variation in the physical world),
but in subjective terms it has not (because of no variation in
the cognitively represented world). However, there are also
examples, where a change in space results in a change in the
(perceived) situation as different rules and roles become salient
and predominant. Suppose the individual from before comes
home, greets his/her spouse (room: hallway; role: spouse), goes
on to play with the kids (room: children’s room; role: parent),
then cooks dinner (room: kitchen; role: chef), eats with family
(room: dining room; roles: spouse + parent), and after that
works on a project for the meeting the next day before going
to bed (room: home office; role: worker). In this example, the
different rooms are associated with different roles which are, in
turn, associated with different generative behavioral rules (Argyle
et al., 1981). Thus, situations may be demarcated in physical
and psychological terms as each room comes attached with
different meanings, roles, and rules. Taken together, there may
be discontinuities in the physical and psychological situations
with various transitions to different situational structures
(Magnusson, 1981a,b,c).
Situational Information
Generally, there are three types of situational information
(Rauthmann, 2015; Rauthmann et al., 2015c): cues,
characteristics, and classes. Cues (e.g., amount of people, number
of books, lighting, noise, etc.) circumscribe distal stimuli in the
physical environment that are objectively measurable. They
have been mainly used for experimental social-psychological
research and often comprise PEARLS (Noftle and Gust, 2015):
persons (any other persons around someone), events (anything
happening around someone), activities (what people are doing),
roles (the formal and social roles that people inhabit), location
(the space and time in which a situation is couched), and states
(people’s ambient thoughts, feelings, and desires). Note here that
particularly roles and states pertain more to aspects of or within
a person that accompany a situation, and do not necessarily
belong to or define it (Rauthmann et al., 2015a).
Characteristics (e.g., intellectual, adverse, terrifying, etc.)
describe meanings and interpretations that people form about
single or multiple cues once they have explicitly and/or
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implicitly processed them. They can be used to describe
situations similar to how people are described with personality
dimensions (de Raad, 2004; Edwards and Templeton, 2005).
Recently, Rauthmann et al. (2014) proposed to taxonomize
situation characteristics into the Situational Eight DIAMONDS
Model, containing Duty (Does work need to be done?),
Intellect (Is deep cognitive information processing relevant?),
Adversity (Is someone under threat?), Mating (Is the situation
erotically charged?), pOsitivity (Is the situation enjoyable?),
Negativity (Could the situation turn negative?), Deception
(Is mistrust an issue?), and Sociality (Is meaningful social
interaction and relationship building possible?). This taxonomy
integrates most dimensions from previous situation literature
(see Rauthmann, 2015 for a review) and also includes some
that have not been routinely found (i.e., Intellect, Deception).
Additionally, it has already spawned well-validated assessment
tools (32-item measure: Rauthmann et al., 2014; 24-item
measure: Rauthmann and Sherman, 2015a; 8-item ultra-short
measure: Rauthmann and Sherman, 2015b). Further, the
DIAMONDS model has proven useful in substantive empirical
research, including (a) predicting personality expressions in
an experience sampling study (Sherman et al., 2015), (b)
understanding the temporal contiguities among and between
personality states and situation characteristics (Rauthmann
et al., in revision), (c) predicting contact and construal of
situations by personality traits (Rauthmann et al., 2015c), and
(d) tracking people’s situations on Twitter (Serfass and Sherman,
2015). Further, Rauthmann (in press) has demonstrated how
the DIAMONDS dimensions essentially capture evolutionarily
important motivational processes and content. Taken together,
the DIAMONDS dimensions offer a broad and useful taxonomy
of the psychological characteristics of situations. As such, we will
make use of this taxonomy in our empirical part later.
Classes (e.g., work situations, interpersonal situations, etc.)
denote types or groups of entire situations with similar cue
constellations (e.g., all situations with people in them may
be “interpersonal situations”) or similar levels or profiles of
situation characteristics (e.g., all situations which score highly on
pOsitivity and Sociality may denote “pleasant social interaction
situations”). The most prominent and inclusive taxonomy comes
from van Heck (1984, 1989) who identified 10 situation classes:
interpersonal conflict, joint working and information exchange,
intimacy and interpersonal relations, recreation, traveling,
rituals, sport, excesses, serving, and trading.
As Figure 2 summarizes, situation change may be studied
according to whether (or to what extent), when, how, and why
cues, characteristics, and/or classes change. Ideally, situation
change would be tackled for cues, characteristics, and classes
simultaneously in one design, but theory, preferences of
researchers, and/or design restrictions (e.g., participant burden,
financial costs, etc.) may limit the ways in which situation
change is studied. Thus, we present here briefly different ways of
examining situation change.
Change of Cues
The first row of Figure 2 concerns the change of situation
cues. One could think of this in a nomothetic sense (i.e., the
data are averaged across many participants in a study and
thus capture processes at the between-persons level) or in an
idiographic sense (i.e., the data come from one participant only
and thus capture within-person processes). Though cues could,
in principle, also be reported by participants (e.g., by asking
them which cues they noticed in their situation; see Sherman
et al., 2010 for this methodology), this approach hinges upon
several assumptions. First, it assumes that people can actually
report objective cues. In reality though, we suspect that people
are more likely to report some interpretation of cues or even
characteristics. Second, this approach assumes that cues are
only important if they are consciously noticed and reported.
However, cues may also work outside of consciousness (i.e.,
be implicitly processed) and generate behavioral consequences.
As such, if cues should be in the focus, then we would advise
measuring them as directly as possible (not via participants)1.
One potentially fruitful avenue for this approach lies in the
use of convolutional neural networks to detect and extract cues
from streams of photographs. Changes in photostreams can
be used as one indicator of situation change (Bolaños et al.,
2015).
For objective cues, Figure 2 shows the proceedings of 4
cues (Cues 1–4) through 4 time points (tn to tn+3). As can
be seen, there are 3 cues (Cues 1–3) available at tn, 4 cues
(Cues 1–4) at tn+1 and tn+2, and 2 cues (Cues 2 and 3) at
tn+3. If objective cues of situations are the benchmark criterion,
then any change in objective cues denotes situation change.
In Row 1, situation change then occurs from tn to tn+1 and
from tn+2 to tn+3, while the situation remains stable from tn+1
to tn+2. Attending to the objective cues of situations allows
a micro-perspective on the situation(s) studied (depending on
how many cues are sampled, of course) because researchers
can distinguish cues that are constantly present (Cues 2 and
3), are available only for a limited time (Cue 1), or briefly
appear and disappear (Cue 4). For simplicity, we assumed
in Figure 2 that cues are either present or not, thus limiting
situation change to the quantity and types of cues available.
However, it is also possible that (a) two or more cues “interact”
with each other or form a cue conglomerate (many cues are
grouped together) and/or (b) a cue changes into a different cue
(i.e., change in nature). Thus, in addition to quantity, also the
quality of cue changes should be examined. Studying situation
change in terms of the change of objective cues in quantity
and quality represents an environment-driven approach, and
researchers must effectively strive to “catalog” the (natural or
standardized laboratory) environments their participants are in.
The catalog should be either exhaustive (i.e., striving to measure
all quantifiable environmental information) or theory-driven
(i.e., only specific cues are assessed, tailored to a specific theory
or model), but not be purely ad-hoc (except for exploratory
purposes).
1It may be an interesting task to catalog objective cues in a situation and contrast
these with the cues participants noticed and reported. Of course, participants
cannot process all cues and will not find all of them relevant (or recall them). Thus,
the selection of cues that participants nominate are likely the most important and
salient ones to them (e.g., a book), and these may be tied strongly to perceived
situation characteristics (e.g., intellectual).
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FIGURE 2 | Change of different situation variables. Thick black arrows denote a change.
Change of Characteristics
If researchers want to emphasize more phenomenological aspects
of situations, then they can focus on whether and to what extent
the psychologically important characteristics of situations change.
Row 2 of Figure 2 concerns the change of situation characteristics
(Characteristics a-c). Again, such change may be examined at
the within-person or the between-person level, though Figure 2
illustrates characteristics change within one individual only. As
can be seen, all three situation characteristics (a, b, and c)
exist in some quantity in each situation; however, the salience,
importance, or relevance of each characteristic can vary at each
time point. This is illustrated in Figure 2 with gray bars on top
of each characteristic: the higher the bar, the more defining the
characteristic is of the situation at a given time point. Thus,
if psychological characteristics of situations are the benchmark
criterion, then any change in the salience or the importance of
situation characteristics (which are used to describe a situation)
denotes situation change. As can be seen in Figure 2, the gray
bars of Characteristics a, b, and c are identical at tn+1 and
tn+2, indicating that the individual perceived those situations
as psychologically identical. At tn+3, however, the importance
of the three characteristics shifts, such that Characteristic a
now gains relatively more weight than Characteristics b and c.
Thus, situation change in terms of the change of psychological
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characteristics would have occurred from tn to tn+1 and from
tn+2 to tn+3.
The segmentation of situations according to their
psychological characteristics presents a more molar approach
as opposed to the molecular approach taken when examining
cue changes. As such, this approach will not be as measurement-
heavy as with cues, but it does require input from at least
the participant(s) in the situation. This may make some
researchers uncomfortable because situation characteristics
now are essentially people’s perceptions only (which is no
problem with perceived cues because they have a real-life
counterpart cue that can be physically measured). As such, a
situation variable is essentially a person variable (a perception).
However, Rauthmann et al. (2015a) showed that this problem
can be tackled by employing multiple perceivers (or sources
of ratings) when characteristics are to be rated (for empirical
applications, see Sherman et al., 2010, 2012, 2013; Rauthmann
et al., 2015c). In their terminology, participants physically in
the situation and affected by it are termed “raters in situ;”
bystanders or confederates in the situation but not acting or
personally detached from it “raters juxta situm;” and laboratory
assistants not in the situation and detached from it “raters ex
situ.” Obtaining ratings from other sources than raters in situ
grants the opportunity to derive scores shared between raters in
situ and raters juxta situm and/or ex situ (= consensual aspects
of the situation) and not shared between different raters (=
idiosyncratic aspects of the situation) (see Rauthmann et al.,
2015c).
Change of Classes
At a considerably high level of abstraction, researchers may be
interested whether or to what extent the class of a situation
changes (not just its single cues or some set of characteristics).
Situation classes can be derived in two ways. First, situation
class membership can be assessed directly by asking raters in
situ, juxta situm, and/or ex situ (including the researchers) to
categorize the situation into a certain group or type of situations.
Second, situation class membership can be assessed indirectly by
grouping situations with similar (a) cues (or cue constellations)
or (b) levels or profiles of situation characteristics (measured by
ratings in situ, juxta situm, and/or ex situ) together. Regardless
of which of these methods is used, the result is an abstract,
nominal categorization of a situation to a certain class (e.g., a
threat situation, a work situation, etc.). If class memberships
of situations are the benchmark criterion, then any change in
class membership denotes situation change. As with cues and
characteristics, such class membership change may be studied
between and within persons.
Row 3 of Figure 2 depicts changes in class membership. As
can be seen, the situations at tn to tn+2 belong to Class A, while
the situation at tn+3 belongs to Class B
2. Thus, situation change
occurs from tn+2 to tn+3. (Note that this also corresponds to
how cues and characteristics change as, on average, the cues and
characteristic levels are at tn to tn+2 more similar to each other
2In principle, a situation could also belong to (two or more classes). However, for
simplicity sake and illustrative purposes, our example assumes that a situation can
only belong to one class at a time.
than to those at tn+3 where the situation seems to have changed
markedly).
Analytical Level
As alluded to in the previous explanations of Figure 2, situation
change may be examined nomothetically or idiographically.
Nomothetic analyses concern estimates of situation change
across individuals (usually for situations that are similar for
the population of participants studied), allowing to examine
inter-individual differences in between-person analyses. For
example, interesting between-person questions are: Do some
people experience more situation change than others? Are inter-
individual differences in the level of neuroticism related to
perceiving more frequent situation changes?
Idiographic analyses, on the other hand, concern the stability
or variability of situations (cues, characteristics, classes) within
individuals, allowing to examine intra-individual differences
in within-person analyses. For example, interesting within-
person questions are: How often does Alex experience adverse
situations? Do such adverse situations lead to more Adversity
down the road or are those situations only single (but intense)
instances? Do they occur with certain regularity? Do they change
into other situations (e.g., they start as adverse, but usually end
pleasant)?
Ideally, situation change studies would cater to both between-
and within-person questions as nomothetic and idiographic
perspectives and analyses, respectively, are not irreconcilable
opposites, but can be combined. For example, experience
sampling or ambulatory assessment methodology (Shiffman
et al., 2008), where participants report upon their current
situation and mental states several times a day for several
days (prompted by their smartphones or PDAs), grants the
opportunity to examine real-time person-situation transactions
at both a between- and within-person level (see Fleeson,
2007; Sherman et al., 2015). We believe that particularly this
methodology will be quite useful in exploring and understanding
situation change at different data-analytical levels.
Analysis of Change Data
Methodological and data-analytic advances in analyzing
Intensive Repeated Measurements in Naturalistic Settings data
(Moskowitz et al., 2009) will likely be the most fruitful way of
studying situation change in vivo. Consensus about when change
occurs can be examined qualitatively via subjective impressions
of change points (e.g., by asking raters in situ and/or ex situ
when a situation has changed). However, a more convincing
case for consensus on situation change can be made by not
only examining consensus on whether a situation has changed,
but also by assessing how and to what degree the situation has
changed. This will be best achieved by approaches that quantify
characteristics of situations. As such, situation change can also
be quantitatively assessed by determining to what extent (in situ,
juxta situm, or ex situ) ratings of the psychological characteristics
of the same situation correlate higher with each other than
ratings of the psychological characteristics of different, but
temporally adjacent, situations. Quantity of situation change,
for each individual, can be measured at the level of a single
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situation characteristic or at the level of profiles. To measure the
former, one could compute the within-person standard deviation
(SD) of each DIAMONDS situation characteristic (rated either
in situ, juxta situm, or ex situ) across time (see Fleeson, 2001,
2007 who quantified variability in personality expressions and
situation characteristics across time like this). To measure the
latter, one could correlate the DIAMONDS profile scores for one
situation with the DIAMONDS profile scores for another (or all
other) situation(s). Such profile correlations reflect “situational
similarity” (Sherman et al., 2010); low(er) profile correlations
would reflect strong(er) differences in situations across time. We
can then attempt to explain both of these measures of average
situation change via correlation/regression with personality
or changes in momentary states (Question 2). Lastly, average
situation change can be used as a predictor of outcomes such
as momentary personality, affect, or self-esteem (Question 3).
Beyond these rather simple analyses, situation change can also
be modeled using more advanced techniques. For example,
differential equation modeling (Deboeck, 2011) can be used to
identify within-person, non-linear patterns of situation change
(e.g., oscillation) over time, and the nested nature of the data
(situations within participants) will require, for some questions,
multilevel models (Nezlek, 2012) or autoregressive models (Eid
et al., 2012).
Empirical Examples
Below, we present some findings from preliminary data where
we demonstrate different data-analytical procedures of studying
situation change. First, we quantify situation change as the
consensus between different raters on when a situation has
changed. Second, we zoom in on situation change by examining
howmuch characteristics change.We perform these two analyses
for one individual only to demonstrate an idiographic approach.
After that, we perform different analyses on a data set with
N = 60 participants to demonstrate a nomothetic approach.
First, we examine mean-level change of situation characteristics
for two persons only (to demonstrate individual differences).
Second, we quantify change at the level of single situation
characteristics (within-person SDs) and characteristic profiles.
Lastly, we illustrate how the relationships among situation
characteristics may change across situations in dynamic network
analyses. All data were gathered in accordance with the United
States Department of Health and Human Services code of federal
regulations title 45, part 46 (45 CFR 46) and approved by
the Florida Atlantic University Institutional Review Board. All
subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with the
Belmont Report.
Data Set #1: Agreement on Situation Change
Determining the existence of psychological phenomena (e.g.,
personality) is a much more difficult task than determining
the existence of physical objects (e.g., other people, a book, a
cake) because psychological constructs lack concrete physical
existence. However, using the time-honored practice of
consensus, psychology has had no trouble demonstrating the real
and meaningful existence of a large number of psychological
constructs. We propose that the same practice can be used
to determine the existence of situation change: if people
reasonably agree that a situation has changed, then we can
say with probabilistic certainty that it has indeed consensually
changed.
In a pilot project aimed at examining this hypothesis, we
had one participant wear a mini-video camera (about the
size of a thumb) on his shirt from the moment he woke
up for a little over an hour. We then enlisted nine research
assistants to independently view the recorded video. They
indicated, based on their own subjective interpretations, each
time the situation the participant was in changed. The results
from this task are displayed visually in Figure 3. As can be
seen, the raters differed in their perceptions of whether or
not a situation changed (e.g., Rater 3 indicated more frequent
changes than Rater 9), as indicated by a change in color










❶ ❷ ❸ ❹ ❺ ❻ ❼ ❽ ❾ ❿
FIGURE 3 | Situation changes according to 9 independent judges (Data set #1). Change in colors from left to right represent each rater’s individual change
point. Black bars represent consensual change points. Time (in minutes) is depicted along the x-axis. Situation descriptions: (1) Taking dogs outside; (2) Watching
dogs come back in; (3) Feeding dogs; (4) Driving to work; (5) Stop at coffee shop for coffee; (6) Continue driving; (7) Walk into office; (8) Sitting in office; (9) Walking to
class; (10) In class.
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in Figure 3. However, raters also demonstrated approximate
consensus about when situation change occurred, as indicated
by the vertical black bars. From these ratings, it appears
that the individual wearing the mini-video was in approx. (at
least) 10 different situations (or situational episodes). Thus,
we suspect that situation change is indeed a real phenomenon
that can be detected by others with reasonable amounts of
consensus. However, this exercise only treats situation change
as a binary phenomenon (a situation has either changed or
not) and does not allow us to delve into the more substantive
questions of why a situations has changed or which aspects have
changed.
Data Set #1: Change of Characteristics
To quantify situation change with respect to a more fine-
grained analysis of situation characteristics in our pilot video,
we sampled two separate 30 s clips from each of the 10 different
situations indicated between the black bars in Figure 3 (i.e.,
20 total clips). Two groups of research assistants (n = 4
in each group) then watched one of the 30 s clips from each
of the 10 situations (clip order was counter-balanced) and
rated the psychological characteristics of the situation shown
in those clips using the RSQ-8 (32 items; Rauthmann et al.,
2014). The participant’s (rated) DIAMONDS characteristics are
plotted in Figure 4. As can be seen, the participant’s situations
were relatively high on Duty (while Adversity and Deception
were low), and Intellect gradually increased across situations
(as the person approached school and eventually arrived in
class).
If the black bars noted in Figure 3 represent actual situation
change, then we would expect to find that the 30 s clips from
the same situation are rated as more psychologically similar
than 30 s clips from different situations. This is indeed what
we found. Specifically, ratings of the same situation were more
similar to each other (average r = 0.35) than ratings of
different situations (average r = 0.22). Such results suggest that
people are sensitive to situation change and that the RSQ-8 may
be used to identify situation change concerning psychological
characteristics. Of note, this result also indicates that the pilot
participant’s situations showed some stability across time (r =
0.22), which will be addressed shortly.
The ability to quantify situation change is crucial for this
research because it allows us to investigate further questions such
as: (1) How much situation change does a person experience
across the day? (2) How consistent is change across time
(e.g., hours, days)? (3) How much within- and between-
person variance is there in situation change? These questions
can be addressed at both the level of a single situational
characteristic (e.g., How much does a person’s experience of
Duty change across time?) and of the situational profile (e.g.,
How stable/variable is profile of situation characteristics that
a person experiences across time?). As noted, the answer to
this last question for the pilot participant was r = 0.22.
This finding suggests that, while there was some stability in
this person’s situational experience over time, there was also
a great deal of variability. Such variability can be visualized,
as done in Figure 4, which shows average coder ratings of
the Situational Eight characteristics in each situation. As can
be seen, there was a large amount of variability in the pilot
participant’s situation characteristics across time. Further, some
situation characteristics showed more variability than others.
Adversity (green line) was relatively low and stable across
time for this participant. Intellect (red line) showed more
variability and generally increased over time (which is nice to see
because the 10th situation was in a college classroom). Lastly,
in terms of their overall Situational Eight profiles, Situations
1 and 2 look more similar to each other than Situations 7
and 8.
FIGURE 4 | Mean-level changes of the Situational Eight DIAMONDS over a 1h period (10 situations) of one participant (Data set #1). Duty: green;
Intellect: blue; Adversity: brown; Mating: red; pOsitivity: magenta; Negativity: black; Deception: gray; Sociality: orange. Situation descriptions: (1) Taking dogs outside;
(2) Watching dogs come back in; (3) Feeding dogs; (4) Driving to work; (5) Stop at coffee shop for coffee; (6) Continue driving; (7) Walk into office; (8) Sitting in office;
(9) Walking to class; (10) In class.
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Data Set # 2: Inter-Individual Differences in Situation
Change
So far, we have demonstrated how situation change could be
studied for one individual with idiographic analyses. However,
many psychologists may be interested in how situations
change generally or in comparing situation change between
different individuals (see Dalal et al., 2015 for a review).
To this end, we ran a follow-up study with N = 60
participants (undergraduate students) who now wore mini-
video cameras for 24 h. Participants were asked to record,
for approx. 30s, each new situation they encountered (this
time we allowed them to use their own definition of what
constituted a new situation). These videos were later rated
by 4 research assistants on the Situational Eight DIAMONDS
situation characteristics with two items per dimension from
the RSQ-8 (Rauthmann et al., 2014) for economic reasons.
We then formed aggregate scores of the DIAMONDS for
each situation (across the 4 research assistants). For illustrative
purposes here, we chose two individuals with more than
10 situations sampled: For showing differences in mean-level
changes, we selected Subject 29 (19 situations) and Subject 30 (10
situations).
FIGURE 5 | Mean-level changes of the Situational Eight DIAMONDS for two participants (Data set #2). Duty: green; Intellect: blue; Adversity: brown; Mating:
red; pOsitivity: magenta; Negativity: black; Deception: gray; Sociality: orange. (A) Subject 29, (B) Subject 30.
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We simply plotted the DIAMONDS composite scores across
the respective situations from Subjects 29 and 30 (see Figure 5)
to get a picture of inter-individual differences in mean-
level changes (as in Figure 4). As can be seen, there were
commonalties and differences between both participants. As for
the commonalities, the situations of both participants could
be characterized, on average, as more social and positive
than deceptive, adverse, and negative. This is consistent with
other research finding that the typical situation, even across
different countries, is mildly positive and social (Guillaume
et al., 2015). However, there were also differences between
both participants. Subject 29’s situations seem to change more
strongly than Subject’s 30s; they showed more mean-level
changes across different situation segments. This may be a first
hint at inter-individual differences in the degree of situation
change.
Data Set # 2: Single- and Profile-Level Analyses
Situation change in terms of variations in situation characteristics
can be analyzed for each single characteristic or for a profile
of characteristics. At the single characteristics level, the within-
person SD (across all situations) indexes the amount of change.
As can be seen in Table 1, Sociality and Intellect showed, on
average, the most variation, while Adversity and Negativity the
least. Figure 6 additionally shows the density distributions of
within-person SDs for all DIAMONDS. As can be seen, there
are sizeable individual differences in Duty, Intellect, and Sociality,
while there are less in the other characteristics dimensions. This
inter-individual variation could, at some point, be explained
by other individual difference variables, such as self- or peer-
reported personality of participants.
At the profile level, the correlation between a profile of
characteristics in one situation and the profile in the next
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics of within-person SD of situation experiences.
Dimension n M SD Median [min to max] Skewness Kurtosis SE
Duty 57 0.94 0.44 0.88 [0.00–2.30] 0.77 0.45 0.06
Intellect 57 1.06 0.59 0.90 [0.00–3.45] 1.28 2.90 0.08
Adversity 57 0.37 0.28 0.35 [0.00–1.65] 2.08 7.02 0.04
Mating 57 0.80 0.41 0.70 [0.09–2.30] 1.10 1.80 0.05
pOsitivity 57 0.76 0.31 0.69 [0.00–1.42] −0.21 −0.40 0.04
Negativity 57 0.46 0.32 0.40 [0.00–1.50] 1.04 0.66 0.04
Deception 57 0.57 0.30 0.54 [0.00–1.50] 0.88 1.05 0.04
Sociality 57 1.11 0.55 1.16 [0.00–2.74] 0.14 0.20 0.07
n = 57 (from N = 60) because 3 people only recorded 1 situation. Within-Person SD = within-person standard deviation.
FIGURE 6 | Density distributions of within-person SDs in the Situational Eight DIAMONDS (Data set #2).
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situation indexes situational similarity or stability (see Sherman
et al., 2010). One can then compute such correlations for all pairs
of situations and average the profile correlations for each person.
The grand average profile similarity across all participants was
0.79 (median = 0.79, SD = 0.44; min = −0.06, max = 1.00),
indicating that Situational Eight DIAMONDS profiles remained,
on average, relatively stable within persons. However, as Figure 7
(histogram of average within-person profile similarities for
all pairs of situations) shows, there were also relatively large
individual differences in average situational similarities. This
suggests that, for some people, there is more, and for others
less profile stability (i.e., they show more severe changes in
situational experiences). These individual differences could,
again, be explained by other individual differences variables (e.g.,
personality) at some point.
Data Set # 2: Dynamic Networks of Situation Change
The preceding analyses are fairly static and do not readily allow
inferences about temporal dynamics of the interrelations between
situation characteristics. Thus, we used network analyses to
examine processes of situation change. This involved several
steps: For Subjects 55 and 58 (those with the largest numbers
of situations sampled), we (a) within-person centered the
DIAMONDS composite scores for each situation, (b) stored each
of those as a matrix (with 1 row and 8 columns), (c) multiplied
that matrix by its transpose to create a matrix of cross-products
(treating this matrix of cross-products as a similarity matrix),
and (d) repeated Step c for each consecutive pair of situations
(i.e., each situation transition). We then were able to model
these data with the R package “qgraph” (Epskamp et al., 2012;
see also Costantini et al., 2015) as a network, consisting of
the Situational Eight DIAMONDS, across the situations of the
participants. In these networks, the arrows represent temporal
associations from tn to tn+1 (i.e., how prior pOsitivity predicts
later Sociality and so on). Figure 6 shows gif-animated networks
of how the Situational Eight DIAMONDS characteristics change
across situations for Subject 55 (27 situations) and 58 (23
FIGURE 7 | Density distribution of average profile similarities.
situations). Changes are between adjacent situations only (e.g.,
a participant’s Situation 1 to his/her Situation 2, Situation 2
to 3, and so on). Red arrows reflect negative associations and
green arrows positive associations; thicker arrows mean stronger
(positive or negative) associations. Note that we have modeled
the change of relationships among and between the DIAMONDS
in the network animations.
As can be seen in Figure 8, when only looking at transitions
from Situation 1 to Situation 2, there were again commonalities
and differences between the change networks of Subjects 55 and
58. For example, both participants had in common that prior
Adversity predicted less later Sociality. However, there were also
differences. For example, prior pOsitivity predicted more later
Duty for Subject 55, while it was less for Subject 58. Indeed,
Adversity was generally more “active” in Subject 58’s change
network: It predicted more later Duty and less later Sociality
and it was predicted by less prior Sociality and pOsitivity.
Because both participants were not in the same situation but
in different ones, the apparent differences found here may be
spurious: Both participants could actually be fairly similar, but
their situations are just actually different. To account for this
explanation, we also computed the average situation change
networks of Subjects 55 and 58 (see Figure 9). As can be seen,
the inter-individual differences were not as pronounced once we
examined average change, though they did not disappear. For
example, Adversity still had amore prominent role in Subject 30’s
network.
To get a glimpse of how strong inter-individual differences
of intra-individual situation change networks were, the
online Supplemental Materials contain an .avi video clip
“AvgChangeForEachSubject” that depicts the average situation
change networks for all participants. Note, however, that the
number of situations differed substantially between participants
(M = 9.62 different situations, SD= 6.19, min= 1, max= 27).
EXPLAINING SITUATION CHANGE
If situation change exists and if it can be quantified, the next
important question is determining the factors that might explain,
or at least be associated with, situation change:Why do situations
change? Our pilot findings described above indicated that there
was both consistency and variability of situation experiences
and change across time. Though empirical literature has almost
nothing to say about situation change, there is good reason to
expect that stable personality dimensions will be associated with
situation change. For example, experience sampling research
assessing momentary affective states has shown that individuals
high in Neuroticism are more likely to experience dramatic
shifts in affect (Eaton and Funder, 2002). Thus, we would
anticipate that individuals high in Neuroticism also experience
more variability in their situations over time. Not only focusing
on stable personality dimensions, we might also anticipate that
changes in momentary personality expressions (Fleeson, 2001,
2007) or transient goals (e.g., what a person needs, wants, desires,
or intends in a given situation) correspond with situation change.
Additionally, person-situation transactions may help explain
situation change.
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FIGURE 8 | Animated situation change networks of two participants across time. Situation change networks are animated GIFs. Red arrows: negative
prediction; green arrows: positive prediction. Dty: Duty; Int: Intellect; Adv: Adversity; Mate: Mating; Pos: pOsitivity; Neg: Negativity; Dec: Deception; Soc: Sociality. The
animated gif forms can be found in the Supplemental materials.
FIGURE 9 | Average situation change networks of two participants. The networks represent the averages across all situation-to-situation changes from
Figure 6. Red arrows, negative prediction; green arrows, positive prediction. The.avi video clip “AvgChangeForEachSubject” in the online Supplemental Materials




Many situations seem to “simply change on their own,” but
generally people can also influence their situations in different
ways; they are not merely passively or randomly “exposed” to
situations, but also shape and define them (Plomin et al., 1977;
Buss, 1981, 1987; Scarr and McCartney, 1983; Snyder and Ickes,
1985; Ickes et al., 1997; Caspi and Roberts, 2001). Table 1 gives
an overview of six possible person-situation transactions, which
we refer to as situation management strategies, that allow people
to “manage” situations by experiencing or shaping situations
(differently than before). Situation management strategies refer
to how people deal with, navigate in, and govern their daily
situations and can thus explain situation change. Broadly, such
management can be voluntary (≈ explicit, conscious, intentional,
deliberate, effortful, systematic) or involuntary (≈ implicit,
unconscious, unintentional, indeliberate, effortless, capricious).
To better contrast the different strategies in Table 2, they are
evaluated in terms of (a) intentionality of utilizing the strategy,
(b) effort for the strategist, (c) control granted to the strategist,
and (d) (physical) activity of the strategist while pursuing the
strategy (Table 3).
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TABLE 2 | Situation management strategies in extant literature.
Person-situation transactions:
situation management strategies
Scarr and McCartney (1983):
genotype → environment effects
Buss (1987): person-environment
correspondence processes
Caspi and Roberts (2001):
person-environment transactions
Construal ? ? Reactive
Maintenance (Passive) ? ?
Evocation Evocative Evocation Evocative
Selection Active Selection Pro-active
Modification ? Manipulation ?
Generation Active Manipulation ?
Terms from the authors (in columns) were matched with the six situation management strategies. Parentheses () mean that the term may probably describe the respective strategy.
Question marks (?) mean that there is probably no direct analog.
TABLE 3 | Overview of major types of important situation management strategies.
Strategy Individual difference variables Properties
Situation … Individual differences in the tendency to … Intentionality Effort Control Activity
Construal Constructor Uniquely construe situations differently from the consensus / / ++ −−−
Maintenance Sustainer (Passively) remain in a situation without changing it, thereby possibly maintaining it / / −− −−
Evocation Conjurer (Unwillingly) elicit certain situations −−− −−− −− /
Selection Picker (Willingly) select certain situations (without creating them) + / ++ +
Modification Engineer (Actively) modulate situations in a certain goal-serving way +++ ++ ++ ++
Generation Creator (Pro-actively) create situations in a certain goal-serving way +++ +++ +++ +++
+++: extremely strong; ++: very strong; +: strong; /: strong to weak; −: weak; −−: very weak; −−−: extremely weak. These distinctions are only approximations (by the two authors
of this work) and will need to be empirically challenged with real data.
Construal
People may distinctly perceive situations differently from how
other people see them. We refer to this strategy as situation
construal, and there may be individual differences in the extent
to which people are situation constructors. Construal can be
intentional and effortful (e.g., during cognitive restructuring
mechanisms) or unintentional and automatic (e.g., because
of motives and values, but also psychopathology). Construing
situations in a certain manner (e.g., trying to find the silver
lining in an otherwise dire situation) may grant the situation
constructor at least cognitive control over the situation by
changing it in his/her unique perceptions. Because construal
resides only at the mental level, no physical activity is involved.
Maintenance
People may remain in and maintain a situation, thus fostering
the stability of a situation and consequently inhibiting change.
We refer to this strategy as situation maintenance, and there
may be individual differences in the extent to which people are
situation sustainers. Maintenance can be intentional (especially
while bearing or sitting out a situation) or unintentional.
Depending on the characteristics of the situation, it may
require effort to remain in the situation or not. Maintaining
a situation should usually not result in much active control,
except if the status quo needs to be upheld against change
(e.g., if one wants a situation to stay as it is, but other
parties want change). The strategy is marked by passivity
although active resistance may be used to achieve maintenance
of an already existing situation (to preserve it as it is). To
our knowledge, maintenance has so far not been sufficiently
conceptually addressed in traditional transaction models (e.g.,
Buss, 1987).
Evocation
People may engender certain situations without specific
intentions of doing so3. We refer to this strategy as situation
evocation, and there may be individual differences in the extent
to which people are situation conjurers. Situation evocation
captures genuinely unintentional elicitations of situations (e.g.,
when one’s behavior triggers reactions of others, thus changing
the situation). Accordingly, usually no effort has been invested
in bringing about the elicited situation because the situation was
neither planned nor intended. As a result, the situation conjurer
only has limited options to control the inadvertent situation, and
he/she may be active or not during the evocation process4.
Selection
People may choose (i.e., approach or avoid) certain situations.
We refer to this strategy as situation selection, and there may
3If situations are engendered in an intentional and/or goal-directed way, then they
utilize modification or creation.
4By not doing anything, people can elicit adverse situations (see, e.g., laissez-faire
leadership: Furtner et al., 2013). Thus, evocation does not require physical activity
to take place. Should a person, however, actively “provoke” a situation, then this
falls under either situation modification (if the provoked situation is an escalation
of an already existing one) or situation creation (if the provoked situation is created
out of the blue).
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be individual differences in the extent to which people are
situation pickers. Selection is usually an intentional process (e.g.,
thinking about where to go), but situations may also not be
explicitly sought because (a) situations can traverse “naturally”
into different situations (e.g., another person joins and the
situation changes), (b) people more or less “just go with the
flow” instead of deliberately selecting every new situation to
engage in, and (c) people can only select situations within the
limits of a given pool of possible situations to choose from.
As such, the effort in choosing situations may be more or less,
depending on whether a situation is intentionally sought after
(e.g., a romantic date) or unintentionally just happens (e.g., a
stimulating conversation). However, since intentional selection
includes not only the promotion but also the avoidance of certain
situations, this strategy allows the utilizer a certain amount of
control and requires some level of activity.
Modification
People may actively change an existing situation into something
different (e.g., in a goal-serving way). We refer to this strategy as
situation modification, and there may be individual differences in
the extent to which people are situation engineers. Modification
differs from selection in that not a new or qualitatively different
situation is sought, but an already existing one actively “worked
on” and transformed. As such, it harbors a high degree of control
and activity, relatively to the other strategies. Modification
also differs from evocation in that modulations are conducted
intentionally and with some amount of effort (time, energy, etc.).
Creation
People may pro-actively and purposefully create new situations
in the service of their goals. We refer to this process as situation
creation, and there may be individual differences in the extent
to which people are situation creators. Creation differs from
modification in that not a pre-existing situation is transformed,
but an entirely new one willingly created. As such, the creation
strategy harbors, relative to all other strategies, the highest levels
of intentionality (creation is purposeful and goal-oriented), effort
(creation requires resources), control (creation implies control
over the creative process), and activity (creation requires work).
Different Types of Situation Change
through Different Situation Management
Strategies
Taking the previous explications into account, we can now
ask, for each person, to what extent the situation (i.e.,
cues, characteristics, classes) changed because (a) he or she
perceived it differently (construal change), (b) it was changed
by something outside of his or her control (evocative change),
(c) he or she left for another situation (selective change),
(d) he or she actively changed it (manipulative change), or
(e) he or she created an entirely new situation (generative
change)? By categorizing situation changes in this manner
we can more specifically assess the associations between
types of change (construal, evocative, selective, manipulative,
generative) and personality and momentary states. For example,
questions to be asked then include: (1) Are certain personality
dimensions associated with a tendency toward particular kinds
of situation change? (2) Does the presence of particular
goals or affective states predict different kinds of situation
change?
It can be a difficult task disentangling which strategy (Table 2)
has been used by a person and, by extension, which type of
situation change has occurred, but we believe that each strategy
leaves characteristic “traces” in how strongly and fast situations
are changed within a person. We refer to these traces as flux
functions which describe the continuous change of situations
within an individual over a certain time span. Thus, situation
change can be examined in response to different situation
management strategies.
Hypothesized (but fictitious) flux functions are presented in
Figure 10 for each strategy. The x-axis represents time and
shows for Figures 10A–F two different situations. The y-axis
represents variability of the actual or perceived environment
(with 0 denoting total stability and 1 denoting maximal
change). Figure 10A illustrates construal (construal situation
change) where the experience of a psychological situation
SA
∗ transitions into the construed psychological situation
SA
∗∗. Figure 10B illustrates maintenance (which does not yield
situation change, but stability) where the situation SA is
maintained as situation SA through time. Figure 10C illustrates
evocation (evocative situation change) where the situation
SA changes into the situation SA! via involuntary/inadvertent
elicitations. Figure 10D illustrates selection (selective situation
change) where the situation SA is de-selected (avoidance), and the
situation SB selected instead (approach). Figure 10E illustrates
modification (manipulative situation change) where the situation
SA is voluntarily/intentionally modified into the situation SA
′.
Figure 10F illustrates Generation (creative situation change)
where the new situation SA has been created. Lastly, Figure 10G
illustrates a complex concatenation of strategies (showing all
types of situation change) where the situation SA is created
which is, for some time, maintained as situation SA until
the situation SA! has been evoked which is then modified
into the situation SA
′. The modified situation SA
′ is then
deselected, and situation SB selected. To our knowledge, no
empirical study has so far examined any form of flux function
so that this approach represents a novel avenue for future
research.
Zooming in on the Processes of Change
We should try to dig further and inquire about the underlying
processes of situation change: Why do people change situations?
It is likely that motivational processes (such as goals, needs, and
motives) play a key role here (see Yang et al., 2009). People’s goals
may not only shape the way they perceive situations (Rauthmann,
in press), but also how they respond to them. According to
Yang et al. (2009), situations may be understood in terms of
their goal content and their goal processes. Regarding content,
evolutionarily important goals may be particularly important
(see Brown et al., 2015) as recurring ancestral presses have
likely attuned our perceptual systems to motive categories that
historically fostered survival and reproductive fitness in the
environment of evolutionary adaptedness. Regarding processes,
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FIGURE 10 | Illustration of six situation management strategies and their possible trajectories (“flux-functions”). x-axis: Different situations along time (t);
y-axis: Variability (Var) of the environment (0 = total stability, 1 = no stability at all = maximal variability). Bold lines illustratively denote the extent to which the
environment is malleable, plastic, or variable. No actual data were used. Construal (A): The experience of a psychological situation SA* transitions into the construed
psychological situation SA**. Maintenance (B): The situation SA is maintained as situation SA through time. Evocation (C): The situation SA changes into the situation
SA ! via involuntary/inadvertent evocation. Selection (D): The situation SA is de-selected (avoidance), and the situation SB selected instead (approach). Modification
(E): The situation SA is voluntarily/intentionally modified into the situation SA
′. Generation (F): The situation SA has been created. Complex concatenation of strategies
(G): The situation SA is created which is, for some time, maintained as situation SA until the situation SA ! has been evoked which is then modified into the situation
SA
′. The modified situation SA
′ is then deselected, and situation SB selected.
what is happening or could happen to people’s goals is important:
Can they be achieved or are they blocked? Empirical studies (e.g.,
Edwards and Templeton, 2005; Yang et al., 2006) lend support
to the idea that people broadly perceive situations in terms
of whether they foster or hinder goal pursuit and attainment.
Situations may change, in part, because people change their
momentary goals, intentions, and strategies. This is also in line
with recent theory and research that emphasizes the role of social-
cognitive mechanisms behind the manifestation of personality
traits into personality expressions (Fleeson, 2012; Fleeson
and Jayawickreme, 2015). Because personality expressions and
concurrent situation characteristics are intertwined (Sherman
et al., 2015; Rauthmann et al., in revision), it is plausible that
situation change can be similarly predicted by goal processes as
can be personality expressions (e.g., McCabe and Fleeson, 2012).
Taken together, attending to people’s enduring and momentary
goals (that are activated and salient in a given situation) should
be fruitful because they may be able to illuminate why (i.e.,
for what reasons and for what anticipations of outcomes)
people attempt to maintain or change a situation in the first
place.
TRAJECTORIES AND OUTCOMES OF
SITUATION CHANGE
What are the outcomes and consequences of situation change? If
situation change can be quantified (Question 1) and categorized
and explained (Question 2), it becomes reasonable to ask about
the consequences of situation change. Generally, effects of
situation change may manifest at short-, middle-, and longer
terms (see Figure 1).
For short-term consequences, we can ask: What kinds of
behaviors are enacted as a result of (different kinds and
magnitudes of) situation change? For example, we would expect
that transitioning from a situation characterized by low Duty
(e.g., there is no work to be done) to one that is high
in Duty (e.g., work needs to be done) would result in a
person expressing more conscientious behavior (e.g., organizing,
working hard). To the extent that this person can be characterized
and also describes him- or herself as a generally conscientious
person, this person may experience authenticity because of
increased personality-behavior fit (cf. Jones et al., under review).
Additionally, the personmay experience mild positive affect, self-
esteem, and self-efficacy in dealing with the conscientiousness-
affording situation because there is personality-situation fit
(Rauthmann, 2013). Lastly, a person with appropriate responses
to a situation, or behavior-situation fit, may be said to be
well-adjusted to his or her surroundings and thus also garner
positive social consequences (e.g., respect, reputation, more
pay, etc.). Thus, situation change may stand in the service
of short-term personality-behavior, personality-situation, and
behavior-situation fit, and all three types of fit may entail
middle- to long-term intrapersonal (e.g., affect, self-esteem) and
interpersonal (e.g., status, popularity) adjustment. For example,
via habitual (= typical and repeated) situation changes people
may be able to cumulatively “optimize” their surroundings
according to their needs and personalities. Thus, in the long
haul, short-term situation changes may stand in the service of
long-term developmental regulation (Haase et al., 2013) where
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 1938 | 88
Rauthmann and Sherman Situation Change
people actively manage their surroundings and development
(Baltes, 1997; Roberts and Caspi, 2003). For example, the
corresponsive principle (Roberts, 2005, 2006; Roberts andWood,
2006) specifies that (a) people modulate their situations and
environments according to their traits (see Gosling et al., 2002,
2008 for personality-manifestation in personal environments)
and that (b), in turn, these traits are consolidated by the
selected situations and environments (e.g., via socialization
processes). Thus, particularly developmental psychologists and
researchers interested in personality development may attend to
understanding situation change processes better.
Nonetheless, there are also several other interesting
questions, such as: (1) To what extent does overall situational
variability (a lot vs. little change) impact how individuals
are feeling, thinking, and behaving? (2) How do individuals
adjust their goal strivings as a result of situation change?
(3) Does personality moderate the associations between
situation change and these outcomes? Answers to these
questions will provide a greater understanding to two of
psychology’s most important outcomes: Why do people behave
the way they do, and what makes a person feel good or
bad?
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
There are many ways in which situation change can be studied,
depending on (a) the resolution of interest (situation—episode—
environment—context), (b) the situation variables used as
benchmark criteria for change (cues—characteristics—classes),
(c) the measurement of situation variables (e.g., actual—
perceived; in situ—juxta situm/ex situ rated; -oriented), (d)
the level of analysis (between-person—within-person, variable-
oriented—profile), and (e) the type of situation change studied
(construal—evocative—selective—manipulative—generative).
We hope that this article could make researches aware of this
diversity and alert to important questions as well as intriguing
ways of answering them. Situation change remains as of yet
an overlooked concept that can enrich personality, social, and
developmental psychology.
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Remembering the emotions we have experienced in the past is the core of one’s unique
life-experience. However, there are many factors, both at the state and trait level that
can affect the way past feelings are seen. The main aim of the current study was
to examine the impact of individual differences on systematic biases in retrospective
ratings compared to the momentary experience of basic emotions such as sadness,
fear, happiness, and anger. To this end, an experience sampling study across 2 weeks
was conducted using a younger and an older age-group; the experience of momentary
emotions was assessed on 7 randomly determined occasions per day, the retrospective
ratings being collected at the end of each day about that day, as well as at the end
of the study about the previous 2 weeks. The results indicated that age and daily
tiredness have significant effects on retrospective emotion ratings over a 1-day period
(state level), enhancing the retrospective ratings of negative emotions and decreasing
the ratings of felt happiness. Whereas personality traits influence the more long-term
emotion experience (trait level), with all Big Five personality traits having selective impact
on retrospective emotion ratings of fear, sadness, happiness, and anger. Findings provide
further evidence about the systematic biases in retrospective emotion ratings, suggesting
that, although retrospective ratings are based on momentary experience, daily tiredness
and personality traits systematically influence the way in which past feelings are seen.
Keywords: retrospective ratings, emotional memory, age, daily tiredness, personality
INTRODUCTION
Remembering one’s emotions over time is at the core of human life experience, and we all have
emotional memories that are vivid and lasting. Recent research suggests that people remember their
emotions quite accurately both after 90 days (Barrett, 1997) and after 1 year (Röcke et al., 2011).
However, retrospective ratings of experienced affect are also susceptible to systematic biases. It has
been found that individuals retrospectively overestimate both positive and negative affect when
comparing momentary reports with end-of-day ratings (Thomas and Diener, 1990; Parkinson
et al., 1995). Age, among other individual difference factors, has also been found to influence
both the momentary and retrospective ratings of emotions (Röcke et al., 2011). In addition to
individual differences and the respondent’s current mood, memory about emotional experiences
can also reflect the emotion regulation strategies used in a particular situation. Emotion regulation
refers to attempts to influence one’s subjective emotion experience and expression, involving both
up- and down-regulation, as well as antecedent-focused and response-focused emotion regulation
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(Gross et al., 2006). Emotion regulation strategies are thought
to differ across age-groups (Urry and Gross, 2010), and
across emotion categories (Gross et al., 2006). A recent study
by Shallcross et al. (2012) showed that the nature of age-
related decreases in emotional processing is best understood
across discrete emotions. The current study extends research
on retrospective emotion by comparing retrospective and
momentary emotion reports. Further, the impact of daily
tiredness and personality on such reports are explored.
Momentary vs. Retrospective Reports
Current study used experience sampling methodology to capture
ratings of emotional experiences as dynamic psychological
processes. The advantages of experience sampling compared to
nomothetic approaches, is the focus on individuals’ current or
very recent experiences and the usage of multiple assessments
over time in everyday life (Trull and Ebner-Priemer, 2009).
Retrospective self-reports may be biased by variety of heuristics,
the retrieved emotional states are summarized by taking also
into account the personal relevance and significance of reported
experiences, as well as social expectations (e.g., Wilhelm and
Grossman, 2010). However, repetitive self-ratings and frequent
monitoring may produce other biases, for example response
shifts (Schwartz et al., 2006). It has been found that individuals
retrospectively overestimate both positive and negative affect
when comparing momentary reports with retrospective ratings
(Thomas and Diener, 1990; Parkinson et al., 1995). The
Accessibility Model of Emotional Self-Report by Robinson
and Clore (2002) proposes different levels of remembering
based on accessibility principles, and makes the distinction
between momentary emotions, short-term retrospective reports
(i.e., end of day), and longer-term reports (i.e., a week or
multiple weeks), with each of these judgments being influenced
by different sources of knowledge. Short-term judgments are
influenced by more episodic forms of memory biases or
episodic knowledge such as salient experiences and current
affective state. By contrast, longer-term retrospective reports are
influenced by more semantic forms of knowledge, including
the beliefs and theories about self, and one’s personality. The
age, neuroticism, extraversion, and tiredness can be expected
to influence retrospective emotion ratings, but there is no clear
timeline distinction provided by previous studies (Carstensen
et al., 2011; Röcke et al., 2011).
According to accessibility model of emotional self-reports,
the current emotions are accessed directly based on experiential
knowledge, specific moments from the past can be retrieved from
the episodicmemory, but also from the semantic knowledge—the
situation-specific beliefs and identity-related beliefs (Robinson
and Clore, 2002). The amount of time between the event and the
recall defines the extent of accessible episodic memories, and the
shift from episodic to semantic memory, i.e., situation-specific
and identity-based beliefs (Tulving, 1984; Robinson and Clore,
2002). According to the two-process model, the recollection of
emotion experience over the longer time-frame (i.e., last few
weeks) has found to rely on semantic memories, whereas for
shorter periods (i.e., past day) the episodic knowledge is used
(Robinson and Barrett, 2009). There is evidence that contrary
to peak-end rule in memories for pain experiences (Redelmeier
et al., 2003), the retrospective evaluations of multiepisode
emotion experience across 1 day rely rather on averaged ratings
of emotions (Miron-Shatz, 2009; Röcke et al., 2011).
There are distinct types of memory biases in retrospections
due to episodic (factors affecting retrieval of event-related
context) vs. semantic knowledge or beliefs about emotions
(Robinson andClore, 2002). Personality can be viewed as a source
of beliefs that contribute differentially to online and retrospective
emotion reports, with being related rather to semantic memory
(Robinson and Clore, 2002). Age is another factor that can be
expected to interfere with both online and retrospective emotion
reports, the question is whether more as a short-term (retrieving
the context of event) or long-term (regarding event-specific or
general beliefs about the influence of age on emotion experience).
Thirdly, the everyday tiredness can be expected to act more as
an episodic biasing factor inferring the recollection of contextual
details of experience as tiredness itself is rather situational and
contextual feature.
Age and Emotional Memory
Previous studies have suggested that age differences in emotional
long-term memory reflect a memory retrieval bias, meaning
that the emotional life of older people is different, as emotional
memories have a different meaning for them (Spaniol et al.,
2008). It has also shown that older people tend to experience
specific mood states (e.g., nocturnal regrets) that are rare in
younger adults (e.g., Schmidt et al., 2011).
According to socioemotional selectivity theory, older adults
are expected to endorse more positive stimuli during memory
retrieval than younger adults (Carstensen et al., 2011). Urry and
Gross (2010) proposed a SOC-ER (selection, optimization, and
compensation with emotion regulation) framework of emotion
regulation processes that facilitate the emotional positivity effect.
According to this framework, older adults use more effective
situation selection by reducing the probability of engaging
in social situations that might elicit negative emotions and
deploy more attention to positive information. A meta-analysis
of memory and attention for emotional stimuli, for example,
reflected smaller negativity preferences for older than for younger
adults (Murphy and Isaacowitz, 2008). Nevertheless, although
older adults have been found to rate the valence of remembered
events more positively, this effect appears to reflect a generally
positive overall mindset rather than emotion regulation strategies
related to personal autobiographic memory (Schryer and Ross,
2012). Findings about emotion experience and the positivity
effect in older age are mixed, however. Charles et al. (2010), for
instance, found that reduced exposure to daily stressors in older
age partially explained age-related reductions in negative affect.
Shallcross et al. (2012) found differences across emotion
categories, with lower levels of experienced anxiety and anger,
but not sadness. Regarding age differences in the recall of
experienced emotions, Grühn et al. (2005) found no aging bias
favoring memory of positive material, whereas Röcke et al.
(2011) suggested that the correspondence between momentary
and retrospective ratings are similar at older and younger ages.
Previous studies suggest that life context creates emotional
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stability in older age; that is, the exposure, not the reactivity,
to daily stressors has been found to differ between younger and
older people (Sliwinski et al., 2009; Brose et al., 2013).
Taken together, previous studies suggest age differences in
emotional lives, but there is no clear consensus about the
role of emotional vs. contextual processes leading to emotional
positivity in older age. The role of proactive and reactive emotion
regulation strategies is a critical factor in understanding the
emotional world during aging, whether the positivity effect
comes from the lesser experience of negative emotions, or is the
experience regulated down by cognitive reappraisal reflected in
retrospective emotion ratings. The focus of the current study
is to explore whether experienced daily emotions moderate the
positivity of retrospective evening ratings—whether the positivity
is moderated by the experience and whether the pattern is similar
for different emotion categories.
Personality and Retrospective Emotion
Ratings
In addition to age, personality traits could also be expected to
interact with emotion recall. There are systematic links between
personality and the affective experience, with neuroticism
predisposing the experience of more negative, and extraversion
more positive emotions (Costa and McCrae, 1992; Watson
and Clark, 1992). According to Robinson and Clore (2002),
personality-related beliefs can bias reports about retrospective
emotion experiences as personality constitutes a source of
knowledge that can be used when reporting emotions felt in
the past.
More recent studies have found other Big Five personality
traits, in addition to neuroticism and extraversion to be also
associated with individual differences in emotional processes
in daily life (Komulainen et al., 2014). Conscientiousness have
found to predict lower levels of negative affect, agreeableness is
associated with lower negative and higher positive affect, whereas
openness is related to higher stress-reactivity (Komulainen
et al., 2014). Neuroticism and extraversion have been found
to influence retrospective ratings, with more neurotic people
remembering having experienced more negative emotions and
more extraverted people more positive emotions (Barrett,
1997).
However, age and valence effects in emotional memory do
not change when neuroticism is included as a covariate (Spaniol
et al., 2008). Thus, there is no clear consensus about the
extent to which personality traits influence the formulation of
retrospective emotion ratings, and about whether there are any
differences at the time level (the influence of recent vs. long-term
emotional memories).
Daily Tiredness and Emotional Processing
Daily tiredness is a common phenomenon in everyday life, a
universal sensation that is considered a natural response to
life strain, caused by strenuous activities and emotional stress
(Mengshoel, 2010). The life satisfaction and positive affect
experienced during the day has been found to be strongly
influenced by sleep quality and tiredness, among other variables
(Kahneman et al., 2004). Previous studies have suggested that
impaired sleep quality leads to low positive affect (Sonnentag
et al., 2008; Bower et al., 2010), whereas the association between
sleep and mood is bi-directional (Vandekerckhove and Cluydts,
2010). Zohar et al. (2005) found that fatigue resulting from sleep
loss, amplified negative emotions as a reaction to an unpleasant
event and suppressed positive affect as a response to positive
event. Sleep loss and tiredness have been linked to increased
emotional lability and deficits in emotion regulation (Dahl and
Lewin, 2002; Yoo et al., 2007). In the context of the accessibility
model of emotional self-report (Robinson and Clore, 2002), the
daily tiredness can operate as a systematic retrospective bias at
the episodic memory level, being specific to time and space,
and affecting the accessibility to contextual details of event. In
addition to accessibility, tiredness can be expected to influence
short-term memory about emotion events via mood congruency
mechanisms (Rusting and DeHart, 2000) or general arousal
level can act as an interference factor (Robinson and Clore,
2002).
Although previous work supports the widespread lay
assumption that sleep quality and tiredness appear to be linked
to affective functioning, there is need for ambulatory designs for
stronger inferences (Bower et al., 2010). Previous studies have
also reached to contradictory results, as a study by Peeters et al.
(2006) found no relationships between sleep quality and daily
affect, whereas Bower et al. (2010) provided evidence that sleep
quality is a predictor of positive affect. However, previous studies
have also suggested that subjective feeling of fatigue is better
predictor of depression than sleep problems (Koffel and Watson,
2009). On the other side, higher levels of trait positive affect
as a disposition, not a state, have found to be associated with
better overall sleep quality (Ong et al., 2013). Poorer sleep quality
impairs individual’s ability to use cognitive reappraisal to regulate
negative emotions (Mauss et al., 2013). A recent review, Deliens
et al. (2014) conclude that exposure to emotional experiences
changes sleep-patterns, with emotional disturbances developing
after sleep problems.
Taken together, previous studies suggest that sleep plays
important role in one’s ability to manage emotional information.
While, overall, there is more research about illness-related
fatigue, emotion studies have so far paid less attention to daily
tiredness as a possible influencing factor of the retrospective
ratings of experienced emotions. Walker and Harvey (2010)
conclude that while mood and tiredness resulting from impaired
sleep, are unquestionably linked, the exact nature and outcomes
of this relation remains to be determined. Kashani et al. (2012)
found that individuals reporting a natural trend for high stress
levels reported also a greater daytime sleepiness, tiredness, poorer
sleep quality and duration. It is also proposed that personality
traits might modulate the link between emotional experiences
and sleep quality, whereas the exact nature of this is relation is
not clear (Deliens et al., 2014).
The current research includes state-level daily tiredness rated
at the end of day and trait-level tiredness across 2 weeks as
possible influencing factors in retrospective emotion rating,
leading, thus, to the possible enhancement of retrospective
ratings of negative emotions and to the possible reduction of
positive affect.
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Aims of the Current Study
Taken together, previous studies have suggested the link between
sleep quality and emotion experience, as well as the link
between personality traits (i.e., neuroticism and extraversion)
and remembering one’s emotional experiences. The main aim
of the current study was to determine sources of systematic
bias in retrospective ratings of the momentary experience of
four emotions: fear, sadness, and anger as prototypical negative
emotions, and happiness as prototypical positive emotion
(Russell and Barrett, 1999; English and Carstensen, 2014), both
over a period of 1 day and of 2 weeks. More specifically, it is
assumed that retrospective ratings are formulated not only on
the basis of experienced emotions, but are also influenced by
participant’s daily tiredness, age, and personality traits, and that
these patterns differ meaningfully across emotion categories. As
the purpose of biases in memory for emotions is to enhance one’s
emotional coping and support coherent self-view (Robinson and
Clore, 2002), the systematic biases might differ across discrete
emotions.
In summary, we hypothesized that the tiredness, personality
traits and age moderate the relationship between momentary
emotion ratings and retrospective ratings of 1 day (hypothesis
1) and 2 weeks (hypothesis 2), with meaningful differences
across the two time-frames. It was also expected that there is
interaction between age and experienced emotion that influences
the way in which past feelings are remembered and serves as an
emotion regulation strategy (hypothesis 3). As previous studies
have suggested Big Five personality traits to have different impact
on daily emotional life, the impact of personality traits on the
retrospective emotion ratings was expected to differ across the
four measured emotion categories (hypothesis 4).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethical Considerations
The Research Ethics Committee of the University of Tartu
approved the study, and all participants provided written
informed consent. All the research procedures were conducted
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Participants
This study is a part of a larger research project concerning
emotion experience in daily life (see also Kööts et al., 2011,
2012). The sample of this project consisted of 110 participants (70
women and 40 men), with ages ranging from 19 to 84 years. All
participants were ethnic Estonians and received EEK 520 (about
EUR 33) for taking part. The first group of participants (n = 55;
42 women and 13 men) was recruited from 2 day centers. The
age of participants in this group ranged from 61 to 84 years,
with a mean age of 68.2 (SD = 5.5). About one-third (36%)
of these older respondents had higher education. The second
group of participants (n = 55; 28 women and 27 men) consisted
of undergraduate students from the University of Tartu, and
was recruited via advertisements placed in university academic
buildings and residence halls. Students came from different
faculties of the university and those majoring in psychology were
not eligible to participate. The mean age of students was 21.3
years (SD= 1.0), ranging from 19 to 23 years.
Procedure
Experience Sampling Data
The study consisted of 14 days of experience sampling using iESP
software (http://seattleweb.intel-research.net/projects/ESM/
iESP.html). Participants were signaled randomly 7 times per day
during average waking time, to report their current emotions
(i.e., up to 99 possible assessments per participant). There were
10,667 measurement trials of momentary emotion across all
participants, with an average of 97 measurement trials per
participant. The response rate was 82.8%, which is considered
to be within normal range for an experience-sampling study
(Zelenski and Larsen, 2000). Participants were asked to indicate
on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1—not at all to 4—to a large
extent), as used in other ESM studies (Mroczek et al., 2003;
Gerstorf et al., 2009; Thompson et al., 2011), the extent to
which each of the seven basic emotions (anger, happiness,
contempt, disgust, fear, sadness, and surprise), as well as six other
emotion-related features (disappointed, irritated, in physical
pain, sleepy, hungry, and tired) described their current emotional
and physiological state as quickly and accurately as possible.
Considering the focus of the current paper, four emotions were
included in subsequent analyses: happiness (M = 2.05, SD =
0.62), fear (M = 1.12, SD = 0.25), and sadness (M = 1.34, SD =
0.44), and anger (M = 1.11, SD = 0.22). Momentary tiredness
was included as a variable of interest (M = 1.83, SD= 0.64).
Additional Measures
For the whole period of 14 days, participants were asked
in the evening to recall their emotions for the day. The
evening questionnaire consisted of 21 terms about emotional and
physiological state, with the instruction to assess the extent to
which they had experienced the respective states, averaging these
across the day on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1—not at all to 4—
to a large extent). The questionnaires were brought back at the
end of the study. The four emotions were used for current study:
happiness (M = 1.24, SD = 0.97), fear (M = 1.24, SD = 0.57),
and sadness (M = 1.57, SD = 0.83), and anger (M = 1.29, SD =
0.68); and tiredness (M = 2.28, SD= 0.97).
Participants completed the Estonian version (Allik and Realo,
1997) of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS;
Watson et al., 1988), which asks the extent to which they had
experienced different emotions during the previous 2 weeks, at
the end of the experience sampling period. For current study, the
respective items from PANAS reflecting the four emotion terms
of happiness (M = 2.78, SD= 0.80), fear (M = 1.45, SD= 0.78),
and sadness (M = 2.15, SD = 0.96), and anger (M = 1.85, SD =
0.86); and tiredness (M = 2.46, SD= 0.87) were used.
At the beginning of the study, participants also filled in the
Estonian version (Kallasmaa et al., 2000) of the Revised NEO
Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R; Costa and McCrae, 1992).
Analyses
As a first step, experienced emotions were averaged separately
for each emotion category (sadness, fear, happiness, and anger),
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to produce a mean of all momentary affect ratings across 1
day. There were 1535 mean daily ratings across all participants.
Previous studies have suggested mean average momentary
assessment to be the best predictor of retrospective ratings of
emotions (Röcke et al., 2011).
The Multilevel Regression Analysis Predicting
Evening Retrospective Emotion Ratings
A multilevel regression approach was used to explore the
moderating role of personality traits and daily tiredness, in
addition to experienced momentary emotion, in predicting the
retrospective emotion ratings across 1 day and across the 2 weeks.
A series of multilevel models was conducted in theMixedmodule
of IBM SPSS 20.0 with restricted maximum likelihood estimation
(REML). The retrospective emotion ratings of Fearij, Sadnessij,
Happinessij, and Angerijwere modeled using a multilevel random
intercept model in which the Level 1 random intercept was
predicted bymeanmomentary emotion ratings, personality traits
and daily tiredness. As the first step, a no-predictor model was
developed to partition the variance in retrospective emotions into
within- and between-person components, in order to determine
how much of the variance lies between people. Next, a two-
level model for analyzing both within- and between-person
variability was built. At Level 1, respective retrospective emotionij
represents the emotion rating for participant j at in the evening or
across the 2 weeks i as the outcome variable, where β represents
the intercepts, r is the respective residual component, ε represents
the error term:
Level 1 Model:
Evening rating of fearij, sadnessij, angerij or happinessij
= β0j + rij + εij.
At Level 2, a set of predictors was added to the model. It
was proposed that the age, personality traits (neuroticism,
extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and
conscientiousness) and tiredness might explain differences in
retrospective emotion ratings between individuals at the end
of the day. The momentary emotions were taken into account,
to control the effect of personality traits and tiredness above
momentary emotions.
Level 2 Models:
β0j = γ00+ γ01respective mean momentary emotionj +µ0j + εij,
β0j = γ00 + γ01respective mean momentary emotionj
+γ02tiredness at the end of the dayj + γ03neuroticismj
+γ04extraversionj + γ05openness to experiencej
+γ06agreeablenessj + γ07conscientiousnessj + γ08agej
+γ09age ∗mean momentary emotionj + µ0j + εij,
where µ0j and εij refer to random error terms, i.e., the random
part of the model.
In addition, as previous studies have suggested age differences
in emotion experience, the interaction between age and
momentary emotion were taken into account, indicated as
age∗mean momentary emotion.
The model criteria were explored in order to examine
the improvement of the null model and the following fixed-
effects model. The intraclass correlation (ICC), describing the
proportion of between-persons variance to the total variance was
also calculated at each level.
The Linear Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting
Retrospective Emotion Ratings across the 2 Weeks
A linear multiple regression analysis was used to explore
the role of personality traits and tiredness in predicting
retrospective emotion ratings over the period of 2 weeks.
The main purpose of the analysis was to explore whether
retrospective ratings of experienced emotions over the 2 weeks
are formed on the basis of evening and/or daily emotional
experiences, and whether the influence of age, tiredness, and
personality traits is similar to evening evaluations. As the
data had only between-people variance, a linear multiple
regression analysis was used with the emotion experience
of the five measured emotions over the 2-week period as
the dependent variable and momentary emotion, evening
evaluations, age, personality, and daily tiredness as predictor
variables.
RESULTS
First, the correlations between the mean of momentary
emotion ratings, mean evening emotion ratings, and 2-week
ratings, measuring the experience of the respective emotions
across the two study weeks, were explored. Emotion ratings
taken at different moments in time were all significantly
correlated (Table 1); correlations were moderate, similar to
previous studies (Röcke et al., 2011). Thus, the results are
in accordance with previous studies, suggesting that people’s
perceptions of their past emotional experiences are only in
part derived from their momentary experiences, and other
significant influencing factors can be expected to exist (Barrett,
1997).
TABLE 1 | Pearson correlations between mean momentary emotion
ratings, evening ratings, and 2-week ratings of respective emotions.
Emotion Two-week and Two-week and Mean daily and
mean momentary evening ratings evening
emotion of daily emotions ratings
Happiness 0.38** 0.36** 0.43**
Fear 0.22** 0.42** 0.30**
Sadness 0.34** 0.47** 0.50**
Anger 0.18** 0.31** 0.40**
N = 1484.
**Correlations are significant at the p < 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Retrospective Emotion Ratings across 1
Day
Hypothesis 1 predicted that age, personality traits and tiredness
moderate the relationship between momentary emotion ratings
and retrospective emotion ratings of happiness, fear, sadness, and
anger across the period of 1 day.
The results of the null model, Level 1 random intercept model,
and Level 2 fixed-effects models are presented comparatively in
Tables 2–5, separately for each of the four emotions.
First, the effects of mean momentary emotion ratings
were explored. The experienced mean momentary emotions
had significant effect on retrospective emotion ratings for all
emotions (fear: γ = 0.483, p < 0.01; sadness γ = 0.628, p < 0.01;
happiness γ = 0.543, p < 0.01; anger: γ = 1.130, p < 0.01). The
reductions in variance estimates (R2) suggest that the mean of
momentary emotion ratings of the respective emotion accounts
for about 3 (fear) to 10 (happiness) percent of the within-
people variability, and for about 18 (fear) to 42 (anger) percent
of the between-persons variability in evening emotion ratings.
Thus, a significant portion of the variability in means of evening
ratings across people can be attributed to differences in the daily
emotion experience. However, theWald Z test suggests that, even
after controlling for the mean of momentary emotion ratings
within-people, a statistically significant amount of variation in
outcomes still remains both within- and between people for all
four emotions (p > 0.05).
Next, the effect of Level 2 fixed predictors was explored.
Individuals who reported more tiredness at the evening, tended
to enhance the retrospective ratings of negative emotions (the
effect of tiredness for fear: γ = 0.036, p < 0.01; for sadness
γ = 0.141, p < 0.01; for anger: γ = 0.058, p < 0.01) and
reduced retrospective rating of happiness γ = −0.142, p < 0.01,
compared to reported mean momentary emotion.
The Level 2 models suggest that tiredness impacts the
evening ratings of all measured emotions, magnifying negative
emotions and reducing happiness. Retrospective evening ratings
of happiness were associated with neuroticism (γ = −0.004,
p < 0.05) and extraversion (γ = 0.010, p < 0.01). There
were no significant effects for evening retrospective ratings for
other emotions (p > 0.05). The effects of age were included
in model both as single predictor, but also in interaction
with reported mean momentary emotions (hypothesis 3). Older
adults have found to report less negative emotions and more
positive emotions in general (Carstensen et al., 2011), however,
it is possible that in situations where negative emotions are
experienced, the retrospective ratings of older adults may be
different. The age effect on retrospective emotion ratings was
significant only for anger (γ = 0.018, p < 0.01), suggesting that
older adults tended to retrospectively enhance the experienced
anger compared to mean momentary assessments. There was a
significant interaction between mean momentary emotion and
age in predicting retrospective emotion ratings for sadness (γ =
−0.010, p < 0.01), for fear (γ = −0.006, p < 0.05), for anger
(γ = −0.020, p < 0.01), and for happiness (γ = −0.005, p <
0.01), supporting the hypothesis 3. Thus, the more older adults
experienced both negative and positive emotions, the more it was
biased in evening retrospective ratings as less intense. Adding
fixed predictors significantly improved the model, there was
observable R2−change at between-people level for all measured
emotions. The hypothesis 1 was partly supported as daily
tiredness and age were found to moderate the relationship
between momentary emotion ratings and retrospective ratings
TABLE 2 | The evening ratings of fear—results of the mixed models analysis of the null model and fixed effects random intercept model.
Model Predictors −2RLL Estimates of fixed effects Estimates of covariance parameters


















Intercept 2145 0.69 0.07 994.07 87.88 0.00 28.47% 6.19** 26.41** 3.19% 18.62%
Mean momentary fear 0.49 0.06 1479.20 68.64 0.00
Intercept 2194 0.48 0.22 320.24 4.82 0.03 23.66% 5.70** 26.38** 0.39% 22.43%
Mean momentary fear 0.80 0.13 1480.70 38.97 0.00
Age 0.00 0.00 492.30 0.03 0.86
Tiredness 0.04 0.02 1478.37 5.01 0.03
Age*daily emotion −0.00 0.00 1415.72 6.42 0.01
N 0.00 0.00 100.89 0.05 0.83
E −0.00 0.00 102.75 0.01 0.91
O −0.00 0.00 100.80 0.10 0.75
A 0.00 0.00 99.58 0.17 0.68
C 0.00 0.00 101.80 0.05 0.83
**p < 0.001; N, neuroticism; E, extraversion; O, openness to experience; A, agreeableness; C, conscientiousness; −2RLL refers to −2 Restricted Log Likelihood.
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TABLE 3 | The evening ratings of sadness—results of the mixed models analysis of the null model and fixed effects random intercept model.
Model Predictors −2RLL Estimates of fixed effects Estimates of covariance parameters


















Intercept 2997 0.74 0.08 573.28 96.22 0.00 31.46% 6.16** 26.37** 7.33% 42.26%
Mean momentary sadness 0.63 0.05 1466.88 181.58 0.00
Intercept 2940 −0.07 0.21 186.93 0.10 0.75 15.92% 4.96** 26.34** 3.54% 7.23%
Mean momentary sadness 1.01 0.09 1220.47 134.23 0.00
Age 0.00 0.00 351.81 1.27 0.26
Tiredness 0.14 0.02 1402.41 48.49 0.00
Age*daily emotion −0.01 0.00 1216.66 27.95 0.00
N 0.00 0.00 97.83 1.47 0.23
E −0.00 0.00 99.23 1.16 0.28
O 0.00 0.00 96.72 1.58 0.21
A 0.00 0.00 96.19 1.59 0.21
C −0.00 0.00 97.22 0.05 0.83
**p < 0.001; N, neuroticism; E, extraversion; O, openness to experience; A, agreeableness; C, conscientiousness; −2RLL refers to −2 Restricted Log Likelihood.
TABLE 4 | The evening ratings of happiness—results of the mixed models analysis of the null model and fixed effects random intercept model.
Model Predictors −2RLL Estimates of fixed effects Estimates of covariance parameters


















Intercept 3562 1.31 0.09 683.31 202.90 0.00 30.06% 6.27** 26.40** 10.43% 30.17%
Mean momentary happiness 0.54 0.04 1495.66 205.58 0.00
Intercept 3565 1.35 0.31 174.30 19.05 0.00 27.04% 5.87** 26.36** 3.60% 16.87%
Mean momentary happiness 0.71 0.07 1493.89 92.34 0.00
Age 0.01 0.00 304.66 1.64 0.20
Tiredness −0.14 0.03 1486.85 31.78 0.00
Age*daily emotion −0.01 0.00 1462.99 8.62 0.00
N −0.00 0.00 100.12 4.54 0.04
E 0.01 0.00 102.09 19.31 0.00
O −0.00 0.00 100.17 0.57 0.45
A −0.00 0.00 98.95 1.42 0.24
C −0.00 0.00 100.18 0.04 0.85
**p < 0.001; N, neuroticism; E, extraversion; O, openness to experience; A, agreeableness; C, conscientiousness; −2RLL refers to −2 Restricted Log Likelihood.
across 1 day. Surprisingly, personality traits had no significant
influence on emotional experience across 1 day, except for
happiness.
Retrospective Ratings across 2 Weeks
Next, the retrospective ratings over the 2-week period were
assessed in order to test the hypothesis 2.
The results of the multiple regression analysis (Table 6)
suggest tiredness, personality traits, and age to be important
predictors of emotion evaluation over the 2-week period,
supporting the hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 4 predicted that the
influence of personality traits on retrospective emotion ratings
differs across the measured emotion categories. Nearly all
personality traits are significantly related to trait-level emotion
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TABLE 5 | The evening ratings of anger—results of the mixed models analysis of the null model and fixed effects random intercept model.
Model Predictors −2RLL Estimates of fixed effects Estimates of covariance parameters


















Intercept 2760 0.05 0.09 1279.38 0.27 0.60 13.24% 4.95** 26.41** 7.33% 42.26%
Mean momentary anger 1.13 0.07 1493.09 235.00 0.00
Intercept 2765 −0.65 0.21 512.41 9.07 0.00 7.96% 3.84** 26.40** 2.49% 44.78%
Mean momentary anger 1.89 0.14 1464.14 173.82 0.00
Age 0.02 0.00 878.16 21.87 0.00
Tiredness 0.06 0.02 1150.66 9.66 0.00
Age*daily emotion −0.02 0.00 1399.89 40.79 0.00
N 0.00 0.00 104.21 1.64 0.20
E −0.00 0.00 108.37 3.03 0.08
O 0.00 0.00 104.49 0.55 0.46
A −0.00 0.00 103.41 0.89 0.35
C 0.00 0.00 105.22 0.12 0.73
**p < 0.001; N, neuroticism; E, extraversion; O, openness to experience; A, agreeableness; C, conscientiousness; -2RLL refers to -2 Restricted Log Likelihood.
TABLE 6 | Multiple regression analysis of emotion ratings across the 2 weeks—mean of respective momentary emotion ratings, respective evening
emotion ratings, personality traits, tiredness, and age as predictors.
Two-week emotion rating Model summary Predictors (Standardized coefficient beta)







Fear 0.54 0.29 0.66 0.12** −0.21** 0.04 0.06 0.04 −0.24** 0.13** 0.31** 0.10**
Sadness 0.70 0.45 0.71 0.28** −0.13** 0.11* 0.03 −0.06* −0.27** 0.09** 0.22** 0.05**
Happiness 0.55 0.30 0.75 −0.31** 0.13** 0.24** 0.08* −0.10* 0.22** 0.26** 0.15** 0.08**
Anger 0.59 0.34 0.70 0.15** 0.05 0.15** 0.03 −0.13** −0.27** 0.03 0.18** 0.04
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.001; N, neuroticism; E, extraversion; O, openness to experience; A, agreeableness; C, conscientiousness.
ratings, with the trait neuroticism being important predictor for
all emotion categories (p < 0.05). The retrospective ratings
of fear are influenced by higher neuroticism (β = 0.12, p <
0.001) and lower extraversion (β = −0.21, p < 0.001). The
retrospective ratings of sadness are predicted by personality traits
of neuroticism (β = 0.28, p < 0.001), extraversion (β = −0.13,
p < 0.001), openness to experience (β = 0.11, p < 0.05), and
conscientiousness (β = −0.06, p < 0.05). The retrospective
ratings of happiness are predicted by all big five personality traits:
neuroticism (β = −0.31, p < 0.001), extraversion (β = 0.13,
p < 0.001), openness to experience (β = 0.24, p < 0.001),
agreeableness (β = −0.08, p < 0.05), and conscientiousness
(β = −0.10, p < 0.05). The retrospective ratings of anger
are predicted by neuroticism (β = 0.15, p < 0.001), openness
to experience (β = 0.15, p < 0.001), and conscientiousness
(β = −0.13, p < 0.001). There are also differences across
emotion categories, with the assessment of experienced anger and
sadness across the 2 weeks depending more on evening ratings
than momentary emotions—if the emotion is strong enough to
be presented in evening ratings, then it also affects the emotion
experience across the 2 weeks.
DISCUSSION
The current study extends previous research by exploring the
effect of momentary emotions, daily tiredness, and personality on
the retrospective ratings of four emotions across two age-groups
across different time frames.
Previous studies have demonstrated age-related positivity
effect in emotion experience (Carstensen et al., 2011). This
emotional positivity can be also reflected in retrospective
emotion ratings. Consistent with the third hypothesis, the
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association of age and retrospective emotion ratings is moderated
by the felt momentary emotions. The stronger were the
momentary emotions, the stronger was the age effect, suggesting
that retrospective reduction of the intensity of experienced
emotions may serve as one of reactive emotion regulation
mechanisms behind the positivity effect.
The Impact of Personality on Retrospective
Emotion Ratings
Consistent to our fourth hypothesis, the associations between
personality traits and retrospective emotion ratings differed both
across emotions and time frames. The retrospective ratings
of happiness are linked to personality traits of extraversion
and neuroticism already in the evening ratings of the past
day. At longer time frame, all Big Five personality traits have
impact on emotional memories about happy feelings. Memories
about experienced fear are influenced only by neuroticism and
extraversion. Retrospective ratings of sadness are strongly related
to neuroticism, but are also predicted by extraversion, openness
and conscientiousness. Retrospective ratings of anger, however,
are predicted by neuroticism, openness, and conscientiousness.
However, a significant part of variability in all retrospective
emotion ratings was still left unexplained by the model; this
might be due to the influence of emotions experienced at
the moment of recall that were not measured in the current
study (i.e., situational beliefs or self-esteem as proposed by
Robinson and Clore, 2002). Our study extended the results
of recent study on the association between daily affect and
personality traits (Komulainen et al., 2014) that showed the role
of all Big Five personality traits in emotion processes. Similarly,
conscientiousness was associated with lower affect levels, whereas
openness to experience predicted retrospective enhancement of
experienced emotions.
Taken together, current study shows the role of personality
traits in affecting memories of experienced emotions, with all
Big Five personality traits having a significant role in formulating
retrospective emotion ratings.
Tiredness and Retrospective Emotion
Ratings
Tiredness is a very common condition; it can be physical,
psychological, or social. In any case, we can assume it to have an
impact on one’s emotional world, whereas experienced emotions
can be both a cause and a consequence of tiredness. Previous
studies have rather focused on sleep quantity and quality and
related affect regulation problems, our findings contribute to
the current knowledge of the association between tiredness and
retrospective assessments of experienced emotions. There is
significant influence of daily tiredness on retrospective emotion
ratings across 1 day. The feeling of tiredness at the end of the
day makes one to enhance the experienced negative emotions of
fear, sadness and anger. In addition, the experienced happiness
is seen less intense when rated at the state of evening tiredness.
This result is in accordance with previous studies and supports
the theorized link between the experience of tiredness and anxiety
(Jiang et al., 2003; Kahneman et al., 2004). Alternatively, it has
been suggested that pre-sleep period at the evening is the first
quiet time during the day available to review the day’s events and
one’s own behavior, that may lead to more precise self-perception
(e.g., Schmidt and Van der Linden, 2009). In addition, tiredness
also influences retrospective ratings across 2 weeks. In general,
the reported subjective feeling of tiredness is linked to affective
functioning, similar to the results reported by sleep studies
(Bower et al., 2010). It is suggested that at the end of the day,
people have a quiet moment in order to analyze the experienced
events and behavior. Findings provide further evidence for the
accessibility model of emotional self-report (Robinson and Clore,
2002), suggesting that, although retrospective ratings are based
on momentary experience, daily tiredness and personality traits
systematically influence the way in which past feelings are seen.
Our study confirms that tiredness systematically influences the
memories about experienced emotions, and may, thus, lead to
more negative view of life.
Age and Retrospective Ratings
Age-related differences in both emotion experience and
emotional memory are well documented by previous research.
The current study confirms age patterns found in previous
studies, suggesting that the emotional world becomes
more stable as people age (Carstensen et al., 2011). One
important contribution of the current study is that age effects
in retrospective ratings were found to be moderated by the
experience of respective momentary emotions. The current
study provides empirical support for the SOC-ER framework
by Urry and Gross (2010), suggesting that the positivity effect
in older adults is achieved by more effective situation selection,
which brings about less negative and more positive emotions.
Age-related shift of retrospective emotion rating toward more
positive look is more reflected at trait-level emotion experience,
and less at state level. If, however, the situation selection
approach does not work and older people experience negative
emotions, then the retrospective ratings are used as means for
emotion regulation. The memories of experienced emotions
are regulated to less intense, compared to momentary ratings.
Whereas, this retrospective reassessment takes place also in
the case of experienced happiness. Previous studies also show
that for older people the intentional suppression of unwanted
memories is more difficult (Anderson et al., 2011). Perhaps this
is the wisdom that comes with experience: the use of proactive
vs. reactive emotion regulation strategies. However, when
momentary emotions are experienced, there is a stronger impact
on emotional life for older than for younger people.
The Remembering of Past Emotions
The current study also investigated the remembering past
emotions, and the factors that can be associated with the
distortion of these memories. The results indicate that even
when momentary emotions, age effects, personality traits, and
daily tiredness are taken into account, a significant amount of
variability is still left to be explained. This might reflect the
influence of post-event emotions and reappraisals that shape
the emotional memory. This finding is in line with previous
research suggesting that a tendency exists to achieve coping in
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the present by reconstructing the past (Levine and Safer, 2002).
Also, in the context of the accessibility model of emotional self-
report (Robinson and Clore, 2002), current research suggests
that personality processes are involved rather in the long-
term modification of emotional memory than during that of 1
day, operating based on semantic knowledge and one’s beliefs
about emotions. Also, age has more influence at trait-level,
suggesting that older people tend to assess experienced emotions
retrospectively into positive direction. Interestingly, tiredness
can also be regarded as systematic biasing factor that interferes
emotion reports both at online level, tied to specific situations,
as well as at the level of semantic memory over longer periods of
time.
Implications and Limitations
Identifying the systematic biases in retrospective emotion ratings
that are produced by trait-level variables like age and personality
traits can foster the better understanding of individual differences
in daily emotional life. Our findings contribute to the
current knowledge of the associations between momentary and
retrospective emotion ratings, further confirming the existence
of recall bias in retrospective assessment of emotions. From
methodological point of view, previous studies (e.g., Sato and
Kawahara, 2011) have used evening emotion ratings vs. 2-week
ratings of mood. The results of our study suggest also the evening
emotion ratings to be subject of both state- and trait level biases.
The results further suggest that when using retrospective emotion
ratings, both in clinical or research setting, one should also take
into account the current psychological state (e.g., tiredness) and
also the trait-level influence factors (e.g., age and personality
traits). Previous studies have shown the influence of neuroticism
and extraversion on remembering the past emotions (Barrett,
1997). Our studymakes specific contribution in showing that also
openness to experience, conscientiousness and agreeableness as
traits shape the memories about emotional experiences.
Several potential limitations of the study can be noted. The
most important limitation of our study is that the study sample
included only two age-groups, and therefore the results cannot
directly be generalized to whole population. We only used
emotion ratings averaged across 1 day, future studies could also
look for peak-end rule in memories of experienced emotions.
In addition, the evening questionnaires were paper-and-pen
questionnaires, leaving the possibility of back-filling. Future
research could be directed to advancing the understanding of
other biases in memory for emotions at different points of time
(e.g., different coping strategies used in different situations, etc.),
and could include also middle-aged people to shed light into
emotional changes across the entire lifespan.
CONCLUSIONS
Taken together, the results of the current study showed that
systematic biases in retrospective emotion ratings across 1 day
come from tiredness and age, whereas retrospective emotion
ratings across the 2 weeks are also influenced by personality
traits. Considering tiredness, personality traits, and the age effect
provides new insight into individual differences in retrospective
emotion ratings in the context of accessibility model of emotional
self-report (Robinson and Clore, 2002). The current study
replicated the previous findings of a positivity effect in emotional
experience with age and extended the prior literature by showing
that age-related positivity in emotional life can be partially
attributed to successful use of retrospective reassessment as
an emotion regulation strategy. Personality traits, however,
appeared to influence a more long-term view of past emotional
experience, compared to the 1-day perspective. Future research
could be directed to advancing the understanding of other biases
in memory for emotions, and could include also middle-aged
people to shed light into emotional changes across the entire
lifespan.
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Whereas several studies have demonstrated that core self-evaluations (CSE)–or one’s
appraisals about one’s own self-worth, capabilities, and competences–relate to job
outcomes, less is known about the mechanisms underlying these relationships. In the
present study, we address this issue by examining the role of within- and between-person
variation in CSE in the relationship between work pressure and task performance. We
hypothesized that (a) work pressure relates to task performance in a curvilinear way,
(b) state CSE mediates the curvilinear relationship between work pressure and task
performance, and (c) the relationship between work pressure and state CSE is moderated
by trait CSE. Our hypotheses were tested via a 10-day daily diary study with 55 employees
in which trait CSE was measured at baseline, while work pressure, task performance, and
state CSE were assessed on a daily basis. Bayesian multilevel path analysis showed that
work pressure affects task performance via state CSE, with state CSE increasing as long
as the employee feels that (s)he is able to handle the work pressure, while it decreases
when the level of work pressure exceeds the employees’ coping abilities. Moreover, we
found that for people low on trait CSE, the depleting effect of work pressure via state CSE
happens for low levels of work pressure, while for people high in trait CSE the depleting
effect is located at high levels of work pressure. Together, our findings suggest that the
impact of work pressure on task performance is driven by a complex interplay of between-
and within-person differences in CSE.
Keywords: core self-evaluations, task performance, state, trait, within-person, between-person
INTRODUCTION
Most studies on the role of personality in work and organizational settings have focused on the Big
Five dimensions, arguing that they cover a large part of what is referred to as personality (Barrick
and Mount, 1991; Barrick et al., 2001). Whereas this claim has indeed been supported by a bulk
of empirical research, it has also become clear that the Big Five personality dimensions are not all
encompassing, with one important example being that they “fail to capture chronic differences in how
individuals evaluate themselves” (Kacmar et al., 2009, p. 1572). Owning to this, scholars have started
to study traits that tap more into self-evaluations. One personality dimension that is particularly
relevant in this respect and that is gaining more and more popularity in the work and organization
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domain is core self-evaluations (CSE)—or the appraisals a
person makes about his/her own self-worth, capabilities, and
competences (Judge et al., 1998).
core self-evaluations is a broad personality dimension
consisting of four lower-order dimensions: self-esteem (i.e., the
worthiness that is attributed to oneself as a person); generalized
self-efficacy (i.e., one’s beliefs about his/her ability to handle
situations and solve problems); locus of control (i.e., one’s
beliefs regarding his/her capacity to influence life’s events); and
neuroticism (i.e., one’s inclination to focus on negative aspects
of the self and experience negative affect; Judge et al., 2003). The
validity and importance of CSE for the work and organizational
domain has been supported by studies that demonstrated its
predictive validity over and beyond each of the four separate CSE
sub-dimensions (Erez and Judge, 2001), and over and beyond
each of the Big Five personality dimensions (Judge et al., 2008) for
the prediction of important work outcomes such as performance
and job satisfaction.
Although previous research has shown that there is a
relationship between stable, between-person differences in CSE
and stable, between-person differences in job outcomes, no
studies have focused on if and how CSE relates to job outcomes
on a day-to-day basis. Nevertheless, such an understanding is
important, both from a theoretical and a practical point of view.
Theoretically, shifting the attention from between- to within-
person fluctuations implies that CSE is no longer conceptualized
as fixed, but rather as something that dynamically fluctuates as
a function of everyday experiences. Hence, it becomes important
to not only study the consequences of CSE, but also its day-to-
day antecedents; an endeavor that will significantly increase our
understanding of the mechanisms underlying the elicitation and
functioning of CSE at work. On a practical level, conceptualizing
CSE as a construct that is subject to within-person variationmight
open the door for job (re)design that takes into account these
within-individual fluctuations or for various types of managerial
interventions aimed at increasing employee CSE. In the present
paper, we aim to expand our understanding of the mechanisms
underlying day-to-day fluctuations in CSE by examining (a) how
day-to day variation in work pressure is related to day-to day
variation in CSE, (b) how variable, within-person differences in
CSE dynamically interact with stable, between-person differences
in CSE, and (c) how within- and between-person differences in
CSE together relate to job performance.
Within-person Fluctuations in CSE
Although CSE has traditionally been conceptualized as a stable
personality trait (Judge et al., 1998), recent research indicates
that it not only varies between but also within individuals
(Schinkel et al., 2004;Debusscher et al., 2015b;Dóci andHofmans,
2015). This is not surprising as self-efficacy, self-esteem, and
neuroticism—all being sub-dimensions of CSE– have been shown
to consist of a stable, between- as well as a variable, within-person
component (Heatherton and Polivy, 1991; Bandura, 2006; McNiel
and Fleeson, 2006; Debusscher et al., 2014, 2015a). Thus, even
though individuals are inclined to habitually view themselves in a
more positive or negative light, recent research suggests that their
self-evaluations vary across time and in different circumstances
(Judge and Kammeyer-Mueller, 2004); an idea that closely aligns
with the new framing in personality psychology that focuses not
only onbetween-, but also onwithin-person fluctuations (Fleeson,
2001; Funder, 2009). In line with this, the present study aims to
reconcile the stable trait and the variable state perspectives by
examining how state and trait CSE dynamically interact in daily
working life.
To do so, we start from the Core Self-evaluations Job Affect
Multilevel (CSEJAM) model of Judge et al. (2012). According to
this model, variation in one’s work and life environment trigger
variation in state CSE, which in turn relates to job affects and
affect-driven behaviors. Turning to the interplay between trait
and state CSE, Judge et al. (2012), in their CSEJAM model, argue
that trait CSE moderates the relationship between the situational
triggers and state CSE because it influences the extent to which
the work and life environment trigger increases or decreases in
state CSE. In other words, the CSEJAMmodel conceptualizes trait
CSE as individual differences in the sensitivity to CSE-relevant
situational provocation; a conceptualization that is also adopted in
well-known person-situation interactionism models such as Trait
Activation Theory (Tett and Guterman, 2000) and the Traits as
Situational Sensitivities Model (Marshall and Brown, 2006).
In the present study, we draw on the CSEJAM model to study
the relationships between work pressure, trait and state CSE, and
task performance. The reason for focusing on work pressure as an
antecedent and task performance as an outcome of state CSE is
threefold. First, work pressure and task performance are everyday
constituents of working life (Minbashian et al., 2010). Second,
they are elements of all working environments, and therefore
they generalize across tasks and situations. Third, research shows
that a stressful working environment relates to correlates of
CSE, such as stress, anxiety (Wood et al., 2011), self-efficacy,
hope, optimism, and resiliency (Newman et al., 2014), while CSE
(Chang et al., 2012) as well as its different subdimensions (Judge
and Bono, 2001) has been shown to relate to task performance. In
what follows, we will first discuss the within-person relationships
between work pressure, state CSE, and task performance,
and subsequently, we will discuss the moderating effect of
trait CSE.
Relating Work Pressure to Task
Performance: The Mediating Role
of State CSE
Recent research suggests that not all job demands are alike and that
it is important to distinguish between hindrance and challenge
demands (LePine et al., 2005). Hindrance demands, such as role
conflict or red tape, are typically perceived as opposing personal
growth and achievement, which implies that, even if employees
are able to overcome them, they offer little to no potential gain
(Cavanaugh et al., 2000). Instead, challenge demands such as
task complexity and work pressure are perceived by employees
as opportunities to learn and achieve, and therefore they create
an opportunity for personal growth and goal achievement
(Cavanaugh et al., 2000). However, besides their motivational
effect, challenge demands are also energy-draining, manifested in
the positive relationship with psychological strain and ill health
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(Boswell et al., 2004; LePine et al., 2004, 2005; Podsakoff et al.,
2007).
The theory and empirical research on challenge demands
suggest that work pressure has the potential to stimulate as well
as deplete work outcomes; a dual function that is supported by
an inverted U-shaped relationship between challenge demands
on one hand and performance, motivation, job satisfaction, and
other important work outcomes on the other hand (Xie and Johns,
1995; De Jonge and Schaufeli, 1998; Zivnuska et al., 2002). To
explain this curvilinear relationship, researchers often draw on
the Yerkes-Dodson law (Yerkes and Dodson, 1908) and activation
theory (Gardner, 1986; Gardner and Cummings, 1988). Both
theories suggest that at very low levels of activation, people
are apathetic. Therefore, increases in work-related stimulation
have an energizing effect when the current stimulation level
is low. However, when the activation level is already high,
increasing the level of work pressure further, might trigger the
individual’s feeling that s/he can no longer cope with the high
demands (Boswell et al., 2004; Webster et al., 2010), and under
these conditions, performance, motivation, and other work-
related outcomes start to deplete. Therefore, drawing on the
Yerkes-Dodson law (Yerkes and Dodson, 1908) and activation
theory (Gardner, 1986; Gardner and Cummings, 1988), we expect
within-person variation in work pressure to relate to within-
person variation in task performance in an inverted U-shaped
way.
Hypothesis 1: Work pressure has an inverted U-shaped within-
person relationship with task performance.
As mentioned above, work pressure has an energizing effect
as long as the individual feels that s/he is able to cope with
the demands at hand, while it becomes counterproductive if the
level of work pressure exceeds the individual’s coping abilities
(Boswell et al., 2004; Webster et al., 2010). Because state CSE
reflects the momentary appraisals a person makes about his/her
own self-worth, capabilities, and competences to cope with the
environmental demands (Judge et al., 1998), we expect variation
in perceived work pressure to trigger variation in state CSE. In
particular, when working under little work pressure, people may
feel in control, but at the same time they might feel under-
stimulated, frustrated, and passive (Gardner, 1986; Gardner and
Cummings, 1988; Zivnuska et al., 2002). As a result of this
mixture of experiences, their state CSE will be sub-optimal.
Instead, when experiencing a level of work pressure that is
demanding but feasible “people are likely to believe that there is a
positive relationship between efforts expended on coping with these
demands, and also likely to believe that if these demands are met,
valued outcomes will occur.” (LePine et al., 2005, p. 765). Under
these conditions the person’s sense of self-esteem (Rodell and
Judge, 2009), self-efficacy, and control is enhanced because of the
perceived relationship between efforts and results, while positive
emotions are triggered (LePine et al., 2005) because the person
expects to obtain valued outcomes. This mixture of ingredients
(i.e., high self-esteem, self-efficacy, and control, combined with
low negative emotions or low state neuroticism) represents an
optimal level of state CSE. Finally, when work pressure grows
further it might become overwhelming, there by depleting the
sense of self-efficacy and self-worth, evoking the feeling that the
person is no longer in control, and boosting state neuroticism
because of increased feelings of anxiety (Zivnuska et al., 2002). In
other words, when job demands become excessive, they exhaust
one’s personal resources—which in this study are captured by
CSE– (Bakker et al., 2003, 2004). This idea of a curvilinear
relationship between job demands and how one acts, feels, and
thinks has been supported by research showing that challenge
stressors relate curvilinearly to anxiety and emotional exhaustion
(Xie and Johns, 1995; De Jonge and Schaufeli, 1998). In summary,
we suggest that the relationship between work pressure and state
CSE is inverted U-shaped; it peaks at moderate levels and declines
at low and high levels of work pressure.
Hypothesis 2: Work pressure has an inverted U-shaped within-
person relationship with state CSE.
In the foregoing, we have argued that within-person variation
in work pressure triggers within-person variation in CSE, and
that performance varies as a function of the extent to which
the individual feels that s/he can cope with the situational
demands, which in the present study is captured by the level of
state CSE. Although there is to the best of our knowledge only
one within-person study on the positive relationship between
CSE and task performance (Debusscher et al., 2015b), meta-
analytical research has shown that, at the between-person level,
CSE (Chang et al., 2012) as well as its four sub-dimensions (Judge
and Bono, 2001) is positively related to task performance. An
important reason for the positive relationship between CSE and
task performance is that individuals who are high on CSE are
better at setting goals, working toward them, and are as a result
more motivated to perform their jobs. Indeed, both in a lab
experiment and a field study, Erez and Judge (2001) demonstrated
that CSE related to task motivation, persistence, goal setting,
goals commitment, activity level, and task performance. Building
on these findings, we hypothesize that day-to day variation
in state CSE relates positively to day-to day variation in
task performance, which, when combined with the foregoing
hypotheses, implies that state CSE is expected to mediate the
curvilinear within-person relationship between work pressure
and task performance.
Hypothesis 3: State CSE mediates the inverted U-shaped within-
person relationship between work pressure and task performance.
The Impact of Trait CSE on the
Within-person Work Pressure-state
CSE Relationship
Following the CSEJAM model (Judge et al., 2012) and person-
situation interactionism models, we expect trait CSE to moderate
the relationship between work pressure and state CSE. This
expectation follows from the conceptualization of traits as
individual differences in the sensitivity to situational provocation.
Moreover, it relates to the concept of contingent units of
personality, which represent the extent to which a single
individual’s expression of a personality trait is contingent upon a
specific feature of the situation (Minbashian et al., 2010). Building
on the idea of traits as situational sensitivities, we argue that trait
CSE relates to contingent units of CSE (i.e., the extent to which
CSE is contingent upon work pressure).
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In particular, and in line with Trait Activation Theory (Tett
and Guterman, 2000) and the Traits as Situational Sensitivities
Model (Marshall and Brown, 2006), we expect the within-
person relationship between work pressure and state CSE to
be weaker for people high on trait CSE than for people low
on trait CSE. That is, for a person high in trait CSE, we
expect the level of state CSE to be less contingent upon the
level of work pressure because they are less susceptible to it.
This reasoning is in line with the finding that people high in
trait neuroticism react more strongly to negative environmental
features than people low in neuroticism, even when confronted
with relatively small problems (Suls andMartin, 2005; Debusscher
et al., 2015a). In the same vein, Bolger and Schilling (1991)
demonstrated that people high in trait neuroticism have an
increased reactivity to stressful situations. Regarding self-efficacy,
O’Connor et al. (2009) demonstrated that people with low
trait self-efficacy are more susceptible to hassles than people
high on trait self-efficacy. Finally, for self-esteem, it has been
shown that people high in trait self-esteem are protected from
the effects of external factors (Mossholder et al., 1981). As
emotional stability (being the counterpart of neuroticism), high
self-esteem, and high self-efficacy are indicators of high CSE,
these findings suggest that people high in trait CSE might be
less susceptible to variation in work pressure than low trait CSE
people.
Hypothesis 4: Trait CSEmoderates the within-person relationship
between work pressure and state CSE, such that the relationship is
stronger in individuals with lower trait CSE.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Fifty-five employees (33 women) from different Belgian
companies participated in the study. On average, respondents
were 44.31 years old (SD = 11.29) and their mean company
tenure was 15.65 years (SD = 11.97). Fifteen participants had
a secondary school degree, 12 completed a higher professional
education, and 28 completed higher academic education. In
terms of job content, 16 worked in logistics and distribution, 13 in
governmental and non-profit organizations, 6 in health care, 6 in
telecom, 4 in the financial sector, 1 in chemistry and pharmacy,
3 in human resources, 2 in communication, and 4 in other jobs.
Ten participants worked part-time (seven participants worked
4 days, one participant worked 3 days, and two worked 2.5 days
a week), and they only filled out the daily questionnaires on days
on which work was done.
Procedure
The study was approved by the Human Research Ethics
Committee of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Dossier ECHW2015-
17). We recruited participants in several ways. We posted a
call on the intranet of the Flemish education networks, in the
alumni newsletter of theVrijeUniversiteit Brussel, andwe emailed
personal contacts. In these calls, we explained the goal of the
study and stressed that the anonymity of records would be
ensured. We only contacted people again who indicated that
they were willing to participate in the study (via email or
orally).
Participants were enrolled in a 10-day daily diary study in
which trait CSE was measured at baseline, while work pressure,
state CSE, and task performance were assessed daily. For the
daily diary part, participants received an email each working day
including a link to a survey in which they had to report on their
level of work pressure, state CSE, and level of task performance,
and they did so for 10 consecutive working days. At the beginning
of each survey, we again stressed that the data would be made
anonymous. Moreover, participants could stop participating in
the study whenever they wanted. All scales, as well as the items
within each scale, were randomized. Following this procedure, we
collected 327 out of a maximum of 550 (55 employees × 10 days)




Trait CSE was measured using the twelve-item CSE-scale of Judge
et al. (2003). An example item of this scale is “Overall, I am
satisfied withmyself.” The items were rated on a seven-point scale,
ranging from “completely disagree” to “completely agree.” The
alpha reliability coefficient of this scale was 0.84.
State CSE
Because personality states can be defined as momentary
enactments that have “the same affective, behavioral, and
cognitive content as their corresponding traits” (Fleeson, 2012,
p. 52), state CSE was also measured using the trait CSE-scale
of Judge et al. (2003). To allow for a momentary or state
measure of CSE, we slightly adapted the items (e.g., “Since this
morning, I was satisfied with myself ”). The items were rated
on a seven-point scale, ranging from “completely disagree” to
“completely agree.” To test the reliability of the scale, we used the
multilevel confirmatory factor analysis approach of Geldhof et al.
(2014), which revealed that the within-person omega reliability
coefficient was 0.73.
Work Pressure
Work pressure was measured using the three-item scale of Bakker
et al. (2003). Similar to the state CSE scale, we slightly adapted it
to allow for daily ratings of work pressure (e.g., “Today, I had too
much work to do”). All items had to be rated on a seven-point
scale, ranging from “completely disagree” to “completely agree.”
The within-person omega reliability coefficient was 0.80.
Task Performance
Task performance was measured using the seven-item task
performance subscale of Williams and Anderson (1991). Similar
to the state CSE scale, we slightly adapted it to allow for
momentary self-ratings of performance (e.g., “Since this morning,
I adequately completed assigned duties”). The seven items had
to be rated on a seven-point scale, ranging from “completely
disagree” to “completely agree.” The within-person omega
reliability coefficient equaled 0.75.
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TABLE 1 | Means, standard deviations, intra-class correlations and correlations for all study variables.
M SD ICCbetween−person ICCwithin−person 1 2 3
1. Work pressure 3.09 1.11 0.55 0.45
2. State CSE 5.34 0.91 0.77 0.23 0.01
3. Task performance 5.60 0.76 0.45 0.55 0.26** 0.33**
4. Trait CSE 5.05 0.81 – – 0.34* 0.77** 0.37**
**p< 0.01 (two-tailed); *p< 0.05 (two-tailed); M, mean; SD, standard deviation; ICC, intra-class correlation. The correlations between work pressure, state CSE, and task performance
are within-person correlations (i.e., computed on person-centered data; N= 327). The correlations with trait CSE are between-person correlations (i.e., to compute them, work pressure,
state CSE, and task performance were aggregated to the person-level; N = 55).
Analyses
Because of the complexity of the mediation model, we first
tested all hypothesized relationships separately using two-level
regression analyses with the lme4 package in R (Bates, 2010).
All level-1 predictors (i.e., work pressure and state CSE) were
person-centered, while the level-2 predictor (i.e., trait CSE) was
grand-mean centered. This procedure ensures that the level-
1 predictors contain within-person variability only, which is
necessary because the hypotheses regarding the relationships
between work pressure, state CSE, and task performance pertain
to the within-person level. To test whether the effect of the level-
1 predictors was consistent across individuals, we tested whether
a model with a random slope on the between-person level fitted
our data significantly better than a model without random slopes.
Both models were compared using a log-likelihood difference
test, and when the slope was non-significant (p > 0.05), it was
trimmed.
Next, the hypotheseswere tested simultaneously using Bayesian
two-level path modeling in Mplus version 7.3 (Muthén and
Muthén, 1998–2012). We used Bayesian estimation because it
can flexibly accommodate non-normal distributions (Muthén,
2010; Kruschke et al., 2012; Zyphur and Oswald, 2013), which
is important when testing for mediation using the product-
of-coefficients approach (i.e., the product of two coefficients
is traditionally non-normally distributed). Moreover, it allows
testing complicated models. An important difference between
Bayesian and the more traditional—frequentist—approach is that
Bayesian analysis does not yield p-values and confidence intervals.
Instead, for each parameter in the model, Bayesian analysis yields
a posterior distribution, which shows the probability distribution
of the parameter given the data (Kruschke et al., 2012; Zyphur and
Oswald, 2013). Based on these posterior distributions, credibility
intervals can be constructed. These credibility intervals include
a predefined percentage of the posterior distribution (e.g., 95%),
thereby returning the most credible values of the parameter. For
our Bayesian analysis, wewill draw on these credibility intervals to
help deciding which parameter values should be deemed credible
or not (Kruschke et al., 2012).
RESULTS
Means, standard deviations, correlations, and intra-class
correlations (ICCs) of work pressure, state CSE, momentary task
performance, and trait CSE are shown in Table 1. These ICCs
show, for each level-1 variable, the proportion of variation due to
between- and within-person differences. Overall, the ICCs show
that a substantial part of the variability in work pressure, state
CSE, and task performance is due to within-person differences.
Next, we tested the hypothesized relationships by means
of a series of two-level regression analyses. First, we tested
whether within-person fluctuations in work pressure relate in
an inverted U-shaped way to within-person fluctuations in
task performance (i.e., Hypothesis 1). To do so, we predicted
momentary task performance from work pressure and work
pressure squared (work pressure was person-centered before
computing the squared effect). Moreover, we tested whether these
relationships varied across individuals. In line with Hypothesis
1, we found that both the linear (γ = 0.18; p = 0. 004) and
the quadratic (γ = −0.11; p = 0. 041) component of work
pressure related to momentary task performance (see Figure 1).
Furthermore, the impact of both the linear (σ2 = 0.08; p< 0.001)
and the quadratic (σ2 = 0.02; p = 0.003) component differed
across individuals. Next, we tested whether there is an inverted
U-shaped within-person relationship between work pressure and
state CSE (i.e., Hypothesis 2). This analysis revealed that the
quadratic (γ = −0.10; p = 0.015), but not the linear (γ = 0.03;
p = 0.434) component of work pressure related to state CSE,
thereby supporting Hypothesis 2. Moreover, we found between-
person differences in the strength of the relationship between the
linear component of work pressure and state CSE (σ2 = 0.02;
p = 0.006), but not in the relationship between the quadratic
component of work pressure and state CSE (σ2 = 0.01; p= 0.614).
Thirdly, we tested the moderating effect of trait CSE on the
relationship betweenwork pressure and state CSE (i.e., Hypothesis
4). This was done by adding the main effect of trait CSE as well
as the interaction between trait CSE and the linear component
of work pressure to the previous model. In line with Hypothesis
4, this analysis showed that trait CSE negatively moderated the
relationship between work pressure and state CSE (γ = −0.12;
p= 0.024).Moreover, there was a positive direct effect of trait CSE
on state CSE (γ = 0.80; p < 0.001). A graphical representation of
this moderation effect is shown in Figure 2, which shows that the
level of state CSE of people high on trait CSE is less affected by the
level of work pressure these people experience. Finally, we tested
a model in which momentary task performance was predicted
by state CSE, work pressure, and work pressure squared1. This
analysis showed that state CSE (γ = 0.36; p < 0.001) and work
pressure (γ = 0.17; p = 0.004) related positively to momentary
1Although this test does not directly addresses one of our hypotheses, we
performed it to decide whether or not to include random slopes for the
direct effects (i.e., the relationships between work pressure and work pressure
squared on one hand and momentary task performance on the other hand) in
the Bayesian path model.
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FIGURE 1 | Momentary task performance as a function of work pressure. The work pressure scores are person-centered.
task performance, but work pressure squared did not (γ =−0.06;
p = 0.210). Moreover, the impact of work pressure (σ2 = 0.07;
p < 0.001) and work pressure squared (σ2 = 0.01; p = 0.019)
differed across individuals, while this was not the case for state
CSE (σ2 = 0.01; p= 0.241).
Next, we tested the moderated mediation model in its entirety
using Bayesian two-level path analysis. To this end, a model was
tested in which state CSE was predicted by the linear and squared
effect of work pressure, while momentary task performance was
predicted from state CSE and the linear and squared effect
of work pressure (all these relationships were modeled at the
within-person level). Moreover, and in line with the results of
the multilevel regression analyses, we included random slopes
for the relationship between work pressure and state CSE,
the relationship between work pressure and momentary task
performance, and the relationship betweenwork pressure squared
and momentary task performance. At the between-person level,
the random slope between work pressure and state CSE was
regressed on trait CSE2. To formally test the indirect (mediation)
effect of work pressure on momentary task performance via state
CSE (i.e., Hypothesis 3), we relied on the approach of Hayes and
Preacher (2010), which is specifically developed for testing non-
linear mediation. Because the relationship between work pressure
2The results from the Bayesian path analysis fully replicated the findings of the
separate regression analyses.
(X) and state CSE (i.e., the a-path) is curvilinear, while the
relationship between state CSE and momentary task performance
(i.e., the b-path) is linear, the mediation effect not only depends
on the a- and b-paths, but also on X, which implies that the
effect of work pressure on momentary task performance via state
CSE is conditional on the level of work pressure. Because of this
reason,Hayes andPreacher (2010) refer to the indirect effect as the
instantaneous indirect effect, which is the effect of the predictor
on the outcome through the mediator(s) at a specific value of the
predictor.
A graphical representation of the instantaneous indirect effects,
together with the 95% credibility intervals for people low (−1 SD),
average, and high (+1 SD) on trait CSE is shown in Figure 3.
From this figure, it can be seen that for low levels of work
pressure the instantaneous indirect effect of work pressure on
task performance via state CSE is positive [e.g., for people with
a low (−1 SD) trait CSE score the instantaneous indirect effect
equals 0.23 when the level of work pressure is low (i.e., a score
of −2)]. This implies that, when work pressure is low, further
increases in work pressure promote task performance via their
effect on state CSE. Moreover, because the curves—describing the
instantaneous indirect effect– decrease, the motivational effect of
increases in work pressure weakens with increased levels of initial
work pressure. On the contrary, for high initial levels of work
pressure, the instantaneous indirect effect of work pressure on
task performance via state CSE is negative [e.g., for people with
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FIGURE 2 | State Core Self-Evaluations as a function of work pressure. The work pressure scores are person-centered.
a low (−1 SD) trait CSE score the instantaneous indirect effect
equals −0.13 when the level of work pressure is high (i.e., a score
of 2)]. This means that further increases in work pressure deplete
task performance via their negative effect on state CSE. Moreover,
this depleting effect becomes stronger when the initial level of
work pressure is higher (which can be seen from the fact that
the curves decrease). Combined, Figure 3 thus provides support
for a curvilinear mediation effect (i.e., Hypothesis 3) as increases
in work pressure are promoting task performance via state CSE
when the level of work pressure is low, while they deplete task
performance via state CSE when the level of work pressure is high.
Regarding the moderation effect of trait CSE, Figure 3 shows that
for people low in trait CSE the depleting effect of work pressure via
state CSE especially holds for low levels of work pressure, while for
people high in trait CSE the depleting effect is especially located at
high levels of work pressure. This can be seen from the fact that the
curves shift downwardwhen going from low to high trait CSE, and
from the fact that the 95% credibility intervals contain 0 at high
(respective low) values of work pressure for people low (respective
high) in trait CSE.
DISCUSSION
With the present paper, we contributed to a better understanding
of the role of CSE at the workplace. This was done by (a)
shedding light on a work-related trigger (i.e., perceived work
pressure) and consequence (i.e., task performance) of state CSE
and (b) by revealing the unique way in which state and trait
CSE interact. This is a major contribution to the literature on
CSE, as it uncovers the mechanisms through which CSE relates
to work outcomes in everyday working life. In what follows,
we will discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our
findings.
Theoretical Implications
In line with the CSEJAM model (Judge et al., 2012) and
person-situation interactionism models (Tett and Guterman,
2000; Marshall and Brown, 2006), we found that trait CSE
can be conceived of as individual differences in the extent to
which appraisals about one’s sense of self-worth, capabilities, and
competence depend on environmental stimulation. This showed
from the fact that the relationship betweenwork pressure and state
CSE differed as a function of the individual’s level of trait CSE.
Importantly, our findings not only support, but go well beyond
the mechanisms proposed by person-situation interactionist
models such as Trait Activation Theory (Tett and Guterman,
2000) and the Traits as Situational Sensitivities Model (Marshall
and Brown, 2006) by showing that the mediation effect of
work pressure on task performance via state CSE is not only
quantitatively, but also qualitatively different for people with
different levels of trait CSE. That is, for people low in trait CSE,
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FIGURE 3 | The (instantaneous indirect) mediation effect of work pressure on momentary task performance via state core self-evaluations (CSE) as a
function of work pressure (person-centered values). The left panel shows the mediation effect for people scoring 1 SD below the average on trait CSE; the
middle panel shows the mediation effect for people with an average level of trait CSE; and the right panel shows the mediation effect for people scoring 1 SD above
the average on trait CSE. The work pressure scores are person-centered. The dotted lines represent the 95% credibility intervals.
the depleting effect of work pressure via state CSE operates for
low but not for high levels of work pressure, while for people high
in trait CSE the depleting effect is located at high but not at low
levels of work pressure. Altogether, this suggests that, depending
on one’s trait CSE level, qualitatively different mechanisms might
be at play.
We suggest that this dual mechanism can be explained by goal
setting (Locke and Latham, 1990) and self-discrepancy theory
(Higgins, 1987). In particular, low levels of work pressure might
not pose a problem for people high in trait CSE because these
individuals have a higher level of goal setting motivation (Erez
and Judge, 2001). An important reason for this might be that goal
commitment—which is an element of goal setting motivation– is
a function of expected goal attainment, and this is per definition
higher in people who are high in trait CSE. Because people
high in trait CSE have higher levels of goal commitment, they
do not require external pressure to perform well. People low in
trait CSE, in contrast, do not have this strong base of resources,
and therefore rely more on external pressures to regulate their
behavior. Indeed, because they are less likely to believe that
they can achieve what they want to achieve, their level of goal
commitment is generally lower. Therefore, their level of state CSE
is more strongly influenced by external pressures when the level
of work pressure is low. The result of all of this is that under
conditions of low work pressure, the level of state CSE of high trait
CSE people is virtually unaffected when work pressure decreases,
while the level of state CSE of low trait CSE people decreases
because of the combination of under-stimulation and a lack of
goal setting motivation. Turning to high levels of work pressure,
we believe that the reason for the detrimental effect of increased
levels of work pressure on the state CSE of individuals high on
trait CSE, may be that their self-image strongly relies on the idea
that they succeed in whatever they undertake. However, when
they come across a situation in which the level of work pressure is
(too) high, this high sense of achievement gets threatened, which,
according to self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), leads to a
flow of negative emotions such as disappointment, dissatisfaction,
sadness, and depression. People with a low trait CSE level, in
turn, should experience these feelings of self-discrepancy to a
lesser extent because for them not being able to cope with the
demands at hand is nothing new, and is more congruent with
their self-image. As a result, under high work pressure, the level
of state CSE of people high on trait CSE decreases when high
work pressure increases further due to increasing feelings of self-
discrepancy, while the state CSE level of people low on trait
CSE does not decrease substantially because being unable to
meet demands is not perceived as a shock for their self-image.
It should be noted that, to formally test this dual mechanisms
account, future research is needed in which goal commitment
and self-discrepancy aremeasured along with work pressure, state
CSE, trait CSE and task performance.
A possible alternative explanation for the finding that there are
qualitatively differentmediation effects for people high and lowon
trait CSE is that the levels of perceived work pressure might not
be comparable. Because we person-centered the perceived work
pressure scores, all between-person differences in work pressure
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were removed from the data. Yet, it might be that that the baseline
of work pressure is higher for trait CSE people, as they seek
and create jobs that offer challenges; an idea that aligns with the
finding that people select situations that are congruent with their
personality (Emmons et al., 1986; Côté and Moskowitz, 1998;
Frederickx and Hofmans, 2014). Because of this (which is by the
way supported by the positive correlation between the person’s
average level of work pressure and his/her trait CSE level), people
high on trait CSEmight experience generally higher levels of work
pressure than people low on trait CSE. As a result, for people high
on trait CSE, levels of work pressure that are lower than usual can
still be relatively high, and therefore theymight still be challenging
and not be associated with apathy. Conversely, levels of work
pressure higher than usual might be extremely high for people
high in trait CSE, whichwould then lead to overload and depletion
of their state CSE level. For people low in trait CSE, levels of work
pressure lower than usual may be very low and therefore offer
no stimulation at all, hence depleting their state CSE level. When
experiencing more work pressure than usual, the level of work
pressure might be high, but still manageable for those low in trait
CSE; and therefore it should not relate to decreased levels of state
CSE. We tested this alternative explanation by regressing state
CSE on the grand-mean centered work pressure scores (which
contain both between- and within-person variability). Although
the effects are weaker (i.e., the effects of work pressure squared
and the interaction between trait CSE and work pressure are only
significant at the p < 0.10 level), the pattern of findings was
similar to that found with person-centered scores. This implies
that between-person differences in work pressure cannot fully
explain the qualitatively different mechanisms. However, to find a
definite answer to the question whether individual differences in
the average level of work pressure might explain why people with
different trait CSE levels react differently to work pressure, future
research is needed. Oneway to do so would be tomanipulate work
pressure rather than to measure it.
Practical Implications
In line with previous findings on challenge demands, our study
shows that, up to some point, work pressure might stimulate state
CSE and task performance. This implies that managers should
not always try to decrease the level of work pressure. Instead,
they might try to keep work pressure at a moderate level as this
seems to work best with all employees. Additionally, our findings
also revealed that the mechanism relating work pressure to task
performance is different for people with different trait CSE levels.
While increasing low levels of work pressure can activate people
low on trait CSE because it increases their state CSE level, it
has little effect on people high on trait CSE. This implies that
managing the level of work pressure is especially relevant when
the employee is low in trait CSE, as for these people increasing
challenge demands can trigger resources. Finally, very high levels
of work pressure should always be avoided as they strongly deplete
the state CSE of people high, and do no longer activate the state
CSE of people low in trait CSE.
Limitations and Future Research
Despite its strong points, our study is also subject to some
limitations. First, all data were self-reported and came from
a single source. Whereas self-reports are needed to measure
CSE, they might be problematic for work pressure and task
performance because of self-serving biases. Yet, because of theway
we centered the data (i.e., relative to the individual’s own baseline),
consistent over- or underestimations of the level of work pressure
and task performance are absorbed by the individual’s average and
are therefore removed from the data. As a result, stable, between-
person differences in self-serving biases cannot account for our
findings. However, when the degree of over- or underestimation
varies as a function of one’s level of state CSE, this cannot be
resolved with person-centering the data. To solve this issue, one
should rely on other-rated work pressure and task performance
and/or on objective measures of these variables. Note, however,
that collecting other-ratings might be challenging in a daily diary
study as peers or supervisors typically do not monitor one’s task
performance on a day-to-day basis. Objective task performance,
on the other hand, may resolve the issue of self-serving bias, but
introduces external validity issues as objective task performance
can only be collected for a very limited number of occupational
groups.
A second limitation is that the data are correlational in nature.
This implies that we were able to show that work pressure, state
CSE, and task performancewere related at thewithin-person level,
but not that work pressure caused state CSE, and that state CSE
in turn led to task performance. To test such causal relationships,
experimental research is needed.
Conclusion
Our findings suggest that the impact of work pressure on task
performance is driven by a complex interplay of between- and
within-person differences in CSE. Regarding this interplay, we
supported and extended the idea of traits as individual differences
in the susceptibility to situational provocation by (a) showing that
trait CSE predicts how people react to within-person fluctuations
in work pressure, and (b) that this differential reactivity is qualita-
tively different for people low andhigh in trait CSE. These findings
have important implications for future research and practice
because they suggest that different mechanisms are at play.
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There is a stable relationship between the Openness/Intellect domain of personality and
aesthetic engagement. However, neither of these are simple constructs and while the
relationship exists, process based evidence explaining the relationship is still lacking.
This research sought to clarify the relationship by evaluating the influence of the
Openness and Intellect aspects on several different aesthetic emotions. Two studies
looked at the between- and within-person differences in arousal and the emotions of
interest, pleasure and confusion in response to visual art. The results suggest that
Openness, as opposed to Intellect, was predictive of greater arousal, interest and
pleasure, while both aspects explained less confusion. Differences in Openness were
associated with within-person emotion appraisal contingencies, particularly greater
novelty-interest and novelty-pleasure relationships. Those higher in Openness were
particularly influenced by novelty in artworks. For pleasure this relationship suggested
a different qualitative structure of appraisals. The appraisal of novelty is part of the
experience of pleasure for those high in Openness, but not those low in Openness. This
research supports the utility of studying Openness and Intellect as separate aspects of
the broad domain and clarifies the relationship between Openness and aesthetic states
in terms of within-person appraisal processes.
Keywords: Openness/Intellect, interest, knowledge emotions, aesthetics, personality processes, appraisals,
multi-level modeling
INTRODUCTION
“It is art that makes life, makes interest, makes importance... and I know of no substitute whatever for
the force and beauty of its process.”
-Henry James
Making and appreciating art is a quintessentially human behavior, but not everyone would agree
with the sentiment expressed by Henry James above. Divergent opinions about the importance
of art and experiences with art make the study of individual differences a crucial part of
aesthetic science—after all, it is said that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. However, in
psychological aesthetics there are still gaps in what is known about both the beauty and the
beholder. Psychological aesthetics has primarily focused on one aspect of the aesthetic experience
in the form of liking, pleasure and preference. Aesthetics associations with personality—primarily
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Openness/Intellect—have focused almost exclusively on
individual differences in liking different types of art. Further,
little work has gone into understanding the processes underlying
the relationship between aesthetics and Openness/Intellect.
This is problematic because the nature of the personality/art
appreciation relationship could seem circular, given that
personality items directly mention aesthetic engagement when
measuring Openness/Intellect.
In the current study, we extend previous research investigating
the relationship between Openness/Intellect and aesthetic
appreciation in three ways. First, we model the appraisal
processes underlying the emotions of interest, pleasure, and
confusion. This extends previous research by considering
three distinct emotions rather than pleasure only. Second,
we test whether the aspects of Openness and Intellect
differentially predict these three emotional states. This extends
previous research by considering the two different aspects of
Openness/Intellect, rather than the broad domain only. Third, we
test whether the aspects of Openness and Intellect differentially
predict within-person appraisal processes underlying these
three emotional states. This extends previous research by
considering within-person processes, rather than between-
person associations only. By integrating these various elements
we intended to answer the question: Why are those higher in
Openness/Intellect more aesthetically engaged?
Aesthetic People
Openness/Intellect is the personality domain of the aesthetically
sensitive, according to many areas of research. It is the best
predictor of positive aesthetic attitudes and participation in
aesthetic activities such as visiting museums, reading literature,
and creating art (McManus and Furnham, 2006). Previous
findings have demonstrated Openness/Intellect to be the best
personality predictor of artistic creativity (Feist, 1998; Silvia
et al., 2009b) and vocational interests related to the arts (Barrick
et al., 2003). Most importantly, Openness/Intellect is a consistent
predictor of aesthetic appreciation, which has been shown to
be highly variable (Vessel and Rubin, 2010). Several studies
indicate that Openness/Intellect is associated with liking a broad
range of artistic types including abstract, representational, pop,
renaissance, cubism, Japanese, and unpleasant art (Furnham and
Walker, 2001; Rawlings, 2003; Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2009,
2010). Openness/Intellect therefore is a domain of personality
that explains individual differences in creating, seeking, and
appreciating art.
Openness/Intellect is an unusually heterogeneous personality
domain, and recent work suggests that it can be represented
with two major aspects: Openness and Intellect (DeYoung et al.,
2007, 2012;Woo et al., 2014). Johnson (1994) poetically described
Openness as interest in beauty and Intellect as interest in truth,
suggesting that they are both information-seeking traits diverging
in the types of situations that elicit interest.
Intellect is associated with fluid and crystallized intelligence
and with scientific creativity, while Openness is associated
with artistic creativity, implicit learning ability, and crystallized
intelligence (Kaufman et al., 2010; Nusbaum and Silvia, 2011;
Kaufman, 2013). DeYoung (2014) distinguishes the aspects
on the basis of different styles of cognitive exploration, with
Openness reflecting individual differences in exploration through
perceptual or sensory information, and Intellect reflecting
individual differences in learning and exploration of abstract
information. Johnson’s (1994) and DeYoung’s (2014) distinctions
suggest that Openness, as opposed to Intellect, is the aspect
primarily associated with appreciation of visual art. Further
distinctions based on emotional experiences have also emerged.
Silvia and Nusbaum (2011) showed that Openness, and not
Intellect, is associated with unusual aesthetic experiences such
as chills, feeling touched, and absorption, suggesting differences
between the aspects in the propensity to experience states that
have been linked to broad definitions of aesthetic experiences.
Given the distinction between Openness and Intellect we aimed
to test their differential roles in aesthetic experiences.
Aesthetic Emotions
Nearly all research on the link between personality and
aesthetic appreciation, like aesthetics research more generally,
has focused on how much participants liked or disliked an
artwork (e.g., Furnham and Walker, 2001; Rawlings, 2003;
Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2009). Since the pioneering work of
Berlyne (1971), most models of aesthetics concern themselves
with states of pleasure, liking, or preference. Silvia (2009)
argued that, while important, such evaluations do not take
into account the breadth of emotions felt in response to art.
A similar trend exists within the research in the emerging field
of neuroaesthetics, which has almost exclusively focused on the
evaluation of something as pleasing or beautiful (Fayn and Silvia,
2015). Such a reductionist approach runs the risk of missing
meaningful individual differences in aesthetic experiences and in
understanding the ways in which personality traits manifest in
such experiences. Emotions felt in response to aesthetic objects—
categorized within this paper as aesthetic emotions—are varied
and include interest, confusion, pleasure, anger, and even disgust
(Silvia, 2012). The term aesthetic emotions is not used to suggest
a separate group of emotions only felt in response to aesthetic
objects. Rather, it is used to group the states that have been
observed to occur in response to aesthetic objects.
The distinction between liking versus disliking something
may be a valid indicator of pleasure, but it does not represent
the depth and complexity of aesthetic emotions. A group of
emotions frequently felt in response to art, yet distinct from
pleasure, are the knowledge emotions. The knowledge emotions—
interest, awe, beauty, confusion, and surprise—associated with
beliefs about thoughts and knowledge, they stem from epistemic
goals, and arise frommetacognitive processes (Silvia, 2010, 2012).
Several emotional states may fit this categorization, and all
are distinct from pleasure. The emotion of interest has been
distinguished from pleasure on the basis of cognitive appraisal
processes—interest is positively associated with complex stimuli,
but pleasure is negatively related to complexity (Turner and
Silvia, 2006). Two other states that are distinct from pleasure
and involve epistemic goals are awe and beauty. The emotion
of awe is felt as one tries to accommodate vast novelty, the
success of which leads to a powerful emotional state (Shiota
et al., 2007). Awe can be and is frequently experienced as a
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negative and fear-like state when accommodation is unsuccessful.
Beauty is defined as “the exhilarating feeling that something
complex, perhaps to the point of being profound, might yield an
understanding” (Armstrong and Detweiler-Bedell, 2008, p. 312).
Beauty is distinguished from the pleasant on the basis of effort:
pleasure is associated with fluent processing (Reber, 2012), but
beauty relies on effortful processing that drives arousal and
results in an exhilarating experience. Therefore, several aesthetic
states are distinguished from simple pleasure. All are elicited by
complex and novel situations where understanding is required
but is effortful. Pleasure, on the other hand, is facilitated by ease
of understanding.
From the individual differences perspective, two studies have
distinguished pleasure and other aesthetic experiences through
factor analysis techniques. Eysenck (1941) attempted to explain
the presence of two factors in aesthetic preference. The first
factor was easily attributable to valance, while the second was
generally associated with preferences for the abstract. A core
feature of abstract art is novelty and complexity, suggesting
interest driven rather than pleasure driven preferences. More
recently, Marković (2010) found that two factors describe
aesthetic appreciation. These factors were labeled affective tone
and aesthetic experiences. Descriptors “lovely” and “charming”
loaded highest on affective tone, while aesthetic experience was
associated with adjectives such as “exceptional” and “profound.”
Thus, converging evidence and theory suggest that some aesthetic
experiences are distinct from mild positive states of pleasure
and that at the core of these states is the resolution of novelty
and complexity, rather than fluent processing associated with
pleasure.
Aesthetic states, like other emotions, are generated by
appraisal process patterns (Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003). Interest
occurs when a stimulus is appraised as novel yet understandable
(Silvia, 2005). Novelty orientates and highjacks our attention,
while the resolution of the novelty toward understanding leads
to the positive experience of interest. This appraisal structure
has been supported in response to art, poetry, and film (Silvia,
2005, 2008; Silvia et al., 2009a; Silvia and Berg, 2011). Pleasure
and confusion are also predicted by the same appraisals but
in different ways. Confusion is associated with appraisals of
novelty and lack of understanding (Silvia, 2010). Pleasure is
elicited by appraised understanding and negatively related to
novelty (Turner and Silvia, 2006). The appraisal approach is
therefore particularly useful in distinguishing differing aesthetic
emotions and studying the underlying processes that facilitate
them.
Between Aesthetic Emotions and
Aesthetic People
Appraisal theories of emotions have been used to further
understanding of processes that underlie personality traits
associated with emotional experiences. There are two ways in
which personality is involved in the appraisal-emotion system:
(1) appraisal strength—the tendency to appraise situations in
a particular way—varies as a function of personality; and (2)
appraisal-emotion relationships vary as a function of personality
(Kuppens, 2009; Kuppens and Tong, 2010).
Openness/Intellect has been implicated in both of the
aforementioned ways. Curiosity—a trait associated with
Openness/Intellect (Mussel, 2010)—is associated with greater
appraised understanding, which fully mediates the curiosity-
interest relationship (Silvia, 2008). That is, curious people feel
greater interest because they are better able to understand
epistemic situations, which in turn predicts greater interest. This
finding is consistent with the theoretical framework proposed
by Mussel (2013) for Intellect traits. Within this framework,
Intellect traits are associated with processes of seeking and
conquering intellectually stimulating events, which map onto
interest and understanding.
Further, within the experience of interest, novelty and
understanding have been found to form two clusters with
Openness/Intellect predicting membership in only one (Silvia
et al., 2009a). Openness/Intellect was associated with the cluster
in which novelty was a much stronger predictor of interest
while understanding was less important, compared to the other
cluster. This suggests that Openness/Intellect may moderate
the interest-appraisal relationships predisposing those higher
on Openness/Intellect to be more sensitive to novelty and less
sensitive to understanding appraisals. One study has looked at
the unique influence of the Openness and Intellect aspects on
the processes and appraisal structure of interest in response to
quotations. Openness was related to greater interest overall and
a lessened reliance on understanding, while Intellect related to
greater understanding (Fayn et al., 2015). This suggests that
Openness and Intellect may relate to interest in different ways
and that appraisal processes are useful for explaining these
differences.
The influence of Openness/Intellect on the appraisal structure
of pleasure and confusion, and the distinct influence of Openness
and Intellect on the appraisal structure of interest, have not
previously been tested. Taken together, previous findings indicate
that appraisals can explain the mechanisms that underlie
Openness/Intellect and its relationship with interest. Therefore,
we aimed to evaluate the underlying processes associated with the
Openness and Intellect aspects in order to understand whether
those higher in either aspect are more aesthetically engaged and
how the aspects manifest differently in aesthetic experiences.
The Present Research
In summary, positive aesthetic experience is broader than liking
and may be divided into two families of experiences: pleasure
and the knowledge emotions. Openness/Intellect may influence
both these states and the processes that underlie these traits.
Therefore, we moved away from the predominant practice
of evaluating liking artworks, in lieu of measuring distinct
emotional states that have previously been implicated in the
aesthetic experience. Additionally, by studying variability in
appraisal-emotion relationships across multiple stimuli we were
able to evaluate the way personality manifests in aesthetic
experiences. Thus, the aims of the current research are
to explore the relationship between Openness/Intellect and
aesthetic appreciation by: (1) extending the states studied within
personality-aesthetics relationships to pleasure, interest, and
confusion; (2) evaluating the unique influences of the Openness
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and Intellect aspects; and (3) testing whether the Openness and
Intellect aspects moderate the within-person appraisal processes
that underlie these aesthetic emotional states.
Study 1 evaluated the differential influence of Openness and
Intellect on different aesthetic states in response to visual art. In
Study 2 we tested whether the appraisal processes associated with
interest, pleasure and confusion can explain the relationships
between Openness/Intellect and aesthetic appreciation, and
whether the Openness and Intellect influence appraisal processes.
STUDY 1
The purpose of this study was to test whether Openness and
Intellect differentially predict states of interest, pleasure, and
arousal. Based on past work on Openness and Intellect, we
predicted that Openness would be a stronger predictor of
aesthetic experience than Intellect.
Method
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the
University of Sydney. Written consent was obtained from all the
participants before the experiment according to the established
guidelines of the committee.
Participants
A total of 53 psychology students (74% female) participated in
the study for course credit. Participants were aged between 17 and
42 years (M = 19.15 years, SD= 3.01 years). All participants were
proficient in English ensuring comprehension of instructions.
Procedure
The study was conducted on computers over two 1-h sessions
to minimize the influence of a long session of psychometric
assessments on aesthetic appreciation. In the first session
participants completed the Openness and Intellect scales, as
well as other individual difference measures not relevant to the
current study. In the second session—at least 1 h apart from
the first—participants reported their thoughts and feelings in
response to seven color images taken from published art books.
The images were all in color and could broadly be described as
modern art, comprising of both abstract and representational
examples. The artists were: Dorosheva, Kadel, Kiefer, Magritte,
Moki, Pollock, and Ryden.
Measures
Openness and Intellect
Openness and Intellect were assessed using the Big Five Aspect
Scales (DeYoung et al., 2007). Each scale included 10 Likert
style items on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree,
5 = strongly agree) such as “I enjoy the beauty of nature”
(Openness) and “I like to solve complex problems” (Intellect).
The Openness scale is made up of items that reflect the Openness
to Aesthetics, Feelings and Fantasy scales, while Intellect items
include self-reported ability and Openness to Ideas items. The
scale yields a full-scale Openness/Intellect score along with scores
for the Openness and Intellect aspects. The internal consistencies
for Openness (α = 0.86) and Intellect (α = 0.79) were good within
the current sample.
Ratings of interest, pleasure, and arousal
After viewing each picture, people rated it on a series of seven-
point semantic differential scales. The scales assessed feelings of
interest (interesting-uninteresting, engaging-boring), pleasure
(pleasing-displeasing, enjoyable-unenjoyable), and arousal
(calm-aroused, sluggish-excited). Most of the items have been
used in past research in research on emotions (e.g., Day, 1967,
1968; Silvia, 2005; Turner and Silvia, 2006). The items were
reverse-scored and averaged; high scores indicate high levels of
interest, pleasure, and arousal.
Results and Discussion
The analyses were conducted with Mplus 7.2 (Muthén and
Muthén, 1998–2012) using maximum likelihood with robust
standard errors. For interpreting effect sizes, we use the
common guidelines (Cumming, 2012) of r = 0.10/0.30/0.50
as small/medium/large. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics
and correlations for the measures of personality and aesthetic
experience.
The zero-order correlations suggest, as expected, that
Openness was associated with stronger aesthetic engagement
than Intellect: Openness had stronger relationships, medium
in size, with all three outcomes. To examine their differences
more formally, we conducted a multivariate regression model
in which Openness and Intellect were the two predictors and
interest, pleasure, and arousal were the outcomes. Figure 1
displays the model and results. The effects of Openness on
interest, pleasure, and arousal were medium in size, and most
were statistically significant; the effects of Intellect on interest,
pleasure, and arousal, in contrast, were all near-zero or small in
size. The results lend support to the utility of separating Openness
and Intellect when evaluating individual differences in aesthetic
states. Openness had notable relationships with the three types of
aesthetic experience, whereas Intellect did not. Limitations of this
study are the small sample size which we addressed in study 2, and
a limited range on the Openness scale. Both of these limitations
have a bearing on the strength of the results found in this study.
Small sample sizes are an indication of underpowered studies,
while range restrictions usually underestimate effect sizes.
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations of personality
variables with between-person aggregated ratings.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5
(1) Intellect 35.08 6.43 1 0.27 0.13 0.18 0.10
(2) Openness 40.23 5.39 1 0.28 0.34 0.39
(3) Interest 5.83 0.67 1 0.84 0.50
(4) Pleasure 5.52 0.74 1 0.47
(5) Arousal 4.67 0.72 1
n = 53. All relationships above 0.18 are significant at 0.05 level, all those above
0.38 are significant at the 0.01 level, and all those above 0.49 are significant at the
0.001 level.
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FIGURE 1 | Effects of Openness and Intellect on ratings of interest,
pleasure, and arousal: Study 1. n = 53. Note that the effect of Intellect on
Arousal is β < 0.01 and hence not drawn. Standard errors are reported in
brackets. ∗p < 0.05.
STUDY 2
Study 2 sought to extend these findings in several important ways.
First, we shifted the range of emotional states that we assessed
by focusing on interest, pleasure, and confusion. Whereas interest
and pleasure have a long history in aesthetics research, confusion
has only recently attracted attention among emotion researchers
as a response to events that are unfamiliar and hard to understand
(Silvia, 2010).
Second, to understand the processes underlying the
Openness/Intellect-emotion relationships, appraisal processes
were evaluated. The inclusion of appraisal processes can
help determine why those higher in Openness/Intellect are
more aesthetically sensitive—whether they are more or less
emotionally responsive to appraisals. That is, we seek to
determine whether Openness/Intellect can explain individual
differences in appraisal-emotion relationships. As previously
mentioned, Openness/Intellect moderates the appraisal structure
of interest and relates to greater appraisals of understanding
(Silvia, 2008; Silvia et al., 2009a). The current study extends
this finding in several ways. First, we examine the two aspects
of Openness/Intellect for their unique influence on aesthetic
experience. Second, we test whether Openness and Intellect
similarly moderate the appraisal structure of pleasure and
confusion. We expect, as in Study 1, that Openness but not
Intellect will be the aesthetically relevant aspect. Third, we
included an additional individual difference measure to help
clarify the roles of Openness and Intellect. A possible explanation
for the relationship between Openness/Intellect and aesthetic
appreciation is that those higher in Openness/Intellect have
greater knowledge of the arts (Silvia, 2007a), which in turn
predicts interest in art (Silvia, 2006). Art expertise has been
shown to moderate the interest-appraisal relationships—experts
are less reliant on understanding and more sensitive to novelty
(Silvia, 2013)—a finding also associated with Openness/Intellect
(Silvia et al., 2009a). This may indicate that the effects of
Openness/Intellect on aesthetic appreciation are a function of
expertise in the arts rather than a differences in personality.
These variables have not been studied together in the context of
aesthetic appreciation, therefore, we controlled for art expertise
in the current study.
Method
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by the Human Ethics Committees of
the University of Sydney and the University of North Carolina
at Greensboro. Written consent was obtained from all the
participants before the experiment according to the established
guidelines of the committees.
Participants
A total of 225 students from various degrees and majors
(69% female) participated in the study for either course credit
or $10 USD compensation. The students majors were 25.3%
Physical Sciences, 21.8% Arts, 14.7% Psychology, 12% Health
Sciences, 10% Business/Economics, 6.7% Social Sciences, 4.4%
were undecided, and 4.9% had majors that did not fit into
the categories presented as they were mixtures of more than
one category. Participants’ age was between 18 and 56 years
(M = 20.56 years, SD = 4.91 years). All participants were
proficient in English ensuring comprehension of instructions.
Procedure
The data were collected during a 1-h session in groups ranging
from 1 to 8 participants at a time. The study involved completion
of self-report personality scales and ratings of 18 visual art images.
We sought to include a broad scope of pieces ranging from
traditional to contemporary art. The images were all in color and
included both abstract and representational works. The artists
were: Bacon, Blake, Goya, Hayuk, Kato, Kiefer, Magritte, Marc,
Monroe, Pollock, Repin, Ryden, Schiele, Siqueiros, and Turner.
The self-report scales came before and after the visual art ratings
to avoid fatigue. All data was collected using Medialab (Jarvis,
2004) on computers. Images were presented in a random order,
as were questions relating to the images; both controlled by the
randomization algorithm within Medialab.
Measures
Openness and Intellect
As in Study 1, Openness and Intellect were assessed using the Big
Five Aspect Scales (DeYoung et al., 2007). Each scale has 10 items
on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly
agree).
Art expertise
Art expertise was measured using the aesthetic fluency scale
(Smith and Smith, 2006), which assesses expertise by asking
people how familiar they are with different figures and ideas from
art history. The scale got participants to report their familiarity
in response to 10 people and concepts (Mary Cassatt, Isamu
Noguchi, John Singer Sargent, Alessandro Boticelli, Gian Lorenzo
Bernini, Fauvism, Egyptian Funerary Stelae, Impressionism,
Chinese Scrolls, Abstract Expressionism). The scale ranged from
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0 (I have never heard of this artist or term) to 4 (I can talk
intelligently about this artist or idea in art). It should be noted that
the fluency scale assesses self-reported expertise in the arts and
may be subject to overclaiming. However, the aesthetic fluency
scale has been used widely used to assess expertise and has
displayed good internal and external validity (e.g., Silvia, 2007a;
Silvia and Barona, 2009; DeWall et al., 2011; Silvia and Nusbaum,
2011; Smith, 2014).
Emotions and cognitions in response to visual art
Participants viewed 18 images of various valance and style taken
from various art books, previous studies, and the google images
database. Participants could observe the image for as long as they
wanted, but for a minimum of 5 s. A smaller version of the image
was also visible while reporting on their thoughts and feelings.
For each image participants completed items assessing various
emotions and cognitions. For emotional evaluations participants
were asked: “Did you find this picture. . .” followed by items
for interesting, pleasing, and confusing. Appraisal processes of
novelty (complex-simple, unusual-common) and understanding
(hard to understand-easy to understand, comprehensible-
incomprehensible) were assessed using seven-point semantic
differential scales. All scales had been previously used in
assessments of aesthetic states (Silvia, 2005, 2010, 2013). In
addition to the emotion items, we asked some behavior-like
preference items, which are common in aesthetics research (e.g.,
Cooper and Silvia, 2009). For each image, participants were
asked I would like more information on this image, On Facebook
I would “like” this image, On Facebook I would share this image
on my wall, and I would like to own a copy of this. Each item was
answered with a binary NO/YES scale. The time taken to view
each image was also recorded to evaluate whether Openness or
Intellect were associated with longer viewing times.
Results and Discussion
Data Reduction and Analysis
The items for the personality and aesthetic fluency scales were
averaged to form overall scores. Internal consistencies for the
BFAS Openness and Intellect scales, and the aesthetic fluency
scale were good (see Table 2).
The large number of images viewed by each person allowed
us to use multilevel models, which can estimate between-person
effects, within-person effects, and their interactions (Silvia,
2007b; Nezlek, 2011). For the multilevel models, between-person
predictors (Openness, Intellect, and Aesthetic Fluency) were
centered at the sample’s grand mean and were rescaled by
dividing the full scale score by the number of items in the
scale.Within-person predictors (appraisals of novelty-complexity
and understanding) were centered at each person’s own mean
(Enders and Tofighi, 2007). The null model was used to evaluate
intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs). The ICCs indicated a
significant amount of variance for interest (19%), pleasure (11%),
and confusion (13%) at the between-person level.
The random slope and intercept models were tested separately
for each emotion and are graphically depicted in Figure 2.
The analyses were conducted with Mplus 7.2, using maximum
likelihood with robust standard errors. All coefficients are
unstandardized regression weights; some, where noted, are
logistic effects. Estimation of power is a contentious topic within
multilevel modeling due to the complexity of the parameters
being estimated (Nezlek, 2011); by most standards the number
of level 1 and level 2 units of measurement in our sample is
sufficient to assume accurate estimations of the parameters of
interest (Maas and Hox, 2005).
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Relationships
Openness and Intellect were both related to greater Aesthetic
Fluency, pleasure, and lower confusion. Openness, but not
Intellect, was related to greater interest (Table 2). The states of
interest and pleasure had a strong overlap at the between and
within person levels, and were unrelated to confusion at the
between person level. Pleasure and interest differed from each
other in their within-person relationship with confusion, interest
was independent of confusion, but pleasure had a small negative
relationship with confusion.
Overall Between-person Effects of Openness and
Intellect on Emotions and Preference Ratings
Our first models examined the overall effects of Openness and
Intellect on emotion ratings (interest, pleasure, and confusion)
and on preference ratings (e.g., whether people indicated wanting
to own a copy of the image). As expected, Openness and Intellect
showed diverging relationships with these outcomes. Openness
predicted finding the images significantly more interesting
(b = 0.61, SE = 0.11, p < 0.001), more pleasing (b = 0.77,
SE = 0.09, p < 0.001), and less confusing (b = −0.31, SE = 0.10,
p = 0.003). Intellect, in contrast, predicted finding the images
less confusing (b = −0.29, SE = 0.11, p = 0.008), but it didn’t
significantly predict either interest (b = −0.06, SE = 0.10,
p = 0.573) or pleasure (b = 0.09, SE = 0.09, p = 0.287).
TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics and correlations between personality traits, aesthetic fluency and emotions.
N M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
(1) Openness 225 39.16 5.59 (0.76) 0.39 0.53 0.39 0.56 −0.28
(2) Intellect 225 36.23 5.51 (0.80) 0.39 0.11 0.27 −0.28
(3) Aesthetic Fluency 224 22.21 7.41 (0.83) 0.36 0.52 −0.26
(4) Interest 224 5.21 0.84 1 0.67 0.06
(5) Pleasure 224 3.51 0.83 0.52 1 −0.13
(6) Confusion 224 3.98 0.80 0.02 −0.20 1
All relationships above 0.13 are significant at 0.001 level, and all those below 0.13 are not significant; correlation below the diagonal are within-person relationships;
Cronbach’s alphas in parentheses.
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FIGURE 2 | A depiction of the multilevel models.
For the preference ratings, a logistic model found that
Openness significantly predicted the likelihood of wanting more
information about the image (b = 1.65, SE = 0.32, p < 0.001), the
likelihood of liking (b = 0.93, SE = 0.16, p < 0.001) and sharing
(b = 1.09, SE = 0.25, p < 0.001) the image on Facebook, and the
likelihood of wanting to own it (b = 1.14, SE = 0.18, p < 0.001).
Intellect, in contrast, did not significantly predict wanting to learn
more (b = −0.49, SE = 0.30, p = 0.101), liking (b = −0.08,
SE = 0.16, p = 0.619) or sharing (b = 0.14, SE = 0.18, p = 0.402)
the image on Facebook, or wanting to own it (b= 0.02, SE= 0.22,
p = 0.942).
For view times—averaged across all stimuli—a regression
model found that Openness significantly predicted greater
viewing times (b = 206.29, SE = 62.85, p = 0.001). Intellect did
not predict variance in view times (b = −0.39.06, SE = 63.89,
p = 0.542).
In short, Openness and Intellect diverged in their relationships
with aesthetic experience, preference ratings, and viewing times.
Openness significantly predicted all of them, but Intellect
predicted only feeling less confused.
Overall Within-person Effects of Appraisals on
Emotions
The results for all multilevel models are presented in Table 3.
These models evaluated the within-person main effects
of appraisals on emotions. As in past work, interest was
significantly predicted by appraisals of high novelty and high
comprehensibility, and confusion was predicted by high novelty
and low comprehensibility. Pleasure, in contrast, was more
weakly predicted by novelty but predicted by comprehensibility,
consistent with models that emphasize ease of understanding
(Reber, 2012) and achieving insight and knowledge (Leder et al.,
2012) as a source of liking.
Personality as Predictors of Emotion Intercepts and
Moderators of Appraisal-emotion Relationships
Openness and Intellect had different main effects on aesthetic
experience, but do they moderate how appraisals influence
aesthetic experience? These models included Openness and
Intellect as between-person predictors of emotions and appraisal-
emotion slopes. If a between-person trait significantly predicts a
slope, then the relationship between an appraisal and an emotion
shifts across levels of the trait. Prediction of intercepts implies
that the overall mean of the emotion shifts according to trait
regardless of appraisals. Both intercepts and slopes were modeled
as random in these models.
Openness predicted larger intercepts for interest, pleasure,
and smaller intercepts for confusion. Intellect predicted lower
intercepts for confusion, but was not significantly related to
interest and pleasure intercepts.
For interest (Model 1), the effect of novelty was moderated
by both Openness and Intellect. For people high in Openness
and Intellect, novelty was more strongly coupled to interest.
No significant moderation effects appeared for understanding.
For pleasure (Model 2), the effect of novelty was moderated by
Openness but not Intellect. For people high in Openness, novelty
was more strongly linked to pleasure. Follow up analysis on
the difference between the novelty-pleasure slopes for Openness
and Intellect indicated that they were not significantly different
from each other (Wald test = 1.00, df = 1, p = 0.32). No
significant moderation effects appeared for understanding. And
for confusion (Model 3), in contrast, neither Openness nor
Intellect moderated either appraisal. Neither the effect of novelty
nor the effect of understanding on confusion varied across levels
of Openness and Intellect.
Considered together, these results suggest that both Openness
and Intellect are associated with greater sensitivity to novelty
in the experience of interest, but only the Openness aspect is
associated with greater sensitivity to novelty in the experience
of pleasure. While the slope moderations by Openness and
Intellect were not found to differ from each other, the moderating
influence of Openness was significant, while the influence of
Intellect was not. Finally, Openness, but not Intellect, was
associated with greater pleasure and interest overall.
Exploring Art Expertise
Our final models explored the roles of art expertise (measured
with the aesthetic fluency scale). To examine art expertise, we
included it alongside Openness and Intellect to see if it reduced
their effects. As we discussed earlier, such a result would suggest
that the effects of personality are largely carried by acquired
expertise about the arts.
The inclusion of art expertise didn’t change any of the
Openness and Intellect findings with respect to interest,
confusion and pleasure. This suggests that the effects of Openness
and Intellect are not driven by greater expertise in the arts. For
interest (Model 4), neither the effect of novelty nor the effect of
understanding was moderated by art expertise, but expertise was
related to greater intercepts in the model. For pleasure (Model
5), neither the effect of novelty nor the effect of understanding
was moderated by art expertise, but expertise was related to
greater intercepts in the model. And for confusion (Model 6), art
expertise moderated the effect of novelty, but not understanding;
in contrast, neither Openness nor Intellect moderated either
appraisal. This suggests that novelty is less related to confusion
for those with greater art expertise. These results suggest that
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TABLE 3 | Multilevel models of within and between person predictors of aesthetic experiences.
Within-person predictors
Interest (DV) Pleasure (DV) Confusion (DV)
Novelty 0.39∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.08∗∗ (0.03) 0.20∗∗∗ (0.02)
Understanding 0.28∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.28∗∗∗ (0.03) −0.56∗∗∗ (0.03)
Between-person predictors
Slopes Slopes Slopes
Intercept N U Intercept N U Intercept N U
Models 1–3
Openness 0.61∗∗∗ (0.11) 0.12∗∗ (0.04) −0.06 (0.05) 0.77∗∗∗ (0.10) 0.16∗∗ (0.05) 0.02 (0.05) −0.31∗∗ (0.10) −0.01 (0.04) −0.03 (0.04)
Intellect −0.06 (0.10) 0.12∗ (0.05) 0.05 (0.04) 0.09 (0.09) 0.07 (0.06) −0.04 (0.05) −0.29∗∗ (0.11) −0.06 (0.04) 0.01 (0.05)
Models 4–6
Openness 0.45∗∗∗ (0.12) 0.11∗ (0.05) −0.04 (0.05) 0.57∗∗∗ (0.09) 0.13∗ (0.06) 0.03 (0.05) −0.23∗ (0.15) 0.03 (0.04) <0.01 (0.05)
Intellect −0.09 (0.10) 0.11∗ (0.05) 0.07 (0.04) −0.01 (0.09) 0.05 (0.06) −0.03 (0.04) −0.27∗ (0.11) −0.04 (0.04) 0.03 (0.05)
Aesthetic
fluency
0.28∗∗ (0.08) 0.02 (0.04) −0.05 (0.03) 0.34∗∗∗ (0.07) 0.04 (0.04) −0.03 (0.04) −0.13 (0.09) −0.06∗ (0.03) −0.06 (0.04)
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001; N = Novelty-Interest slope; U = Understanding-Interest slope; Standard errors are reported in brackets.
the novelty-interest and novelty-pleasure moderation are not
influenced by art expertise but are rather driven by Openness.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Openness/Intellect is the personality domain that best explains
individual differences in aesthetic appreciation. However, the
research linking actual art appreciation to the domain has
several issues. First, as discussed in the introduction the focus
on liking artworks is limited, as aesthetic experience is much
broader and richer than mild feelings of pleasure (Silvia, 2009).
Second, there’s a risk of circularity in the relationship, given
that items about aesthetic engagement appear on all major
Openness to Experience scales. Without examining why this
relationship exists, not much is added to our understanding
of Openness/Intellect and aesthetics. In this research, we
broadened the range of aesthetic emotions and examined
appraisal mechanisms that could explain differences in aesthetic
experience as a function of Openness/Intellect. Art expertise was
evaluated alongside personality to test whether the influence of
Openness and Intellect on aesthetic appreciation can be explained
by greater art knowledge.
As predicted, Openness/Intellect reflected individual
differences in aesthetic experiences—both pleasure and the
knowledge emotions. The strength of the relationship was
particularly driven by Openness as opposed to Intellect,
supporting the distinction in the aspects based on perceptual
versus abstract engagement (DeYoung, 2014). Mechanisms for
these relationships were also discovered through differences
in appraisal-emotion relationships. The Openness/Intellect
aspects predicted reactivity to novelty appraisals in experiences
of interest. While the novelty seeking core of Openness/Intellect
has previously been suggested (Woo et al., 2014), our study
provides within-person process evidence for this special
relationship with novelty and demonstrates that those
higher in Openness/Intellect are reactive to novelty in their
experiences with interest. Openness diverged from Intellect in
the experience of pleasure. Intellect did not predict individual
differences in the processes associated with pleasure, but
novelty was a stronger predictor of pleasure for people high
in Openness. Further, Openness predicted greater interest
and pleasure regardless of how artworks were appraised,
further distinguishing it from Intellect. Openness and Intellect
were related to lower levels of confusion, but variance in
appraisal-emotion relationships was not associated with either
aspect.
Finally, the possible confound of art expertise was evaluated as
an explanation for the Openness-aesthetic emotions relationship.
The inclusion of art expertise did not influence any of the
Openness-aesthetic emotion relationships, suggesting that the
effects were particular to the personality variables rather than
greater expertise. Expertise did predict greater interest and less
confusion overall, and it was related to a smaller relationship
between novelty and confusion.
Together these findings provide an important update for our
understanding of the relationship between the Openness/Intellect
and aesthetic emotions. Particularly, our findings show that
Openness, as opposed to Intellect, is the aspect of the aesthetically
engaged, and provide a process based understanding for why
those higher in Openness are more aesthetically engaged. Finally,
methodological differences between this and previous research
on personality and aesthetics highlight the advantages of the
current approach.
Within this paper we assume rather that test a causal flow from
personality to emotion states. That is, we assume that personality
reflects biologically driven consistencies in emotions, cognitions,
and behavior. Therefore, personality is treated as an antecedent
of states. Similarly, appraisals are considered to be antecedents
of emotions. For interest, both appraisals, when experimentally
manipulated, have been shown to influence interest (Silvia, 2005).
Thus, within this paper, we treat appraisals as causing emotions.
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Advantages of the Current Method
There are two methodological differences between the current
method and most of the research on personality and aesthetics.
First, we moved away from the predominant practice of
evaluating liking artworks and shifted toward measuring distinct
emotional states that have previously been implicated in the
aesthetic experience. Liking is a common and important
aesthetic response—mild feelings of pleasure might be the
most common everyday aesthetic experience—but it is only
one of many important experiences people have in response
to the arts (Silvia, 2009). Second, we explored both within-
and between-person effects. The integration of dispositional
and situational variables has long been advocated (Cronbach,
1957; Underwood, 1975), but it is uncommon for aesthetics
research to examine effects at the within-person level of
analysis, which is the natural level for examining how appraisals
influence emotional responses (see Silvia, 2007b; Nezlek,
2011).
The How and Why of Openness/Intellect
and Esthetics
Previous research has demonstrated that Openness/Intellect is
related to differences in appraisal processes for the emotion of
interest (Silvia, 2008; Silvia et al., 2009a). The current research
builds on these findings in two important ways by: (a) evaluating
the independent roles of Openness and Intellect in interest-
appraisal processes; and (b) evaluating differences in pleasure-
appraisal and confusion-appraisal processes.
Openness and Intellect were both associated with reactivity
to novelty in the experience of interest suggesting that
novelty sensitivity is at the core of the domain. However,
Intellect, as opposed to Openness, did not reflect greater
interest overall. This suggests that being higher on Intellect
is reflective of lower than average levels of interest when
novelty is not found in an artwork, yet higher than average
interest for novel artworks. Conversely, Openness was
related to greater interest regardless of appraised novelty
suggesting that while novelty is preferred, greater interest
is experienced even in the absence of it. The sensitivity to
novelty in the experience of interest for both Openness and
Intellect provides a possible process explanation for part
of the Openness-Fluid-Crystallized-Intelligence (OFCI)
model which proposes a developmental link between
Openness/Intellect and fluid intelligence (Ziegler et al., 2012).
Ziegler et al. (2012) propose that being open increases learning
opportunities, thereby increasing fluid intelligence. Our
findings suggest that Openness/Intellect is associated with a
sensitivity, through interest, to stimuli and situations that are
appraised as novel and complex. This preferential engagement
with challenging information could support the pathway
from Openness/Intellect to gains in fluid and crystallized
intelligence.
While the Openness and Intellect aspects reflect quantitative
differences in the appraisal structure of interest, qualitative
differences are present in the experience of pleasure. Openness,
but not Intellect, was associated with the presence or absence of
a pleasure-novelty relationship. Studies have shown quantitative
differences in appraisal structures—the appraisal structure
remains constant yet the predictive strength of an appraisal
varies as a function of a trait (Kuppens and Tong, 2010).
However, few studies have found qualitative differences in
appraisal structures. Our findings indicate that those higher
in Openness experience pleasure as a function of novelty
and understanding, while those lower on the aspect are only
influenced by understanding. The idea that understandable
things are pleasant is congruent with fluency based aesthetic
theories where things that are easily understood are pleasant to
the beholder (Reber, 2012). Our findings suggest that this may
primarily be the case for people lower on Openness. For those
higher on Openness, pleasure is also influenced by the novelty of
an artwork.
This finding has important implications for aesthetic theories.
Fluency based accounts are at odds with interest based
accounts. Interest requires novelty, whereas fluency-based
aesthetic experiences are a function of easy processing. This
distinction maps nicely onto interest and pleasure. Interest is
experienced in the face of novelty and pleasure is experienced
when processing requires little effort. Our research suggests that
individual differences both complicate and clarify this distinction.
It seems that the influence of fluent processing in the experience
of aesthetic pleasure is dependent on trait standing. Those
higher in Openness are sensitive to novelty and complexity in
their experience of pleasure. Conversely, pleasurable experiences
for those lower on Openness are not predicted by stimulus
novelty.
Openness/Intellect Model
These findings add to the growing empirical consensus for the
utility of studying Openness and Intellect as separate aspects
of the broader domain. The distinction previously proposed—
Openness as exploration through perception, and Intellect
through learning and abstract information (DeYoung, 2014)—
is supported with Openness reflecting greater pleasure and
interest and less confusion in response to visual art. While
Intellect was also found to play a role in the processes that
facilitate interest, this role does not predict greater aesthetic
reactions but rather reflects a preference for the novel, and
a lesser tendency to feel confusion in response to visual art.
The relationship between Intellect and interest in art, when
controlling for Openness, is not evident at the between-
person level, but is apparent when within-person processes
are considered. Future studies are encouraged to explore the
differential influence of Openness and Intellect on interest
in non-perceptual stimuli such as science and philosophy
to gain further insights into this useful separation of the
Openness/Intellect domain.
CONCLUSION
Henry James saw art as central to life and beauty, and this attitude,
like that of many other creative people, was likely a function
of his Openness. We aimed to extend our understanding of the
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role personality plays in common aesthetic experiences: pleasure,
interest, and confusion. Our findings suggest that Openness,
as opposed to Intellect, is the personality core of aesthetic
experiences, and that the relationship persists because those
higher in Openness are more sensitive to novelty in artworks
and experience greater engagement overall, predisposing them
to feel more interest and pleasure in response to the
arts.
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Personality traits can predict how well-sojourners and expatriates adjust to new cultures,
but the adjustment process remains largely unexamined. Based on recent findings
that reveal personality traits predict as well as respond to life events and experiences,
this research focuses on within-person change in contextualized extraversion and its
predictive validity for cross-cultural adjustment in international students who newly
arrived in US colleges. We proposed that the initial level as well as the rate of change in
school extraversion (i.e., contextualized extraversion that reflects behavioral tendency
in school settings) will predict cross-cultural adjustment, withdrawal cognitions, and
school satisfaction. Latent growth modeling of three-wave longitudinal surveys of 215
new international students (54% female, Mage = 24 years) revealed that the initial level of
school extraversion significantly predicted cross-cultural adjustment, (lower) withdrawal
cognitions, and satisfaction, while the rate of change (increase) in school extraversion
predicted cross-cultural adjustment and (lower) withdrawal cognitions. We further
modeled global extraversion and cross-cultural motivation as antecedents and explored
within-person change in school extraversion as a proximal factor that affects adjustment
outcomes. The findings highlight the malleability of contextualized personality, and more
importantly, the importance of understanding within-person change in contextualized
personality in a cross-cultural adjustment context. The study points to more research
that explicate the process of personality change in other contexts.
Keywords: extraversion, personality change, contextualized personality, cross-cultural adjustment, international
students, United States, cross-cultural motivation, latent growth model
INTRODUCTION
In today’s global economy, adapting and adjusting to new cultures as sojourners and expatriates
have become increasingly important. International corporations frequently send individuals to
work in foreign countries for an extended period of time, and the success of such foreign
assignment is anything but guaranteed (Brookfield Global Relocation Services, 2012). Among
the factors that lead to expatriate outcomes, cross-cultural adjustment is a crucial contributor to
expatriate success, while inability to adjust is linked to expatriate’s early return and inadequate
performance (Naumann, 1992; Shaffer et al., 1999; Anderson, 2005).
Given the importance of understanding the antecedents of cross-cultural adjustment, there
has been a growing interest in identifying individual characteristics to predict cross-cultural
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adjustment (Arthur and Bennett, 1995; Ones and Viswesvaran,
1999). In particular, personality (e.g., Swagler and Jome, 2005; Sri
Ramalu et al., 2010) and cross-cultural motivation (e.g., Templer
et al., 2006) have been shown as antecedents of successful
adjustment. However, following research on personality change
(e.g., Vaidya et al., 2002; Lüdtke et al., 2011), it is likely that
sojourners experience personality change in response to the
changes they encounter in a new cultural environment. More
importantly, it remains to be seen whether such change can
predict cross-cultural adjustment.
The goal of the current research is to study contextualized
extraversion change in the cross-cultural adjustment process.
We situate our investigation in a particular population: newly
arrived international students in US colleges and universities,
given the unique dual challenge faced by this population. On
the one hand, international students, like all sojourners, undergo
the process of adjusting to a foreign culture. On the other hand,
international students need to manage the academic (e.g., Credé
and Niehorster, 2012) and social demands (Ross et al., 1999) that
can have a substantial impact on their long-term career outcomes.
This study makes several theoretical contributions to the
personality and work adjustment literature, accompanied by
practical implications for organizations. First, by recognizing
the malleable aspect of personality, organizational researchers
can better understand how personality changes and the impact
of these changes on vocational and career adjustment. Second,
examining personality changes in the cross-cultural context will
lay the ground work for illuminating personality changes in
other important, specific contexts pertaining to work-related
transitions and adaptation.
Cross-cultural Adjustment
In the past few decades, there has been a growing interest
in studying personality to predict cross-cultural adjustment.
For instance, Swagler and Jome (2005) showed that high
levels of agreeableness and conscientiousness, as well as low
levels of neuroticism, were linked to better psychological
adjustment among American Sojourners in Taiwan. In addition,
sociocultural adjustment was predicted by high levels of
extraversion. Similar results were found by Sri Ramalu et al.
(2010), where high levels of agreeableness and extraversion
were associated with better general cross-cultural adjustment
among a diverse sample of expatriates in Malaysia, while greater
conscientiousness and openness to experience were linked to
better work adjustment. In addition, Peltokorpi (2008) revealed
that emotional stability was related to better adjustment in both
non-work related (interaction and general living) and work
related adjustment among expatriates from 21 countries in Japan.
Although researchers have examined various personality traits
that predict cross-cultural adjustment, we focus on extraversion
and cross-cultural motivation in our current research model (see
Figure 1) as distal antecedents. We briefly review the influence
of extraversion and cross-cultural motivation on adjustment
outcomes below.
In the current study, we focus on the personality domain of
extraversion as a lens to understanding the process of cross-
cultural adjustment. Extraversion describes the extent to which
a person is assertive, warm, excitement-seeking, and people-
oriented (Costa and McCrae, 1992). Research has shown that
extraverts tend to seek out more social activities (e.g., Argyle
and Lu, 1990; Asendorpf and Wilpers, 1998), grow a bigger
social network (e.g., Asendorpf and Wilpers, 1998), and create
a more positive social environment (e.g., Eaton and Funder,
2003). Not only are extraverts more sociable, they also enjoy
social activities to a greater extent. Studies have shown that
extraverted individuals tend to report higher intimacy, higher
satisfaction, and less conflict in social interactions (e.g., Barrett
and Pietromonaco, 1997; White et al., 2004). Given its relevance
in social interactions, extraversion in a cross-cultural setting may
drive sojourners to seek out more interpersonal relationships,
receive more social support, and gain satisfaction via interacting
with others. In addition, extraverts also tend to be happier
than introverts, owing to the positive relationship between
extraversion and positive affect (Costa and McCrae, 1992; Lucas
and Baird, 2004). In line with this reasoning, extraversion has
been shown to significantly predict sojourner (Swagler and Jome,
2005) and expatriate (Sri Ramalu et al., 2010) adjustment and
satisfaction.
Yet another reason to highlight the role of extraversion in
cross-cultural adjustment lies in America’s overall “extraverted
culture.” Data has suggested that America has one of the
highest average scores on extraversion in the world (McCrae
and Terracciano, 2005). According to the person-environment
fit literature that emphasizes the congruence between individual
characteristics and the environment (Kristof-Brown and Guay,
2011), extraversion should be especially relevant and predictive
of adjustment in the US.
Cross-cultural adjustment can be challenging. Thus, successful
cross-cultural adjustment requires motivation that drives one’s
continuous effort in learning and engaging in the new
environment. Cross-cultural motivation is defined as “the
capability to direct attention and energy toward learning
about and functioning in situations characterized by cultural
differences” (Ang et al., 2007). It is one of the three dimensions
in the Cultural Intelligence framework that captures two related
aspects, namely cross-cultural self-efficacy and cross-cultural
intrinsic motivation (Ang et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010). First,
individuals with high cross-cultural motivation tend to be more
self-efficacious in their adaptive capability. According to the
theory of self-efficacy, individuals who believe in their capability
tend direct more attention and effort in gathering information
and developing strategies to meet the challenges (Bandura, 2002).
Thus, in a cross-cultural setting, high motivation can enable
sojourners to better channel their effort and knowledge into
understanding the local culture and behave accordingly. Second,
cross-cultural motivation reflects higher intrinsic interests in
being part of the cross-cultural experiences. Compared to those
with little or no motivation, highly motivated individuals enjoy
social interactions with people from other cultures, and are
more likely to adjust behaviors to achieve smooth and successful
encounters (Chen et al., 2010). Research evidence suggests
that cross-cultural motivation can enable better adjustment and
adaptation in a foreign culture (Templer et al., 2006; Ang et al.,
2007; Chen et al., 2010). Therefore, we posit that individuals with
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FIGURE 1 | Model 1 with hypotheses.
higher levels of cross-cultural motivation will also have better
cross-cultural adjustment outcomes.
Personality Change
Cross-cultural adjustment is a process where a person interacts
with and adapts to a foreign environment. Although the existing
literature has shed light on the impact of personality on cross-
cultural adjustment, the focus on traits as static dispositions
ignores the potential process by which one experiences changes in
personality during cross-cultural adaptation. Given the malleable
aspect of personality that has been demonstrated in recent
research (Caspi and Roberts, 2001), we argue that change in
personality can be used as an appropriate lens to investigate the
process of cross-cultural adjustment.
The person-environment interactional approach of
personality development recognizes the active role people
take in their environment, and emphasizes the interactive
dynamics between the traits and environmental contexts in
shaping personality changes (Fraley and Roberts, 2005). On the
one hand, selection effects posit that personality traits predict life
events, such that people with different personality traits would
select themselves into different events or be selected by others
into different situations (Headey andWearing, 1989; Roberts and
Wood, 2006). On the other hand, socialization effects refer to the
influence of life events on personality traits, such that personality
changes are reactions to these events (Roberts and Mroczek,
2008; Roberts et al., 2008). Longitudinal studies have supported
both effects (e.g., Vaidya et al., 2002; Specht et al., 2011; Boyce
et al., 2015). For instance, in a two-wave longitudinal study,
Vaidya et al. (2002) demonstrated support for selection effects,
such that college students who scored higher on initial levels of
extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness were more
likely to experience positive events later on, whereas negative
events were predicted by lower initial levels of agreeableness and
conscientiousness, as well as higher initial levels of neuroticism.
Socialization effects were also supported, linking positive events
(Time 1) with increases in extraversion and negative events
(Time 1) with increases in neuroticism over time. Similar
patterns of results were shown in a 4-year longitudinal study
(Lüdtke et al., 2011). Comparing samples of young adults who
followed different career paths, initial levels of personality
traits had a significant impact on career choices (i.e., attending
college or vocational training), while experiences and events
in different careers also predicted changes in personality
traits among these individuals. Socialization effects were also
evident when linking work and social experiences to personality
changes. For instance, individuals with higher work participation
or advances in status also reported increases in domains of
conscientiousness (agency and norm adherence; Roberts, 1997;
Roberts et al., 2001) and in the social dominance facet of
extraversion (self-confidence and assertiveness; Clausen and
Gilens, 1990). In a sample of German adults, Boyce et al. (2015)
also showed support for the socialization effects in the context
of unemployment, such that individuals who had undergone
unemployment experienced significant patterns of change in
agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience.
Experiences from social relationships can also contribute to
change in personality traits, such that first time in a romantic
relationship was associated with increases in extraversion and
conscientiousness, as well as decreases in neuroticism (e.g.,
Neyer and Lehnart, 2007; Lehnart et al., 2010; however, see
Asendorpf and Wilpers, 1998). Therefore, it can be concluded
that personality traits predict as well as respond to life events and
experiences.
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Building upon the empirical findings on personality and
its predictive value, researchers have started to use personality
change to aid the prediction of various outcomes. For instance,
Mroczek and Spiro (2007) found that mortality among aging
men was predicted by both high initial levels and increases in
neuroticism (N = 1,663). In addition, Siegler et al. (2003) showed
that gains in hostility from college tomidlife were linked to a wide
range of negative outcomes, such as social isolation, obesity, as
well as negative changes in economic and work life.
In sum, the literature suggests that personality can change
throughout the life course, and such changes can provide
valuable information in understanding and predicting important
life outcomes. In the current study, we focus on change in
contextualized personality, namely school extraversion, and
its impact on cross-cultural adjustment. Compared to global
traits, which cannot fully account for situational variations
(Mischel, 1968, 1973; Wright and Mischel, 1987), contextualized
personality captures one’s behavioral expressions of trait
personality within a particular context (e.g., at work; Heller
et al., 2009). For example, work contextualized personality
captures one’s behavioral expressions of trait personality at work
(Heller et al., 2009). In a similar vein, school extraversion
represents the summary of a student’s extraverted behavior in
the school context. Contextualized personality has been shown to
outperform global traits in predicting context-specific outcomes
(Schmit et al., 1995; Hunthausen et al., 2003; Bing et al., 2004).
For instance, in a sample of 89 middle-aged women, Roberts
and Donahue (1994) showed that contextualized personality
varied across different roles (e.g., as a mother or as a worker)
and role-specific personality had a significant advantage in
predicting role-specific criteria in the corresponding context,
whereas general personality yielded better prediction on general
life outcomes. In a meta-analysis, Shaffer and Postlethwaite
(2012) concluded that contextualized personality measures had
higher validity in predicting job performance than global (i.e.,
non-contextualized) personality measures, such that the increases
in validity exceeded at least 100% for four of the Big Five
dimensions (openness to experience, extraversion, agreeableness,
and emotional stability).
Given the proximity of contextualized personality, we intend
to bridge the two areas of research (i.e., personality change
and contextualized personality) and examine contextualized
extraversion change and its relationship to cross-cultural
adjustment outcomes. There are two major reasons for the
use of this particular approach. First, personality change
may be better captured in particular contexts, such that
contextualized extraversion would experience more change
than global extraversion. From a personality development
perspective, evidence has supported the interaction between
traits and contexts in shaping personality changes (Fraley and
Roberts, 2005). Given the dynamics between the person and
the environment, it is important to consider the corresponding
context in which personality change may take place. From
another point of view, life experiences and events can also lead
to subsequent personality changes. For instance, Lüdtke et al.
(2011) found that different life paths predicted different changes
in personality, such that individuals on a vocational career path
had higher increases in conscientiousness and lower increases
in agreeableness than their counterparts who chose to pursue
college degrees. In such cases, differences in contexts (vocation
vs. school) may provide different cues that facilitate changes in
personality. Therefore, as Lewis (1999) argued, the best way to
study personality change is to examine behavior in context.
Second, contextualized personality change may provide better
prediction than global personality change in the corresponding
context. Bing et al. (2004) argued that the specificity of the
reference point may account for the incremental validities
of contextualized personality over global traits. Similarly, the
validity of personality changes in predicting outcomes (in a
particular context) may be improved by applying a specific
context that responds with the criteria. Namely, specification
of the context (e.g., school) may yield better and more
accurate predictions in context-related outcomes (e.g., school
satisfaction) due to the proximity of the predictors (e.g., school
extraversion). Therefore, we focused on school extraversion and
linked its initial level and change to cross-cultural adjustment
outcomes.
Hypothesis 1: The initial levels of school extraversion will
positively predict cross-cultural adjustment,
such that students with higher initial school
extraversion will have (a) better cross-cultural
adjustment; (b) greater school satisfaction; and
(c) lower withdrawal cognitions.
Hypotheses 2: Change in school extraversion will positively
predict cross-cultural adjustment outcomes, such
that increases in school extraversion will predict
(a) better cross-cultural adjustment; (b) greater
school satisfaction; and (c) lower withdrawal
cognitions.
In an attempt to identify antecedents for personality change,
we discuss the potential influence of global extraversion and
cross-cultural motivation on the initial level and change in
school extraversion. As the initial status of school extraversion
represents how extraverted an individual is upon first assessment,
we expect that global extraversion will likely be positively related
to the initial level in school extraversion (see Bing et al., 2004;
Heller et al., 2009). The impact of global extraversion on the
change in school extraversion, however, is less clear. On the one
hand, individuals who are already extraverted in general may
be more prone to engage in and enjoy social interactions at
school, and the positive feedback and experience in the overall
“extraverted” environment may in turn prompt them to further
elevate their extraversion in a school setting. On the other
hand, introverts may have a greater potential than extraverts to
increase their school extraversion in the process of cross-cultural
adjustment because they have more room to grow.
Hypothesis 3: Global extraversion (Time 1) will
positively predict the initial levels of
school extraversion.
Research Question 1: How will global extraversion influence the
slope of change in school extraversion?
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Individuals with high cross-cultural motivation will have
higher capacity and motives in learning and monitoring
behaviors in a foreign context, which may result in them
acting more extraverted in the US society. As described earlier,
the US is among the most extraverted societies in the world,
and sojourners coming from other cultures may encounter
individuals who are more extraverted than those they are
accustomed to interacting with. When these differences emerge,
high cross-cultural motivation can trigger self-efficacy and help
channel attention and effort in learning and adapting to the
differences. As a result, when interacting with a group of
extraverts, sojourners with high cross-cultural motivation may
be more likely to develop strategies, such as acting more
extraverted, in order to ensure smooth interactions and effective
communication. In addition to being more self-efficacious,
sojourners with high cross-cultural motivation also tend to show
more intrinsic interests in learning and engaging in the cross-
cultural experiences. Compared to people with low cross-cultural
motivation, highly motivated individuals may be more likely
to initiate interactions with the local people, learning more
about the American culture, and be more motivated in adjusting
behaviors (e.g., act more extraverted) in order to tackle the
barriers in social interactions.
Hypothesis 4: Cross-cultural motivation (Time 1) will positively
predict the initial levels of school extraversion.
Hypothesis 5: Cross-cultural motivation (Time 1) will positively
predict the slope of change in school extraversion.
Thus far, our hypotheses are focused on extraversion as
a higher-order factor of personality. According to DeYoung
et al. (2007), extraversion encompasses two aspects, namely
enthusiasm (positive emotion and sociability) and assertiveness
(social dominance and the enjoyment of exhibitionism and
leadership roles). In an exploratory fashion, we examined
whether the pattern of results differ across these two aspects of
extraversion.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
This research was approved by the Institutional Review Board at
Wayne State University. Online informed consent was obtained
from all participants in this research.
Participants
The current sample consisted of first-year undergraduate and
graduate international students from sixteen universities who
had recently arrived at the United States at the time of the
first survey. To maximize the representativeness of the current
sample, two methods were utilized for recruitment: (1) An
e-mail advertisement about the study was sent to the Office of
International Students and Scholars of 157 universities across
the United States to solicit eligible international students. In
order to reach out to universities across the United States
with relatively large international student bodies, the names
of the universities were obtained from (1) the list of National
Universities with Most International Students on USNews
(USNews, 2012), and (2) the list of Accredited Programs
in Clinical Psychology on the official website of American
Psychological Association (American Psychological Association
[APA], 2012). Thirteen universities (response rate = 8.28%)
agreed to advertise the current survey via Listserv or Newsletter;
and (3) a Facebook message was sent to 27 universities who
had a Facebook page and did not respond to the e-mail
inquiry. Two universities (response rate = 7.40%) agreed to
post a study advertisement on their official Facebook page. To
ensure that the current sample consists of only newly arrived
international students, we screened out students who were not
from a foreign country or had been in the US for 3 months or
longer.
Two hundred and eighty-nine individuals provided sufficient
data (i.e., no missing values on global extraversion or cross-
cultural motivation) to be included in the analysis (57% males;
average age = 23, SD = 5). Participants were asked to complete
three questionnaires over 4 months after arriving in the United
States. Participants in the current study reported coming from a
diverse range of countries, with the top five countries being China
(22%), Canada (13%), Australia (8%), Japan (7%), and India (6%).
Procedure
Acknowledging the limitation of cross-sectional designs in
making predictive inferences, the present study adopted a
longitudinal design to better capture the changes in personality
and to make a stronger test for predictive values of such changes
(Funder, 2008). Pinpointing the timeframe for longitudinal
changes to occur can be challenging, as the patterns of
change can depend on a multitude of environmental and
personal factors in the transition process. However, it has been
shown that most issues related to adaptation occur in the
early stage of a cross-cultural experience (Ward et al., 1998;
Ying, 2005). Therefore, in the current study, cross-cultural
adjustment was captured in the first 4 months (approximately
one academic semester) after international students’ arrival in
the states. Specifically, participants were asked to complete
measures of school extraversion, global extraversion, and cross-
cultural motivation within the first month after arriving in the
US (Time 1), followed by the second assessment of school
extraversion 2 months after the first wave (Time 2) and the
third assessment of school extraversion together with cross-
cultural adjustment outcomes (i.e., cross-cultural adjustment,
withdrawal cognitions, and school satisfaction) 4 months after
the first wave (Time 3). Participants who completed the study
were compensated a $10 gift card and a chance to win a $50 gift
card based on random drawing.
Screening for Insufficient Effort
Responding
To ensure data quality, we utilized two measures of insufficient
effort responding (IER; Huang et al., 2012) to screen participants
who did not fully attend to the survey instructions and items
(see DeSimone et al., 2015). Removing IER prior to data analysis
is important because IER can have potential deleterious impact
on survey results (Huang et al., 2014b). First, we used three
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items from a validated infrequency scale (Huang et al., 2014a)
designed to detect IER in a low-stakes survey context. The three
items presented counterfactual statements (i.e., “I have never
used a computer”; “Eat cement occasionally”; and “Can teleport
across time and space.”) where deviation from choosing the
“correct” answers would indicate possible IER behavior. The
three items were scattered in the first survey. Any response option
indicating disagreement to the counterfactual statements was
coded as attentive responding (0), whereas the other response
options were coded as IER (1). The IER scale score was
computed as the average of the three dichotomized item scores
(α = 0.75).
The second operationalization of IER used the response time
approach, where an unrealistically short survey completion time
was used to indicate IER.We adopted Huang et al.’s (2012) 2 s per
item criterion and flagged individuals who responded faster than
this on each survey. Participants were coded as IER (1) based on
survey completion time if they sped through at least one of the
three surveys and attentive responding (0) if otherwise.
To maximally retain the sample and avoid misclassifying
attentive respondents, we followed Huang et al.’s (2012)
recommendation to remove respondents who clearly engaged
in IER behavior. Specifically, we excluded responses that (a)
scored 1 on the IER scale (i.e., failing all three IER items);
and (b) sped through at least one of the surveys. This post
hoc decision rule was made after the data collection but before
testing the current researchmodel. Out of the 289 participants, 74
(25.61%) individuals were flagged and removed from subsequent
analyses, leaving the final sample of 215 participants (54% male;
Mage = 24 years, SD = 4).
Measures
Global Extraversion
Global extraversion (α = 0.77) was measured with the 20-item
extraversion scale from DeYoung et al. (2007), which measures
two aspects of extraversion, namely enthusiasm (α = 0.73) and
assertiveness (α = 0.65). Participants were asked to rate how
well each item accurately described themselves. Sample items
include: “Make friends easily” (enthusiasm) and “Take charge”
(assertiveness). All items were administered on a seven-point
Likert scale, ranging from 1 (very inaccurate) to 7 (very accurate).
School Extraversion
To assess School extraversion, we adapted the global extraversion
measure by asking participants to reflect only on their behavior
at school settings (see Schmit et al., 1995; Bing et al., 2004). All
items were administered on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging
from 1 (very inaccurate) to 7 (very accurate). Cronbach’s alphas
were 0.84, 0.77, and 0.72 across the three waves, respectively. For
the two aspects of school extraversion, the Cronbach’s alphas were
0.79, 0.76, and 0.71 for school enthusiasm and 0.71, 0.68, and 0.63
for school assertiveness, respectively.
Cross-cultural Motivation
Ang et al.’s (2007) five-item motivational cultural intelligence
(CQ) scale was used to assess cross-cultural motivation (see
Chen et al., 2010). This measure captures both cross-cultural self-
efficacy (a sample item is: “I am confident that I can socialize with
locals in a culture that is unfamiliar to me.”) and cross-cultural
intrinsic motivation (a sample item is: “I enjoy interacting with
people from different cultures.”). All items were administered on
a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strong disagree) to 7
(strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha of the scale was 0.82.
Cross-cultural Adjustment
We used a 14-item scale from Black (1988) to assess three facets
of cross-cultural adjustment: general (seven items; α = 0.83),
interaction (four items; α = 0.86), and work (three items;
α = 0.80). Items pertaining to work adjustment were adapted to
the school context. Participants were asked the extent to which
they feel adjusted (or unadjusted) to the various aspects of their
life in the US. All items were administered on a seven-point Likert
scale, ranging from 1 (very unadjusted) to 7 (very adjusted).
Withdrawal Cognitions
Withdrawal cognitions were measured based on Shaffer et al.’s
(2006) six-item scale (adapted from Hom and Griffeth, 1991).
A sample item is: “I plan to leave this school.” All items were
administered on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strong
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The measure had a Cronbach’s
alpha of 0.97.
School Satisfaction
Satisfaction was assessed in the school context using a seven-item
scale from Lounsbury et al. (2005). A sample questions is “How
satisfied are you with how much you are leaning in school?” All
items were administered on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging
from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 7 (very satisfied). Cronbach’s alpha
was 0.83 for the scale.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations are presented
in Table 1. Global extraversion positively correlated with school
extraversion assessed at each time point (rs= 0.77, 0.55, and 0.54,
respectively, p < 0.001), and the estimates were in line with the
correlations previous reported between global and contextualized
personality (e.g., Bing et al., 2004; Heller et al., 2009). Global
extraversion (Time 1) and school extraversion at each time
point was positively associated with the three aspects of cross-
cultural adjustment and school satisfaction but was unrelated to
withdrawal cognitions.
Prior to hypothesis testing, we examined whether school
extraversion at the initial time point added incremental validity
above and beyond global extraversion in predicting cross-
cultural adjustment outcomes. Without controlling for school
extraversion, global extraversion predicted the three aspects
of cross-cultural adjustment (general adjustment, β = 0.31,
p < 0.001; interaction adjustment, β = 0.31, p < 0.001; school
adjustment, β = 0.25, p < 0.001) and school satisfaction
(β = 0.39, p < 0.001), but not withdrawal cognitions (β = 0.03,
p = 0.68). To test the incremental validity of school extraversion
above and beyond global extraversion, we used hierarchical
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multiple regression and regressed the cross-cultural adjustment
outcome variables separately onto global extraversion (step 1)
and school extraversion (step 2). Results revealed that school
extraversion significantly predicted school adjustment when
controlling for global extraversion, β = 0.22, p = 0.04, explaining
2% additional variance. However, school extraversion did not
add any significant incremental prediction for any of the other
outcomes.
We employed latent growth modeling (LGM; Chan, 2002)
to test the hypotheses. Based on structural equation modeling,
LGM allows for modeling and estimating different parameters of
change in a longitudinal dataset (Lance et al., 2000; Chan, 2002).
Specifically, we used two latent factors (Kline, 2005; Kaplan, 2009;
e.g., Chan and Schmitt, 2000) to model the change trajectory for
school extraversion: (a) the latent intercept factor that represents
the initial status of school extraversion (i.e., how extraverted an
individual is upon first assessment); and (b) the latent slope factor
that represents the rate of change in school extraversion (i.e., how
an individual’s extraversion has changed across the span of the
study). In light of the present sample size, we used observed scale
scores as indicators in the LGM analysis.
We tested two nested models to assess whether there was non-
linear change in school extraversion. For the intercept term, both
models fixed factor loadings to one for each of the three school
extraversion measures. In contrast, for the slope term, the initial
constrained model (Model 1, see Figure 1) fixed factor loadings
to 0, 1, and 2 for T1–T3 school extraversion, respectively, whereas
the unconstrained model (Model 2, see Figure 2) fixed factor
loadings for T1 and T2 school extraversion but freely estimated
the loading for T3 school extraversion. Thus, the intercept term
indicates the initial level of school extraversion, while the slope
term indicates the rate of change in school extraversion. In
both models, we included global extraversion and cross-cultural
motivation as predictors for the intercept and slope of school
extraversion.
Initial model testing revealed that Models 1 and 2 did
not converge because a correlation estimate went outside
of the reasonable bounds. Specifically, the correlation
between cross-cultural motivation and the slope of school
extraversion change was estimated to be −1.01 for Model
1 and −1.15 for Model 2, respectively. Given this error,
we started diagnosing the cause of this issue by removing
the adjustment outcomes from Models 1 and 2 to focus on
the effects of the predictors (i.e., global extraversion and
cross-cultural motivation) on school extraversion change
(intercept and slope). These simplified models converged
reasonably well: modified Model 1 (see Figure 3): χ2(3) = 12.52,
CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.12, SRMR = 0.16; modified Model
2 (see Figure 4): χ2(2) = 1.44, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.00,
SRMR = 0.01. Importantly, cross-cultural motivation did not
predict either the intercept or the slope of school extraversion
change (Model 1: βs = 0.10 and 0.04, respectively; Model 2:
βs = 0.11 and −0.02, respectively). These non-significant paths
were incongruent with the observed strength of relationships
between cross-cultural motivation and adjustment outcomes
(see Table 1), suggesting that the erroneous estimates were
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FIGURE 2 | Model 2 with hypotheses.
FIGURE 3 | Results from the modified Model 1 with the predictors and school extraversion change. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001; †p ≥ 0.05;
N = 215. Estimates are standardized estimates from the modified Model 1 (i.e., the constrained model). Solid lines represent significant paths, whereas dotted lines
represent insignificant paths.
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FIGURE 4 | Results from the modified Model 2 with the predictors and school extraversion change. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001; †p ≥ 0.05;
N = 215. Estimates are standardized estimates from the modified Model 2 (i.e., the unconstrained model). Solid lines represent significant paths, whereas dotted
lines represent insignificant paths.
on adjustment outcomes could not be accounted for in
Models 1 and 2. In addition, a chi-square difference test
revealed that relaxing the constraint on the slope significantly
improved the model fit, χ2(1) = 11.08, p < 0.001,
suggesting that the change was non-linear (thus retaining
Model 2).
Given past research that suggests a positive influence of cross-
cultural motivation on cross-cultural adjustment and adaptation
(e.g., Templer et al., 2006; Ang et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010),
we reestimated Model 2 with direct paths from cross-cultural
motivation to cross-cultural adjustment outcomes. In other
words, in these reestimated models, cross-cultural motivation
served the role of a covariate such that its influence on adjustment
outcomes could be controlled for. The model had reasonably
good fit to the data (see Figure 5): χ2(13) = 26.32, CFI = 0.99,
RMSEA = 0.07, SRMR = 0.03. The loading for the slope on
T3 school extraversion was 0.98, indicating a nearly flat rate of
change from T2 to T3 on school extraversion.
We proceeded to examine the hypotheses with the estimates
from Model 2 (see Figure 5). The initial status of school
extraversion predicted two aspects of cross-cultural adjustment
(general adjustment, β = 0.23, p = 0.01; school adjustment,
β = 0.20, p = 0.03), school satisfaction (β = 0.20, p = 0.03), and
withdrawal cognitions (β = −0.36, p< 0.001), but not interaction
adjustment (β = 0.09, p = 0.27). Therefore, Hypotheses 1a
was partially supported, while Hypotheses 1b and 1c were fully
supported. Meanwhile, the slope of change in school extraversion
predicted two aspects of cross-cultural adjustment (general
adjustment, β = 0.29, p = 0.002; school adjustment, β = 0.22,
p = 0.02) and withdrawal cognitions (β = −0.20, p = 0.04),
but not interaction adjustment (β = 0.13, p = 0.13) or school
satisfaction (β = 0.12, p= 0.18). Thus,Hypothesis 2awas partially
supported, Hypothesis 2b was not supported, and Hypothesis 2c
was fully supported.
Supporting Hypothesis 3, global extraversion (β = 0.86,
p < 0.001) significantly and positively predicted the intercept of
school extraversion. Interestingly, global extraversion negatively
predicted the slope of change in school extraversion (β = −0.62,
p < 0.001). Furthermore, cross-cultural motivation did not
predict the intercept (β = 0.11, p = 0.06) or the slope of change in
school extraversion (β = −0.03, p = 0.79), thus failing to support
Hypotheses 4 and 5. For a comparison purpose, we tested Model
2 (i.e., the unconstrained model) with the full sample (N = 289)
without excluding any cases marked as IER. The model had good
fit: χ2(13) = 25.46, CFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.06, SRMR = 0.02.
The directions and the significance of the paths were similar
to those in the IER-excluded sample (N = 215), except that
the intercept of school extraversion no longer predicted school
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FIGURE 5 | Results from Model 2 with direct paths from cross-cultural motivation to cross-cultural adjustment outcomes. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01;
∗∗∗p < 0.001; †p ≥ 0.05; N = 215. Estimates are standardized estimates from Model 2 (i.e., the unconstrained model). Observed measures of school extraversion
were included in the model but not presented here. Solid lines represent significant paths, whereas dotted lines represent insignificant paths.
FIGURE 6 | Results from the final Model 2 omitting the paths from cross-cultural motivation to change in school extraversion. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01;
∗∗∗p < 0.001; †p ≥ 0.05. N = 215. Estimates are standardized estimates from Model 2 (i.e., the unconstrained model). Observed measures of school extraversion
were included in the model but not presented here. Solid lines represent significant paths, whereas dotted lines represent insignificant paths.
adjustment, β = 0.14, p= 0.06. Based on these results, we retained
amore simplifiedmodel excluding the non-significant paths from
cross-cultural motivation to change in school extraversion (see
Figure 6). It should be noted that themodel trimming at this stage
did not affect the conclusions regarding the substantive effects
hypothesized above.
Given that our model suggests a potential mediating effect
of school extraversion (both in terms of initial status and rate
of change) on the relationship between global extraversion and
cross-cultural adjustment outcomes, we tested a partial mediation
model by allowing the direct paths from global extraversion to
the cross-cultural adjustment outcomes [model fit:χ2(8)= 18.95,
CFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.08, SRMR = 0.05], and compared it
with Model 2. A chi-square difference test revealed that adding
the direct paths did not significantly improve the model fit,
χ2(5) = 7.37, p = 0.19, indicating that the more parsimonious
Model 2 should be retained. In addition, results from the
partial mediation model showed that none of the paths from
global extraversion to cross-cultural adjustment outcomes was
significant, while the paths from global extraversion to change
in school extraversion and from change in school extraversion to
adjustment outcomes all remained similar to those in Model 2.
This pattern of results indicates that global extraversion does not
directly impact cross-cultural adjustment outcomes, but rather
influences them through the initial level and rate of change in
school extraversion.
In an exploratory fashion, we examined the two aspects of
school extraversion (i.e., enthusiasm and assertiveness) separately
to see if either of them was driving the results. Specifically,
we retested Model 2 using school enthusiasm (Model 3) and
school assertiveness (Model 4) separately. Results from Model
3 showed that there was a significant mean level increase in
school enthusiasm (Ms = 0.17, p = 0.004). The initial status of
school enthusiasm predicted all three aspects of cross-cultural
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adjustment (general adjustment, β = 0.31, p = 0.001; interaction
adjustment, β = 0.17, p = 0.04; school adjustment, β = 0.28,
p = 0.03), school satisfaction (β = 0.26, p = 0.001), and
withdrawal cognitions (β = −0.29, p = 0.002). Meanwhile,
the slope of change in school enthusiasm also predicted the
three aspects of cross-cultural adjustment (general adjustment,
β = 0.38, p < 0.001; interaction adjustment, β = 0.22, p = 0.02;
school adjustment, β = 0.29, p = 0.006) and school satisfaction
(β = 0.21, p = 0.01), but not withdrawal cognitions (β = −0.08,
p = 0.42).
In terms of school assertiveness, results from Model 4 showed
that there was not a significant mean level change in school
assertiveness (Ms = −0.08, p = 0.18). In addition, the initial
status of change in school assertiveness negatively predicted
withdrawal cognitions (β = −0.27, p = 0.002) but did not
predict any of the three aspects of cross-cultural adjustment
(general adjustment, β = 0.07, p = 0.43; interaction adjustment,
β = −0.02, p = 0.79; school adjustment, β = 0.05, p = 0.03) or
school satisfaction (β = 0.06, p = 0.45). Likewise, the slope of
change in school assertiveness did not predict the three aspects of
cross-cultural adjustment (general adjustment, β = 0.11, p= 0.34;
interaction adjustment, β = 0.02, p = 0.89; school adjustment,
β = 0.07, p = 0.59), school satisfaction (β = −0.03, p = 0.81),
or withdrawal cognitions (β = −0.12, p = 0.42). Therefore, we
conclude that school enthusiasm, but not school assertiveness,
was the driving force behind school extraversion change and
cross-cultural adjustment.
DISCUSSION
Recognizing the malleable aspect of personality and its potential
beneficial effect on cross-cultural adjustment in the US, the
current study marks a first attempt to capture the process by
which sojourners experience changes in personality during cross-
cultural adaptation, while positioning the changes as proximal
antecedents to cross-cultural adjustment outcomes. As expected,
students with higher initial school extraversion also had better
cross-cultural adjustment in general and at school, greater school
satisfaction, and lower withdrawal cognitions. More importantly,
increases in school extraversion were shown to positively predict
general and school-specific adjustment and negatively predict
withdrawal cognitions. In addition, global extraversion positively
predicted the initial level of school extraversion yet negatively
predicted the rate of change in school extraversion. Findings
from the current study lay the ground work for investigating
personality changes in specific contexts pertaining to work-
related transitions and adaptation. Taken together, this study
makes a number of notable contributions to the literatures of
cross-cultural adjustment and personality and sheds light on
practices in sojourners and expatriate assessment and selection.
Theoretical and Practical Implications
In line with the cross-cultural adjustment literature (e.g., Swagler
and Jome, 2005; Sri Ramalu et al., 2010), the current study
highlights the important role of contextualized extraversion in
facilitating sojourners’ adjustment in a new cultural environment.
Our findings demonstrate that school extraversion and its
change predicted both general cross-cultural adjustment and
academic related adjustment (i.e., school adjustment, withdrawal
cognitions). The positive effects of school extraversion and
its change on general and school adjustment in the US
might be attributed in part to the overall high level of
extraversion in the US society (see McCrae and Terracciano,
2005), such that sojourners who are more extraverted or
becoming more extraverted in the school context may find their
own characteristics increasingly congruent with those of the
cultural environment, which in turn lead to better adjustment
outcomes. Although in the expected directions, neither the
initial status nor the change in school extraversion predicted
interaction adjustment, suggesting that extraversion in the school
context may not have a direct impact on international students’
socialization and interaction with the host nationals in general.
That is, as interaction with host nationals can occur beyond
the school context, extraversion and its changes contextualized
within the school context may not be particularly fitting to
predict interaction adjustment outside of the school context.
In addition, exploratory analyses on the two aspects of school
extraversion (i.e., enthusiasm and assertiveness) showed that
school enthusiasm, but not school assertiveness, was the driving
force behind school extraversion change and cross-cultural
adjustment.
Our findings imply that entering and living in a new culture
can lead to changes in one’s contextualized personality, a notion
that is in line with the socialization effects (Roberts andMroczek,
2008; Roberts et al., 2008). On the other hand, one should
consider the potential selection effects (Headey and Wearing,
1989; Roberts and Wood, 2006) simultaneously. For instance,
individuals who choose to study or work abroad may tend to be
more extraverted than those who do not. Likewise, international
students who are more extraverted or becoming more extraverted
in the school context may also select themselves or be selected
into more desirable and acceptable events (e.g., study groups,
social activities) that may facilitate their adaptation. Future
research should test these factors as potential mechanisms via
which personality and its change exert effects on cross-cultural
adjustment.
Building upon the previous research that has demonstrated
the proximity of contextualized personality, we posit that
personality change may be better captured in particular contexts,
and that contextualized personality change may provide better
prediction than global personality change in the corresponding
context. Therefore, we examined extraversion changes in a
specific context, the school context, and linked these changes
to cross-cultural adjustment outcomes. In doing so, the current
study advances the existing literature that has been mainly
focused on the contextualization of stable personality traits
and shows promising results of using contextualized personality
changes to predict context specific and general outcomes.
In an attempt to find out what drives contextualized
personality change, we examined the relations of two
individual differences (i.e., global extraversion and cross-
cultural motivation) with school extraversion change. We found
that global extraversion, although positively related to the initial
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status of school extraversion, negatively predicted the rate of
change in school extraversion. In other words, international
students who had higher global extraversion also tended to
behave more extraverted at school in the beginning but were
also more likely to experience a decrease in school extraversion,
whereas individuals who had lower global extraversion also
behaved more introverted at school in the beginning but may
experience an increase in school extraversion. This suggests that
introverts may have a greater potential and more room than
extraverts to increase their contextualized extraversion while
adjusting to a new culture. Although global extraversion was
inversely related to the slope of change in school extraversion,
descriptive statistics indicate that individuals who were high on
global extraversion remained more extraverted in school (5.21
at T1 to 4.74 at T3) compared to those who were low on global
extraversion (3.56 at T1 to 3.90 at T3), despite the changes.
Proposing that individuals with high cross-cultural motivation
will have high capacity and motivation to behave extraverted in
the US, we examined cross-cultural motivation as an antecedent
for the initial status and change in school extraversion. Failing
to support our hypothesis, we did not find any evidence linking
cross-cultural motivation to either the initial status or change
in school extraversion. Therefore, the current study’s findings
suggest that school extraversion and its change may be more
driven by one’s standing on global extraversion than by cross-
cultural motivation.
Despite the growing interest in studying cross-cultural
adjustment, the current study is the first to integrate the
recent developments in personality research in a cross-cultural
context. Based on the findings, the current research echoes
past studies (e.g., Caligiuri, 2000) that suggest organizations
in the US might incorporate extraversion as a selection tool
for sojourners and expatriate workers. Meanwhile, practitioners
should recognize the potential malleability of contextualized
personality, especially under the influence of other individual
characteristics (e.g., global personality), and how personality
change may predict adjustment and withdrawal. By identifying
changes in contextualized extraversion and their impact on
cross-cultural adjustment, the current study broadens our
understanding of the role of personality in adaptation and
adjustment. Particularly, stable personality traits have been
examined to understand how individuals adapt to changes in
their work environment (Huang et al., 2014c). On the other
end of the continuum, individuals respond to changes in their
task context with varying personality states (Minbashian et al.,
2010; Huang and Ryan, 2011). The current study identified
contextualized extraversion change as an additional mechanism,
beyond stable traits and momentary states, that may contribute
to one’s acceptance of environmental and organizational change,
as well as psychological and work adjustment (e.g., adaptive
performance, see Jundt et al., 2015).
Limitations
Despite the contributions, this study has a few limitations. First,
international students in the current study were facing dual
challenges of adapting to a new culture and adjusting to college.
Therefore, it is unclear to what extent personality change was
driven by cultural influence or school experience. Future studies
may further tease apart the cultural and school influences on
personality change by measuring them separately or using a
non-student sample.
Second, the current findings, based on international students,
may not be readily applied to foreign workers adjusting to the
US culture. Although international students may share similar
encounters and experiences with organizational sojourners
and expatriates in a foreign culture (e.g., cultural shock and
adaptation), and that personality traits (e.g., conscientiousness)
have been shown to predict similar outcomes in work and school
contexts (e.g., job performance and school performance; Barrick
and Mount, 1991; Bing et al., 2004), it is unknown whether
findings from the current research can be fully replicated in
organizational settings. Therefore, researchers are encouraged
to replicate this study using organizational sojourners and
expatriates.
Third, while we focused on extraversion in the current study
given the cultural context, the other four Big Five traits (i.e.,
agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness to experience, and
neuroticism) have also been linked to cross-cultural adjustment
in other cultures (e.g., Swagler and Jome, 2005; Peltokorpi, 2008;
Sri Ramalu et al., 2010). Although we attempted to explore
changes in the other four personality dimensions by tracking
them via the mini-IPIP scales (Donnellan et al., 2006), we
were unable obtain reliable measures with four items on each
personality dimension. Therefore, a venue for future research is
to extend the current study and further examine the relationship
between changes of other personality dimensions and cross-
cultural adjustment.
Future Directions
As the first study to examine contextualized personality change
in the cross-cultural adjustment context, the current study
points to a few interesting venues for future research. The
first direction for future research pertains to individual factors
that may contribute to personality changes in a cross-cultural
context. In the current study, we examined global extraversion
and cross-cultural motivation as two individual characteristics
that may drive changes in school extraversion. Meanwhile,
other individual differences may also lead one’s contextualized
personality to change in a cross-cultural context. For instance,
openness to experience may influence the extent to which one
is susceptible to cultural influences and subsequently how he
or she behaves in a cross-cultural context. Self-monitoring, the
extent to which an individual observes and controls his or her
behavior according to situational cues (Snyder, 1974), may shape
how this person adjusts behaviors when encountered with a new
cultural environment. Demographic variables, such as age, may
also play a role in whether and how much personality changes
during cross-cultural adaptation.
Second, future research should investigate personality changes
in other important, specific contexts pertaining to work-related
transitions and adaptation. Studying personality changes in
different contexts (e.g., cultural, work, and family) is important
because not only can it provide insight on the potential varying
degrees of personality changes associated with particular contexts
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(e.g., personality changes may be more pronounced in a cross-
cultural context than in an organizational socialization context),
but it can also improve the predictive validity of the individual
characteristics for the outcomes of interest. For instance, the
model of attraction–selection–attrition (ASA; Schneider, 1987)
indicates that organizational newcomers who share similar
characteristics with the existing employees should be more
likely to stay in the organization and less likely to withdraw.
Considering the malleable aspect of contextualized personality, it
is possible that some newcomers may experience changes in work
contextualized personality that can enable them to fit better with
the work group. Therefore, newcomer contextualized personality
changes may predict newcomer adjustment and turnover during
organizational socialization.
Third, despite the fact that personality and life experiences
are interactive in nature, limited research has been conducted
to study the two aspects in conjunction. As discussed earlier,
the interplay of personality and life events can be referred
to as selection effects and socialization effects. The current
findings regarding changes in contextualized personality show
support for the socialization effects (Roberts and Mroczek,
2008; Roberts et al., 2008). Extending the previous longitudinal
studies that have demonstrated both the selection effects and
the socialization effects (e.g., Vaidya et al., 2002; Specht et al.,
2011), future research on personality changes in a cross-cultural
context should examine the potential impact of cross-cultural
adjustment outcomes on personality. For instance, a sojourner
who is successfully adjusting to the American culture may also
become more interested in reaching out to the local nationals,
attending activities and events, and staying an active part of
his or her surroundings, all of which indicate an increasing
level of extraversion. In contrast, a sojourner who experiences
difficulty in adapting to a new cultural environment may further
withdraw from social interactions and activities, leading to
a decrease in extraversion. Therefore, future research should
explore the reciprocal relationship between personality and
adaptation outcomes.
Fourth, provided the growing literature that suggests change
in trait personality (e.g., Roberts et al., 2001; Vaidya et al.,
2002; Lüdtke et al., 2011; Boyce et al., 2015), it would be an
interesting research question to examine the potential change
in trait extraversion in a cross-cultural context. It is likely
that, given the prolonged influence of cross-cultural events
and experiences, some individuals might eventually experience
significant changes in their trait personality (e.g., become more
extraverted in general). Although we did not examine change
in trait extraversion in our study, the current findings regarding
change in contextualized extraversion and its predictive validity
lay the groundwork for studying trait changes in the future.
Fifth, based on the findings that contextualized personality
may be malleable, organizational researchers and practitioners
may explore the feasibility of developing training interventions
that aim to elevate certain contextualized personality
characteristics (cf. Huang and Ford, 2012) among sojourners
and expatriates based on the cultural context.
CONCLUSION
The current captures the process by which sojourners experience
changes in personality during cross-cultural adaptation and
examine how these changes relate to cross-cultural adjustment
outcomes. By demonstrating that the initial status and change
in school extraversion predict cross-cultural adjustment
outcomes, our findings lay the ground work for investigating
personality changes in specific contexts pertaining to work-
related adaptation and shed light on practices in sojourner and
expatriate assessment and selection.
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Prosocial behavior (PSB) is increasingly becoming necessary as more and more
individuals experience exclusion. In this context it is important to understand the
motivational determinants of PSB. Here we report two experiments which analyzed
the influence of dispositional (prosocialness; rejection sensitivity) and motivational
variables (prosocial self-efficacy; prosocial collective efficacy; trust; anger; social
affiliation motivation) on PSB under neutral contexts (Study 1), and once under inclusion
or exclusion conditions (Study 2). Both studies provided evidence for the predicted
mediation of PSB. Results in both neutral and inclusion and exclusion conditions
supported our predictive model of PSB. In the model dispositional variables predicted
motivational variables, which in turn predicted PSB. We showed that the investigated
variables predicted PSB; this suggests that to promote PSB one could (1) foster
prosocialness, prosocial self and collective efficacy, trust in others and affiliation
motivation and (2) try to reduce negative feelings and the tendency to dread rejection in
an attempt to reduce the negative impact that these variables have on PSB. Moreover,
the few differences that emerged in the model between the inclusion and exclusion
contexts suggested that in interventions with excluded individuals special care emphasis
should be placed on addressing rejection sensitivity and lack of trust.
Keywords: prosocial behavior, exclusion, psychosocial variables, predictive model, mediation
INTRODUCTION
Civic cooperation, assistance, and solidarity are increasingly becoming necessary. More and more
individuals are experiencing social exclusion resulting, for example, in job loss, eviction from one’s
home or complete marginalization. Promotion of prosocial behavior (PSB) — defined as an broad
range of acts, including helping behavior, altruism, cooperation and solidarity intended to benefit
other people (Weinstein and Ryan, 2010) — in individuals, groups and communities encourages
the development of networks that facilitate coexistence, well-being and healthier social and
environmental contexts. It therefore seems important to analyze the motivational determinants
of PSB. In this research we analyzed the influence of psychosocial variables — some dispositional
and some motivational — on PSB, first in a neutral context (Study 1), and then in the context of
included versus excluded groups (Study 2).
Based on the Cognitive Affective Personality System Theory (CAPS; Mischel and Shoda, 1995;
Mendoza-Denton et al., 2001), we analyzed the role of some dispositional and psychosocial
variables in predicting PSB in both a neutral and an inclusion versus inclusion contexts, as well as
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the potential relations between those predictors themselves. The
CAPS conceives of the individual as a complex processing system,
and suggests that the situation and the cognitive, affective, and
personality components interact together, leading individuals
to behave in a specific way. Thus, as state in the CAPS
(Cervone, 2005), we proposed that some knowledge structures
(the dispositional variables proposed in both studies) causally
influence appraisal processes (as the psychosocial variables
explored in both studies); that both kinds of variables interact
together; and that this interaction leads individuals to behave in a
specific way, i.e., in a prosocial specific way, as we are interested
in explored in this study.
Shoda and Mischel (2006) claimed that the selection of the
plausible mediators and determinants of a specific behavior
depends on the behavior one is interested in predicting and on the
situation within which this behavior is expected to occur. Thus,
some variables widely studied in the past in relation to PSB (such
as the dispositional and psychosocial variable of this study) seem
to be potentially interconnected mediators that can be explored to
predict this behavior by following the CAPS approach. Previous
studies have shown that dispositional prosocialness (Eisenberg
et al., 2002; Carlo et al., 2003), self-efficacy (Bandura, 2001;
Caprara and Steca, 2005), and trust (Rotenberg et al., 2005;
Welch et al., 2005; Derfler-Rozin et al., 2010; Berigan and Irwin,
2011) are potential predictors of PSB. Moreover, the relations
between most of those variables have also been demonstrated,
and therefore led us to theorize some meditational hypotheses
not yet explored to our knowledge. Thus, it will be interested
to explore the validity of a determinant model of PSB involving
all those variables, by exploring how they interact together to
explain PSB, what to our knowledge has not been explored
to the date. Moreover, the exploration of some variables—as
rejection sensitivity, anger and affiliation motivation—seems to
be particularly relevant in order to explain PSB in the context
of social inclusion. Thus, it may be relevant to explore the
validity of the model explored in a context of social exclusion by
adding those variables explicitly relevant in this context, and once
more by exploring the relations those variables maintain between
themselves and their potential mediating role in explaining PSB
in such contexts.
In brief, the global aim of our two studies was to analyze
the role of some dispositional and psychosocial variables in
predicting PSB, and to analyze the relation between those
predictors themselves by testing the potential mediating effects
of self and collective efficacy, trust, anger and affiliation
motivation, in accordance with the CAPS (Mischel and Shoda,
1995; Mendoza-Denton et al., 2001). The variables studied
were chosen in line with the CAPS (Mischel and Shoda,
1995; Mendoza-Denton et al., 2001) that discuss interconnected
mediators, which predict individual behavior. In line with
the premise of Shoda and Mischel (2006), the relevance of
one or other mediator depends in part on the behavior
theorists are interested in predicting and on the context in
which this behavior occurs. As such, the dispositional and
psychosocial variables chosen for this study have been commonly
related to PSB in previous literature and/or to social exclusion
situations.
The potential of this study lies in the fact that it explores a
potential model of PSB, including the potential relations between
different dispositional and psychosocial variables, exploring not
only the effect of those variables on PSB, but also the potential
interactions between themselves; interactions that finally led
to explain PSB. Moreover, we then apply this model to the
context of social exclusion versus social inclusion by adding
some variables especially relevant in those contexts. In this sense,
the analysis of such variables as predictors of PSB, and the
testing of the potential relations between them, may be pertinent
from a theoretical perspective. Additionally, from an applied
perspective, because social exclusion is a common result of the
crisis, and because social assistance and PSB promote healthier
social and environmental contexts and thus are increasingly
necessary, it seems relevant to study which variables can be
predictors of PSB, not only in neutral contexts, but also in
the contexts of inclusion versus exclusion situations; and then
propose some practical interventions based on the results to
promote this kinds of beneficial behaviors.
Psychosocial Variables Related to
Prosocial Behavior
Many variables have been related to PSB. Dispositional
prosocialness, i.e., the disposition or tendency to help, share,
cooperate, empathize and take care of other people (Caprara
et al., 2000) might be a predictor of PSB. It has been demonstrated
that (1) prosocial tendencies correlate positively with global PSB
and negatively with aggression (Carlo et al., 2003), (2) prosocial
disposition in childhood is related to PSB in young adulthood
(Eisenberg et al., 2002) and (3) that individuals with prosocial
orientation engage in more PSB, e.g., donating than individuals
with individualistic and competitive orientations (Van Lange
et al., 2007). Additionally, it is assumed that individuals’ behavior
tends to be congruent with their disposition (Heider, 1958) and
that attitudes drive behavior (Helper and Albarracin, 2014) i.e., a
positive attitude to some object or objective will result in behavior
designed to increase or promote it. We therefore argue that
prosocialness will predict PSB.
H1: Individuals with higher levels of prosocialness engage in higher
levels of PSB.
Prosocial Self-Efficacy and Prosocial
Collective Efficacy and Related Variables
Self-efficacy can be responsible for unity and directness in
terms of the individual’s actions (Caprara and Steca, 2005). The
relationship between behavior and perceived efficacy — at both
individual and collective level —has been widely debated (for a
review see Bandura, 2001). Without confidence in their ability
or the ability of their group to do something, it is unlikely that
individuals will engage in a related behavior (Bandura, 2001).
There is also evidence that empathic self-efficacy directly predicts
PSB across ages (Caprara and Steca, 2005). From this evidence
it follows that higher prosocial self-efficacy — confidence in
one’s own ability to act prosocially — and higher collective
prosocial efficacy — confidence in the ability of one’s group to
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act prosocially — will predict higher levels of PSB (Cuadrado and
Tabernero, 2015).
Prosocialness has been associated with self-efficacy. Highly
prosocial individuals probably tend to have high levels of
confidence in their ability to behave in a prosocial way. Bandura
et al. (1999) confirmed the relationship between prosocialness
and both self-efficacy and social efficacy. The relationship
between empathic self-efficacy beliefs and prosocialness is
dynamic (Alessandri et al., 2009). Hence, it seems that the
greater the prosocialness levels individuals possess, the more their
prosocial self-efficacy will be elevated.
Prosocial self-efficacy and collective prosocial efficacy are also
related. Self-efficacy influences beliefs about the effectiveness of
one’s group (Fernández-Ballesteros et al., 2002). In other words
individuals who doubt their own efficacy probably have little
confidence in the efficacy of their group, and vice versa (Bandura,
2000; Fernández-Ballesteros et al., 2002).
H2: Prosocial self-efficacy mediates the relationship between (a)
prosocialness and prosocial collective efficacy, and (b) prosocialness
and PSB.
Trust and Related Variables
Previous research has shown that trust, which “represents
confidence in the strength of a partner’s commitment” (Rusbult
and Agnew, 2010, p. 339), promotes PSB (Rotenberg et al., 2005;
Welch et al., 2005; Derfler-Rozin et al., 2010; Berigan and Irwin,
2011).
It is easy to understand the relationship between prosocialness
and trust: prosocial individuals expect that PSB will be
reciprocated and therefore tend to trust others. The more
empathetic an individual is — empathy is an important
component of prosocialness (Caprara et al., 2005) — the more
likely it is that he or she will feel something in common with
others and therefore the more likely he or she is to trust
others (Levenson and Ruef, 1992) and be willing to approach
them. Empathy and prosocialness promote good interpersonal
relationships (Davis and Oathout, 1992) and it has been claimed
that empathy and trust are closely related (Ickes et al., 1990).
Feng et al. (2004) showed that in an online context empathic
communication increases trust. Altruism, benevolence, and
generosity — which are strongly associated with prosocialness —
have also been found to predict trust (Nooteboom and Six,
2003; Klapwijk and Van Lange, 2009; De Dreu et al., 2010). For
example, Klapwijk and Van Lange (2009) found that generosity
has an important role in building and maintaining trust; and
De Dreu et al. (2010) found that parochial altruism promoted
in-group trust. We anticipated that more prosocial individuals
would show more trust.
It also seems likely that individuals who believe strongly in the
prosocialness of their group are confident that group members
will treat them with goodwill and benevolence. Sapouna (2010)
defined collective efficacy — which is strongly related to, and
intertwined with trust (McKenzie et al., 2002) — as “a mutual
trust (among the members of a group) combined with their
willingness to intervene to achieve common goals” (p. 1920).
This suggests that collective efficacy may play a critical role in
decisions about the trustworthiness of group members (Kramer
et al., 1996). De Cremer (1999) showed that high perceived
collective efficacy reduced fear and thus enhanced individuals’
trust in the cooperative intentions of others. We anticipated that
individuals with high collective prosocial efficacy would trust in
the goodwill of their partners.
H3: Collective prosocial efficacy mediates the relationship between
(a) prosocialness and trust, and (b) prosocial self-efficacy and trust.
H4: Trust mediates the relationship between prosocialness and PSB.
In short, as Figure 1 shows, we proposed a predictive model
of PSB in which prosocialness and trust were direct predictors
of PSB; prosocial self-efficacy mediated the relationships
between (1) prosocialness and prosocial collective efficacy
and (2) prosocialness and PSB; collective efficacy mediated
the relationships between (1) prosocialness and trust and
(2) prosocial self-efficacy and trust; and trust mediated the
relationship between prosocialness and PSB.
FIGURE 1 | Hypothesized predictive model of prosocial behavior; PSB, prosocial behavior.
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In Study 1 we tested this model in a neutral context.
But what happens when individuals are suffering exclusion?
Would the variables tested in this model still predict PSB?
Would inclusion/exclusion moderate how predictive variables
influenced PSB? Previous studies have shown that exclusion
and inclusion can influence the extent to which an individual
behaves prosocially (e.g., DeWall and Richman, 2011; Lee
and Shrum, 2012), so in Study 2 we tested our model in
two different conditions — inclusion and exclusion — adding
some variables — rejection sensitivity, anger, and affiliation
motivation—which seemed relevant to the context conditions.
STUDY 1
The objective of this study was to analyze the relationships
between the various motivational determinants of PSB and devise
a predictive model of PSB in a neutral context.
Materials and Methods
Participants, Measures and Procedure
The participants were 93 students (86% women, 14% men; age
range: 21-43 years, M = 23.46, SD = 2.94) randomly selected
from the University of Cordoba (Spain).
Students completed in our laboratory an online questionnaire
created with the Global Park survey program. Then participants
were informed that they would have to do some online group
tasks in which they would have the opportunity to earn points,
which would be exchanged for cash at the end of the experiment
(this was part of the manipulation; there were no online
participants). Before the group task, dispositional prosocialness
was assessed. Then, to ensure the reliability of the online group
tasks, the program asked participants to introduce themselves
to the other online contestants. Then, in order to know the
other participants who may comprise their group, they read
the description of six participants (all the participants read the
same descriptions of fictitious online participants. Descriptions
gave information on sex, age, career choice, academic course,
leisure interests etc.). At this point they were informed that
the computer had randomly allocated them to a three-person
online group. Next prosocial self-efficacy, collective prosocial
efficacy, and trust were assessed. After this the participants
played three rounds of the public good dilemma game; this
allowed them to earn points that could be exchanged for
cash (all participants were informed that they had earned 10
euros). Finally, participants were fully debriefed and probed for
suspicion.
The Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness only
requires revision and approval by an institutional review board
(ethics committee) when the studies imply (a) clinical human
experimentation; (b) use of human embryonic stem cells, or
derived therefrom, from pre-embryos remaining lines; (c) Use of
tissues or biological samples of human origin; (d) Use of personal
data, genetic information, etc.; (e) Animal Experimentation; (f)
Use of biological agents of risk to human health, animal or plant;
(g) Use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs); or (h) Release
of GMOs. Thus, the study was not reviewed nor approved by any
institutional ethics committee before the study began because it
was exempt from ethical approval procedures.
Dispositional prosocialness
Prosocialness was measured with the short version of the
Prosocialness scale (Caprara et al., 2005). This consists of 12
items, e.g., ‘I try to console people who are sad’ with responses
given on a seven-point Likert scale.
Prosocial self-efficacy [α = 0.88, M = 6.10, SD = 0.80, range
(4.00–7.00)]. Self-efficacy with respect to PSB was assessed using
a short (five-items; ‘I can behave cooperatively,’ ‘I can distribute
resources equitably,’ ‘I can make an equal division of a common
monetary fund,’ ‘I can adopt behavior oriented to help others,’
and ‘I can share resources’) scale with responses given on a 7-
point Likert scale, in accordance with Bandura’s (2006) guide to
constructing self-efficacy scales . Because this was not a validated
scale, we performed Exploratory Factorial Analysis (EFA) with
Varimax rotation; this confirmed that the scale had a one-factor
structure that explained 68.31% of the variance in scores.
Prosocial collective efficacy [α = 0.94, M = 5.88, SD = 1.05, range
(1.00-7.00)]. Participants’ perceptions of the prosocial efficacy
of their group were assessed with a short scale designed in
accordance with Bandura’s (2006) guide to constructing self-
efficacy scales. The scale consisted of the same five items as
the individual prosocial self-efficacy scale and responses were
given on the same 7-point Likert scale, but all the items were
preceded by the phrase ‘My group can’ (e.g., ‘My group can
behave cooperatively’). EFA with Varimax rotation confirmed
that the scale had a one-factor structure that explained 83.16%
of the variance in scores.
Trust [α = 0.72, M = 5.22, SD = 1.44, range (1.00-7.00)]. Trust
was assessed using an adaptation of Greenhalgh and Chapman’s
(1998) scale. The scale included three items (e.g., ‘I feel that those
two people can be counted on to help me’) to which participants
responded using a 7-point Likert scale to indicate their trust in the
participants with whom they were to perform the online group
tasks. Participants completed the scale before solving the online
group tasks. EFA with Varimax rotation confirmed that the scale
had a one-factor structure that explained 77.43% of the variance
in scores.
Prosocial behavior [α = 0.88, M = 5.14, SD = 1.74, range (0.00-
6.67)]. PSB was assessed using the public good dilemma game;
this in an N-person prisoner’s dilemma game which is usually
used to assess tendency to cooperation. An explanation of the
game by Santos et al. (2008, p. 213) states that “cooperators (C)
contribute an amount c (‘cost’) to the public good; defectors
(D) do not contribute. The total contribution is multiplied by
an enhancement factor r and the result is equally distributed
between allN members of the group.” In our experiment we used
a three-person prisoner’s dilemma and three rounds were played.
In each round players were given a certain number of points and
had to decide how many points to keep and how many to donate.
Donated points were doubled and distributed among the group.
The mean number of points a participant donated over the three
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rounds of the game was used as a measure of PSB, donating more
points indicated greater prosocialness.
Treatment of the Data
Sex and age were not the principal aim of our study and did not
show any significant influence on the other variables of the study,
and were thus omitted from all further analyses.
Preliminary analyses
In order to test the means and standard deviations of the
variables of the study, as well as the interactions between them
some descriptive analyses and correlation tests including all the
variables were performed.
Multicollinearity tests
To detect multicollinearity we examined the correlation matrix
for the independent variables, the variance inflation factor (VIF)
and tolerance values for all the constructs (Kline, 2005).
Mediation analyses
In order to confirm hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 mediation analyses
were computed with Amos (version 21) by following the product-
of-coefficients strategy with bootstrapping to test the strength and
significance of the indirect effect (Shrout and Bolger, 2002). In the
present study the 95% confidence interval of the indirect effect
was obtained with 2,000 bootstrap resamples.
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM)
In order to confirm a predictive model of PSB a path analysis
was performed with Amos 21. To estimate the causal model the
following indicators of the goodness of fit were used:
(a) Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA),
which is considered as a good fit with values lower than
0.05, as an adequate fit with values between 0.05 and 0.08,
as a mediocre fit with values between 0.08 and 0.10, and as a
not acceptable fit with values higher than 0.10. (Browne and
Cudeck, 1993; Schermelleh-Engel and Moosbrugger, 2003);
(b) Comparative Fit Index (CFI) which is suitable if you have
values above 0.97 (Schermelleh-Engel and Moosbrugger,
2003);
(c) Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), for which Hoyle (1995)
suggests values above 0.9 as appropriate, and Schermelleh-
Engel and Moosbrugger (2003) suggest values above 0.95
indicative of good fit.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Correlation analysis was used to explore the relationships among
all investigated variables in the study. As can be seen in Table 1,
all correlations were in the expected direction.
A Predictive Model of Prosocial Behavior
To detect multicollinearity we first examined the correlation
matrix for the independent variables; the absence of high
correlations (i.e., 0.85 or greater) suggested that the data were
not affected by collinearity (Kline, 2005). As Table 1 shows, the
highest correlation was between prosocialness and prosocial self-
efficacy (r = 0.64). We next checked the VIF and tolerance values
for all the constructs. All VIF values were less than 5.0 (range:
1.309-1.871) and all tolerance values were between 0.10 and1.0
(range: 0.535-0.764) so we can be confident that the data were
not affected by multicollinearity (Kline, 2005).
Mediation hypotheses (H2, H3, and H4) were tested using
bootstrapping analyses in Amos 21. As Table 2 shows, all the
hypotheses were confirmed.
Moreover, in order to confirm the predictive role of the
variables, as well as the hypothesized predictive model of PSB,
a path analysis was performed with Amos 21. The goodness-
of-fit tests revealed that the model was well-fitted [χ2(3,
N = 93) = 2.78, p = 0.43; RMSEA = 0.01 (95% CI [0.01,0.17]);
CFI = 1.00; GFI = 0.99]. Results confirmed Hypotheses 2 (a and
b), 3b—but not 3a—and 4, but only partially Hypothesis 1 (see
Figure 2).
Discussion
All the variables investigated contributed to a predictive model
of PSB in which prosocial self-efficacy and trust act as direct
predictors. The direct predictive role of prosocialness was
not confirmed; it should, however, be noted that correlation
and mediation analyses indicated that — in line with H1 —
prosocialness was correlated with PSB and directly predicted it
(R = 0.29∗∗; β = 0.29∗∗); although prosocialness was not a direct
predictor of PSB in the model the two variables were related,
with prosocialness directly predicting PSB. This result indicates
that a prosocial disposition might lead individuals to behave
prosocially, i.e., in congruence with their disposition (Eisenberg
et al., 2002; Carlo et al., 2003).
Regarding the direct predictors of PSB and in line with
previous studies (Rotenberg et al., 2005; Welch et al., 2005)
the experiment showed that having confidence in partners’
goodwill encouraged individuals to behave in a prosocial way
and conversely participants were less generous to partners they
perceived as untrustworthy. Additionally, prosocial self-efficacy
directly predicted PSB; the more confident individuals were in
their ability to behave prosocially, the more likely they were
to behave prosocially. This result is consistent with self-efficacy
theory (Bandura, 2001), which states that individuals are less
likely to attempt behaviors if they do not believe that they are
capable of executing them successfully.
The mediating roles hypothesized were confirmed. Prosocial
self-efficacy fully mediated the relationships between (1)
prosocialness and prosocial collective efficacy and (2)
prosocialness and PSB. The more prosocial an individual’s
disposition the more likely he or she was to feel capable of
behaving prosocially (Alessandri et al., 2009) and in turn, (1)
the more they felt that their group was efficacious in behaving
prosocially (Fernández-Ballesteros et al., 2002), and (2) the more
they behaved prosocially (Bandura, 2001).
Prosocial collective efficacy fully mediated the relationships
between (1) prosocialness and trust and (2) prosocial self-efficacy
and trust. In accordance with previous research we found that (1)
the greater individuals’ disposition to PSB the more likely they
were to feel that their group was capable of behaving prosocially
(Alessandri et al., 2009) and (2) the more individuals perceive
themselves as highly efficacious in a determined behavior (being
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TABLE 1 | Correlations, means, standard deviations, and alpha reliabilities for all the study one variables.
1 2 3 4 5 Mean Range SD α
(1) Prosocialness − 5.96 (3.42–7.00) 0.72 0.90
(2) PS self-efficacy 0.64∗∗ − 6.10 (4.00–7.00) 0.80 0.88
(3) Collective PS efficacy 0.48∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ − 5.88 (1.00–7.00) 1.05 0.94
(4) Trust 0.41∗∗∗ 0.25∗ 0.48∗∗∗ − 5.22 (1.00–7.00) 1.44 0.72
(5) PSB 0.29∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.30∗∗ − 5.14 (0.00–6.67) 1.74 0.88
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
PS self-efficacy, prosocial self-efficacy; collective PS efficacy, collective prosocial efficacy; PSB, prosocial behavior.
TABLE 2 | Type of Mediation Observed.
Hypothesis Direct Beta without Mediator Direct Beta with Mediator Indirect Beta
H2a: PSness → PS self-efficacy → collective PS efficacy 0.48∗∗∗ 0.17 (ns) 0.31∗∗∗
H2b: PSness → PS self-efficacy → PSB 0.29∗∗ 0.13 (ns) 0.16∗∗
H3a: PSness → collective PS efficacy → trust 0.41∗∗∗ 0.23 (ns) 0.18∗∗
H3b: PS self-efficacy → collective PS efficacy → trust 0.33∗∗∗ −0.09 (ns) 0.30∗∗∗
H4: PSness → trust → PSB 0.29∗∗ 0.20 (ns) 0.09∗
Direct and indirect effects calculated with bootstrapping analysis.
PSness, prosocialness; PS self-efficacy, prosocial self-efficacy; collective PS efficacy, collective prosocial efficacy; PSB, prosocial behavior. The first column is a statement
of the hypothesis. The second column gives the regression weight for the direct association between the independent variable (IV) and the dependent variable (DV) before
controlling for the effects of the putative mediator (M). The third column gives an estimate of the standardized direct effect of the IV on the DV after controlling for the
effects of the putative M. The fourth column gives an estimate of the standardized indirect effect of the IV on the DV after controlling for the effects of the putative M in
bootstrapping analysis.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
FIGURE 2 | Confirmed predictive model of prosocial behavior. Values for relationships between variables are beta coefficients. PSB, prosocial behavior
(∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001).
prosocial), the more they perceive that their group is efficacious in
this same behavior (Bandura, 2000; Fernández-Ballesteros et al.,
2002). In turn, the more they perceive their partner as having high
abilities in being prosocial, the more they trust in those partners
(Kramer et al., 1996; De Cremer, 1999).
Trust emerged as a mediator of the relationship between
prosocialness and PSB. The more prosocial an individual’s
disposition the more likely he or she is to trust others
(Nooteboom and Six, 2003) and hence to behave prosocially
toward them (Welch et al., 2005). This psychological pattern
seems intuitively plausible: prosocial and empathic individuals
usually see others like them, tend to expect some reciprocity,
and consequently trust the others (Levenson and Ruef, 1992). In
the expectation that the others will operate with goodwill, trust
can produce not only reciprocity but also social orientation by
bestowing on individuals the motivation to approximate those
others, to engage in activities with them, as well as encouraging
closeness as the starting-point for relationships (Welch et al.,
2005); therefore it seems logical that trust may produce PSB
(Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Zaskodna et al., 2013).
STUDY 2
Study 1 provided evidence for a predictive model of PSB in which
prosocialness, prosocial self-efficacy and trust act as predictors
of PSB in a neutral context; however, previous studies have
shown that exclusion and inclusion may affect the extent to
which an individual behaves prosocially (Maner et al., 2007;
Williams, 2007; Smart Richman and Leary, 2009; Romero-Canyas
et al., 2010b; DeWall and Richman, 2011; Lee and Shrum,
2012). In our societies, more and more people are experiencing
social exclusion, and even complete marginalization. In this
context, the promotion of PSB is increasingly relevant. The causes
of PSB have generally been attributed to positive experiences
and factors; nevertheless PSB may also arise after negative life
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events (Vollhardt, 2009), as social exclusion. However, there is
controversy about whether exclusion leads to prosocial (Maner
et al., 2007; Mead et al., 2010) or antisocial behavior (Ayduk
et al., 2008; Coyne et al., 2011). Consequently, it seems pertinent
to explore how PSB is affected by inclusion and exclusion and
whether the mechanisms that predict PSB in neutral contexts
are the same in contexts of inclusion or exclusion. We were
therefore interested in exploring potential contextual differences
in associations between predictor variables and PSB; in particular
we wanted to know whether the predictive variables explored in
Study 1 were similarly powerful predictors of PSB in included and
excluded individuals.
The objective of Study 2 was to determine if the model
developed in Study 1 was valid for excluded and included
individuals. We also added some supplementary variables of
particular relevance to inclusion/exclusion contexts to the
model: rejection sensitivity, anger, and affiliation motivation.
In general, we expected that the variables that have shown
to be predictors of PSB in Study One in a neutral context
will be similarly powerful predictors of PSB in excluded and
included contexts. There is no reason to think that prosocialness,
prosocial self-efficacy, collective prosocial efficacy nor trust will
not predict PSB in excluded and included contexts to the
same extent as in a neutral context. Nevertheless, considering
a new variables included in Study 2, it is interesting to note
that we expected that rejection sensitivity will be predictor
of anger and PSB only in contexts of exclusion, but not
in contexts of inclusion. This prediction is based in the
rejection sensitivity model of Levy et al. (2001) in which it
is explained that rejection sensitivity is activated only when
rejection cues are detected, triggering in turn negative affective
states as anger, which in turn reduce the probability to behave
prosocially.
Psychosocial Variables Related to
Prosocial Behavior
In Study 2 we used the model found in Study 1 is replicated by
adding some variables of particular interest in the context of the
exclusion-PSB relationship.
Rejection Sensitivity and Related Variables
Rejection sensitivity — i.e., the tendency to anxiously expect
social rejection (Downey and Feldman, 1996) — moderates
the link between exclusion and antisocial behavior: exclusion
provokes aggression toward the rejecters in individuals who
are highly sensitive to rejection but not in those who are less
sensitive (Ayduk et al., 2008). Rejection sensitivity therefore
seemed relevant to a model intended to predict PSB in the
contexts of exclusion and inclusion.
Rejection sensitivity has been related to self-efficacy, which
is in turn related to PSB. When rejection-sensitive individuals
perceive rejection cues they activate negative self-efficacy beliefs
(Ayduk et al., 2000). Rejection sensitivity impairs self-regulation,
and — to an even greater extent — self-efficacy and interpersonal
self-efficacy (Downey and Feldman, 1996; Levy et al., 2001;
Inzlicht et al., 2006). The low interpersonal self-efficacy of high
rejection sensitivity individuals produces decreases in confidence
and skill in social interaction, particularly in the event of meeting
new people, where there are more chances to be rejected;
and as rejection sensitivity increases, interpersonal competence
decreases (Butler et al., 2007). One would therefore expect
rejection sensitivity to be negatively associated with prosocial
self-efficacy and collective prosocial efficacy. We therefore
predicted that:
H1: Prosocial self-efficacy mediates the relationship between
rejection sensitivity and prosocial collective efficacy.
Anger and Related Variables
Anger increases when individuals feel excluded (Chow et al.,
2008; Romero-Canyas et al., 2010b) and it has been shown
that anger increases antisocial desires and exacerbates antisocial
behavior (Leach et al., 2006) and reduces prosocial behavior in
excluded individuals (Cuadrado et al., 2015). We consider that
anger is relevant to models of the relationship between exclusion
and PSB therefore included it as a motivational determinant in
our predictive model of PSB.
There is evidence that anger is related to variables known to
be associated with PSB, such as rejection sensitivity, collective
efficacy and trust. In line with the rejection sensitivity model
(Levy et al., 2001), Downey et al. (2000) offered a model
in which—when rejection cues are perceived—high rejection
sensitivity heightens cognitive-affective overreactions such as
anger, that in turn increment the likelihood of violence
occurring. In rejection-sensitive individuals exclusion elicits
hostility (Ayduk et al., 1999) and reduces positive affect (Romero-
Canyas et al., 2010b). Luterek et al. (2004) have also demonstrated
that rejection sensitivity mediates the relationship between
childhood sexual abuse and anger. We expected that the more
individuals dread rejection, the more they feel angry when
excluded.
Efficacy beliefs influence whether individuals think
optimistically or pessimistically and their emotional responses
(Bandura, 2000). Individuals who perceive that they or their
group have low efficacy in a given task feel bad and activate a
negative affect—such as anger (Valentino et al., 2009)—and a
drop in positive affect (Salanova et al., 2011).
A propos trust, affective states influence the way in which
we form an opinion of how trustworthy a person is (Jones and
George, 1998). Individuals report more positive perceptions of
others and report higher interpersonal trust when experiencing
positive affect; conversely when experiencing negative affect, they
are more likely to see others in a negative light and to perceive
them as less trustworthy (Jones and George, 1998). Individuals
experiencing positive affect tend to view human nature as more
positive (Veitch and Griffitt, 1976), whilst anger decreases trust
(Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005).We expected that angry individuals
would trust their partners less.
In line with previous research and the results of Study 1 we
hypothesized that:
H2: Anger mediates the relationship between (a) rejection
sensitivity and trust, (b) prosocial self-efficacy and trust, and (c)
prosocial collective efficacy and trust.
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Affiliation Motivation and Related Variables
Affiliation motivation is the desire to maintain social contact
or a sense of belonging (Veroff and Veroff, 1980); it motivates
individuals to pursue positive interpersonal relationships
(Zaskodna et al., 2013). High affiliation motivation reflects a
strong sense of social interdependence (Markus and Kitayama,
1991) and so individuals with high affiliation motivation tend
to act on behalf of their society or for the benefit of the group,
i.e., in a prosocial manner. Individuals with high affiliation
motivation will tend to behave in a friendly, prosocial manner
in order to create or maintain social contact and avoid breaking
bonds (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Zaskodna et al., 2013).
Many authors (Maner et al., 2007; Smart Richman and Leary,
2009; Romero-Canyas et al., 2010b; DeWall and Richman,
2011) have argued that rejected individuals tend to behave
prosocially only when they see an opportunity to reconnect
with others and have the desire to do so. These data suggested
that affiliation motivation was likely to be a predictor of
PSB.
There is also evidence that affiliation motivation is associated
with several potential predictors of PSB. If we assume that
prosocialness includes the tendency to take care of other people
(Caprara et al., 2000) then it follows that prosocialness should
increase desire for social contact and hence that prosocialness
should predict affiliation motivation.
Rejection-sensitive individuals expect to be rejected by others
and avoidance of such rejection is one of their primary goals
(Downey and Feldman, 1996). Fear of rejection is an important
component of affiliation motivation (Shipley and Veroff, 1958).
Maner et al. (2010) argued that the increase in progesterone
levels which is observed in individuals who dread rejection when
they are given an opportunity to re-affiliate is consistent with
their desire for compensatory social contact and their affiliation
motivation.We anticipated that individuals who anxiously expect
rejection would have a greater desire to continue interacting than
less rejection-sensitive individuals.
The more capable individuals feel of doing something, the
greater their motivation to act accordingly. Individuals who feel
themselves to be highly capable of PSB are likely to behave
prosocially, in accordance with this perception, and are more
likely to be motivated to continue cooperating with partners
than individuals with lower prosocial self-efficacy. This suggests
that collective efficacy may increase the likelihood of engaging in
relationships (Tasa et al., 2011). Social self-efficacy has also been
related to the pursuit of social goals, as the more individuals feel
socially efficacious, the more they endorse affiliation motivation
(Patrick et al., 1997). We hypothesized that both self and
collective prosocial efficacy would be positive predictors of
affiliation motivation.
Given that trust is an expectation that others will contribute
to positive outcomes and that trust tends to be reciprocal,
individuals should have a greater desire to affiliate with
people they trust. Trust leads to more open communication
(Smith and Barclay, 1997) and to cooperation (Parks et al.,
1996). Trusting individuals tend to be intrinsically motivated
to engage in activities with others whereas less trusting
individuals are less likely to want to affiliate (Green and Brock,
1998). Trust fosters closeness and is the starting point for
personal relationships (Welch et al., 2005). We hypothesized
that:
H3: Trust mediates the relationship between (a) prosocialness and
affiliation motivation, and (b) prosocial collective efficacy and
affiliation motivation.
H4: Affiliation motivation mediates the relationship between (a)
prosocialness and PSB, (b) rejection sensitivity and PSB, (c)
prosocial self-efficacy and PSB, (d) prosocial collective efficacy and
PSB, and (e) trust and PSB.
In short, our predictive model of PSB was very similar to
that in Study 1, but included some supplementary variables.
In this new model, in addition to the relationships of Study
1, prosocial self-efficacy also mediated the relationship
between rejection sensitivity and prosocial collective efficacy.
Anger mediated the relationships between (1) rejection
sensitivity and trust, (2) prosocial self-efficacy and trust and
(3) collective prosocial efficacy and trust. Trust mediated
the relationships between (1) prosocialness and affiliation
motivation and (2) collective efficacy and affiliation motivation.
Affiliation motivation mediated the relationships between
(1) prosocialness and PSB, (2) rejection sensitivity and
PSB, (3) prosocial self-efficacy and PSB, (4) prosocial




The participants were 119 students (71.4% women, 28.6% men;
age range: 17-51 years,M = 19.89, SD = 5.18) randomly selected
from the University of Cordoba (Spain). Students who take part
in the first study were not able to take part in this second study.
Manipulation and Measures
The procedure was similar to that used in Study 1. Participants
completed an online questionnaire in our lab and were
then informed that they would have to do some online
group tasks in which they would be able to earn points that
would be exchanged for cash at the end of the experiment.
Before the group tasks, dispositional prosocialness, rejection
sensitivity and anger were assessed. Next, to ensure the
reliability of the online group tasks, the program asked
the participants to introduce themselves to the rest of the
online contestants. Then participants read descriptions
of six fictitious participants (all the participants read the
same descriptions). They were then told that the computer
had randomly allocated them to a three-person online
group. At this point a sense of exclusion or inclusions
was induced by having the participants play a round (30
passes in total) of the fourth version of the Cyberball game
(Williams et al., 2012), a program developed for research on
exclusion. Participants were randomly assigned to the exclusion
condition (in which they received the ball only twice) or
the inclusion condition (in which they received the ball ten
times).
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FIGURE 3 | Hypothesized predictive model of sharing resources prosocial behavior; SAM, social affiliation motivation; PSB, prosocial behavior -
sharing resources.
At this point a manipulation check was performed. Then,
prosocial collective efficacy, anger, social affiliation motivation
and trust were assessed. Then participants played two rounds of
the N-person prisoner’s dilemma game [M = 2.58, SD = 0.78,
range (0.00–3.50); Mincluded = 2.63, SD = 0.79, range (0.00–
3.50); Mexcluded = 2.52, SD = 0.77, range (0.00–3.50)] to assess
PSB. After the two rounds, participants were informed that
we had obtained enough data and that no further play was
required. Finally, participants were fully debriefed and probed for
suspicion.
As study one, this study was exempt from ethical approval
procedures and thus was not reviewd nor approve by any
institutional review board (ethics committee).
The variables were as in Study 1 (Cronbach’s alphas for
reliability are shown in Figure 4), with the addition of three
new variables considered relevant to the inclusion/exclusion
context.
Rejection sensitivity
[M = 3.83, SD = 1.45, range (1.00-7.00); Mincluded = 3.88,
SD = 1.44, range (1.17-7.00); Mexcluded = 3.77, SD = 1.46, range
(1.00-6.67)]. Rejection sensitivity was measured with the six-item
Hypersensitivity to Social Rejection scale (Ronen and Baldwin,
2010; e.g., ‘If someone doesn’t seem to like me I think about it
for the rest of the day’), with responses given on a 7-point Likert
scale.
FIGURE 4 | Predictive model of sharing resources prosocial behavior confirmed to be equal across the two samples. SAM, social affiliation motivation;
PSB, prosocial behavior - sharing resources (∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001).
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Anger
Anger was assessed before and after the manipulation using a
three-item (e.g., ‘angry’) short version of the anger factor of
the Profile of Moods States scale (McNair et al., 1971) with
responses given on a 7-point Likert scale. Descriptive statistics
for anger before the manipulation were M = 1.52, SD = 0.81,
range (1.00–4.33); Mincluded = 1.50, SD = 0.84, range (1.00–
4.033); Mexcluded = 1.53, SD = 0.79, range (1.00–4.00). After
the manipulation the corresponding statistics were M = 2.05,
SD = 1.58, range (1.00–7.00); Mincluded = 1.24, SD = 0.54, range
(1.00–4.00);Mexcluded = 2.90, SD = 1.84, range (1.00–7.00).
Affiliation motivation
[M = 5.51, SD = 5.51, range [1.33–7.00]; Mincluded = 6.16,
SD = .74, range (3.67–7.00); Mexcluded = 4.84, SD = 1.31, range
(1.33–7.00)]. Participants’ desire to continue interacting with
their group was assessed with a specially developed six-item scale
(‘I wish to remain part of this group for future group tasks,’ ‘I
would like to remain part of this group,’ ‘I dislike this group
for future group tasks,’ ‘I would like to be fully accepted by the
members of this group in the future,’ ‘I would like to be fully
integrated into this group in the future,’ and ‘I would like the
members of this group to accept me in the future’) to which
responses were given using a 7-point Likert scale. EFA with
Varimax rotation confirmed that a single factor explained 62.9%
of the variance in scores.
Manipulation check
A manipulation check was performed after the experimental
manipulation. Perceptions of inclusion and exclusion were
measured with four items (‘My group members have excluded
me,’ ‘My group members have included me,’ ‘I feel excluded by
my group members,’ and ‘I feel included by my group members’).
Treatment of the Data
Sex and age were not the principal aim of our study and did not
show any significant influence on the other variables of the study,
and were thus omitted from all further analyses.
Preliminary analyses
In order to test the means and standard deviations of the
variables of the study, as well as the interactions between them
some descriptive analyses and correlation tests including all the
variables were performed.
Multicollinearity tests
To detect multicollinearity we examined the correlation matrix
for the independent variables, the VIF and tolerance values for all
the constructs (Kline, 2005).
Mediation analyses
In order to confirm hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4 mediation analyses
were computed with Amos (version 21) by following the product-
of-coefficients strategy with bootstrapping to test the strength and
significance of the indirect effect (Shrout and Bolger, 2002). In the
present study the 95% confidence interval of the indirect effect
was obtained with 2,000 bootstrap resamples.
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM)
In order to confirm a context-sensitive predictive model of PSB
a multi-group SEM analysis (moderated analysis) was conducted
with Amos (version 21) to test for the equivalence of the causal
structure between the two experimental conditions; this analysis
was performed according to the steps prescribed in Byrne (2009)
and by using the critical ratio for differences between parameters
method. To estimate the causal model the same indicators of the
goodness of fit of Study 1 were used.
Results
Manipulation Check
ANOVA showed main effects of experimental condition on
perception of exclusion [F(1,118) = 94.34, p < 0.001] and
inclusion [F(1,118) = 127.31, p < 0.001]. Participants in the
exclusion context felt more rejected [Mexcl = 4.05, SDexcl = 1.88,
rangeexcl (1.00–7.00); and Mincl = 1.43, SDincl = 0.92, rangeincl
(1.00–6.00)] and less included [Mexcl = 2.41, SDexcl = 1.83,
rangeexcl (1.00–7.00); and Mincl = 5.75, SDincl = 1.37, rangeincl
(2.00–7.00)] than participants in the inclusion context. We
therefore concluded that the manipulation was effective.
Preliminary Analyses
Correlation analyses were performed to explore the relationships
between all the variables in the study. As can be seen in Tables 3
and 4, all correlations were in the expected direction.
A Context-Sensitive Predictive Model of Prosocial
Behavior
To detect multicollinearity we examined the correlation matrix
for the independent variables; the lack of high correlation
coefficients (i.e., 0.85 or greater) indicated that collinearity was
not a problem (Kline, 2005). As indicated in Table 3, the highest
correlation coefficient was between prosocialness and prosocial
self-efficacy (r = 0.65). Next we checked VIF and tolerance values
for all the constructs. All VIF values were less than 5.0 (range:
1.070-2.415) and all tolerance values were between 0.10 and 1.0
(range: 0.414-0.934) so we can be confident that the data were
not affected by multicollinearity (Kline, 2005).
Bootstrapping analyses were performed with Amos 21 to test
hypotheses about mediation of relationships involving PSB (H1,
H2, H3, and H4). Most hypotheses were confirmed; the exception
was H4b, that affiliation motivation mediates the relationship
between rejection sensitivity and PSB (Table 5).
Multi-group structural equation modeling (SEM) was
performed to confirm the context-sensitive predictive model
of sharing resources PSB. The model was a good fit to the data
[χ2(15, N = 119) = 7.46, p = 0.94, RMSEA = 0.01, 95% CI
[0.01,0.02]; CFI = 1.00, GFI = 0.98]. Comparison of the well-
fitted baseline unconstrained model [χ2(30, N = 119) = 27.36,
p = 0.60, RMSEA = 0.01, 95% CI [0.01,0.06]; CFI = 1.00,
GFI = 0.95] with the well-fitted fully constrained model [χ2(43,
N = 119) = 55.09, p = 0.10, RMSEA = 0.05, 95% CI [0.01,0.08];
CFI = 0.95, GFI = 0.90] using the chi-square comparison test
indicated a difference between the inclusion and exclusion groups
[χ2(13) = 27.73; p > 0.01]. The critical ratio for differences
between parameters method revealed groups differences in the
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TABLE 3 | Correlations, means, standard deviations and alpha reliabilities for all the study two variables of the general sample.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Mean Range SD α
(1) Prosocialness − 6.10 (4.17–7.00) 0.62 0.87
(2) Rejection sensitivity 0.02 (ns) − 3.83 (1.00–7.00) 1.45 0.88
(3) PS self-efficacy 0.55∗∗∗ −0.18∗ − 6.25 (4.00–7.00) 0.70 0.85
(4) Collective PS efficacy 0.03 (ns) −0.10 (ns) 0.19∗ − 4.85 (1.00–7.00) 2.09 0.98
(5) Anger −0.07 (ns) 0.29∗∗∗ −0.16# −0.52∗∗∗ − 1.98 (1.00–7.00) 1.51 0.91
(6) Trust 0.20∗ −0.10 (ns) 0.22∗ 0.65∗∗∗ −0.63∗∗∗ − 4.42 (1.00–7.00) 1.89 0.97
(7) SAM 0.26∗∗ 0.06 (ns) 0.27∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ − 5.51 (1.33–7.00) 1.25 0.87
(8) PSB 0.26∗∗ 0.14 (ns) 0.19∗ 0.06 (ns) −0.08 (ns) 0.13 (ns) 0.26∗∗ − 2.58 (0.00–3.50) 0.78 R = 0.77∗∗∗
#p < 0.09, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
For PSB’ reliability, Pearson correlation analysis was done because it is composed only by two variables. PS self-efficacy, prosocial self-efficacy; collective PS efficacy,
collective prosocial efficacy; SAM, Social affiliation motivation; PSB, prosocial behavior.
rejection sensitivity→anger path (ßexclusion = 0.59, p > 0.001;
ßinclusion = 0.01, ns; z = 4.05, p > 0.01) and the prosocial
collective efficacy efficacy→trust path (ßexclusion = 0.19, p > 0.05;
ßinclusion = 0.68, p > 0.001; z = −2.66, p > 0.01). Figure 4
represents the general model for the combined sample.
Discussion
All the variables analyzed contribute to a predictive model of
PSB — valid for both excluded and included individuals —
in which prosocialness and affiliation motivation act as direct
predictors of PSB. Most of the paths in the Study 1 model were
confirmed. The disappearance of two of the relationships found
in Study 1 — between (1) prosocial self-efficacy and PSB and (2)
trust and PSB — might be due to the incorporation of affiliation
motivation, which acted as a mediator of those relationships,
such that there were no longer direct associations between the
independent variables and PSB. The model was valid for both
included and excluded individuals although there were two path
differences. First, rejection sensitivity only predicted anger in the
context of exclusion; this is consistent with previous reports that
rejection-sensitive individuals only react with anger when they
feel rejected (Downey et al., 2000; Levy et al., 2001; Luterek et al.,
2004). Second, there was a stronger association between collective
prosocial efficacy and trust in the context of inclusion. Individuals
who were confident in the ability of their group to act prosocially
trusted their partners more, particularly when they felt included
in the group. This provides some evidence, albeit weak, that
exclusion reduces trust (Twenge et al., 2007).
In line with previous studies (Eisenberg et al., 2002; Carlo
et al., 2003) we found that prosocialness was a direct determinant
of PSB and that individuals tend to behave in accordance with
their dispositions (Heider, 1958). Affiliation motivation was also
a direct predictor of PSB. The desire to maintain social contact
motivates individuals to behave in a prosocial and friendly way
in order to achieve affiliation (Baumeister and Leary, 1995;
Zaskodna et al., 2013).
There was evidence for all the hypothesized mediation
relationships except for the mediation of the relationship
between rejection sensitivity and PSB by affiliation motivation.
Nevertheless, the predictive model confirms that, as expected,
rejection sensitivity negatively predicted affiliation motivation
(Shipley and Veroff, 1958; Maner et al., 2010), which in turn was
a positive predictor of PSB (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; DeWall
and Richman, 2011; Zaskodna et al., 2013).
Prosocial self-efficacy mediated the association between
rejection sensitivity and collective prosocial efficacy. The more
sensitive individuals are to social rejection, the more likely they
are to feel rather incapable of PSB (Butler et al., 2007), and also
to feel that their group is relatively incapable of PSB (Fernández-
Ballesteros et al., 2002).
Anger runs as a mediator between three different links.
It mediated the relationship between rejection sensitivity and
trust; rejection sensitive individuals tend to report greater anger
(Downey et al., 2000; Levy et al., 2001) and in turn to have less
trust in others (Jones and George, 1998). Anger also mediated
the relationships between self- and collective prosocial efficacy
and trust. In other words when individuals feel that they or their
group are relatively incapable of PSB they tend to report greater
anger (Bandura, 2000; Valentino et al., 2009) and to trust their
interaction partners less (Jones and George, 1998).
Trust mediated two relationships. It was a partial mediator
of the prosocialness-affiliation motivation association. The more
individuals have a prosocial tendency, the more they trust others
(Nooteboom and Six, 2003), and in turn the more they wish
to affiliate with their group (Patrick et al., 1997), probably
because prosocial individuals tend to feel that others resemble
them, expect some reciprocity, and consequently trust them
(Levenson and Ruef, 1992) and wish to keep in contact with
them. Trust implies an expectation that others will operate with
goodwill and therefore motivates individuals to engage with
others thus producing a social orientation; trust also promotes
closeness which is the starting point for friendships (Welch
et al., 2005). It therefore seems logical that trust would increase
affiliation motivation (Green and Brock, 1998). Second, we
found that trust fully mediated the prosocial collective efficacy-
affiliationmotivation association; individuals who felt their group
was capable of PSB were more likely to trust group members
(Sapouna, 2010) and in turnmore motivated to affiliate with them
(Patrick et al., 1997).
Affiliation motivation mediated four different relationships.
It was a partial mediator of the prosocialness-PSB relationship.
As a personal trait that includes the tendency to take care of
others prosocialness (Caprara et al., 2000) obviously increases (1)
the desire for positive interaction with the others, i.e., affiliation
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 2001 | 150

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































motivation (Hill, 1987) and (2) PSB; this is consistent with
Eisenberg et al. (2002), Carlo et al. (2003) and with the theory
that individuals tend to behave in a way which is consistent with
their thoughts, beliefs and attitudes (Heider, 1958).
Affiliation motivation also mediated the associations between
prosocial efficacy—both self and collective—and PSB. Our results
showed that individuals who felt that they and their group were
highly capable of PSB were more motivated to affiliate with
others (Patrick et al., 1997), probably because perceiving oneself
or one’s group as prosocial motivates individuals to develop
positive interpersonal relationships and maintain social contacts.
A higher desire to maintain social contact in turn results in
more PSB, probably because, as Baumeister and Leary (1995) and
Zaskodna et al. (2013) argued, individuals with high affiliation
motivation behave in a friendly way in order to maintain social
contact and avoid exclusion.
Affiliation motivation also mediated the relationship between
trust and PSB. Trusting individuals were more likely to desire
social contact (Patrick et al., 1997) and in turn more likely to
engage in PSB (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Zaskodna et al.,
2013).
Note that the mediation analyses indicated that two variables,
prosocialness and affiliation motivation, were direct predictors of
PSB. In addition path analysis confirmed the direct and indirect
predictive relationships detected in the mediation analyses.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The validity of our model in the contexts of inclusion and
exclusion indicates that psychosocial interventions designed to
foster prosocialness, individual and collective prosocial efficacy,
trust and affiliation motivation, as well as interventions to
decrease negative affect, have the potential to promote PSB
in both excluded and included individuals. The differences
in relationships in the two contexts suggest, moreover, that
psychosocial interventions could be used to (1) mitigate the
negative impact of rejection sensitivity, especially in individuals
who feel ostracized and (2) increase trust, especially in excluded
individuals.
Affiliation motivation is possibly the most interesting of the
mediators we identified. In Study 1 we demonstrated that trust
tends to engender PSB, whilst in Study 2 we demonstrated that
this relationship was mediated by affiliation motivation. It is
possible that trust enhances the probability that someone will act
prosocially (Rotenberg et al., 2005) precisely because it enhances
intrinsic motivation to affiliate (Parks et al., 1996; Green and
Brock, 1998). This might explain why Twenge et al. (2007) failed
to show that trust mediated the effect on PSB—because affiliation
motivation mediates the trust-PSB relationship. We also found
that affiliation motivation mediated the relationship between PSB
and most of the predictor variables we investigated. This pattern
of results suggests that affiliation motivation may be a predictor
of PSB in both included and excluded individuals and it follows
that practitioners should take special care to enhance individuals’
affiliation motivation as a means of fostering PSB. In this context
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TABLE 5 | Type of mediation observed.
Hypotheses Direct Beta without Mediator Direct Beta with Mediator Indirect Beta
H1: RS → PS self-efficacy → collective PS efficacy −0.10 (ns) −0.07 (ns) −0.03∗
H2a: RS → anger → trust −0.03 (ns) 0.07 (ns) −0.10∗∗
H2b: PS self-efficacy → anger → trust 0.10 (ns) 0.08 (ns) 0.14∗
H2c: collective PS efficacy → anger → trust 0.64∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
H3a: PSness → trust → SAM 0.25∗∗ 0.16∗ 0.09∗∗
H3b: collective PS efficacy → trust → SAM 0.49∗∗∗ 0.08 (ns) 0.33∗∗∗
H4a: PSness → SAM → PSB 0.26∗∗ 0.20∗ 0.05∗∗
H4b: RS → SAM → PSB 0.14 (ns) 0.13 (ns) 0.02 (ns)
H4c: PS self-efficacy → SAM → PSB 0.19∗ 0.12 (ns) 0.06∗∗
H4d: collective PS efficacy → SAM → PSB 0.06 (ns) −0.06 (ns) 0.12∗∗
H4e: Trust → SAM → PSB 0.13 (ns) −0.04 (ns) 0.17∗∗
Direct and indirect effects in proposed mediation relationships. PSness, prosocialness; RS, rejection sensitivity; PS self-efficacy, prosocial self-efficacy; collective PS
efficacy, collective prosocial efficacy; SAM, social affiliation motivation; PSB, prosocial behavior. The first column is a statement of the mediation hypothesis. The second
column presents the regression weight for the direct association between the independent variable (IV) and the dependent variable (DV) before controlling for the effects
of the putative mediator (M). The third column presents an estimate of the standardized direct effect of the IV on the DV after controlling for the effects of the putative M.
The fourth column presents an estimate of the standardized indirect effect of the IV on the DV after controlling for the effects of the putative M in bootstrapping analysis.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
we suggest that it would be useful to promote broad, strong social
networks.
Limitations and Future Directions
Although this study has implications for our understanding
of the psychosocial determinants of PSB it is important to
highlight its limitations. The data for both studies were from
a student sample with a majority of women so care must
be exercised in interpreting the findings and they may not
generalize to the wider population. There is no reason to believe,
however, that relationships investigated in these studies would
be different in the student and general populations. It would
nevertheless be interesting to replicate this study in a larger
sample that was representative of the general population; such
a study would allow the investigation of potential sex and age
effects.
In these studies the possible interactions were limited;
participants were members of a group of (fictitious) strangers
and all interactions took place online. We also cannot be
sure that the Cyberball task represents a good proxy for real
world inclusion and exclusion contexts. For these reasons our
results may not generalize to genuine personal relationships
and real world social exclusion. In this context it is relevant
that humans tend to act for the benefit of close relations
(Olson and Spelke, 2008; IJzerman et al., 2015). Iannone
et al. (2014) showed that being excluded by two people
who were stranger to each other made participants feel
worse than being excluded by two people who were friends
with each other. We also note that whilst laboratory studies
have shown that exclusion at the hands of an out-group is
painful (Williams et al., 2000; Smith and Williams, 2004),
even if the out-group is despised (Gonsalkorale and Williams,
2007), a study of real life exclusion showed that rejection
by people to whom one feels close is more painful that
rejection by strangers or acquaintances (Nezlek et al., 2012).
Future research should investigate how the relationships we
have identified are influenced by the ecological validity of the
exclusion manipulation and the strength of the social relationship
between an individual and the group which excludes him or
her.
Similarly, we can wonder about the external validity of
the PSB measure, and whether the prisoner’s dilemma game
is useful in thinking about real world situations. Note that
different studies have corroborated the external validity of the
public good games (Franzen and Pointner, 2013; Stoop, 2014;
Goeschl et al., 2015; Rommel et al., 2015). In a recent study,
Franzen and Pointner (2013) have demonstrated that in lab
behavior is related to PSB in the field—these authors used
a measure of PSB with a dilemma game similar to the one
we have used in this experiment. Moreover, recently Goeschl
et al. (2015) have shown that the prisoner’s dilemma game
is related to PSB (giving money to reduce CO2 emissions)
in the field. Thus, research is showing some evidences of
external validity of the prisoner’s dilemma game, and there is
no reason to believe that the measure used in this experiment
to assess PSB (the prisoner’s dilemma game) does not have
ecological validity. Nevertheless, it would be interesting in future
research to analyze the applicability of the game to the real
world.
Another potential limitation is that our outcome variable
was related to the winning or sharing of a monetary reward
whilst PSB encompasses a wider spectrum of interpersonal
interactions and behaviors (Weinstein and Ryan, 2010). In future
research it would be interesting to measure a broader range
of PSB, including helping behavior, altruism, cooperation, and
solidarity as well as the sharing of resources (Weinstein and Ryan,
2010).
CONCLUSION
As all the variables we investigated were related to
PSB practical interventions to increase PSB should be
designed to (1) promote a more prosocial disposition,
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encourage individuals to perceive themselves as capable
of PSB, encourage trust in others and increase affiliation
motivation and (2) work on negative feelings and
on the tendency to dread rejection to reduce their
negative impact on PSB. Romero-Canyas et al. (2010a),
suggested that the vicious cycle involving rejection
sensitivity and exclusion could be interrupted by promoting
general self-regulatory skills and experiencing supportive
relationships; we suggest that a similar strategy could
be used to promote the motivational determinant of
PSB.
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